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Abstract
Japan’s existing pharmaceutical industry was devastated in the Second World War. But 
the industry recovered quickly, and in 1963, Japan had become the second largest 
producer of pharmaceuticals after the United States. Unlike its automobile or 
electronics industries, however, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry did not become a 
global leader. Japan remains a net importer of pharmaceuticals and few Japanese drugs 
are found outside of Japan. The global pharmaceutical industry is led by firms from the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, rather than those from Japan.
This thesis traces the development of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry after 1945, 
and offers several explanations for why it did not become a world-leading industry. It 
uses two classes of medicines, antibiotics and anti-cancer drugs, as case studies for 
exploring the overall history of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. These case 
studies were selected because of their importance to health outcomes in post-war 
Japan. In the immediate post-war period, the leading causes of death in Japan were 
infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, but in later decades, cancer morbidity and 
mortality rose. Japan was found to be much more successful at developing antibiotics 
than anticancer drugs.
This thesis shows that, while the Japanese pharmaceutical industry had caught up with 
its Western counterparts by the mid 1970s, it did not exploit its potential to become a 
global leader. A few of Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firms did develop blockbuster
3
drugs and expand overseas, but most firms remained domestically oriented. The major 
reasons why Japan did not develop a strong pharmaceutical industry lay in the lack of 
R&D incentives, the government’s protectionist policies, industrial structure, and 
Japanese medical culture. Other reasons of secondary importance included the 
industry’s historical origins in import houses, national differences in patterns of 
disease, Japan-specific drug standards, and barriers to entrepreneurship among 
university academics.
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Conventions
This thesis uses the modified Hepburn system of romanisation, which follows 
Kenkyusha’s New Japanese-English Dictionary (3rd and later editions). Macrons are 
used to indicate long vowels, except for terms or phrases commonly anglicised such 
as Tokyo or shogun. Macrons are not used for Japanese pharmaceutical firms as 
these are generally anglicised, or for referencing Japanese names if these were not 
used in the original English language work.
Names are presented in Western order, with given name first, followed by surname.
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1 Introduction
In 1945, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry lay in ruins, devastated by the Allied 
bombings and the collapse of the Japanese economy. Most of the facilities for the 
production of pharmaceuticals were out of operation. In any event, few Japanese 
citizens had the financial capacity to purchase medicine. Moreover, Japan’s pre-war 
industry had not been very large, at least in comparison with the pharmaceutical 
industries of the more advanced Western countries. In the late 1940s, however, the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry began to re-emerge with the aid of the American 
Occupation authorities. American scientists provided their Japanese counterparts with 
the materials and guidance needed to produce the first antibiotic, penicillin. By 1948, 
Japan was self-sufficient in penicillin.
The penicillin venture during the Occupation period formed the foundations of Japan’s 
post-war pharmaceutical industry. In subsequent years, Japanese pharmaceutical firms 
diversified into other types of medicines. As Japan evolved into a developed economy, 
pharmaceutical firms shifted from producing medicines to treat diseases of poverty to 
those that treated diseases of affluence. The phenomenal growth of the Japanese 
economy was accompanied by a similar expansion of the pharmaceutical market. 
Japan has been the second largest pharmaceutical market in the world since 1963.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese government fostered the growth of the 
pharmaceutical industry. The government encouraged Japanese firms to acquire 
foreign technologies, sheltered firms from foreign competition, and subsidised
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patients who purchased prescription medicines.1 As Japan’s intellectual property 
regime until 1975 allowed firms to imitate foreign drugs, Japanese firms developed 
their industry by borrowing and modestly improving upon foreign technologies.
In the mid 1970s, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry opened up to the entry of 
foreign pharmaceutical firms and became more research oriented. In 1975, the 
government lifted restrictions on foreign direct investment in the pharmaceutical 
industry, invited foreign firms to expand business in Japan, and exposed Japanese 
firms to greater competition. In the following year, Japan’s intellectual property 
regime was changed to discourage firms from launching copies of existing medicines 
and began to protect the discoveries of innovative drugs. Japanese firms began to 
increase their investments in pharmaceutical R&D to develop original drugs. In the 
1980s, the Japanese authorities further deregulated the market under pressure from the 
United States and Europe.
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was transformed in the 1990s, as firms intensified 
their R&D orientation, expanded overseas, and rationalised and restructured their 
operations. The harmonisation of Japanese pharmaceutical regulations with those of 
the United States and Europe changed market dynamics, as Japanese drugs were now 
recognised abroad and vice versa. This led to an influx of foreign firms in Japan, and to 
a rise in the number of Japanese firms operating overseas. This move to globalise was 
not just prompted by a search for larger markets. Japanese firms also hoped to obtain
1 This thesis refers to the pharmaceutical industry in terms of the prescription drugs industry. Prescription drugs refer to 
medication that can be purchased with a physician’s prescription.
quicker drug approvals that were possible in countries such as the United States. As the 
costs of R&D began to escalate in step with advances in science and technology, the 
industry began to experience an unprecedented period of reorganisation.
Despite its remarkable growth since 1945, however, the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry has not become a world-leading industry. Japan has continued to be a net 
importer of pharmaceuticals, and Japanese pharmaceutical firms are much smaller and 
invest much less in R&D compared to their counterparts in the United States and 
Europe. Few Japanese firms have launched global blockbuster drugs. Some Western 
observers in the 1980s predicted that Japanese pharmaceutical firms would penetrate 
global markets and achieve successes similar to Japanese automobile and consumer 
electronics firms. While it is true that a handful of Japanese pharmaceutical firms, such 
as Takeda and Daiichi Sankyo, have become global players, the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry has remained relatively weak. Japan’s leading pharmaceutical 
firms have a smaller workforce, invest less in R&D, and record much lower sales 
compared to the leading global firms.
The experience of the pharmaceutical industry illuminates the paradox of Japan’s dual 
economy. Japan has an internationally competitive tier of export industries, such as 
carmakers and electronics, which coexist with non-competitive industries such as 
aluminium and food processing. While the Japanese pharmaceutical industry straddles 
these two tiers, most firms exist in the second tier. Compared to many of the country’s 
stronger industries, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry has been characterised by a
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domestic orientation, heavy reliance on imports, and small to medium sized firms. 
These phenomena require historical explanation.
In this thesis, I explain why Japan was unable to develop a globally competitive 
pharmaceutical industry, despite its success in developing other high technology 
industries. No single factor explains why the Japanese pharmaceutical industry did not 
become an export-oriented or world-leading industry. I consider a number of factors, 
including government policy, industrial structure, and medical culture, that influenced 
industrial development. I aim to provide a comprehensive, multifactorial explanation 
for the relative weakness of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry.
My study of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry speaks to several broader themes in 
Japanese economic history. It addresses the role of the state in late economic 
development and the paradox of Japan’s dual economy. I also examine whether the 
features of Japanese capitalism are conducive to the growth of a high technology 
industry such as pharmaceuticals. The thesis also shows how Japanese firms have 
responded to changes in intellectual property regimes and to the recent pressures of 
deregulation and globalisation.
The pharmaceutical industry is an important field of study in its own right. Most 
developed economies spend a substantial amount on health care and on medicines. In 
2005, for example, OECD countries spent an average 8.9% of GDP on health care, of
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which 13.8% was spent on prescription drugs.2 In Japan, health care spending 
accounted for 8.2% of GDP, of which 17.0% was spent on prescription drugs.3 
Moreover, therapeutic discoveries launched by pharmaceutical firms have 
revolutionised health standards and contributed significantly to economic 
development and social welfare.
Historical works on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry
The Japanese pharmaceutical industry is an important topic, but very little has been 
written on its history in either English or Japanese. The existing literature is largely 
confined to company histories written by company employees. Takeda, Daiichi 
Sankyo and Astellas and other leading Japanese pharmaceutical firms have published 
such histories.4 The in-house company histories are academically useful, as they 
provide chronologies of firms and other factual information. But they do not engage in 
rigorous analysis. The Japan Society for the History of Pharmacy published a history 
of the industry in the mid 1990s.5 Similar to the company histories, however, this work 
was more descriptive than analytical. A recent volume by Takashi Nishikawa provided 
an account of how the foundations of the post-war pharmaceutical industry were
2 Average calculated from Organisation for Economic, Co-operation, and Development, OECD Health Data 2008: Statistics and 
Indicators fo r  30 Countries (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008) in SourceOECD, 
http:www.sourceoecd.org. It should be noted that the methods used to calculate figures vary according to country. In addition, 
figures for prescription drug expenditures as a percentage of total health care expenditures are not available for all OECD 
countries. The average has therefore been calculated based on available figures.
3 Ibid.
4 See for example, Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 200-nen [200 Years of Takeda] (Osaka: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 
1984); Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 90-nenshi [Daiichi Pharmaceutical, a 90 Year History] (Tokyo: Daiichi 
Pharmaceutical Co., 2007); Sankyo Co., Sankyo 100-nenshi [Sankyo, a 100 year History] (Tokyo: Sankyo Co., 1999); Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., Fujisawa Yakuhin 100-nenshi [Fujisawa Pharmaceutical, a 100 Year History] (Osaka: Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., 1995); Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Yamanouchi Seiyaku 50-nenshi [Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical, a 
100 Year History] (Tokyo: Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., 1975). Daiichi Sankyo and Astellas were both formed in 2005 as a 
merger between Daiichi and Sankyo, and Fujisawa and Yamanouchi, respectively.
s Nihon Yakushi Gakkai, Nihon Iyakuhin Sangydshi [The History o f the Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakuji 
NippSsha, 1995).
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created during the Occupation period.6 But such works are few in number.
In contrast, the histories of the pharmaceutical industries of other industrialised
countries have been the subject of extensive research. These include both in-house and
scholarly company histories. There are also histories of pharmaceutical industries
written of single countries and cross-country comparative histories of the
pharmaceutical industry.
Most of the leading global pharmaceutical firms have published company histories.
Commissioned works include those by R. R T. Davenport-Hines, Judy Slinn, and
Edgar Jones and John Savage on Glaxo, as well as Edmund Pratt and Jeffrey Rodengen 
on Pfizer.7 There are also scholarly studies of individual pharmaceutical firms. Louis
Galambos’s recent work on the history of Merck, for example, demonstrated the
importance of networks in technological innovation. Galambos’s study is widely
o
respected in business history.
In addition to company histories, there are histories of pharmaceutical industries in a
single country. These include works such as The British Pharmaceutical Industry since 
1851 by T.A.B. Corley.9 In The Rise o f  Drug Manufacture in America, Glenn
6 Takashi Nishikawa, Kusuri Kara Mita Nihon; Shawa 20-nendai no Genfukei to Konnichi [Looking at Japan from “Medicine”: 
Scenes from the 1940s to the Present] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 2004).
7 R. P. T. Davenport-Hines and Judy Slinn, Glaxo: A History to 1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Edgar 
Jones and John Savage, The Business o f  Medicine: The Extraordinary History o f  Glaxo, a  Baby Food Producer, which Became 
One o f  the World's Most Successful Pharmaceutical Companies (London: Profile, 2001). See also, Edmund T. Pratt, Pfizer: 
Bringing Science to Life (New York: Newcomen Society of the United States, 1985); Jeffrey L. Rodengen, The Legend o f Pfizer 
(Fort Lauderdale: Write Stuff Syndicate, Inc., 1999).
* Louis Galambos and Jane Eliot Sewell, Networks o f Innovation: Vaccine Development at Merck, Sharp & Dohme, and Mulford, 
1895-1995 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
9 T. A. B. Corley, “The British Pharmaceutical Industry since 1851,” University of Reading Department of Economics, Working 
Paper No. 404,1999.
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Sonnedecker showed how the American industry was transformed from the small
t l ihandicraft enterprises that existed in the late 18 century to the large, bureaucratised, 
and mechanised businesses in the early 20th century.10 Tom Mahoney also wrote on the
rise of the early American pharmaceutical industry through the developments of new 
therapies at major firms such as Eli Lilly, Squibb, and Wyeth.11
These histories of national pharmaceutical industries have been complemented by
cross-country comparative histories. For example, Jonathan Liebenau showed how
differences in medical science and practice impacted the development of 
pharmaceutical industries in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.12
Lacy Glenn Thomas illustrated how British policies strengthened the competitiveness 
of the British industry over the French.13
A recent work by Alfred Chandler examined the development of the American and 
European pharmaceutical and chemical industries.14 Chandler discussed the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry in several paragraphs, but his treatment of the topic was
cursory and focussed on the partnerships between Japanese and American firms such
10 Glenn Sonnedecker, The Rise o f  Drug Manufacture in America (Atlanta: Emory University, 1965). Sonnedecker illustrated 
how, for example, industrialisation and scientific advances in organic chemistry, bacteriology, and pharmacology shaped drug 
manufacture in the United States.
11 Tom Mahoney, The Merchants o f  Life: An Account o f  the American Pharmaceutical Industry (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1959).
12 Jonathan Liebenau, “Industrial R&D in Pharmaceutical Firms in the Early Twentieth Century,” Business History 26, no. 3 
(November 1984): 329-346. Liebenau has also written other cross-country histories of the pharmaceutical industry. See for 
example, Jonathan Liebenau, “Ethical Business: The Formation of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Britain, Germany, and the 
United States before 1914,” Business History 30, no. 1 (January 1988): 116-129.
13 Lacy Glenn Thomas, “Implicit Industrial Policy: The Triumph o f Britain and the Failure o f France in Global Pharmaceuticals,” 
Industrial and Corporate Change 3, no. 2 (1994): 451-489. Other works by Thomas also emphasise the role of industrial policy in 
shaping the pharmaceutical industry. See for example, Lacy Glenn Thomas, “Spare the Rod and Spoil the Industry: Vigorous 
Competition and Vigorous Regulation Promote Global Competitive Advantage,” First Boston Working Paper Series 90-03,1990.
14 Alfred D. Chandler, Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story o f the M odem Chemical and Pharmaceutical 
Industries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 200,237. Passing referenes to Japan are made on pages 189-190,200, 
237,270-271, and 273-274.
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as Takeda and Abbott, or Kirin Brewery and Amgen. Chandler noted that the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry did not become a global player like its consumer electronics 
industry because of “barriers to entry.” Observing the difference between the strengths 
of Japan’s consumer electronics industry and the weakness of its pharmaceutical and 
chemical industry, Chandler argued that it was the timing of Japan’s entry into these 
markets that dictated the different outcomes.
Chandler observed that the chemical and pharmaceutical industry emerged in the late
i,L
19 century, whereas the consumer electronics industry emerged much later, in the 
mid 20th century. He explained that when Japanese consumer electronic firms began to 
export in the post-war period, it was relatively easy for new entrants to penetrate global 
markets because the consumer electronics industry itself was young. In contrast, 
Japanese pharmaceutical firms were unable to enter the markets dominated by the 
long-established European and American companies since the 1970s and 1980s.15
The question of timing identified by Chandler helps to explain why the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry did not become a global leader, but it is not the only reason. 
Chandler argues that Japan’s success in consumer electronics and relative weakness in 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals “cannot be explained in terms of national culture, 
national political processes and institutions, or national educational institutions.”16 In 
this thesis, I argue that some of these factors did play a significant role in shaping 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. Chandler’s work tends to overlook important issues
15 Ibid., 3-6.
16 Ibid, 5.
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such as the role of state-industry relations in the pharmaceutical industry, the role of 
smaller-sized firms in pharmaceutical innovation, and the role of culture in shaping 
industrial development.
The historical literature on the pharmaceutical industry has focussed on a number of 
themes, such as science and innovation, drug regulation, and the links between 
academic and industrial research. For example, Alfonso Gambardella wrote on the 
impact of technological advances on industrial structure, while Peter Temin wrote on
1 7the motivations and implications of American drug regulation. Others such as John 
Patrick Swann, Jeffrey L. Furman and Megan J. MacGarvie examined the American
1 fthistory of cooperative research between universities and the pharmaceutical industry. 
This thesis engages with these themes and attempts to link the Japanese experience 
with the growing body of literature on the history of the pharmaceutical industry in 
other countries.
Non-historical works on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry 
While the historical literature on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry remains sparse, 
a number of non-historians have examined the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. The 
volume of non-historical literature on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry has
17 Alfonso Gambardella, Science and Innovation: The US Pharmaceutical Industry During the 1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); Peter Temin, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980). See also, Peter Temin, “Technology, Regulation, and Market Structure in the Modem Pharmaceutical 
Industry,” The Bell Journal o f  Economics 10, no. 2 (1979): 429-446.
18 John Patrick Swann, “Universities, Industry, and the Rise of Biomedical Collaboration in America,” in Pill Peddlers: Essays on 
the History o f  the Pharmaceutical Industry, eds. Jonathan Liebenau, Gregory J. Higby, Elaine C. Stroud (Madison: American 
Institute o f the History o f Pharmacy, 1990), 73-90; Jeffrey L. Furman and Megan J. MacGarvie, “Early Academic Science and the 
Birth o f  Industrial Research Laboratories in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,” Journal ofEconomic Behavior & Organization 63 
(2007): 756-776.
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burgeoned in step with the industry’s dramatic transformation since the 1990s.19 Much 
of this recent literature has been written from the perspective of political economy, and 
has emphasised issues such as industrial policy, R&D incentives, and international 
competitiveness.
Scholars of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry differ in their assessments of Japan’s 
performance in the pharmaceutical industry. Some emphasize the weakness of the 
industry relative to its foreign counterparts, while others stress its phenomenal growth 
over the post war period. Another group of scholars occupies a middle ground. It 
should be noted that these assessments are situated along a continuum. As well, some 
scholars may differ in their assessments, but share similar views on specific issues.
A particularly negative view of the industry has been put forth by Lacy Glenn Thomas. 
Thomas argued that the Japanese pharmaceutical industry was dysfunctional, and 
explored its “pathologies,” such as short product life, imitative drug development, 
uncompetitive firms, and foreign exclusion. Thomas argued that the weak 
performance of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry was the outcome of flawed
*y(\
industrial policy. While Thomas does situate his analysis in a larger social context, 
his explanation for the weakness of the industry is overly simplistic. Thomas’s account
19 Past scholarship on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry revolved around topical issues o f the time. Over the years, these have 
evolved from writings on capital liberalisation and product patents to R&D, deregulation and industry reorganisation. Recent 
works include, for example, Shin’ichi Ishii, “KigyO no Gaiburenkei ni taisuru Ninshiki to Gaiburenkei no Jisshi: Sangakurenkei to 
Iyakuhin KigyO o Chushin to Shita Hikakubunseki [The Perception and Reality o f External Collaborations: A Comparative 
Analysis o f University-Industry Collaborations in the Pharmaceutical Industry],” Keiei Kenkyu 53, no. 3 (2002): 205-217; Takuji 
Hara, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Process o f  Drug Discovery and Development (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2003); Ryuhei Wakasugi and Harue Wakasugi, “Iyakuhin no Kenkyu Kaihatsu to HOseido [Pharmaceutical R&D and the Legal 
System],” Mitagakkai Zasshi 99, no. 1 (April 2006): 57-74.
20 Lacy Glenn Thomas, The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry: The New Drug Lag and the Failure o f  Industrial Policy 
(Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2001).
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tends to be overly politicised, and he does not fully consider the impact, for example, 
of national differences in patterns of disease, culturally distinct approaches to medical 
therapy, or the lack of entrepreneurship among Japanese firms.
While softer in tone, Jeremy Howells and Ian Neary also adopted a pessimistic view,
and stated that the Japanese pharmaceutical industry suffered from “distant, controlled,
0 1and reactive” government administration. Howells and Neary studied how 
government industry relations shaped the UK and Japanese pharmaceutical industries. 
They offered valuable insight into how government industry relations were influenced 
by a complex combination of factors, including industrial structure, the international 
orientation of industry, the domestic policy-making process, and external pressures 
from foreign governments or industrial associations. In his study of the biotechnology 
sector, Stephen Collins also argued that the Japanese bureaucracy was far less coherent 
and effective in its planning, with much less presence than that of the United States.22
Other academics have provided a more positive assessment of the industry. Hiroyuki 
Odagiri’s optimistic depiction of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry was much the 
opposite of the account given by Thomas. While Odagiri acknowledged that the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry lagged behind its US and European counterparts, his 
emphasis was on the industry’s accomplishments. He argued that the industry’s growth 
was achieved through the entrepreneurial initiative of firms that adopted Western
21 Jeremy Howells and Ian Neary, Intervention and Technological Innovation: Government and the Pharmaceutical Industry in 
the UK and Japan (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
22 Steven W. Collins, The Race to Commercialize Biotechnology: Molecules, Markets, and the State in the United States and 
Japan (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
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technologies, pursued their own innovations, and transformed their business in 
response to evolving market conditions.23 But Odagiri’s work is slightly one-sided. He 
does not elaborate upon why, for example, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry did not 
become an export-oriented industry.
A middle ground has been established by authors such as Tomofumi Anegawa and 
Michael Reich. These scholars do, however, lean toward a negative assessment of the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry. Anegawa argued that the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry succeeded in achieving phenomenal growth and contributing to the country’s 
vast improvements in public health. But as the government failed to implement timely 
policies and as firms failed to seek market opportunities abroad, the industry remained 
dependent on the domestic market -  comprised of firms that were smaller, less 
profitable, and less R&D intensive compared to its foreign rivals. Reich argued that the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry was shaped by a combination of public policies, 
often through indirect and unintentional means. While acknowledging that the 
industry was domestically oriented, Reich argued that the industry’s globalisation had 
been led by the entrepreneurship among Japanese firms.
Both Anegawa and Reich argued that while earlier government policies were effective 
in nurturing the pharmaceutical sector, the government persisted with these policies 
when they were no longer appropriate.24 In their view, the Japanese pharmaceutical
23 Hiroyuki Odagiri and Akira Goto, Technology and Industrial Development in Japan: Building Capabilities by Learning, 
Innovation, and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
24 Michael Reich, “Why the Japanese Don't Export More Pharmaceuticals: Health Policy as Industrial Policy,” California 
Management Review 32, no. 2 (1990): 124-150; Tomofumi Anegawa, “Sangyo Seisaku to shite no Seiko to Kisei Seisaku to shite
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industry developed a strong capacity for innovation.25 But the government failed to 
shift and update its policies to encourage the transition to a more mature 
pharmaceutical industry based on scientific innovation rather than the volume 
production of imitative products. Scholars such as Anegawa and Reich argued that the 
delayed shift in policymaking weakened the industry’s ability to respond to changes in 
the market and compete with leading global pharmaceutical firms.
While Reich elaborates upon the combined effects of health and industrial policy, his 
overemphasis on policy downplays the significance of other factors in the shaping of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. He does not, for example, sufficiently address the 
impact of industrial structure, Japan’s medical infrastructure, or the lack of initiative 
among Japanese firms to expand into overseas markets. Anegawa provides an 
excellent account on how government policy, as well as lack of entrepreneurship, has 
affected Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. But he neglects to address the impact of 
medical culture or the R&D environment in contributing to the relative weakness of 
the Japanese industry. This thesis attempts to address these issues.
The conclusions of this thesis largely support the views outlined by Anegawa and 
Reich. It also provides different explanations for the performance of the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry. While the government’s health and industrial policies did
no Shippai [The Success of Industrial Policy and Failure of Regulatory Policy],” Doraggu Magajin 43 (July 2000): 78-88; 
Tomofiimi Anegawa, “Nihon no Iyakuhin Sangyo: Sono Seiko to Shippai [The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry: Its Success and 
Failure],” lryo to Shakai 12, no. 2 (2002): 49-78. See also, Robert Neimeth, “Japan's Pharmaceutical Industry Postwar Evolution,” 
in The Changing Economics o f  Medical Technology, eds. Annetine Gelijns and Ethan A. Halm, Committee on Technological 
Innovation in Medicine, Institute of Medicine (Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 1991), 155-168.
2S This view was echoed in other works, such as Elma S. Hawkins and Michael R. Reich, “Japanese-originated Pharmaceutical 
Products in the United States from 1960 to 1989: An Assessment of Innovation,” Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 51 
(January 1992): 1-11.
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undermine its potentials for growth, the underperformance of Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry was also due to multiple other factors.
On Japanese industrial policy
This thesis engages with the debate on the role of Japanese industrial policy in 
explaining post-war economic growth. One viewpoint, often associated with Chalmers 
Johnson, has argued that a strong and interventionist state was responsible for Japan’s 
success. Johnson argued that a state-directed capitalism orchestrated primarily by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) played a central role in guiding 
Japan’s post-war economic development. But Johnson’s argument was problematic 
for oversimplifying and exaggerating the role of the MITI. He tended to overlook 
MITI’s failures in industries such as aluminium and petrochemicals, and understated 
the importance of various other factors ranging from Japanese management styles to 
collectivist culture.
Scholars such as Daniel Okimoto have expanded upon Johnson’s view, and have 
argued that the relative effectiveness of Japanese industrial policy was supported by 
other factors, such as the long-standing dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party in 
the Japanese Diet, the relative weakness of labour based political parties, low military 
expenditures, and a sizeable homogeneous population. But Okimoto did not address
26 Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f  Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1982). The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, established in 1949, became the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI) in 2001. This thesis refers to the ministry o f industry as the Ministry o f International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) as the entity that governed Japanese industries for most of the post-war period.
27 Daniel I. Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy fo r  High Technology (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989). For other similar views, see for example, T. J. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative 
Conservatism, Policy and Politics in Industrial States (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982); John Zysman, Governments,
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the role of government policy on the pharmaceutical industry.
The view that industrial policy played a central role in Japanese economic 
development has been challenged by scholars such as Hugh Patrick and Phillip Trezise, 
who argued that the drive and momentum of growth lay outside the realm of the 
state.28 Proponents of this market-regulation thesis have asserted that Japan’s 
economic development occurred through the growth of factor inputs, the dynamism of 
the private sector, improved education, and amicable labour-management relations. 
Other scholars provided alternative reasons for Japan’s so-called economic miracle. 
David Friedman, for example, argued that Japanese economic development occurred
via small-scale firms that developed flexible manufacturing strategies, which featured
• OQextensive and continuous product changes.
In debating the role of industrial policy on Japan’s post-war economic development,
both Johnson’s proponents and his critics referred mostly to the industries that were
regulated by the MITI. The Japanese pharmaceutical industry is an exception in that it
came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), a 
bureaucracy with different priorities in policy. This thesis examines an industry that
M a r k e t s  a n d  G r o w t h :  F i n a n c i a l  S y s t e m s  a n d  t h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  C h a n g e  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
28 Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, A s i a ' s  N e w  G i a n t :  H o w  t h e  J a p a n e s e  E c o n o m y  W o r k s  (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1976). See also, Phillip H. Trezise, “Industrial Policy is not the Major Reason for Japan's Success,” B r o o k i n g s  R e v i e w
t 1, no. 3 (1983): 13-18.
29 David Friedman, T h e  M i s u n d e r s t o o d  M i r a c l e :  I n d u s t r i a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  C h a n g e  i n  J a p a n  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988).
30 One scholar, Gary Saxonhouse did touch upon the role of industrial policy on the pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s. 
Saxonhouse argued that industrial policy did little in its development o f this industry, noting that the government extended few 
direct subsidies, R&D grants, or tax benefits toward industrial development. See Gary R. Saxonhouse, “Industrial Policy and 
Factor Markets: Biotechnology in Japan and the United States,” in J a p a n ' s  H i g h  T e c h n o l o g y  I n d u s t r i e s :  L e s s o n s  a n d  L i m i t a t i o n s  
o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P o l i c y , ed. Hugh Patrick (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1986), 97-133. The Ministry o f Health and 
Welfare, established in 1938, became the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) in 2001. This thesis refers to the 
ministry of health as the Ministry o f Health and Welfare (MHW) as the entity that governed the pharmaceutical industry for most 
of the post-war period.
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lay outside the jurisdiction of the MITI and expands the discussion on the role of 
Japanese government policy in industrial development. This thesis also challenges the 
notion that state intervention led to the development of strong industries, as MHW 
policies did not always result in industrial growth.
On late economic development
This thesis also builds upon the scholarship on late economic development. In the 
1960s, Alexander Gerschenkron introduced the concept of “relative backwardness,” 
and elaborated upon how late developing economies substituted for the missing 
prerequisites of economic modernisation through banks or state intervention. He also 
argued that different economies experienced different trajectories of growth according 
to their level of development.
Since then, the success of the East Asian economies and the struggles experienced by 
the Latin America and African economies have prompted further scholarship on late 
development. Many works have focussed on the role of the state in fostering the 
growth of the late developing economies. A recent work by Mauro Guillen suggested 
that countries experience both different paths and ends in development, and questioned 
the idea of convergence. Scholars writing on the experience of the East Asian 
economies, such as Alice Amsden, Ha Joon Chang, and Takashi Hikino, have 
discussed the role of a highly interventionist state in economic development. Works on
31 Alexander Gerschenkron, E c o n o m i c  B a c k w a r d n e s s  i n  H i s t o r i c a l  P e r s p e c t i v e :  A  B o o k  o f  E s s a y s  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962).
32 Mauro F. Guill6n, T h e  L i m i t s  o f  C o n v e r g e n c e :  G l o b a l i z a t i o n  a n d  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  C h a n g e  i n  A r g e n t i n a ,  S o u t h  K o r e a ,  a n d  S p a i n  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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the East Asian experience have also tended to emphasise how industrialisation often 
occurred through the borrowing of technologies from advanced nations, and how the 
pursuit of incremental innovations led to different forms of corporate organisation. 
Scholars of Latin America and Africa, such as Peter Evans or Robert H. Bates, have 
often considered the multiple reasons for policy failure and underdevelopment.33
This thesis relates these concepts on late development to the development of Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry. Compared to earlier developers, Japan experienced a 
different trajectory in creating a modem pharmaceutical industry. Over the decades, 
Japan developed its industry via a strong developmental state, the borrowing of 
technologies, and different forms of corporate organisation.
In studying the history of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry, this thesis also examines 
the challenges of late developing economies in developing a high technology sector. 
While scholars such as Amsden and Hikino have tended to refer to the state as au
monolithic entity, this thesis attempts to show how different roles of the state -  such as 
to promote industrial growth or improve public health -  came into conflict under 
different ministerial guidance. Moreover, few scholars have examined the evolution of 
pharmaceutical industries from the perspective of late development. This thesis 
engages in discussions over the speed of “catch-up” growth, the organisational
33 Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, “Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: Late Industrialization 
in Historical Perspective,” in C o n v e r g e n c e  o f  P r o d u c t i v i t y :  C r o s s - n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s  a n d  H i s t o r i c a l  E v i d e n c e ,  eds. William J. 
Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 285-315; Ha-Joon Chang, K i c k i n g  
A w a y  t h e  L a d d e r :  D e v e l o p m e n t  S t r a t e g y  i n  H i s t o r i c a l  P e r s p e c t i v e  (London: Anthem Press, 2002); Peter Evans, E m b e d d e d  
A u t o n o m y :  S t a t e s  a n d  I n d u s t r i a l  T r a n s f o r m a t i o n  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert H. Bates, M a r k e t s  a n d  
S t a t e s  i n  T r o p i c a l  A f r i c a :  T h e  P o l i t i c a l  B a s i s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  P o l i c i e s  (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005). See also, 
Alice H. Amsden, T h e  R i s e  o f  " T h e  R e s t " :  C h a l l e n g e s  t o  t h e  W e s t  F r o m  L a t e - i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  E c o n o m i e s  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).
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structure of industry, and the role of the state in guiding industrial development. It also 
elaborates upon alternative paths to development; particularly on how a late 
developing economy might catch up or surpass other economies in the newer, 
knowledge intensive industries, which are based on non-indigenous technologies.
On New Institutional Economics
This thesis also draws upon the insights of New Institutional Economics to examine 
how institutions shaped the history of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. Douglass 
North defined institutions as the "rules of the game," referring to the formal laws, 
informal conventions, and codes of behaviour that shape human interaction.34 
Proponents of New Institutional Economics such as Oliver Williamson and Avner 
Greif have attempted to move beyond the limitations of neoclassical economics to 
examine the role of legal, political, economic, and social institutions in economic 
performance.35
The literature on New Institutional Economics is particularly helpful in examining 
how Japan’s intellectual property regime impacted upon industrial development. The 
delayed adoption of product patents, for example, long discouraged firms from making 
high R&D investments to pursue breakthrough discoveries. The thesis also indicates 
how, at times, the lack of credible institutions -  such as in drug standards or drug
34 Douglass Cecil North, I n s t i t u t i o n s ,  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  C h a n g e  a n d  E c o n o m i c  P e r f o r m a n c e  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 3.
35 See for example, Oliver E. Williamson, M a r k e t s  a n d  H i e r a r c h i e s :  A n a l y s i s  a n d  A n t i t r u s t  I m p l i c a t i o n s  (New York: Free Press, 
1975); Avner Greif, I n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  t h e  P a t h  t o  t h e  M o d e m  E c o n o m y :  L e s s o n s  f r o m  M e d i e v a l  T r a d e ,  P o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y  o f  
I n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  D e c i s i o n s  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also, Ronald Coase, “The New Institutional 
Economics,” A E A  P a p e r s  a n d  P r o c e e d i n g s  8, no. 2 (May 1998): 72-74.
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approval criteria -  undermined the development of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry.
On the varieties of capitalism
Scholars writing on the varieties of capitalism have often distinguished the liberal 
market economies, such as Britain and the United States, from the more coordinated 
market economies, such as Germany and Japan.36 These works on the typologies of 
capitalism have given rise to discussions on convergence. Some scholars, such as
Susan Strange and Philip Cemy, have suggested that the pressures of globalisation and
' i n
deregulation would lead to the erosion of the differences between countries. On the
other hand, scholars, such as Vivien Schmidt, Peter A. Hall and David Soskice have
argued that the differences in political and economic institutions lead firms to generate 
divergent responses and outcomes -  and would limit convergence.
Japanese capitalism has been characterised by the long-term relationships of firms
with their employees, other firms, and government. These manifested during the high
growth rate period as distinct features of the Japanese economic system, such as 
lifetime employment, keiretsu relationships, and strong state-industry relations.39
Scholars of Japan have debated whether the distinctive features of Japanese capitalism
36 Ronald Philip Dore, S t o c k  M a r k e t  C a p i t a l i s m :  W e l f a r e  C a p i t a l i s m :  J a p a n  a n d  G e r m a n y  V e r s u s  t h e  A n g l o - S a x o n s  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000).
37 Susan Strange, T h e  R e t r e a t  o f  t h e  S t a t e :  T h e  D i f f u s i o n  o f  P o w e r  i n  t h e  W o r l d  E c o n o m y  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998; Philip G Cemy, “The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure, and Policy Response,” 
P o l i c y  S c i e n c e s  27, no. 4 (1994): 319-342.
38 Vivien Ann Schmidt, T h e  F u t u r e s  o f  E u r o p e a n  C a p i t a l i s m  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); David W. Soskice and 
Peter A. Hall, eds., V a r i e t i e s  o f  C a p i t a l i s m :  T h e  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  F o u n d a t i o n s  o f  C o m p a r a t i v e  A d v a n t a g e  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). Many scholars have written on this theme. See also, Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, P o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y  o f  
M o d e m  C a p i t a l i s m :  M a p p i n g  C o n v e r g e n c e  a n d  D i v e r s i t y  (London: Sage, 1997).
39 Keiretsu refers to a form of Japanese corporate organisation that featured prominently up to the 1990s, where associated 
member firms were generally centered around a main bank and held interlocking shares. Strong state-industry relations refer, for 
example, in the government’s promotion o f post-war industrial growth through industrial policies implemented via administrative 
guidance.
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have been responsible for the country’s economic stagnation since the 1990s. A related 
issue that has been discussed is whether -  or to what extent -  Japanese capitalism 
might converge with the Anglo-Saxon style of capitalism.
Some scholars have argued that the distinctive features of Japanese capitalism are an 
asset for Japan. For instance, Kozo Yamamura has argued that Japanese capitalism 
would enable the country to develop a strong high-technology sector as the pace of 
technological change slowed. Marie Anchordoguy, however, argued that the distinct 
features of Japanese capitalism became a disadvantage in the information technology 
age. She argued that Japan’s economic system could not respond quickly and flexibly 
to rapid, discontinuous, and unpredictable advances in science and technology or the 
increasing pressures of globalisation.40 Many viewed this as one of the main causes 
for Japan’s weak performance after the 1990s. Scholars such as Steven Vogel agreed 
that the Japanese model needed to change, but stressed the limits of convergence with 
American or British styles of capitalism.41 The experience of Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry largely supports this view, and illustrates that while Japanese capitalism was 
suitable for earlier phases of development, it was less suitable in more advanced 
phases of development.
This thesis studies how the specific features of Japanese capitalism, such as keiretsu 
structures and government policies, shaped Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. Japanese
40 Marie Anchordoguy, R e p r o g r a m m i n g  J a p a n :  T h e  H i g h  T e c h  C r i s i s  U n d e r  C o m m u n i t a r i a n  C a p i t a l i s m  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005).
41 Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, T h e  E n d  o f  D i v e r s i t y ? :  P r o s p e c t s  f o r  G e r m a n  a n d  J a p a n e s e  C a p i t a l i s m  (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003); Steven Kent Vogel, J a p a n  R e m o d e l e d :  H o w  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  I n d u s t r y  a r e  R e f o r m i n g  J a p a n e s e  
C a p i t a l i s m  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
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pharmaceutical manufacturers, for example, long maintained keiretsu relationships 
with pharmaceutical wholesalers rather than vertically integrating. Japanese firms also 
responded closely to changes in government policy. But in recent years, these features 
of Japanese capitalism have become less important for leading Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms that respond increasingly to American or European policies to 
expand into overseas markets. This thesis considers the extent to which Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry might converge with leading Western pharmaceutical firms as 
Japanese firms globalise.
Thesis objectives
This thesis aims to examine the historical causes for the relative weakness of Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry. Studying the weakness of this industry is important in 
developing a deeper understanding of the Japanese economy. This thesis advances 
several reasons, including government policy, industrial structure, and Japanese 
medical culture, to help explain the why Japan was not able to develop a globally 
competitive pharmaceutical industry.
It should be recognised that, in all developed countries, government policy plays a 
central role in the shaping of any pharmaceutical industry. Not only do national 
governments establish the legal definitions of pharmaceuticals, they grant approvals 
for each product launch. In addition, national governments monitor all operations 
beginning from pharmaceutical R&D, manufacturing, marketing, to pricing and 
distribution. In addition, a country’s intellectual property regime and its degree of
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protectionism impacts industrial development. Industrial organisation and medical 
culture also shape the development of a pharmaceutical industry. This is because firm 
size often dictates the type and size of R&D activity possible and medical culture can 
dictate the type of medicines in demand. Through the experience of the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry, this thesis seeks to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the Japanese economy.
Thesis methodology
My research uses two classes of medicines, antibiotics and anti-cancer drugs, as case 
studies for exploring the post 1945 history of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. As 
will be discussed below, my decision to adopt a medicines-based, rather than 
company-based approach stems, in part, from the availability of sources. But a. 
medicines-based approach is also useful, because it sheds light on the extent to which 
the development of the industry was shaped by health needs at a given time, the 
therapeutic attributes of certain medicines, and variations in approaches to medical 
treatment.
i
Demographic statistics indicate high mortality and morbidity rates from infectious 
disease during the early post-war period, and for diseases of affluence in the more 
recent period -  leading to high demand for drugs to treat these conditions. Infectious 
disease, particularly tuberculosis, were the leading cause of death in the years after 
World War II, while cancer has become the leading cause of death in Japan since
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1981.42 Given that antibiotics were important in the early post-war period and 
anticancer drugs became more important in subsequent decades, the two case studies 
encompass the entire post-war period. This thesis examines how Japanese industry 
responded to high demand conditions during earlier and later phases of the post-war 
era.
A case study of the antibiotics sector sheds light on the initial course of development in 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry -  alongside economic trends, demographic change 
and scientific/technological advances. In turn, a case study of the anti cancer drug 
sector illustrates how the industry evolved in later years, in step with revisions toward 
stricter regulatory guidelines for drug development, advances in drug discovery 
methods, and globalisation. This approach also reveals how differences in therapeutic 
attributes, as well as differences between older and newer drugs, influence market 
dynamics.43
There are other reasons why a case study of the antibiotics sector and anticancer drug 
sector will be helpful in examining the historical dynamics of Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry. Both sectors are large: Japan’s antibiotics and anticancer drug markets 
remain the second largest in the world.44 As the most produced and exported 
pharmaceuticals in Japan for much of the post-war era, the antibiotics sector provides 
an ideal forum to examine the acquisition of production as well as export capacities in
42 Ministry o f Health, Labour and Welfare, “Deaths by Leading Cause of Death” Population and Households,” 
http://www.stat.go.ip/english/data/chouki/02.htm. (accessed 1 December 2007).
43 For example, market dynamics differ markedly between chronic and acute ailments.
44 Datamonitor, “Japan -  Antibacterial Drugs,” I n d u s t r y  P r o f i l e  (London: Datamonitor, 2002); Datamonitor, “Japan -  Cancer 
drugs,” I n d u s t r y  P r o f i l e  (London: Datamonitor, 2002).
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the pharmaceutical industry. As Japanese pharmaceutical firms have launched globally 
successful drugs in both sectors, a case study of antibiotics and anticancer drugs in 
Japan will also shed valuable insight into evolution of pharmaceutical innovation in 
Japan.
This thesis has selected different therapeutic sectors, rather than firms, to study the 
history of the pharmaceutical industry. As mentioned earlier, adopting an 
industry-level perspective and examining different therapeutic sectors was partly due 
to the availability of sources. The adoption of an industry-level approach stems from 
the lack of firm-level data available over the entire 1945 period. Opting for a 
firm-based approach would also have required access to company archives. But access 
to company archives has been notoriously difficult in the pharmaceutical industry. 
While a more in-depth case study of individual pharmaceutical firms through company 
archives might have provided a more insight into the motivations behind firm 
behaviour, I have tried to supplement this by examining the experiences of several 
firms through publicly available documents. These include scientific journals, 
newspaper and magazine articles, trade journals and company security filings -  as well 
as company histories.
While the types of information available in these sources were adequate enough to 
followThe drug development at individual firms, in many ways they do not provide a 
comprehensive view of any given firm. However, it is debatable whether access to 
corporate archives will prove easier in the future. Still, examining the industry through
38
therapeutic sectors allows for qualitative data to supplement substantial gaps in both 
industry-wide and firm-level data.
To a certain extent, the selection of specific firms for case studies in the antibiotics and 
anticancer drug sector was also dictated by availability of sources. The firms selected 
were those that developed the leading drugs during a given period. It is recognised that 
they are not representative of the entire pharmaceutical industry; for the most part, 
they showed the Japanese pharmaceutical industry at its best. But by selecting the 
strongest of Japanese firms across time, the case studies should also provide a more 
convincing explanation as to why -  even with its best pharmaceutical firms -  Japan 
was not able to develop a world leading pharmaceutical industry.
Sources
This thesis consulted a range of both archival and published sources from across 
government, industry, and academia. Several interviews were also conducted. The 
thesis follows the evolution of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry with 
consideration to the strengths, weaknesses, and biases of source material.
Archival sources were primarily used to investigate efforts to build a modem 
pharmaceutical industry at the end of the war and during the Allied Occupation of 
Japan between 1945 and 1952. This was done by looking at how Japanese firms 
acquired antibiotic production capacities -  with the help of the Japanese military, 
American Occupation forces, and the Japanese government.
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Japanese military documents pertaining to penicillin production efforts up to 1945 
were viewed at the Naito Museum of Pharmaceutical Science and Industry in Gifu 
Prefecture, Japan. Sources consulted include memoranda by Katsuhiko Inagaki, who 
led initial penicillin production efforts in Japan, minutes of the Penicillin Committee, 
and writings by domestic scientists involved in production efforts.45 These sources 
provided a detailed chronology of penicillin development in Japan.
The American Occupation forces played a fundamental role in establishing the 
foundations of Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical industry. Memoranda, 
correspondence, and official publications by the Public Health and Welfare Section of 
the Occupation regime were consulted at the National Diet Library in Tokyo 46 The 
Prange Collection at the University of Maryland provided a wealth of material 
contained in popular press and trade journals from the Occupation period.47 The 
Rutgers University Special Collections and University Archives held correspondence 
between Japanese government and American scientists regarding technology transfers 
to Japan at the end of the Occupation era.48
It is recognised that the official documents of the Public Health and Welfare Section 
are biased in favour of the Occupation regime, and that this needs to be taken into
45 Penicillin Papers, Naito Museum of Pharmaceutical Science and Industry, Kagamihara, Japan.
46 Papers on the Allied Occupation of Japan, National Diet Library, Tokyo, Japan.
47 Occupation-period Newspapers and Magazines, Gordon W. Prange Collection, University of Maryland Library, College Park, 
Maryland, United States.
48 Selman A. Waksman Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Library, New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, United States.
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account when considering, for example, the discrepancies of statistical data between 
Japanese sources. At the same time, however, much of the memoranda and 
correspondence consulted were not public documents at the time, and contained 
detailed information on the motivations and actions of the American Occupation 
authorities in building a modem pharmaceutical industry in Japan.
This thesis consulted a range of published sources. These included official government 
publications, company documents, academic and trade journals, as well as the popular 
press. Published government sources provided information on state administration as 
well as statistical data on industry performance. While statistical information has been 
compiled by various ministries, changes in government policy and industry trends are 
summarised in Yakumu Koho [Bulletin of Pharmaceutical and Supply Bureau], a 
MHW bulletin that records actions by the Ministry of Health and Welfare toward 
pharmaceutical administration.49 The publication also provides data on approvals 
granted for new drugs (New Chemical Entities) or manufacturing licenses granted. 
Other MHW publications such as the Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chdsa Tokei [Annual 
Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry], Iyakuhin Sangyd Jittai Chosa 
Hokoku [Report on the Status of the Pharmaceutical Industry] provide annual statistics 
on industry. 50 The former provide figures on production and trade according to
49 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Y a k u m u  K o h o  [Bulletin of Pharmaceutical and Supply Bureau] (Tokyo: Yakumu KShOsha, 
1949-2006).
50 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Y a k u j i  K o g y d  S e i s a n  D o t a i  C h d s a  T o k e i  [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Y a k u j i  K o g y d  S e i s a n  D o t a i  C h d s a  
T o k e i  [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000); Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare, Y a k u j i  K o g y o  S e i s a n  D o t a i  C h d s a  T o k e i  [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2001-2006); Ministry o f Health and Welfare, I y a k u h i n  S a n g y d  J i t t a i  C h d s a  H o k o k u  [Report on the Status 
o f the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1988-2000); Ministry o f Health, Labour and Welfare, 
I y a k u h i n  S a n g y d  J i t t a i  C h d s a  H o k o k u  [Report on the Status o f the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Ministry o f Health, Labour 
and Welfare, 2001-2006).
41
therapeutic sector as well as production sites, while the latter provide detailed 
information ranging from firm size, workforce, and market concentration.
There are several limitations with the figures contained in the Yakuji Kogyd Seisan 
Dotai Chosa Tokei and Iyakuhin Sangyd Jittai Chdsa Hokoku. The first involves 
production values contained in the Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chdsa Tokei. These 
production values have been used as proxy measures for market size. It is recognised 
that production values do not accurately measure market size, as they do not reflect 
additional expenses such as handling, shipment, and warehousing, which are included 
in sales values. However, production values are widely used as proxy measures in 
Japan because historical sales figures do not exist for the pharmaceutical industry.
Other limitations with the production values also need be addressed. Production 
figures contained in the Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chdsa Tokei are based on 
questionnaires sent via prefectural agencies to individual firms. This method of data 
collection is subject to firm bias, as firms are likely to submit overly favourable values, 
and as the stronger firms will be more likely to respond. Moreover, while production 
values are lower than statistics for shipment values, it is not entirely clear how these 
figures have been calculated -  and there is likely to be considerable variation at 
individual firms. Despite their weaknesses, however, these production values remain 
the best indicators of industry-wide performance over time.
Similar limitations exist in statistics compiled in the Iyakuhin Sangyd Jittai Chdsa
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Hokoku, such as for firm size, workforce, and market concentration. These data are 
collected from individual firms using questionnaires sent from prefectural agencies. 
As a result, not only are firms likely to submit favourable figures, but the data gathered 
will also be more representative of firms willing and capable of submitting strong 
results. Data gathered are likely to present the Japanese pharmaceutical industry in a 
slightly more positive light than its actual status.
As the Iyakuhin Sangyd Jittai Chdsa Hokoku is not available prior to 1988, market 
concentration data for the years between 1975 and 1994 were obtained from the Fair 
Trade Commission (FTC).51 The statistics made available by the FTC are based on 
responses to questionnaires sent to individual firms. These figures are also prone to 
firm biases, as stronger firms may under-report figures and weaker firms may 
over-report figures. The data are also based on submitted responses of production 
values, which differ from actual sales figures and are subject to the idiosyncrasies of 
calculation methods used at individual firms. However, they remain the best historical 
estimates of market concentration available.
Official prices for prescription drugs in Japan are available in three publications: the 
Hokenyaku Jiten [Insured Drugs Almanac], Shakai Hoken Yakka Kijun [Insured Drug 
List] and Yakka Kijun [Drug List]. The first two are published by a pharmaceutical 
publisher while the latter is published by a legal publisher, but there should be no
51 Japan Fair Trade Commission, S h u y o  S a n g y d  n i  o k e r u  R u i s e k i  S e i s a n  S h u c h u d o  [Concentration Ratio o f Main Industries] 
(Tokyo: Japan Fair Trade Commission, 1975-1994) http://vww.iftc.go.ip/katudo/ruiseki/ruisekidate.html (accessed 1 June 2008).
52 Yakugyo Kenkyu-kai, H o k e n y a k u  J i t e n  [Insured Drugs Almanac] (Tokyo: Jiho, 1969-2006); Nihon Yakuzaishi-kai, 
S h a k a i h o k e n  Y a k k a  K i j u n  [Insured Drug List] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1977-2006). Shin Nihon Hoki Shuppan, Y a k k a  K i j u n  
(Tokyo: Shin Nihon HQki Shuppan,1965,1968,1972,1975,1977-2006).
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discrepancy in the figures, save for differences stemming from the month of 
publication. Prices refer to the brand name drug by the original developer. While 
official figures may differ from market prices, they are still relevant in indicating price 
reduction trends or incentives to minimise investment risk by developing new drugs 
with minimal innovative value and short product life.
Figures on pharmaceutical trade are based on trade statistics in the Tsusho Hakusho 
[White Paper on International Trade] by the MITI, which differ slightly from figures 
compiled by MHW in the Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chdsa Tokei.53 While the former 
are based on customs declarations upon export or import, they latter are based on 
questionnaires sent via prefectural agencies which ask firms applying for import or 
export approval to provide expected import or export values. Although both figures 
may reflect incentives to underreport, trade figures from the Tsusho Hakusho are used 
from the view that custom declarations are likely more accurate than responses for 
expected import /export values.54
It should be noted that trade figures include both finished and bulk products. Japan has 
historically relied on the imports of bulk products to produce finished products. Any 
analysis based on imported values therefore obscures the degree of reliance on bulk 
products, which are much lower in price compared to finished products.
53 In Japan, white papers refer to reports published by government ministries that provide information on the current status of 
relevant policy areas and address future agendas.
34 See Ministry o f International Trade and Industry, T s u s h o  H a k u s h o  [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
1958-1973); Ministry of International Trade and Industry, T s u s h o  H a k u s h o  [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1974-2000). 
From 2001, this data has been available at Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, B o e k i  D o k o  D e t a b e s u  [Database on Trends in 
Trade], http://www.meti.go.ip/policv/tradc policv/trade db/html/01.html (accessed 12 May 2008).
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Figures for the pharmaceutical technology trade were collected from the Kagaku 
Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku [Report on the Survey of Research and Development] 
conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC).55 Values 
for technology trade refer to fees stemming from the use of patents, trademarks and 
know-how. It should be noted that, the figures indicated are likely to be slightly lower 
than actual figures, as the survey does not capture companies capitalised at less than 
100 million yen, and because figures do not reflect the use of patents filed by Japanese 
firms in overseas jurisdictions. The latter is particularly relevant for figures since the 
1990s, as greater numbers of Japanese firms established overseas operations during 
this time.
These figures need to be considered carefully. Due to different methodological 
approaches, technology trade figures compiled by MIAC may overestimate 
technology exports and underestimate technology imports compared to figures 
compiled the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) releases of Kokusai Shushi Tokei Geppo (Balance 
of Payments Monthly].56 This is because the BoJ only includes foreign currency 
payments made for the explicit purpose of technological assistance whereas the MIAC 
includes payments for the use of patents, know-how, technological guidance and 
provision, and other technological assistance. Moreover, MIAC only collects data
55 Bureau o f Statistics, Office o f the Prime Minister, K a g a k u  G i j u t s u  K e n k y u  C h d s a  H o k o k u  [Report on the Survey of Research 
and Development] (Tokyo: Office of the Prime Minister, 1961-1984); Statistics Bureau & Statistics Centre of the Management 
and Coordination Agency, K a g a k u  G i j u t s u  K e n k y u  C h d s a  H o k o k u  [Report on the Survey of Research and Development] (Tokyo: 
Management and Coordination Agency, 1985-2000); Statistics Bureau, Ministry o f Internal Affairs and Communications, ed., 
K a g a k u  G i j u t s u  K e n k y u  C h d s a  H o k o k u  [Report on the Survey of Research and Development] (Tokyo: Ministry o f Internal Affairs 
and Communications, 2001-2006).
56 See Bank o f Japan, K o k u s a i  S h u s h i  T o k e i  G e p p o  [Balance o f Payments Monthly] (Tokyo: Bank of Japan, 1966-2007).
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from firms engaged in R&D activities, while BoJ data includes additional figures from 
quasi-govemmental research institutes as well as service and retail establishments. 
BoJ figures thus tend to be lower than MIAC figures in technology exports, 
particularly as the BoJ does not account for exports from “plants,” while BoJ figures 
tend to be higher than MIAC figures for technology imports, because MIAC figures do 
not include technology imports by quasi-govemmental research institutes.57
In general, combined figures for both prescription and over-the-counter drugs have 
been used as proxy measures of the prescription drugs industry. This is partly because 
the legal distinction between prescription drugs and over-the-counter drugs was not 
made until the “Basic Policies for Drug Manufacturing Approval” were introduced in 
1967. But it is also because official statistics have not distinguished between 
prescription and over-the-counter drugs in the post 1968 period, except for production 
figures available in the Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chdsa Tokei. Production figures 
after 1968 in this thesis therefore reflect the prescription dmg sector, while trade and 
R&D figures reflect the combined sectors. The use of combined figures, however, 
should remain representative of general trends observed in the prescription drugs 
sector, as prescription drugs account for the majority of the dmgs in the 
pharmaceutical industry.58
57 For an explanation o f differences between MIAC and BoJ figures, see Section 2, Chapter 3-1-1 “Wagakuni no Gijutsu B5eki no 
D5k5 [Trends in Technology Trade in Our Country],” in K a g a k u  G i j u t s u  H a k u s h o  [White Paper on Science and Technology], by 
Ministry o f Education, Science and Culture (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, 1984), 
http://www.mext.go.ip/b menu/hakusho/hakusho.htm (accessed 30 May 2008).
58 In value. See Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Y a k u j i  K o g y o  S e i s a n  D o t a i  C h d s a  T o k e i  [Annual Survey on Production in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Y a k u j i  K o g y o  S e i s a n  
D o t a i  C h d s a  T o k e i  [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 
1968-2000); Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Y a k u j i  K o g y o  S e i s a n  D o t a i  C h d s a  T o k e i  [Annual Survey on Production in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2001-2006).
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The published corporate sources consulted in this thesis include company security 
filings and business reports, which were used to obtain firm-level data.59 While the 
information contained in these sources are biased to portray firms in a positive light,
they were used to obtain company data on sales, profits, workforce, and R&D data -  as
well as outlines of individual company histories. Company histories have also been
consulted. While generally heavily biased to portray firms favourably, these
publications have helped identify the nature and impact of government on individual
firms. Similarly, histories of industry and professional organisations such as the Japan
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA), the Japan Medical Association
(JMA) and various regional medical associations reveal the evolving concerns of the 
respective organisations.60
I also consulted various academic journals dating from the late 1940s to 2000s.
Journals such as Iyaku Janaru [Journal of Pharmaceuticals] and Gekkan Yakuji [The
Pharmaceuticals Monthly] helped to identify the concerns facing the pharmaceutical 
industry over the years, while others, such as the Journal o f  Antibiotics and Gann 
[Cancer] helped to show the advances in drug development methods and techniques.61
59 Company securities filings refer to the Y u k a  S h d k e n  H o k o k u s h o  [Annual Securities Report] published by Okurasho 
Insatsukyoku.
60 See for example, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 1 0 - n e n  n o A y u m i  [A 10 year History] (Tokyo: Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 1978); Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, “S e i y a k u k y d  2 0 - n e n  n o  
A y u m i  [A 20 year History o f the Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association] (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association, 1988). Japan Medical Association, N i h o n  I s h i k a i  S o r i t s u  K i n e n s h i :  S e n g o  5 0 - n e n  n o A y u m i  [Japan Medical 
Association Anniversary Publication: A 50-year Post-war History] (Tokyo: Japan Medical Association, 1997).
61 See for example, Iyaku Janaru-sha, I y a k u  J a n a r u  [Journal o f Pharmaceuticals] (Osaka: Iyaku Janaru-sha, 1965-2006); Yakuji 
KenkyOkai, G e k k a n  Y a k u j i  [The Pharmaceuticals Monthly] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Jihosha, 1959-2006). The J o u r n a l  o f  A n t i b i o t i c s  has 
changed names over the years. It began as Japan Penicillin Research Association, P e n i s h i r i n  S o n o t a  n o  K o s e i b u s s h i t s u  [Penicillin 
and Other Antibiotics] (Tokyo: Japan Penicillin Research Association, 1948-1950); Japan Penicillin Research Association, 
J o u r n a l  o f  A n t i b i o t i c s  (Tokyo; Japan Penicillin Research Association, 1951-1952). Thereafter, Japan Antibiotics Research 
Association, J a p a n e s e  J o u r n a l  o f  A n t i b i o t i c s  S e r i e s  A  (Tokyo: Japan Antibiotics Research Association, 1953-1967); and Japan 
Antibiotics Research Association, J a p a n e s e  J o u r n a l  o f  A n t i b i o t i c s  S e r i e s  B  (Tokyo: Japan Antibiotics Research Association,
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The latter publication was also used to identify the collaborative entities involved in 
the development of specific therapies.
References to the Japanese pharmaceutical industry were also made in the popular
press. General newspapers and journals such as the Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, 
Aera, and Bungei Shunju were consulted for this thesis. While popular publications
do have ideological biases, they helped ascertain key developments, public
perceptions, and the significance of industry to the broader economy. Diet proceedings 
were examined to identify key debates on the pharmaceutical industry. While
subject to personal biases, articles and memoirs by entrepreneurs were consulted to
better understand the opportunities and risks felt by business leaders that lay behind 
corporate responses to government policies.64
Several trade publications were consulted as well. The two major annual trade
publications on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry are the Yakuji Handobukku
[Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] and Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] 
released by the industry research firms Jiho and Yakuji Nipposha, respectively.65 The
former summarises key trends in government policy and industry performance while
1953-1967); Japan Antibiotics Research Association, J a p a n e s e  J o u r n a l  o f  A n t i b i o t i c s  (Tokyo: Japan Antibiotics Research 
Association, 1968-2006). See also, Japanese Cancer Association, G a n n :  T h e  J a p a n e s e  J o u r n a l  o f  C a n c e r  R e s e a r c h  (Tokyo: 
Japanese Cancer Association, 1907-1984); Japanese Cancer Association, J a p a n e s e  J o u r n a l  o f  C a n c e r  R e s e a r c h  (Tokyo: Japanese 
Cancer Association, 1985-2002).
62 A s a h i  S h i m b u n  and Y o m i u r i  S h i m b u n  are daily newspapers with nation-wide circulation. A e r a  and B u n g e i  S h u n j u  are 
magazines that discuss current affairs.
63 See Kokkai Gijiroku Kensaku Shisutemu [Full-text Database System for the Minutes of the Diet] http://kokkai.ndl.go.ip/ 
(accessed 1 July 2008).
64 For example, Chobei Takeda, “Iyakuhin Yushutsu no GenjO to Mondaiten [The Status of Pharmaceutical Exports and its 
Problems],” K e i z a i d a n t a i  R e n g o k a i  6, no. 8 (October 1958): 18-19; BenzaburO Kato, “Obei KigyO no Kenkyfl KatsudO o Shisatsu 
shite,” K e i d a n r e n  G e p p o  11, no. 1 (January 1963): 44-47. Chobei Takeda and BenzaburO KatO were the presidents o f Takeda and 
Kyowa Hakko, respectively.
65 YakugyO JihOsha was renamed JihO in 2000. YakugyO JihOsha, Y a k u j i  H a n d o b u k k u  [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] 
(Tokyo: YakugyO JihOsha, 1968-1999); JihO, Y a k u j i  H a n d o b u k k u  [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: JihO, 2000-2007); 
Yakuji NippOsha, S a i k i n  n o  S h i n y a k u  [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippOsha, 1950-2006).
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the latter introduces the key therapeutic attributes of recent drugs launched in Japan 
and includes a summary development history. Both publications are descriptive: the 
former is mainly sourced from government and private agencies, while the latter is 
mainly sourced from scientific journals. The Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Affairs 
Annual] and Yakugyd Keizai Nenkan [Annual on the Economics of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] are no longer in circulation, but they are similar in content to the Yakuji 
Handobukku. These publications by Yakuji Nipposha were also consulted for data 
between the 1950s and 1980s.66 In addition to statistical data, these sources were 
particularly helpful in identifying prevailing concerns in the industry over the years, 
such as safety and efficacy during the 1960s or capital liberalisation and product patent 
protection in the 1970s. For comparative data, non-Japanese trade publications such as 
Scrip and Datamonitor, among others, were consulted.
Unless otherwise stated, figures cited in this paper are given in real terms to better 
evaluate long-run trends, for example, in production, R&D expenditure, and trade. 
Nominal values have been converted into 2005 values using the consumer price index 
(CPI). Figures in US dollars were converted into 2005 US dollars using CPI data 
available from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.68 Figures in 
Japanese yen were converted into 2005 yen with CPI data available from Statistical 
Survey Department, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
66 YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, Y a k u j i  N e n k a n  [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1951,1957,1961, 
1964); YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, Y a k u g y d  K e i z a i  N e n k a n  [Economics o f the Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yakuji 
Nipposha, 1967,1971,1979,1984,1987).
67 For example, Robert Tulloch, P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  M a r k e t s  i n  t h e  P a c i f i c  R i m ,  S c r i p  R e p o r t s  (Richmond: PJB, 1995); Datamonitor, 
“Japan -  Pharmaceuticals,” I n d u s t r y  P r o f i l e  (London: Datamonitor, 2002).
68 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index History Table,” U.S. Department of Labor, 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (accessed 1 July 2008).
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Communications.69 CPI figures have been used for conversion as a widely used 
measure that reasonably reflects the changes in prices over time. Nominal values are 
given in the footnotes and the appendix.
Interviews and correspondence were also conducted with company executives. While 
this thesis is not based primarily on oral histories, interviews and correspondence 
helped illuminate published archival sources and strengthen analyses from my 
research findings. More specifically, they helped ascertain major shifts in the research 
orientation and the international competitiveness of the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry as firms responded to changes in government policy as well as 
scientific/technological advances and globalisation.
Key individuals interviewed included Kenjiro Nagasaka, chairman of Banyu 
Pharmaceutical, who oversaw the firm’s transformation from a small, family run firm 
into Merck Japan. Nagasaka also played a central role in the distribution reforms in the 
pharmaceutical industry in the 1990s, and provided a detailed account of the 
challenges of deregulation and internationalisation facing Japanese firms. Sapan Shah, 
president and CEO of Shionogi America and David Drutz, former vice president of 
Daiichi Pharmaceutical in the United States, shed light on recent developments in 
industry from the viewpoint of non-Japanese nationals employed at Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms.
69 Statistical Survey Department, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, “General Index 
Excluding Imputed Rent for Japan,” Ministry o f Internal Aflffairs and Communications, 
http://www.e-stat.eo.ip/SG 1 /estat/List.do?bid=000000730006&cvcode=0 (accessed 1 July 2008)
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Robert Neimeth and P. Reed Maurer provided the perspectives of foreign firms 
conducting business in Japan. Both individuals were previously representatives of the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA, the American 
industry association) in Japan.70 Neimeth and Maurer elaborated upon the changing 
dynamics of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry and the challenges of operating in 
Japan as executives at leading foreign pharmaceutical firms.
Other individuals consulted included Valdis Jakobsons, chairman of Grindeks, and 
Naoko Wakao, representative of Japan’s Cancer Patients Support Organization
71(CANPS), who provided written responses to letters of enquiry. Through the 
experience of a Soviet firm, Jakobson described how technology transfers to Japan 
were arranged in the late 1960s, while Wakao explained how patient organisations 
worked to obtain Japanese approval of new therapies already recognised overseas.
Chapter outline
The thesis is organised into five chapters. This introductory chapter has offered a brief 
introduction to the thesis. It began by highlighting the aims and significance of this 
research, then provided an overview of the existing literature. This was followed by a 
discussion of the thesis methodology and limitations with the sources. It concludes by
70 Robert Neimeth was executive vice president o f Pfizer and was involved with Pfizer’s operations in Japan for over 20 years. He 
served as chairman o f the Japan Committee o f the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PMA, now PhRMA) from 1991 to 
1993. P. Reed Maurer was vice president o f Eli Lilly Japan and Merck Japan, and has worked in the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry since 1970. He was the first representative in Japan for PhRMA.
71 Grindeks is a pharmaceutical manufacturer that was once a part of the Institute of Organic Synthesis in Latvia. In the late 1960s, 
this organisation provided Japanese firms with the technology to produce an anticancer drug.
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providing an outline of the thesis chapters.
The following chapter provides a historical analysis of the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry. It examines why this industry remained relatively weak, both in comparison 
with global leaders and with other Japanese industries. It follows the evolution of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry across several phases of development, from its origins 
in the late 19th century to a modem industry in 2005. The chapter closes by suggesting 
several reasons for the underperformance of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present the studies on the evolution of Japan’s antibiotics 
sector and anticancer drug sector, respectively. Each chapter follows the evolution of 
the therapeutic sector across several stages of development. Case studies, of drug 
development at individual firms are used to gain a more intricate understanding of firm 
behaviour in response to government policy and changing market conditions. While 
Chapter 3 provides several explanations for the strong performance of Japan’s 
antibiotics sector, Chapter 4 offers several reasons for the weak performance of 
Japan’s anticancer dmg sector.
Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the thesis. The chapter opens with a summary of the 
reasons for the relative weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry, based on the 
studies of the antibiotics and anticancer drugs sectors. This is followed by a discussion 
on the contributions of this research to existing scholarship. The chapter closes by 
considering possible options for future research in this area.
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2 Overview chapter
From the ashes of World War II, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry has experienced 
phenomenal growth. Japanese firms were able to catch up with leading global firms, in 
terms of their ability to discover drugs. But while Japanese pharmaceutical firms were 
able to develop a highly profitable domestic industry, relatively few firms succeeded in 
international markets.72 In the early twenty-first century, the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry remained much smaller and more domestically-oriented compared to its 
counterparts in the United States, Britain or Switzerland. The failure of the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry to become a global leader is striking, given the strong 
performance of Japanese automobile or electronics firms in the global market.
This chapter surveys the history of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry and examines why 
it failed to realise its potential of becoming a global leader. Several factors help explain 
the relative weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. But one of the key reasons 
lay in the lack of an industrial policy designed to develop a research-intensive, 
globally competitive pharmaceutical industry. Governed by the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare (MHW) -  rather than the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
-  the government long prioritised public health agendas to produce drugs at low cost
72 In pharmaceuticals, R&D has two major components: discovery and development. Drug discovery refers to the identification 
o f a potential therapeutic substance. Drug development refers to die process of transforming this substance into a commercially 
viable therapy. Drug development, for example, requires the capacity to conduct clinical trials and meet the criteria set by the 
regulators for drug approval. Japanese firms have demonstrated a strong research capacity to discover potential cures, but they 
have been much weaker at developing drugs into commercially successful medicines.
73 Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, J P M A  D a t a b o o k  (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 
2007), 13-15, 56-58, 60-63.
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for its large population.74 The government also long protected Japanese firms from 
foreign competition and allowed firms to prosper without substantial investments in 
R&D. Most Japanese pharmaceutical firms began to pursue R&D much later than their 
Western counterparts. With their belated adoption of R&D, the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry had compromised their ability to compete against Western 
leaders in a globalising industry.
The history of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry will be examined across seven phases. 
The first phase was the transition from Chinese to Western medicine from the Meiji 
period (1868 and 1912) up to the First World War. During this time, the Japanese 
government adopted Western medicine in favour of traditional Chinese medicine, and 
Japanese firms began to import Western, mostly German, drugs. In the second phase, 
which began during the First World War, Japanese firms shifted from the import to the 
manufacture of Western style drugs. This transition was prompted by the sudden end 
of trade with Germany during the war. Between 1915 and 1945, Japan developed a 
small pharmaceutical industry and expanded into mainland Asia.
The third phase began with Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Between 1945 
and 1952, Japan was occupied by the Allied powers that implemented reforms that 
transformed Japan -  including its pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, the Occupation 
authorities created the foundations of Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical industry by
74 The Ministry o f Health and Welfare, established in 1938, became the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) in 2001. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, established in 1949, became the Ministry o f Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) in 2001.
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enabling Japanese firms to produce drugs and establishing modem pharmaceutical 
regulations to support subsequent development. The fourth phase began when Japan 
regained its sovereignty in 1952. Between 1952 and 1961, Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry began to grow as it produced foreign-discovered dmgs under license in a 
highly protected environment. The leading dmgs produced during this period were 
vitamins and antibiotics, which supplemented lacking nutrients and treated infectious 
diseases, respectively.
The fifth phase refers to the period between 1961 and 1975, when Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry grew through the volume production of imitative dmgs. After 
1961, Japanese firms embarked upon an extraordinary pace of expansion, as the 
government nurtured firms through import-substitution policies and by underwriting 
demand through a universal health care system. Japan’s intellectual property regime, 
based on process patents, also protected Japanese firms from foreign firms who would 
have had to disclose the research results of new dmg discoveries without much reward. 
As the country prospered, Japan’s pharmaceutical firms also began to produce dmgs 
that would treat diseases of affluence. The next phase began in 1975, when Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms shifted from manufacturing-based growth to research-based 
growth. Between 1975 and 1990, Japanese pharmaceutical firms became increasingly 
research oriented in order to compete against new entrants from other sectors of its 
domestic economy and from abroad. This research orientation intensified as the 
government liberalised capital controls and introduced product patents.
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In the most recent phase, between 1990 and 2005, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry 
began to globalise. Globalisation was driven by several reforms to the regulatory 
landscape. For example, Japan harmonised its pharmaceutical regulations with those 
of the United States and the European Union, which made it easier for drugs approved 
in Japan to be approved the United States and Europe — and vice versa. As a result, 
there was increasing foreign competition in the Japanese market. These competitive 
pressures prompted an unprecedented wave of corporate reorganisation and mergers. 
Combined with the escalating costs of drug R&D, leading Japanese firms such as 
Takeda and Daiichi Sankyo began to transfer a large part of their operations abroad.
2.1 The Meiji Restoration and the Meiji pharmaceutical industry, 1868-1914 
Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese government adopted Western 
medicine in place of traditional Chinese medicine.76 As part of its attempts to 
modernise the country, the Meiji government established institutions and 
organisations to promote the use of Western medicine in Japan. These efforts by 
government laid the foundations of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry.77
The Japanese pharmaceutical industry was concentrated in the Doshomachi district of 
Osaka, which , had long been a centre for distributors of Chinese herbal medicines.
75 Developments on Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical industry are well documented in the white papers released annually by the 
Ministry o f Health. See, Ministry of Health and Welfare, K o s e i  H a k u s h o  [White Paper on Health and Welfare] (Tokyo: Okurasho 
Insatsukyoku, 1955-2000); and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, K o s e i  R o d o  H a k u s h o  [White Paper on Health, Labour 
and Welfare] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2001-2007).
76 This transition had occurred rather smoothly, as even through centuries of seclusion from foreign countries during the Edo 
period (1603-1868), Japan had kept abreast o f Western science and technology, including Western medicine, through Dutch 
learning. For developments of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry in the Meiji period, between 1868 and 1912, see Yakugyo Keizai 
Kenkyujo, Y a k u j i  N e n k a n  [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1951), 229-241.
77 A discussion o f Meiji era developments has been written by Whitney Willis Norton, “Notes on the History of Medical Progress 
in Japan,” T r a n s a c t i o n  o f  t h e  A s i a t i c  S o c i e t y  o f  J a p a n  12 (1885): 244-399.
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Since the 17th century, wholesalers had gathered to examine imported medicines and 
bargain over prices. From Osaka, the goods were distributed nation-wide. Major firms, 
such as Takeda, Tanabe, Shionogi, Fujisawa and Ono, originated as importers and 
distributors of Chinese medicines. After the Meiji Restoration, they shifted into
importing Western medicine.
It should be remembered that the major aim of the Meiji government was to resist 
colonisation by the Western powers by adopting Western learning, reforming Japan’s 
institutions, and encouraging industrialisation. Adopting Western pharmaceuticals 
was part of this larger project. Pharmaceutical regulation in the Meiji era was 
designed to curb the circulation of fraudulent, if not toxic, medicines, and myriad 
regulations were introduced to control the sale of imported drugs in Japan. This 
focus on safety regulation might be expected, given the widespread concerns over 
fraudulent drugs in circulation at the time.
In 1874, the government launched its first Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (PAL), which 
also specified the roles and qualifications required of physicians and pharmacists.79 
Indeed, the introduction of a formal education system in Western medicine supported
78 These included B a i y a k u  T o r o s h i m a r i  K i s o k u  [Rules to Control Pharmaceutical Sales] in 1870, B a i y a k u  K i s o k u  [Rules for 
Pharmaceutical Sales] in 1877, and Yakuhin E i g y d  N a r a b i  n i  Y a k u h i n  T o r i s h i m a r i  K i s o k u  [Regulations on Pharmaceutical 
Operations and Products] in 1889. The Japanese Pharmacopoeia was also introduced in 1886. See, Ministry o f Health and 
Welfare, C h i k u j i  K a i s e t s u  Y a k u j i h o  [Explanatory Notes on the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law] (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1973), 1-13. See 
also, Nihon Kogakukai [Japan Federation o f Engineering Societies], M e i j i  K o g y o s h i  [History o f Industry in the Meiji Period] 
(Tokyo: Nihon Kogakukai, 1925), 992-1015; Hajime Soda, “I s h i n k i  n o  S e i y a k u  [Manufacturing Pharmacy during the times o f the 
Meiji Restoration],” l y a k u J a n a r u  11 (August 1972): 38-42. Also Hajime SOda, “I s h i n k i  n o  S e i y a k u  [Manufacturing Pharmacy 
During the Times o f the Meiji Restoration]” l y a k u  J a n a r u  11 (September 1972): 57-60.
79 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, C h i k u j i  K a i s e t s u  Y a k u j i h o  [Explanatory Notes on the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law] (Tokyo: 
Gyosei, 1973): 1-13. See also, Noriko Fukushima and Kayoko Matsumoto, “A Historical Study of the Administration o f 
Pharmaceutical Affairs in Japan: In Relation to a Relaxation of Regulations,” Y a k u s h i g a k u  Z a s s h i  35, no. 2 (2000): 240-246. 
Under traditional practices stemming from Chinese medicine, Japanese physicians both prescribed and dispensed medicines. 
While this practice continued well into the late 20th century, discussions on the legal separation o f this role was introduced in the 
Meiji period.
57
• 80the emergence of a pharmaceutical industry based on Western drugs in Japan. 
Japan learned of Western medicine by hiring foreign teachers, sending students 
overseas, and establishing numerous schools of pharmacy. In the 1870s, departments 
of pharmacy were established at universities alongside technical schools that taught 
students to inspect, evaluate and produce Western medicines.81 This education 
system produced eminent scientists of international renown such as Nagayoshi Nagai, 
Kiyoshi Shiga, and Hideyo Noguchi, who studied overseas and became researchers 
at foreign research institutes. These scholars strengthened the foundations of Western 
medical science at the turn of the 20 century, and helped guide Japan’s early
50pharmaceutical industry.
The Western pharmaceutical industry in Japan began with the Meiji Restoration. From
th  tKthe late 19 century to the early 20 century, wholesalers of Western medicine, who 
showed little interest in manufacture or discovery, dominated the industry. During this 
same period, Germany and the United States were developing a research-based 
pharmaceutical industry in their respective countries -  the former originated from
80 See KOji Yamakawa, “Yakugaku Kyoiku [Pharmaceutical Education],” Y a k u s h i g a k u  Z a s s h i  31, no. 2 (1996): 143-146; Koji 
Yamakawa, “Yakugaku Kyoiku [Pharmaceutical Education],” Y a k u s h i g a k u  Z a s s h i  39, no. 1 (2004): 128-134. The transfer of 
knowledge was essential for a country where Western pharmaceutical science did not exist. German scholars such as Erwin von 
Baelz and Julius Scriba, for example, relayed foreign knowledge to Japanese students at the Tokyo University School o f Medicine. 
Overseas students, sent by the Meiji government to study German medicine, were particularly valuable in building the 
foundations of industry -  acting as conduits of knowledge, later leaders of academe, and entrepreneurs. The pharmacologist Nagai 
Nagayoshi, for example, advised on the building of the first semi-state-owned pharmaceutical firm, held a professorship at Tokyo 
University, was a director of government laboratory, and chaired various academic bodies. Other scholars followed. Joichi 
Takamine, for example, was an overseas student in United States and Britain who discovered drugs such as Takadiastase and 
Adorenarin, who became the president of Sankyo, a leading pharmaceutical firm, and founder o f Riken, a national research 
institute.
81 Hajime Soda, “I s h i n k i  n o  S e i y a k u  [Manufacturing Pharmacy during the times o f the Meiji Restoration]” I y a k u  J a n a r u  11 
(October 1972): 54-58. Since the turn of the century, two types of education were offered: professional education at private 
institutions that catered to pharmacists, and academic education at public institutions who nurtured scientists. The former, with its 
commercial orientation, emphasized methods of pharmaceutical evaluation, inspection and production to the offspring of 
pharmaceutical wholesalers, while the latter encouraged the discovery of new therapeutic substances to prospective scientists. To 
a certain extent, these differences in educational orientation, combined with a sense o f contempt in academic circles -  that 
academic research should not be influenced by commercial motivations -  prevented the transfer of academic knowledge into 
industry.
82 See for example, Yoshio Izumi and Kazuo Isozumi, “Modem Japanese Medical History and the European Influence,” K e i o  
J o u r n a l  o f  M e d i c i n e  50 (June 2001): 91-99.
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academic science while the latter originated from pharmacy practice.83 While the 
Meiji government played an important role in establishing the framework of Japan’s 
early pharmaceutical industry, government measures mostly aimed to secure the safety 
of imported drugs that were in circulation.
2.2 The First World War and the birth of manufacturing pharmacy 
Before World War I, there had been a few tentative attempts to manufacture 
Westem-style drugs in Japan. In 1883, the government established Dainippon 
Pharmaceuticals, a joint venture with Osaka based entrepreneurs, to manufacture 
Westem-style dmgs. Pharmaceutical wholesalers such as Tanabe and Shionogi also 
made some attempts at production.84 But while a handful of firms produced medicines
thsuch as santonin, quinine, and chloroform, most Japanese firms at the turn of the 20
O f
century were concerned with the inspection and sale of imported dmgs. This began 
to change after 1914.
The outbreak of World War I gave rise to the manufacture of pharmaceuticals in Japan. 
When German imports came to a halt during World War I, Japan was faced with a 
dearth of medicines -  and a domestic industry that lacked the capacity to produce 
them. The Japanese government’s response to this crisis was similar to that of the
83 Jonathan Liebenau, “Industrial R&D in Pharmaceutical Firms in the Early Twentieth Century,” Business History 26 (November 
1984): 329-346.
84 For details on the pre-war pharmaceutical industry, see Yakuseki Nipposha, Yakugyd Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] 
(Tokyo: Yakuseki Nipposha, 1935,1938).
85 Dainihon Pharmaceutical Co., Dainihon Seiyaku 100-nenshi [A One Hundred Year History o f Dainihon Pharmaceutical] 
(Tokyo: Dainihon Pharmaceutical Co.: 1993): 1-17. Dainihon Pharmaceutical was established in 1897 as a semi-state owned 
enterprise with 21 Osaka based entrepreneurs dealing in pharmaceuticals. See also Hajime Soda, “Ishinki no Seiyaku 
[Manufacturing Pharmacy during the times o f the Meiji Restoration]” lyaku Janaru 11 (November 1972): 58-63.
86 Germany was an enemy power of Japan during World War I.
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British and American governments. It adopted an import-substitution policy that 
introduced subsidies for pharmaceutical production, nullified Germany’s patent rights,
• 87and disclosed detailed production methods from government laboratories.
During the First World War, the government’s policies gave birth to a new wave of
Japanese pharmaceutical firms, such as Daiichi, Yamanouchi, and Banyu, which were
dedicated to the production of Western medicines. This new breed of firms competed
against each other to produce and sell similar drugs that could no longer be imported
from Germany. One of the medicines replicated during this period was salvarsan, an
QQ
antisyphilis drug that had been developed in Germany in the early 1910s. Daiichi,
Banyu, Sankyo, and Nippon Shinyaku, competed to sell their salvarsan drugs, which
were branded as Arsemin, Eramisol, Arsaminol, and Sabiol, respectively. In the 
interwar period, Japanese pharmaceutical firms diversified into the manufacture of 
vitamins, hormonal preparations, anthelmintics and sulfa drugs.89
The First World War proved crucial in enabling Japanese firms to overcome
limitations in domestic capital, technology and expertise, and produce modem
therapies. But the policy emphasis was on the acquisition of manufacturing
87 For developments in Japan’s pharmaceutical industry from the World War I up to World War II, see Yakugyo Keizai 
Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyd Shimbunsha, 1951), 241-246. See “Iyakuhin 
[Pharmaceuticals],” Meiji Hyakunen Kigyd no Rekishi [Company Histories 100 Years after Meiji] (Tokyo: Keizai Shunjusha, 
1968), 239-240. In addition to publicising data on research conducted at the government’s research laboratories (Naimusho 
Eisei Kenkyujo) on specific production methods, the government provided subsidies to industry via the Law to Promote 
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Production (Senryo Iyakuhin Seizo Shdrei ho). This prompted production at a range o f firms, 
including Tanabe, Dainihon, Shionogi, Sankyo and Takeda. The Wartime Act on Intellectual Property Rights (Kogyd Shoyuken 
Senjiho) also voided the patent rights of enemy countries, legally enabling the production o f patented pharmaceuticals for 
profit.
88 Jurgen Drews, “Paul Ehrlich: Magister Mundi,” Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 9 (3 September 2004): 797-801.
89 Anthelmintics refer to medicines that rid the body of worms. Sulfa drugs were discovered by Gerhard Dogmak in the early 
1930s as one o f the first chemotherapeutic substances that could cure bacterial infections.
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capacities. After all, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was still rather small. In 1937, 
it produced $1.5 billion worth of drugs at a time when the pharmaceutical industry in 
the United States produced $4.7 billion worth of drugs.90 Manufacturing pharmacy 
in Japan emerged out of an incentive to reduce uncertainty and risks inherent in import 
operations. It developed more as an economic response to minimise cost and risk, 
rather than a scientific response to discover novel and innovative therapies for society. 
Intent on acquiring some manufacturing capacities from the West, the development 
of industrial research did not enter into government policies or corporate strategy 
until well after World War II.
Japanese firms also ventured into overseas markets in the interwar years. This 
expansion was fuelled by two major factors. As German imports began to re-enter 
Japan after World War I, Japanese firms were squeezed out of the home market. As a 
result, Japanese firms sought to exploit commercial opportunities in East Asia. 
Takeda, for example, established sales and manufacturing operations in Taiwan, 
Korea and China in the 1930s, in medicines ranging from vitamins to quinine. Other 
firms such as Sankyo established branches in Manchuria, Korea, and China, to 
produce and sell vitamins and galenic preparations.91 Firms such as Banyu expanded 
operations in Korea and China to offer sulfa drugs and a variety of other drugs.
90 In nominal terms, Japan produced 215.9 million yen worth of drugs when the United States produced $345.9 million worth of 
drugs. Historical exchange rates are available in Japan Statistical Association, ed. Historical Statistics o f  Japan Vol. 3 (Tokyo: 
Japan Statistical Association, 1988). YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo 
Shimbunsha, 1957), 289; U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States 1940 
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 820.
91 Sankyo Co., Sankyo 100-nenshi [Sankyo, a 100 year History] (Tokyo: Sankyo Co., 1999), 94-100; Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 
Takeda 200-nen [200 Years of Takeda] (Osaka: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 1984), 101-106. Galenic preparations refer to 
widely-used herbal remedies that were introduced by the ancient Greek physician, Galen.
92 Japan Business History Association, Banyu Seiyaku 85-nenshi [Banyu Pharmaceutical: 85 Year History] (Tokyo: Banyu 
Pharmaceutical Co., 2002), 47-59.
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Japan’s military ventures into East Asia also supported the expansion of the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry. Between 1936 and 1942, production levels grew twenty 
percent from 138 billion yen to 167 billion yen.93 Most of this growth came from sales 
in East Asia; exports to this region accounted for 20% of Japanese production in 1936. 
Indeed, exports still accounted for 17.5% of production in 1943.94
From the late 1930s into the early 1940s, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry evolved 
amidst a war economy. Medicines were considered an essential good, and the 
pharmaceutical industry benefited from the military’s support during the war years. 
The military supplied firms with raw materials, monitored production, purchased the 
drugs for rationing, and monitored their distribution.95 With heavy demand for 
medicines and bolstered by the military’s support, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry 
grew during the first few years of the Second World War. But as Japan began to sustain 
heavy damages and scarce resources were diverted into other war industries, drug 
production peaked in 1942, and fell swiftly until the end of the War.96
93 YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon YakugyO Shimbunsha, 1957), 289. As 
consumer price indices are not available for dates prior to 1947, these values were converted using the domestic corporate goods 
index produced by the Bank o f Japan. This data is reprinted in Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Historical 
Statistics o f  Japan, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Japan Statistical Association, 2006), 492-495.
94 Ibid.
95 In 1938, the military began to control imports of medicine and the allocation o f raw materials for drug production, which were 
soon followed by controls over the production and prices o f drugs. As rations were introduced in 1941, the government procured 
and distributed drugs to rationing posts. Developments during World War II are often documented in company histories. See for 
example, Takeda. Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 200-nen [200 Years o f Takeda] (Osaka: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 1984), 79-81.
96 Yakugyd Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyd Shimbunsha, 1957), 289.
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2.3 The Occupation era and the rebirth of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry, 
1945-1952
As in other industries, World War II left the pharmaceutical industry devastated. In
Q71946, production levels were approximately 15% of 1941 levels. A survey by the 
General Headquarters (GHQ) taken in January 1946 found that only 592
QO
manufacturing establishments remained in business. But Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry suffered much less damage than, for example, the steel and coal industries, 
which had been targeted by Allied forces during the war. The factories of leading 
pharmaceutical firms such as Takeda, Shionogi, Fujisawa and Daiichi remained 
largely unscathed." In fact, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry had suffered much more 
from the loss of East Asian markets than the actual physical damages incurred to its 
domestic facilities.100 Despite the severe lack of raw materials and low purchasing 
power in the country, however, Japan was able to build upon the rudimentary 
production capacities, distribution networks, and human capital it had developed 
before the war.
The Allied Occupation of Japan was led by the Americans, who established their 
headquarters in Tokyo. The GHQ employed many civilian and military experts from 
the United States to work with Japanese government officials in implementing their
97 Ibid.
98 General Headquarters, 28 January, Memorandum on Pharmaceutical Production, AG440 PH, reprinted in Takashi Nishikawa, 
Kusuri Kara Mita Nihon; Showa 20-nendai no Genfukei to Konnichi [Looking at Japan from “Medicine”: Scenes from the 1940s 
to the Present] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 2004), 22.
99 “Trade and Industry: Pharmaceuticals,” February 22,1947. This is also documented in numerous company histories and 
corporate security filings o f the 1940s. See also, Katsuhiro Malsumura, “Seiyaku Kigyo no Saihen Seibi to Gorika Katei, Showa 
20-nen kara 25-nen zenhan made [The Reorganisation and Rationalisation of the Pharmaceutical Industry, from 1945 to early 
1950]” Iyaku Janaru 12 (March 1973): 42-48.
100 This is documented in the security filings of various firms in the late 1940s.
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policies. There were several reasons why the GHQ became interested in rebuilding 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. The American occupation forces believed that 
improving public health conditions for Japanese civilians would help to prevent social 
unrest, a resurgence of militarism, or a turn for Communism. In addition, the 
production of insecticides such as DDT and BHC was considered crucial in containing 
the spread of epidemics. The GHQ also needed to supply medicines such as penicillin 
to American military personnel stationed in Japan.101 The Occupation authorities
believed that domestic production would enable low-cost provision of essential
medicines for both civilian and military purposes while adjusting flexibly to 
fluctuations in demand, without the costs and risks of relying on imports.102
To enable Japanese firms to produce essential medicines, the Occupation authorities
substituted for missing supply and demand. The government prioritised the allocation
of raw materials for pharmaceutical production, and purchased the medicines 
produced. It also established formal transfer mechanisms through rations and 
distribution controls.104 The GHQ also provided government, firms, and academia
with new technologies through foreign advisors. The GHQ’s introduction of penicillin
101 A steady supply o f penicillin was particularly important because many American soldiers in Japan had acquired the venereal 
disease, syphilis, which could be cured with this drug.
102 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan. Annual Summary: 1949 (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 
1949): 121. See also, Takashi Nishikawa, Kusuri Kara Mita Nihon: Shdwa 20-nendai no Genjukei to Konnichi [Looking at Japan 
from “Medicine”: Scenes from the 1940s to the'Present] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 2004). A brief overview of developments in 
the Occupation period has been written by TOru Yamazaki, “Sengo Yakugyoshi [A Postwar History of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (1),” Yakkyoku 16, no. 8 (August 1965): 3-8.
See also Kinoichi Tsunematsu, “Senryoka ni Okeru Yakuji Eisei Taisaku [Public Health and Welfare Policy Under the 
Occupation],” lyaku Janaru 9 (July 1970): 56-58.
103 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan. Annual Summary: 1949 (Tokyo: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public 
Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 173-175. See also, Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 200-nen [200 Years of Takeda] 
(Osaka: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 1984): 126-129.
104 Kunihiko Futaba, “Sengo no Iyakuhin Ryutsushi: Haisen ni yoru ShijO RyOtsO no Konran to Saiken [The History of 
Distribution in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Chaos and the Rebuilding of a War-devastated Market and Distribution System],” 
lyaku Janaru 11 (May 1972): 42-58.
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in Japan played a particularly important role in helping firms to catch up with the West 
and building the foundations of Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical industry.105
The GHQ conducted infrastructural reforms and created modem institutions and
organisations during the Occupation period. These reforms not only improved public
health conditions in Japan, but also supported the growth of the pharmaceutical 
industry.106 The authoritarian nature of the Occupation regime ensured the swift and 
effective execution of these reforms.107
Among the most prominent of these reforms was the revision of the existing
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (PAL) in 1948, whereby the government improved
quality standards and delegated the monitoring of pharmaceutical firms to prefectural
10Rauthorities. Foreign advisors, again, played an important role in reform. In July
1949, a mission of the American Pharmaceutical Association conducted a
comprehensive survey of pharmacy in Japan and provided several recommendations
for modernisation. These reforms spanned the “the education and organization of
pharmacists, the manufacture, control and distribution of pharmaceuticals, and the 
practice of pharmacy, in general, in Japan.”109
105 Nihon Penishirin Kyokai [Japan Penicillin Association], Penihsirin noAyumi: 1946-1961 [The History o f Penicillin: 
1946-1961] (Tokyo: Nihon Penishirin Ky5kai, 1961).
106 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1957), 227.
107 The American efforts at improving public health conditions in Japan is well documented in an interview of Crawford Sams, 
who was the head o f the GHQ’s Public Health and Welfare Section. See Crawford F. Sams, interview by Darryl Podoll, 3 May 
1979, interview OH037, transcript, Washington University School o f Medicine Oral History Project, Bernard Becker Medical 
Library, St Louis, Missouri, http://beckerexhibits.wustl.edu/oral/interviews/sams.html.
108 Yakuji ho, 29 July 1948, Law no. 197. See also Public Health and Welfare Section, Memorandum, 7 October 1948, 
Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG ho. 775024. (NDL). A brief overview of developments leading up to the revision 
of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act in 1948 is documented in Ministry of Health and Welfare, “Iyakuhin [Pharmaceuticals]” in Isei 
Hyakunenshi [A 100 Year History of Administration in Medicine] (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1976): 447-451.
109 Crawford Sams, Public Health and Welfare Section, GHQ, SCAP, “Memorandum to Ministry o f Welfare, Japanese 
Government: Report o f Mission o f the American Pharmaceutical Association,” 30 July 1949, Declassified EO 12065 Section 
3-402/NNDG no. 775024, 5 (NDL).
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The GHQ developed a particular interest in reforming Japan’s pharmaceutical 
education system to improve the country’s standards of pharmacy. A new medical 
system was set forth under the Medical Practitioners Law (Ishi-hd) and the Medical 
Care Law (Iryo-hd) in 1948, and educational standards for physicians and pharmacists 
were raised.110 Modelled on the American system, the Occupation authorities
introduced a new curriculum, extended the duration of study, and introduced a license
to practice pharmacy in Japan. A national board of pharmacy was also established to
examine and license new pharmacists, and continuing education was established for 
professional pharmacists.111 The Occupation forces were also instrumental in the
formation of professional organisations such as the Japan Pharmaceutical Association, 
which aimed to improve standards of pharmacy.112
The Occupation authorities also conducted structural reforms within Japanese
110 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, (1949). Public Health 
and Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 211-212. 
See also, B.N. Riordan, Public Health and Welfare Section, “Meeting of Pharmaceutical Education Council” (meeting held by 
the Pharmaceutical Education Council in Tokyo, Japan, 19 July 1946,17 January, 14 March 1947,12 January, 6 July 1951, 
Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 (NDL). Ishi ho, 30 July 1948, Law no. 201; Iryd ho, 30 July 1948, 
Law no. 205.
111 Charles Band, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, Chief, Supply Division, Public Health and 
Welfare Section, Memorandum for Record, Fifth Refresher Course for Public Health Pharmaceutical Officers,” 12 January 
1949, Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 (NDL); Charles Band, General Headquarters Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Forces, Chief, Supply Division, Public Health and Welfare Section, Memorandum for Record, 
“Meeting o f Pharmaceutical Education Committee,” 20 July 1950, Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 
(NDL); J.M. Bransky, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, Public Health and Welfare Section, 
Narcotic Investigator, Memorandum for Record, “Conference Relative to Raising Standards o f Pharmaceutical Education,” 11 
June 1946 Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 (NDL); B.N. Riordan, General Headquarters Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Forces, Public Health and Welfare Section, Chief, Supply Division, Memorandum for Record, 
“Meeting o f Pharmaceutical Education Council,” 19 July 1946,17 January, 14 March 1947,12 January, 6 July 1951 
Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 (NDL).
112 B.N. Riordan, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, Chief, Supply Division, Public Health and 
Welfare Section, Memorandum for Record, “Reorganization of the Japan Pharmacists Association,” 16 September 1947, 
Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 (NDL); Charles Band, General Headquarters Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Forces, Chief, Supply Division, Public Health and Welfare Section, Memorandum for Record, “Meeting o f House 
o f Delegates, Japan Pharmaceutical Association,” 20 October 1948, Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 
(NDL); Charles Band, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, Chief, Supply Division, Public Health 
and Welfare Section, Memorandum for Record, “First Convention, Japan Pharmaceutical Association, Kyoto 22-25 October 
1948,” 29 October 1948, Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 (NDL); W. Speer, General Headquarters 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, Narcotic Control Division Memorandum for Record, “Reorganization of Japan 
Pharmacist Association,” 20 February 1948, Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024, 3 (NDL).
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ministries. In 1949, for example, the Pharmaceutical and Supply Bureau at the 
Ministry of Welfare was reorganised to place greater emphasis on commercial
113 _
pharmaceutical production for domestic and export markets. These reforms 
implemented by the Occupation forces supported the continued growth of Japan’s 
antibiotics sector into the following decade.
The Japanese Pharmacopoeia was also revised in 1951.114 In 1952, the government 
introduced a new pricing system whereby it set prices on official drugs.115 The pricing 
system was aimed to ensure universal health care access to Japanese citizens in a poor, 
developing economy where acute and infectious diseases were serious concerns.116 
This pricing policy -  which effectively capped prices -  would prove both highly 
contentious and heavily influential in shaping the direction of the post-war 
pharmaceutical industry, as it dented the innovative incentives of Japanese firms 
relative to their Western counterparts.
Following these reforms, Japanese firms began to build new plants in the late 1940s. 
Given the limitations to knowledge, funds and technologies, however, Japanese 
factories were mostly engaged in producing antibiotics and insecticides -  and
113 Charles Band, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces. Chief, Supply Division. Public Health and 
Welfare Section, Memorandum for Record, “Reorganization of the Pharmaceutical and Supply Bureau: Ministry o f Welfare,” 
26 March 29 March, 1 October 1949. Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024 (NDL).
114 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakkyokuho, Dairokuji Kaisei [Japanese Pharmacopoeia, 6th revision] (Tokyo: Ministry o f 
Health and Welfare, 1951). A discussion of the revision to the pharmacopoeia has been written by Gen’ichiro Fukuchi, “Nihon 
YakkyokuhS no Kaisei,” Kagaku Asahi, 1 May 1948,34-35.
115 T5ru Watanabe, “The Changes of Pharmaceutical Administration in Japan after World War.II (1),” Yakushigaku Zasshi 26 
(1991): 1-6
116 The pricing system introduced in 1952 proved extremely beneficial in improving health care conditions in Japan. But in later 
years, in the context of a more developed economy, the capping o f the drug price at the official list price, determining the 
profitability of a drug without reference to the market dynamics significantly dented innovative incentives among Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms compared to those abroad. By comparison, in the United States, for example, firms could be rewarded for 
launching innovative medicines with high prices that would remain constant for the patent protection period.
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repackaging bulk imports. Very few companies were involved in any R&D. Firms 
could manufacture pharmaceuticals with little cost or risk: demand for medicines was 
strong, supplies were provided with government aid, technology transfers were readily 
available, and the medicines produced were purchased under government procurement. 
With low barriers to entry, the pharmaceutical industry attracted new entrants from 
various non-traditional sectors, ranging from food, beverages, confectionery and 
breweries to textiles. As there was weak demand for their non-essential goods after the 
war, many firms in these sectors sought new opportunities in the pharmaceutical 
industry by producing drugs at idle manufacturing facilities. Rather than the 
traditional pharmaceutical firms who, as import-distributors, had limited production 
capacities, it was these new entrants who pioneered the re-emergence of Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry.
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Figure 1. Recovery of Pharmaceutical Production, 1940-195511
Indeed, numerous small firms competed intensely to produce highly profitable drugs 
such as antibiotics and sulfa drugs. Production levels grew rapidly from 76.4 billion 
yen in 1946 to 111.6 billion yen in 1952.118 But despite this increase, Japanese firms 
were unable to keep up with demand. In 1949, for example, the pharmaceutical 
industry only satisfied demand for 32 of the 339 varieties of medicines it 
produced.119 It was only in the mid 1950s that the production of pharmaceuticals in 
Japan would recover to pre-war levels.
The Allied Occupation was essential to the rebuilding of Japan’s pharmaceutical
117 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1957), 289. As 
consumer price indices are not available for dates prior to 1947, these values were converted using the dom estic corporate 
goods index produced by the Bank o f  Japan. This data is reprinted in Ministry o f  Internal Affairs and Communication, 
H istorical S tatistics o f  Japan, vol. 4  (Tokyo: Japan Statistical Association, 2006), 492-495.
118 In nominal terms, production grew from 1.8 billion yen to 58.6 billion yen. Ibid.
119 “Trade and Industry: Pharmaceuticals,” The O riental Economist, 13 Novem ber 1948, 969.
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industry. Not only did the GHQ provide the demand, supply, and transfer mechanisms 
for Japanese industry, it also provided government, firms, and academia with new 
technologies, regulation, and education standards tailored to Japan’s level of 
development that would help sustain and foster growth over the following decades. 
The momentum for production launched in this period and the modem institutions and 
organisations created during this period gave life to Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical 
industry. As the Allied Occupation drew to a close, Japanese firms also became more 
autonomous, and began to arrange their own licensing agreements independently with 
foreign firms, rather than rely upon the Occupation authorities or the Japanese 
government. But the policy emphasis on acquiring manufacturing capacities through 
imported technologies also created the foundations of an imitation industry that relied 
on technology transfers and neglected the development of industrial R&D in Japan.
2.4 Import substitution policies in the 1950s
The Korean War between 195Q and 1953 injected further life into Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry. By 1950, many Japanese firms had begun to suffer from 
falling prices, lack of credit, and excess capacity.120 But special procurements by the 
United States for civilian and military use bolstered demand and provided solvency to 
struggling firms. For the Americans, shipments from Japan offered a flexible and 
low-cost means of providing medicines to American troops in Korea. As in other 
sectors of the Japanese economy, this strong external demand from the US military
120 See Katsuhiro Matsumura, “Seiyaku KigyQ no Keiei Kiban Ky6ka Katei, ShOwa 25-nen Zenhan kara 30-nen Goro made 
[Pharmaceutical Firms Strengthen the Foundations o f their Business, from the Early 1950s to around 1955],” lyaku Janaru 12 
(May 1973): 46-52. Many corporate histories also document this. See for example, Sankyo Co., Sankyo 100-nenshi [Sankyo, a 
i00 year History] (Tokyo: Sankyo Co., 1999), 107; Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 80-nenshi [Daiichi 
Pharmaceutical, a 80 Year History] (Tokyo: Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., 1996), 99-100.
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191resuscitated many domestic firms.
In 1950, the Japanese government embarked upon an import substitution policy that
restricted capital inflows, imported foreign technology, and recognised process patents.
Process patents encouraged the dissemination of technology by legally authorising
Japanese firms to reverse engineer drugs discovered abroad, find another method to
manufacture the drug, and launch this drug as a “new” product in Japan. Under the
Foreign Exchange Control Law and the Foreign Investment Law of 1949 and 1950,
respectively, capital controls were eased, but Japanese firms remained sheltered from 
foreign competition.122 For example, imports were subject to strict quotas, firms
required licenses to produce pharmaceuticals, and ceilings were capped on royalty
rates. Moreover, foreign firms who wished to enter into Japan were restricted to 
manufacturing ventures, required to form joint ventures of up to a 49% stake with local 
firms, and begin local manufacturing operations within two years.
By imposing restrictive and unfavourable conditions, the Occupation era policy
protected Japan’s emerging pharmaceutical industry from foreign competition into the 
1970s.123 By recognising process patents and insisting upon technological diffusion 
across government, industry and academia, Japanese firms were able to enhance their
121 TQru Yamazaki, “Sengo Yakugyoshi [A Postwar History of the Pharmaceutical Industry] (2),” Yakkyoku 16, no. 9 (September 
1965): 7-12.
122 For a brief overview of the history o f foreign direct investment in Japan, see Ralph Paprzycki and Kyoji Fukao, “The Extent 
and History o f Foreign Direct Investment in Japan,” Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series 84 (April 2005): 13-14. For an in-depth 
discussion, see Mark Mason, “The Screen Door. 1950-1870” in American Multinationals in Japan: The Political Economy o f  
Japanese Capital Controls (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 150-198.
123 Even before the yen could freely be exchanged with foreign currencies in 1963, a few foreign firms such as Roche, Schering, 
and Pfizer had established manufacturing operations in Japan. Between 1957 and 1963, foreign firms were allowed to invest over 
50% in yen-based firms. But after foreign direct investments became subject to government approval in 1963, new 
pharmaceutical ventures were virtually excluded from the market.
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production capacities within a sheltered environment.124
In the 1950s, Japanese firms developed production capacities based on technology
imports ranging from antibiotics, hormonal preparations, sulfa drugs, antihistamines
and anti-tubercular preparations. Indeed, Japanese firms became increasingly reliant
on technology imports, which increased from $11.9 million in 1955 to $ 18.4 million in 
I960.125 While most pharmaceutical technology originated from American firms such
as Merck, Parke Davis and Eli Lilly, technology imports also originated from other
countries, such as Ciba and Geigy in Switzerland or Behring and Grunenthal in 
Germany. 126 Japanese firms acquired technological capacities by importing
technology, reverse engineering, inviting overseas advisors, or sending scholars
abroad to learn and adopt new technologies into the Japanese pharmaceutical
177industry.
Production levels rose as Japanese firms acquired more manufacturing capacities in a
protected environment. Production levels corresponded roughly with the pace of
economic growth. Between 1952 and 1961, production levels grew 3.3 fold from
370.7 million yen to 1.24 billion yen at a time when GDP grew 2.1 fold from $196.5
17Qbillion to $408.7 billion. The rise in production levels, however, was well in excess
124 The Japanese had recognised process patents for medicines in 1921, but the country only recognised product patents for 
medicines in 1976.
125 In nominal terms, technology imports increased from $1.6 million to $2.8 million. Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan 
[Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1961), 123.
126 YakugyS Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugy5 Shimbunsha, 1961), 120-124.
127 See “Shihon, Gijutsu no Donyu oyobi Yushutsu [The Import and Export o f Capital and Technology],” Yakuji Nenkan 
[Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1961), 178-181.
128 In nominal terms, production levels grew from 58.6 million yen to 420.2 billion yen. YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji 
Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1961), 1; Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd 
Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 
1953-1967); Angus Maddison and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Centre, The World
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of demand. With such low barriers to entry into Japan’s pharmaceutical industry, the 
market became over-heated. While the Korean War had stimulated production in the 
early 1950s, the end of the War resulted in overproduction -  particularly in drugs such
10 Qas penicillin, vitamins, and insecticides.
The excess supply of drugs began to cause strain in the distribution system. In a 
desperate bid to dispose of their products, advertisements began to make exaggerated 
claims, and some companies began to sell their products at extremely low prices. To 
defend against collapsing prices and to secure profits, pharmaceutical wholesalers 
began to form vertical groupings with manufacturers. Examples included Eisai’s 
Chokora-kai, Sankyo’s Sankyo-kai, and Takeda’s Uroko-kai. As a profitable venture 
that did not have to rely on bank loans, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry did not form 
the sort of keiretsu structures associated with other industries such as steel or 
chemicals. Keiretsu in these sectors generally referred to a group of firms centred 
around a main bank that lent funds and held equity stakes in member companies. 
Groupings within the pharmaceutical industry were in the form of several wholesalers 
associated with a manufacturer who held shares in these wholesalers who specialised 
in the distribution of manufacturers’ products in defined regions. These vertical 
linkages effectively served as a formidable barrier to entry for new entrants, including
Economy, Vol. 2. (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006), 552.
129 See YakugyS Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1957),
230-231; Torn Yamazaki, “Sengo Yakugyoshi [A Postwar History of the Pharmaceutical Industry] (2),” 7-12.
130 Kunihiko Futaba, “Sengo no Iyakuhin Ryutsushi: Doran ni Yoru Kakkyo to Ranbai Mondai no Hassei [The History of 
Distribution in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Korean War Boom and Emerging Problems with Dumping],” lyaku Janaru 11 
(June 1972): 40-54. See also Kunihiko Futaba, “Sengo no Iyakuhin RyOtsushi: Kaj5 Seisan ni Taisuru Shijo no Kakudai to T5sei 
no Hosaku [The History o f Distribution in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Strategies for Controlling a Market Expanding with 
Overproduction]” lyaku Janaru 11 (July 1972): 59-70. See also, “Iyakuhin RyutsO Bumon [The Distribution of Pharmaceuticals] 
Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon YakugyO Shimbunsha, 1961), 49.
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foreign pharmaceutical firms.
As well, the pharmaceutical industry reorganised and became more concentrated as 
larger firms enjoyed greater bargaining power in signing international licensing 
agreements and economies of scale in production. By the 1960s, 11 firms had more 
than 1,000 workers. It was true that Japanese pharmaceutical was still comprised of 
smaller firms than its Western counterparts. After all, more than 75% of Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms employed less than 50 workers.131 But the larger, pre-war 
pharmaceutical firms regained their dominance in Japan’s pharmaceutical industry.
In the 1950s, the government helped Japanese firms develop the pharmaceutical 
industry through a combination of policies under a protected environment. In 
particular, government’s import substitution policy helped Japanese firms catch up and 
acquire manufacturing capacities through technology imports. The government’s 
recognition of process patents further fostered the dissemination of technology across 
a many firms. Both government and firms seemed content with the acquisition of 
technology and disinterested in the development of new technologies. In particular, the 
lack of industrial policy to encourage R&D at a time when the US or British 
governments generously rewarded innovation severely undermined the development 
of a research-intensive pharmaceutical sector in Japan.132
131 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Pharmaceuticals: Caps in Technology (Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1969), 48.
132 Laecy Glenn Thomas, III, “Implicit Industrial Policy: The Triumph of Britain and the Failure of France in Global 
Pharmaceuticals,” 451 -489.
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2.5 Volume-based growth under universal health care, 1961-1975 
Supported by a combination of health and industrial policies, Japanese firms built a 
highly successful domestic industry between 1961 and 1975. To better regulate the 
quality and efficacy of drugs, the government revised the PAL in 1961. In the same 
year, the government also introduced a universal health care system. While there had 
been some coverage for prescription drugs before 1961, the universal health care 
system enabled almost all Japanese citizens to purchase medicines with a small 
co-payment. The introduction of universal health care triggered a period of 
volume-based growth as the government underwrote demand for prescription 
pharmaceuticals.133 Japan’s pharmaceutical industry expanded rapidly as many firms 
launched domestic versions of foreign discovered drugs. In the meanwhile, recurrent 
drug accidents ranging from thalidomide to cold ampoules prompted a series of 
legislation that improved drug safety and standards in Japan.
2.5.1 Thalidomide
The 1960s began with the shock of the thalidomide scandal, which exposed severe 
lapses in existing drug standards and revealed the urgent need to improve drug safety 
and efficacy criteria. Thalidomide was originally developed in Germany by the 
pharmaceutical firm Grunenthal, and was used by pregnant women to treat morning 
sickness. The drug was distributed widely between 1957 and 1962 in 46 countries.134
133 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, “Kokumin Kaihoken Seido no Kakuritsu [The Establishment of a Universal Healthcare 
System],” in Showa 36-nendo Kosei Hakusho [White Paper on Health, 1961] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1962).
134 Stefan Timmermans and Valerie Leiter, “The Redemption of Thalidomide: Standardizing the Risk o f Birth Defects,” Social 
Studies o f  Science 30, no. 1 (2000): 41-71.
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Thalidomide acquired notoriety when it caused tens of thousands of birth defects and
135deaths among babies bom to patients taking the drug.
The thalidomide tragedy underscored the importance of drug regulation. The United
States had managed to avert a national tragedy when the Federal Drug 
Administration (FDA) refused to approve the drug in I960.136 In Germany, the
authorities swiftly banned the drug’s use in November 1961 after the scientist
Widukend Lenz published an article that linked thalidomide to birth defects among 
babies.137 But the Japanese government was much slower to respond. For example,
Asia Pharmaceuticals was granted approval for thalidomide in February 1962, and
Dainihon Pharmaceuticals -  who had been marketing thalidomide since 1958 -  only 
stopped shipments of the drug in May 1962. The Japanese government’s belated
response to the thalidomide tragedy revealed serious lapses in prevailing drug
/
standards and official attitudes toward drug safety.
The thalidomide tragedy resulted in a public outcry, which heightened awareness to
the potential dangers of drugs and propelled regulatory reforms in drug safety and
efficacy around the world. The Americans reacted swiftly to the tragedies overseas
by passing the Kefauver-Harris Amendments in 1962, which bolstered existing US
133 For an overview of the thalidomide disaster, see for example, Sunday Times Insight Team, Suffer the Children: The Story o f
Thalidomide (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979); Harvey Teff, Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath (Famborough: Saxon House,
1976).
136 The American response to the Thalidomide tragedy has been documented in many articles, books. See for example, Philip 
Hilts, “Thalidomide,” in The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years o f  Regulation (New York: Knopf, 2003), 144-165.
l37“Drug is Defended by Germany Maker; Thalidomide’s Link to Baby Deformities Held Lacking,” The New York Times, 4 
August 1962,20.
138 Hideo Fujiki and Mitsuhiro Kida, eds., Yakuhin Kogai to Saiban: Saridomaido Jiken no Kiroku kara [Drug Accidents and 
Trials: From the Records o f the Thalidomide Disaster] (Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1974). Mitsushiro Kida, Thalidomide 
Embryopathy in Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987).
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regulations over drug development. While Britain, for example, legislated quality, 
safety, and efficacy guidelines in 1968, equivalent measures in Japan were only 
implemented when the PAL was revised in 1979.139
2.5.2 Health care reform and the creation of a domestic industry 
With the introduction of universal health care, the Japanese government began to 
underwrite demand for prescription drugs. Japanese pharmaceutical firms also 
benefited from a series of other reforms over the 1960s and 1970s. Of particular 
importance were the 1973 reforms that lowered co-payment levels and provided free 
health care -  including medicines -  for the elderly. These measures increased demand 
for prescription drugs and led to their over prescription. But for many Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms, these health care reforms were important in supporting their 
growth.
In Japan, physicians both prescribed and dispensed prescription drugs. This practice 
fuelled demand for prescription drugs, because pharmaceutical firms sold drugs at 
discounted prices to physicians who profited from reselling their drugs at the official 
rate. The government’s fee-for-service system also created strong incentives for 
physicians to prescribe new, higher priced drugs that tended to have greater 
pharmaceutical price differentials. This was not only because physicians could profit
139 Stuart L. Nightingale, “Drug Regulation and Policy Formulation,” The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society 
59, no. 3 (1981): 412-444; John G. Fleming, “Drug Injury Compensation Plans,” The American Journal o f  Comparative Law 30, 
no. 2 (1982): 297-323; PA Andrews, GM Thompson, GM, and C Ward, “A Regulatory View o f the Medicines Act in the United 
Kingdom” Journal o f  Clinical Pharmacology (1984): 6-8; Harvey Teff, “Drug Approval in England and the United States.” The 
American Journal o f  Comparative Law 33, no. 4 (1985): 567-610; Shosuke Koga, “Yakujihosei no Hensen [Changes to the 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act],” Gekkan Yakuji 21 (November 1979): 31-40.
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from dispensing drugs, but also because the official fees for medical services rewarded 
physicians more for prescription services than for medical consultations.140 It should 
also be noted that the Japan Medical Association (JMA) traditionally wielded
significant power over health care policy in Japan. This was particularly true during 
the JMA’s leadership by Taro Takemi between 1957 and 1982.141
The rapid rate of Japanese economic growth also propelled growth in the
pharmaceutical industry, not just by raising demand among wealthier patients, but also
by encouraging companies from other sectors of the economy to enter the
pharmaceutical sector. New entrants came from various sectors, ranging from
chemicals (such as Sumitomo Kagaku and Mitsubishi Kasei) to textiles (such as Toray 
and Teijin).142 Indeed, Japan’s growth in pharmaceutical production paralleled its
GDP growth, as both pharmaceutical production levels and GDP grew 3.4 fold 
between 1960 and 1975.143
Along with other sectors of the economy in the 1960s, Japanese pharmaceutical
firms also built central research laboratories to develop the industry. But apart from a
few entrepreneurial firms, most industrial R&D was restricted to process innovations
140 See Shuzo Nishimura, “Iryd Sangyd [The Health Care Industry],”in Sengo Nihon Sangydshi [A History o f Japanese Industries 
in the Post-war Period], ed. Sangyo Gakkai [The Society for Industrial Studies] (Tokyo: Tdyd Keizai Shinpdsha, 1995), 769-786.
141 See James Kondo, “The Iron Triangle of Japan’s Healthcare,” BMJ (British Medical Journal) 330 (January 2005): 55-56. See 
also Chusei Mizumaki, Nihon Ishikai: Horaku Suru Seiiki [The Japan Medical Association: Its Crumbling Power] (Tokyo: 
Chudkdron, 2003).
142 These firms also entered pharmaceuticals because they were facing saturation in the domestic market in their respective 
sectors. See Japan Society for the History of Pharmacy, Nihon lyakuhin Sangydshi [A History of the Japanese Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nippdsha, 1995), 121-122. The experience of Kirin Brewery, for example, was recently written by 
Michael Lynskey, ‘T he Locus o f Corporate Entrepreneurship: Kirin Brewery’s Diversification into Biopharmaceuticals,” 
Business History Review (Winter 2006): 689-723.
143 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa 
Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in die Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyd Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000); Angus 
Maddison and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Centre, The World Economy, Vol. 2. 
(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006), 552.
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or minor product innovations. In fact, technology imports rose almost three fold from 
$18.5 million to $64.7 million between 1960 and 1975.144 The creation of these 
research laboratories did prompt the shift of some pharmaceutical research from 
academia to industry. But the lack of facilities, equipment, and human capital left 
pharmaceutical firms reliant on academia to pursue research in pharmaceutical 
innovation.145 Scholars such as Hiroyuki Qdagiri have noted that much of 
pharmaceutical R&D in Japan has occurred as collaborative projects between 
academia and industry.146 In Japan, many firms lacked incentives to invest in R&D, 
not only because of capital limitations, but also due to the lack of facilities and 
equipment, the high cost of raw materials, and lack of export-oriented policies 
supported by the MITI in other industrial sectors.
144 In nominal terms, technology imports rose from $2.8 million to $17.8 million. Bureau of Statistics, Office o f the Prime 
Minister, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku [Report on the Survey of Research and Development] (Tokyo: Office of the 
Prime Minister, 1961-1984).
145 This is evident in drug development records. See Yakuji NippOsha, Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji 
Nipposha, 1950-2006).
146 See Hiroyuki Odagiri,”Transaction Costs and Capabilities as Determinants o f the R&D Boundaries o f the Firm: A Case Study
of the Ten Largest Pharmaceutical Firms in Japan,” Managerial and Decision Economics 24 (2003): 187-211.
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Figure 2. R&D Expenditures, 1960-1975147
R&D expenditures did increase, particularly as the government gradually opened its
doors to foreign competition. But while R&D expenditures increased 8.5 fold from 
19.2 billion yen to 162.4 billion yen and while R&D expenditure as a percentage of 
sales rose 2.2 fold from 2.2% to 4.9% between 1960 and 1975, it was much smaller 
than leading Western counterparts.148 In 1972, for example, R&D expenditures as a
percentage of total sales in Japan stood at 4.2% compared to 9.2% in the United States 
and 8.1% in the United Kingdom, respectively.149 Not surprisingly, few Japanese 
drugs were competitive in export markets. Japanese trade in pharmaceuticals did grow 
from 66.5 billion yen in 1960 to 291.8 billion yen in 1975.150 But imports exceeded
14 Bureau o f  Statistics, Office o f  the Prime Minister, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku  [Report on the Survey o f  Research 
and Development] (Tokyo: O ffice o f  the Prime Minister, 1961-1984).
I4ti In nominal terms, R&D expenditures between 1960 and 1975 increased from 3.7 billion yen to 95.2 billion yen. Ibid.
149 Ibid., Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers o f  America, Pharm aceutical Industry Profile 2008  (Washington, DC: 
PhRMA, March 2008), 53; Great Britain, Business Statistics Office, Industrial Research and  D evelopm ent Expenditure and  
Employment: 1975  (London: H.M.S.O., 1979), 27.
150 Pharmaceutical trade refers to the sum o f  imports and exports in pharmaceuticals. In nominal terms, Japanese trade in
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more than twice the value of exports over the 1960s, and most of Japan’s exports were 
in relatively simple drugs, such as antibiotics and vitamins, that were shipped to the 
developing w orld.151 Moreover, few Japanese drugs were recognised overseas. 
Between 1950 and 1967, less than 2% of drugs introduced in the US, UK, or German 
markets were of discovered in Japan. Conversely, of drugs in Japan, 30.6% was from 
the United States, 12.9% was from Switzerland, and 11.8% was from Germany. 
Japanese drugs comprised 24.7% of the home market.132
im p o r t s
e x p o r t s
Figure 3. Value of Pharmaceutical Trade, 1955-19801 3
pharmaceuticals increased from 12.7 billion yen in 1961 to 167.5 billion yen in 1975. See Ministry o f  International Trade and 
Industry, Tsushd Hakusho  [W hite Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1958-1973).
151 M ostly Asia. See Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakugyo K eiza i Nenkan  [Pharmaceutical Econom ics Annual] (Tokyo: Yakuji 
Nipposha, 1967), 132-137.
152 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developm ent, Pharm aceuticals: G aps in Technology’, 127.
153 Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsushd Hakusho [W hite Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku,
1958-1973); Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsushd Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: G yosei, 1974-2000).
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2.5.3 Economic development and Steps toward capital liberalisation 
As the economy grew, the international community intensified pressures on Japan to 
liberalise its capital. The Foreign Exchange Control Law and the Foreign Investment 
Law had effectively locked out foreign direct investment since 1950. But with its 
accession to the OECD and IMF in 1964, Japan agreed to phase in capital 
liberalisation. The imminent introduction of full capital liberalisation and product 
patents altered industry dynamics, as they incentivised firms to raise their R&D 
investments, modernise facilities, and adopt improved quality standards.154
While the pharmaceutical industry was not fully deregulated until 1975, the 
government gave approval for up to 50% investments in 1967.155 While Japanese 
firms were still much smaller than leading foreign pharmaceutical firms in terms of 
capital, gaps between the West were narrowing -  in profitability, R&D capacity, as 
well as the number and ability of workers.156 And while the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry still grew through the volume based production of drugs discovered overseas, 
it relied less on technology imports compared to other sectors of the Japanese
157economy.
154 YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo., Yakugyo Keizai Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Economics Annual] Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1967), 
236-244.
155 YakugyO Jihosha, Nihon no Iyakuhin Sangyd [The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Jihosha, 1973), 
160-161. [Editorial Committee for the 50 Year History of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, “Jiyuka to Kokusaika no Shinten 
[Progress in Capital Liberalisation and Internationalisation],” in Koseisho 50-nenshi [A 50 Year History o f the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare] (Tokyo: Kosei Mondai Kenkyukai, 1988), 1624-1626.
156 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Pharmaceuticals: Gaps in Technology. However, the 
profitability among firms was heavily bolstered by the health care system and is not an accurate indicator of the ability of Japanese 
firms to compete against foreign counterparts.
157 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakugyo Keizai Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Economics Annual] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1967), 
240.
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2.5.4 Product Standards
In anticipation of capital liberalisation -  as well as in response to recurrent drug 
tragedies -  the government began to improve Japan’s drug quality standards from the 
1960s through administrative guidance. 158 In the “Basic Policies for Drug 
Manufacturing Approval” in 1967, the government specified drug development 
guidelines for the first time.159 While these measures improved the quality of drugs 
available in Japan, they were different from the standards used overseas. The standards 
effectively served as a non-tariff trade barrier and excluded foreign pharmaceuticals 
from the Japanese market. Spurred by government-guaranteed demand for
prescription pharmaceuticals and sheltered from foreign competition, Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry embarked upon a remarkable period of expansion.160
This expansion was also fuelled by the relatively low criteria placed on drugs to 
qualify as a New Chemical Entity (NCE).161 Many of the new drugs launched in Japan 
during the 1960s and 1970s were not necessarily novel, and were approved with 
modest improvements such as more suitable doses, convenient forms of 
administration, or fewer side effects.162 To a certain extent, the government’s policies
158 Administrative guidance refers to informal legislation in the form o f official or unofficial announcements from the 
government. The Japanese government used administrative guidance as an instrument of industrial policy to provide guidelines 
for business. Non-compliant parties could be penalized, for example, by receiving lower quotas or less aid from the government. 
This included the launch o f an adverse reactions monitoring system in 1967 and the adoption o f Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GM P) in 1974. See Kaoru Tabuchi, “GMP no Ayumi to sono Tenbo [History and Prospects o f GMP],” Gekkan Yakuji 21 
(November 1979): 243-247.See also Shinji Nitta, “Iyakuhin no Shinsa Gyosei [Governing the Examination of Pharmaceuticals],” 
Gekkan Yakuji 21 (November 1979): 53-65.
139 This legislation created the distinction between prescription and OTC drugs by establishing criteria for drug approval in Japan. 
The 1967 guidelines, for example, specified the necessary documentation required to pursue a new drug application. Among other 
criteria, the guidelines also asked producers of prescription medicines to disclose adverse effects and provide a stable supply of 
medicines.
‘“ Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa 
Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in die Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
161 A New Chemical Entity is a chemical compound that has not been previously been approved for use in humans.
162 Robert Neimeth, “Japan’s Pharmaceutical Industry Postwar Evolution,” 158-159.
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to place a lower threshold on innovation eased the transition from process to product 
innovations. Under this system, Japanese firms launched many new drugs with 
incremental innovations and marketed these to physicians who could gain from high 
pharmaceutical price differentials. While Japan’s pharmaceutical sector grew steadily 
during this period, with minimal innovative value, most Japanese drugs could not be 
translated into overseas markets.
The gradual liberalisation of capital controls prompted a fresh wave of foreign entrants 
such as SmithKline, Eli Lilly, and Wellcome.163 But foreign firms had yet to put a dent 
into Japan’s antibiotics sector in the 1970s. After all, the product standards introduced 
in 1967 had placed foreign products out of the Japanese market. In addition, foreign 
firms were reluctant to enter a market where their large R&D investments for 
breakthrough drugs would not be rewarded for their innovative value as in their home 
markets. As well, foreign firms had yet to establish a marketing presence in Japan.164 
It was true that capital liberalisation posed a threat to many Japanese firms. But by the 
mid 1970s, Japan’s firms had largely caught up with the West, and the large 
pharmaceutical firms that dominated the domestic market were prepared to capture 
gains from abroad.
2.5.5 1973: a year of welfare for the people -  and for industry
Despite its struggles in R&D, production, and distribution, the government’s
163 Mitsibishi Bank, Ltd., ‘'Nihon Shijo ni Churyoku suru Iyakuhin Gaishi [Foreign Pharmaceutucal Firms Eye the Japanese 
Market,” Mitsubishi Bank Research Report 369 (January 1986): 32.
164 Yakugyo Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Jihosha, 1968-2000).
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sponsorship of demand continued to help the growth of Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry. The impact of the government’s health care policies was particularly evident 
in-the 1973 reforms. Dubbed “The Year of Welfare,” in 1973, the government 
introduced several welfare measures that increased its level of sponsorship of 
prescription pharmaceuticals. Thirty percent co-payment levels were introduced for 
family dependants, medical fees were capped for high cost treatments, and free health 
care was provided for the elderly.165 The impact of these reforms was immediate, and 
while production levels had been increasing since 1961, the 1973 reforms added a 
fresh surge in momentum.
Indeed, from the introduction of universal health care in 1961, the pharmaceutical 
industry expanded markedly. While it was the fifth largest global producer of 
pharmaceuticals in 1960, Japan became the second largest producer of 
pharmaceuticals in 1963. Growth in pharmaceutical production was more rapid in 
Japan compared to the United States or Europe. Between 1960 and 1965, for 
example, pharmaceutical production in Japan increased 1.7 fold compared to 1.4 fold 
in the United Kingdom or 1.3 fold in the United States.166 Between 1961 and 1975, 
production almost tripled from 1.1 trillion yen to 3.1 trillion yen.167
165 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Kosei Hakusho [White Paper on Health and Welfare] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1974).
166 YakugyO Keizai Kenkyu jo, Yakugyo Keizai Nenkan [Economics of the Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yakuji 
Nipposha, 1967), 299.
167 In nominal terms, production levels rose from 218.1 million yen to 1.8 trillion yen. Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji 
Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyO Keizai 
Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
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Figure 4. Value of Pharmaceutical Production, 1955-1980168
Contemporaries expressed concern about the over-production of similar therapeutic
products, which led to intense competition. To a certain extent, the lack of a strong
intellectual property rights regime prompted the entry of many new firms, which also 
intensified volume-based expansion through the 1970s.169 To gain an edge in the
market, Japanese firms -  which numbered 1,359 in 1975 -  continued to engage in 
dumping and excessive bargaining in the form of bribes or services.170 Neither
administrative guidance nor industry initiatives had much effect in curbing these
practices. Some order was restored in 1970, when the government finally threatened to
l6S Ibid. It should be noted that official figures for prescription drugs were not com piled until 1968.. The dip after 1970 is due
largely to the oil shock.
169 Yano Research Institute, “Tasangyo kara no Kigyo Shinshutsu [N ew  Entrants from Other Sectors],” Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan
(Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1975), 78. Between 1970 and 1980, the number o f  facilities related to pharmaceutical
manufacture increased from 20,993 to 22.497. See Ministry o f  Health and Welfare. “Pharmaceutical Business Facilities 
(C.Y. 1 9 4 4 -1 9 9 6 , F.Y. 199 7 -2 0 0 4 ).” http://www.stat.go.ip/data/chouki/24.htm (accessed 27 July 2008).
170 Jyakuhin Sangyo Jitta i Chosa Hokoku [Report on the Status o f  the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Ministry o f  Health and 
Welfare, 1988-2000). Reprinted in Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, D ata Book (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, 2007), 2.
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• • • 171de-list the drugs of firms engaged in excessive discounting practices.
With the launch of universal health care in 1961, the government guaranteed demand 
for prescription pharmaceuticals and substantially expanded the domestic market. 
The government’s health policies increased demand as it encouraged physicians to 
prescribe new drugs to benefit from pharmaceutical price differentials. The 
government’s protectionist policies and recognition of process patents also 
encouraged the development of the pharmaceutical industry by allowing many firms 
to produce similar products.
At the same time, however, impending plans to liberalise capital controls and 
introduce product patents in the 1970s encouraged many firms to invest in R&D and 
seek overseas markets. As in the previous period, links to academic laboratories 
remained essential for drug development. The threat of capital liberalisation also 
encouraged firms to invest in central laboratories; some firms also invested more 
heavily in R&D and launched Japan origin drugs.
2.6 Transitions to quality based growth, 1975-1990
By the 1970s, most Japanese firms were catching up with foreign firms in terms of 
discovery capacity, if not size or sales. Between 1975 and 1979,4% of new drugs that 
were launched in the majority of the G7 countries were discovered in Japan. This was
171 Tokai Bank, Ltd., “Hanbai-m5 no Kyoka o Isogu Iyakuhinkai [The Pharmaceutical Industry Rushes to Strengthen its 
Distribution Network],” Tokai Ginko Chosa Geppo 222 (January 1966): 17-26. See also, Kunihiko Futaba, “Sengo no Iyakuhin 
Ryutsushi: Iyakuhin KogyO no Kiki to Dakai e no Mosaku [The History of Distribution in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Seeking 
Solutions to the Challenges o f the Pharmaceutical Industry],” lyaku Janaru 11 (September 1972): 44-53.
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a time when 29% of new global products were discovered in the United States, 18%
were discovered in Germany, 11% were discovered in Switzerland, and 1% was 
discovered in the United Kingdom.172 Japan’s pharmaceutical industry now reached a
turning point. Government policies to liberalise capital and strengthen intellectual
property protection opened the market and encouraged firms to invest in product 
innovations.173 Under foreign pressure, the government removed barriers to entry and
introduced enhanced safety, quality, and efficacy standards that helped improve the
quality of drugs available in Japan.
2.6.1 Creating a modem market: opening up and protecting intellectual property
In the mid 1970s, the government introduced two measures that aimed to modernise
the market. While intense lobbying by the Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (JPMA) with the MITI, MHW, and Keidanren had helped stall 
deregulation, capital controls were finally liberalised in 1975.174 Product patents were 
introduced shortly thereafter, in 1976.175 Both changes brought an influx of foreign
firms, who could now worry less about the imitation of their products. Not only did
these measures lead Japanese firms to adopt a more research-intensive orientation to
172 P.E. Barral, 20 Years o f  Pharmaceutical Research Results Throughout the World (Antony: Rohne-Poulenc Rorer Foundation), 
24. See also, Elma S. Hawkins and Michael R. Reich, “Japanese-originated Pharmaceutical Products in the United States from 
1960 to 1989: An Assessment of Innovation,” 1-11.
173 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, “Iyakuhin Sangyo nado no GenjO to Shomondai [Current Status and Problems in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry]” in Kdsei Hakusho [White Paper on Health] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1977).
174 Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Seiyakukyd 20-nenshi [A 20 year History of the Japan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association] (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 1988), 57-58, 63-64. Established in 1946, 
the Keidanren was one of Japan’s four leading economic organizations, along with the Nikkeiren, the Japan Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry and the Japan Committee for Economic Development. Known to represent the voice of big business 
toward the government’s economic policies, it merged with Nikkeiren into the Nippon Keidanren in 2002. the Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association’s success in bargaining an extention to capital controls between the late 1960s and 
early 1970s has been discussed in Soichiro Giga, “Han’ei noNaka noNaiyO Gaikan” Iyaku Janaru 9 (October 1970): 24-31. The 
experience of Sankyo’s former vice president is discussed in an interview with Jushin Suzuki, “Hanbai ni Kokoro Ubaware 
Soyaku Wasureta Seiyaku Sangyo [Caught Up in Sales, the Pharmaceutical Industry Forgot to Develop Drugs],” Doraggu 
Magajirt 43 (January 2000): 54-^66.
175 Ministry of Health and Welfare, “Iyakuhin SangyO nado no GenjO to Shomondai [Current Status and Problems in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry]” in Kdsei Hakusho [White Paper on Health] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1977).
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compete, they also helped protect new discoveries made by Japanese firms.
2.6.2 The cost of an ageing population
By the 1980s, Japan began to feel the pressures of an ageing population. The 
proportion of the population aged 65 and over reached 9.1%, more than double the
11 fklevel in 1950. There was higher demand for medicines to treat diseases of affluence, 
and rising health care costs began to place a burden on Japan’s universal health care 
system, which had been based on a population structure characterized by high birth 
rates and a large population of workers who split the cost of elderly care.177
The government responded to the rising health care costs in two major ways. First, it 
introduced biennial price reductions in 1981, starting with a steep, across-the-board
1 7Qreduction of 18.6%. In 1982, it ended free health care coverage to the elderly under 
the law, “Healthcare for the Aged.” The response was swift, and production levels 
peaked in 1982. The rate of growth in production had actually stumbled slightly earlier, 
as the official rates for initial consultation fees and hospitalisation fees were raised in 
1980. But combined with a raise in beneficiary co-payment levels from 10% to 20% in 
1984, production values fell from 4.0 trillion yen in 1982 to 3.8 trillion yen in 1985. 
The biennial price reductions also helped stem the pace of increase in production from 
an average year-on-year growth of 5.2% in the 1970s to 3.8% in the 1980s.179
176 Ministery of International Affairs and Communications/' Population by Single Years o f Age and Sex (1884— 2000),” 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/02.htm (accessed 20 March 2007).
177 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, “Patients and Deaths o f Infectious Diseases and Food Poisoning (1876 1999),” 
http://www.stat.go.ip/data/chouki/02.htm (accessed 6 May 2008).
178 JihO, lryo Iyakuhin Oydkai no Ippan Chishiki [General Information on the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical Industries] (Tokyo: 
Jih5 ,2005), 60.
179 In nominal terms, production values fell from 3.40 trillion yen in 1982 to 3.38 trillion yen in 1985. Ministry o f Health and
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Figure 5. Value of Pharmaceutical Production, 1970-1995180
The biennial price reductions had a particularly severe impact on Japanese
pharmaceutical firms’ incentive to invest in R&D. As the graph in figure 6 indicates, 
drug prices fell 67.9% between 1981 and 1991.181 Drug prices were revised uniformly 
on a regular basis -  regardless of innovative value -  throughout the patent protection 
period. These reductions incentivised Japanese firms to launch a stream of new drugs
with short product life and little innovative value that could recoup the costs of R&D, 
rather than invest in more substantial innovation. After all, the threshold on innovation
was much smaller for new drugs in Japan compared to many advanced markets. While
Welfare, Yakuji K dgyo  Seisan D otai C hdsa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: 
Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
IK0 Ibid. There are three dips in this period. The first is due to the oil shock, the second is due the end o f  free health care for the 
elderly in 1982, and the third stems from the burst o f  Japan’s econom ic bubble o f  the 1980s.
m Jiho, l iy d  Iyakuhin Gvokai no Ippan Chishiki [General Information on the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical Industries] (Tokyo: 
Jiho, 2005), 60.
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the industry did intensify its R&D orientation, most firms invested less than many 
American and European firms. These trends hindered the industry’s prospects of 
launching breakthrough drugs that would have been more competitive overseas.
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Figure 6. Impact of Price Reductions, 1980-2005 (1980=100)182
There were several new entrants into the pharmaceutical sector during this period: 
foreign firms and Japanese firms from other industries. Capital liberalisation in 1975, 
of course, had a pronounced effect on increasing the number of foreign firms in Japan. 
In 1970, there were 74 foreign pharmaceutical firms operating in Japan. By 1980,
1 O l
these figures had risen to 239. Major firms such as Eli Lilly and Glaxo expanded 
their operations in Japan. With limited marketing capacities, however, most foreign
182 Yakuji Kenkyukai, Saikin no Yakumu G ydsei [Recent Trends in Pharmaceutical Administration] (Tokyo: Yakumu Kdhosha,
2005), 133. See also, Jiho, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2000-2007). Drug prices in
1980 are indexed to 100.
183 M itsibishi Bank, Ltd., “Nihon Shijo ni Churyoku suru Iyakuhin Gaishi [Foreign Pharmaceutucal Firms Eye the Japanese 
Market,” M itsubishi Bank Research Report 369 (January 1986): 22-32.
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firms had yet to make a substantial presence in the Japanese market during this
period.184 For many Japanese firms, Merck’s 1983 acquisition of a controlling stake in
1 6^
Banyu highlighted the very threat that they had wished to avoid for decades. While 
foreign firms had existed in Japan before the 1970s, what changed were the 
prominence, power, and permanence of these firms.
There were other new entrants from other sectors of the Japanese economy. Since the 
oil shock of the 1970s, Japan had been unable to check the slowing of its economy. As 
various industrial sectors matured, firms began to seek opportunities for 
diversification, particularly in the hope that they would be able to capitalise on the 
potential of new developments in biotechnology. While funding levels only amounted 
to a tenth of US levels, government agencies such as the Science and Technology 
Agency (STA), MITI, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries and Fisheries 
(MAFF), provided funding for biotechnology research projects. By coordinating 
research between government, industry, and academia, the government aimed to 
translate the fruits of this research into commercially viable discoveries.186
New entrants came from a range of sectors, as evidenced by the textile maker Teijin, 
milk producers such as Snow Brand Milk Products and Meiji Dairies, and breweries
184 YakugyO JihOsha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyO Jihosha, 1968-1999).
185 Steve Lohr, “Merck’s Big Venture in Japan,” The New York Times, 13 October 1983. Merck’s acquisition o f Banyu was one of 
the first foreign acquisitions of a major Japanese firm. Banyu was then a firm listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. However, its overreliance on technology imports and lack of investment in R&D had dried up the firm’s product 
offering and profit potentials. By 1980s, it was in dire need of capital and in search o f a partner who would acquire the firm.
186 See for example, Mark D. Dibner, “Biotechnology in Pharmaceuticals: The Japanese Challenge,” Science 229 (September 
1985): 1230-1235.
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1 Q7such as Suntory and Kirin Brewery. Firms with expertise in fermentation 
techniques were particularly well placed to take advantage of these new technologies. 
Without a sophisticated distribution network, however, few of the new firms posed a 
threat to existing firms -  even if they could discover breakthrough drugs.
2.6.3 “Gaiatsu” in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry
As frictions grew between Japan and its trading partners in the 1980s, foreign 
governments began to place additional pressure on the Japanese government to 
improve access to its market. They argued that non-tariff barriers continued to prevent 
foreign pharmaceutical firms from competing in the Japanese market. These foreign 
pressures, or Gaiatsu, were particularly pronounced from the United States. In 1985, 
American and Japanese officials held market-oriented and sector-selective (MOSS) 
talks that aimed to remove barriers to market access in four sectors -  including 
pharmaceuticals.188
These demands induced Japanese officials to reduce barriers by accepting foreign 
clinical data, clarifying the criteria for innovation, and improving transparency in the 
pricing process. Japanese drug authorities, for example, still required that drugs sold in 
Japan were to be tested on Japanese patients -  and that drug approval applications be 
filed in Japanese. Moreover, Japan’s complex distribution system for pharmaceuticals
187 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1980), 12-15; Kinoichi Tsunematsu, “Saihen 
Katei no Iyakuhin SangyO [The Pharmaceutical Industry under Reorganisation],” Iyaku Janaru 9 (September 1970): 20-23.
188 United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Market Access and Compliance, “MOSS 
Agreement on Medical Equipment and Pharmaceuticals,” United States Department of Commerce, 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/iapan/source/menu/medpharmAa860109.html (accessed 15 May 2007).
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still made it extremely difficult for foreign firms to sell drugs in Japan. Business 
organisations such as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) in the 
United States and the European Business Council (EBC) in Europe also held regular 
talks with Japanese officials and heavily influenced the process of deregulation.190 
The reforms that followed intensified the competitive pressures in the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry.
2.6.4 Responses to change
R & D  e x p e n d it u r e s  
R &  D /s a le s
1 9 7 5  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 5  1 9 9 0
Figure 7. R&D Expenditures, 1975-1990191
While the government’s cost cutting measures did dent incentives to innovate, the
189 ibid.
190 “Yusei na Kaihatsuryoku de Kyuseicho o Tsuzukeru Zainichi Gaishi [With Stronger Developm ent Capacities, Foreign Firms 
in Japan Continue to Grow Rapidly],” D etailman, (M ay 1992): 28-35.
191 O ffice o f  the Prime Minister, Bureau o f  Statistics, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Survey o f  Research 
and Development] (Tokyo: O ffice o f  the Prime Minister, 1961-1984); Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau 
& Statistics Centre, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Survey o f  Research and Development] (Tokyo: 
Management and Coordination Agency, 1985-2000).
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rising competition from new Japanese and foreign firms in a more open market 
urged Japanese firms to intensify their R&D orientation. A 1987 revision in Japan’s 
patent law further encouraged firms to invest in R&D, as it became possible to extend 
the effective life of a patent and recover the time lost in the drug testing and approval
192process.
Indeed, between 1975 and 1990, R&D expenditures rose 3.3 fold from 162.4 billion 
yen to 534.8 billion yen, or from 4.9% to 8.0% in terms of R&D as a proportion of total 
sales.193 The number of regular researchers employed in pharmaceutical firms also
increased from 6,854 to 14,932. Technology imports also rose 2.5 fold from 8.8 billion
yen to 22.3 billion yen, while technology exports leapt 9.3 fold from 2.1 billion yen to 
19.6 billion yen.194 The number of patents approved in Japan among Japanese firms 
also rose from 376 in 1980 to 623 in 1990.195 Over the 1980s, Japan also discovered
24.1% of the world’s new therapeutic substances, compared to 26.6% in the United 
States and 48.7% in Western Europe.196
Between 1975 and 1990, the key change in Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was a shift
192 The partial revision to the patent law, Law No.27 in 1987, became effective in 1988. See “Iyakuhin no Kenkyu Kaihatsu no 
Shien: Gutaiteki na Shiensaku [Supporting R&D in Pharmaceuticals: Specific Support Policies]” in Kosei Hakusho (Tokyo: 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1988)
http://wwwhakusvo.mhlw.go.ip/wpdocs/hpazl98701 /b0053.html: Kazuyuki Motohashi, “Japan's Patent System and Business 
Innovation: Reassessing Pro-patent Policies,” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 03-E-020, 
http://www.rieti.go.ip/en/publications/act dp2003.html (accessed 15 May 2008).
193 In nominal terms, R&D expenditures between 1975 and 1990 rose from 95.2 billion yen to 516.1 billion yen. Ibid.
194 In nominal terms, technology imports rose from 5.2 billion yen to 21.5 billion yen, while technology exports rose from 1.3 
billion yen to 18.9 billion yen. Ibid. See also, Will Mitchell, Thomas Roehl, and Ronald J. Slattery, “Influences on R&D Growth 
among Japanese Pharmaceutical Finns,” Journal o f  High Technology Management Research 6 (1995): 17-31.
195 Japan Patent Office. Number of patents approved are reprinted in Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Data 
Book (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 2007), 45.
196 This figure does need to be treated with caution, as the criteria for new drug approval was lower in Japan for other countries. 
The figure is used to indicate that there were advances in drug discovery during this period. See European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures (Brussels: EFPIA, 1997): 12, and 
EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures (Brussels: EFPIA, 2005), 20.
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from a manufacturing-based to a knowledge-based industry. The Japanese market also
became more concentrated as firms faced more competition and invested in more 
R&D.197 In 1970 Japanese firms invested 3.0% of sales in R&D, but by 1990, these 
figures had increased to 8.0%.198 In the meanwhile, the market continued to expand in
terms of production and trade. While imports were still 3.6 times the value of imports
during this time, Japanese exports increased 1.8 fold from 64.1 billion yen to 116.2 
billion yen between 1975 and 1990.199 Japan’s export destinations also shifted from 
the developing to the developed world.200
Despite the influx of foreign firms, however, the majority of Japanese firms did not
venture abroad. Among the 1,123 Japanese pharmaceutical firms in 2000, for example,
J O 1there were only 245 that had expanded abroad. To a certain extent this was
understandable, as many Japanese firms were not in a position to compete against
J O Jleading Western firms who had already expanded into these markets. Even so,
between 1975 and 1990, Japanese firms adopted a more global orientation. Firms with 
overseas operations rose 3.0 fold from 30 in 1975 to 91 in 1990. But Japanese firms
197 Japan Fair Trade Commission, Shuyo Sangyo ni okeru Ruiseki Seisan Shuchudo [Concentration Ratio o f Main Industries] 
(Tokyo: Japan Fair Trade Commission, 1975-1994), http://www.iftc.go.ip/katudo/ruiseki/ruisekidate.html (accessed 1 June 
2008).
198 Office o f the Prime Minister, Bureau of Statistics, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Survey of Research 
and Development] (Tokyo: Office of the Prime Minister, 1961-1984); Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau 
& Statistics Centre, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Survey o f Research and Development] (Tokyo: 
Management and Coordination Agency, 1985-2000).
199 In nominal terms, Japanese exports increased from 36.8 billion yen to 111.1 billion yen. Ministry o f International Trade and 
Industry, Tsushd Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1958-1973); Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry, Tsushd Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1974-2000).
200 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
201 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Iyakuhin Sangyo Jittai Chosa Hokokusho [Report on the Pharmaceutical Industry] 
(Tokyo: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2001); Yano Research Institute Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan (Tokyo: Yano Research 
Institute), reprinted in Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Data Book (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, 2007), 21.
202 YakugyO JihQsha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyS Jihosha, 1968-1999). See also, 
“Kill or Cure for Japan's Drug Firms,” The Economist, 29 August 1981, 78.
203 Yano Research Institute Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute), reprinted in Japan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, Data Book (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 2007), 21.
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had yet to establish a substantial international presence.204
2.7 Building a R&D intensive, global pharmaceutical industry, 1990-2005 
In contrast to previous decades of relative stability, the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry underwent a dramatic transformation in the 1990s. The industry experienced 
a massive reorganisation, and became more global and research-intensive. The 1990s 
began with reforms to the distribution system, which were followed by the 
harmonisation of pharmaceutical regulations with Europe and the United States, and 
other deregulatory measures. These reforms prompted foreign firms to increase their 
presence in the Japanese market, just as Japanese firms increased their presence 
abroad. As firms attempted to counter rising R&D costs and intense global 
competition, and wave of M&A swept across the industry.
But much remained to be addressed. Delays to drug approval following an HIV blood 
scandal increased R&D costs, while biennial price reductions continued to penalise 
investments in innovation. Structural problems, such as the lack of qualified reviewers, 
and the absence of government funding for industrial R&D, also hindered the launch 
of new drugs in Japan. Seeking more favourable conditions abroad, some Japanese 
firms began to transfer their core operations out of Japan to the United States and 
Europe. The industry did continue to expand in terms of production, trade and R&D. 
But Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was still much smaller than global leaders in
204 In 1990, Takeda, Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firm, was still the only Japanese company that ranked within the top 25 
global pharmaceutical companies (in sales). See PJB Publications, Scrip: Pharmaceutical Company League Tables 1991 
(Richmond: PJB Publications, 1991), 2.
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terms of sales, R&D expenditures, or value of exports, and the country remained a net 
importer of pharmaceuticals.205
2.7.1 The HIV scandal and an enduring drug lag
Just as the thalidomide tragedy coloured the debates over drug approval in the 1960s, 
the HIV blood scandal in Japan did the same in the 1990s. But unlike the more positive 
responses to the 1960s drug scandal through better legislation, the 1990s scandal 
resulted in significant delays to the drug approval process. This led to a serious rise in 
the cost of R&D and urged some Japanese firms to seek more favourable opportunities 
abroad.
The HIV blood scandal was a drug accident that came to light in the 1990s after 
Japanese haemophiliacs contracted HIV from the circulation of untreated blood 
products. Despite knowledge over the potential dangers of unheated blood products, 
the MHW had allowed for their circulation to reduce competition for Japan’s leading 
provider of blood products, Green Cross Corp. The Japanese firm was not yet prepared 
to produce heat-treated blood products that were available abroad. As a 
pharmaceutical firm to which many MHW bureaucrats also retired, conflicts of 
interests also prevented MHW bureaucrats from taking actions that might have 
alienated the firm. Legal proceedings suggested that the MHW had delayed the 
approval of heat-treated blood products in order to allow Green Cross to catch up with
205 See for example, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., “Honkakuteki na KyosO Jidai o Mukaeru Iyakuhin Gyokai [The 
Pharmaceutical Industry to Enter an era of Real Competition],” Chosa Geppo [Monthly Research Report] 107 (February 2005): 
1-9.
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foreign rivals.206
The Japanese drug lag since the 1990s originates from this scandal, which left the 
MHW much more cautious and tentative in the drug approval process. It has also been
a major source of contention for firms seeking to introduce new drugs swiftly into the 
market.207 For many firms, R&D in Japan became less attractive, as longer assessment
times raised the cost of drug development for a relatively low priced drug. In 1980,
A^O
drug approvals in Japan took much less than the 26.3 months in the United States.
But by 2000, the average time for drug approval in Japan was 28.5 months compared 
to 16.5 months in the United States.209
While the major response to the drug scandal was a delay in the drug approval process,
there was a silver lining. The scandal also cut excess demand for unnecessary
medicines and contributed to the fall in production levels over the 1990s. The widely
publicised scandal produced better-informed patients more sceptical of medicines,
increasingly sensitive to out of pocket drug expenses, and reluctant to spend on minor
medicines -  particularly under economic recession.
206 See Yakugai Konzetsu Foramu, Yakugai Eizu wa Naze Okitaka [Why the HIV Drug Tragedy Occurred],” (Tokyo: KirishobQ, 
1996); Eric A. Feldman, “HIV and Blood in Japan, Transforming Private Conflict in Public Scandal,” in Blood Feuds: Aids, 
Blood and the Politics o f  Medical Disaster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 59-94; Takao Takahashi, “Medical Business 
Ethics: The HIV-Tainted Blood Affair in Japan,” in Taking Life and Death Seriously: Bioethics from  Japan, ed. Takao 
Takahashi (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), 253-273.
207 P. Reed Maurer, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, 11 July 2007. Kenjiro Nagasaka, interview by author, Osaka, Japan, 15 
December 2007.
208 Janice M. Reichert, “Trends in Development and Approval Times for New Therapeutics in the United States,” Nature 
Reviews Drug Discovery 2 (September 2003): 697; P. Reed Maurer, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, 11 July 2007. KenjirQ 
Nagasaka, interview by author, Osaka, Japan, 15 December 2007.
209 Kuniaki Yasuda, “Nihon ni Okeru Shiniyakuin no ShSnin Shinsa Kikan [Approval Times for New Drugs in Japan],” 
Research Paper Series, Office o f Pharmaceutical Industry Research, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 35 
(December 2006); Federal Drug Administration, CDER Drug and Biological Approval Reports, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/default.htm (accessed 4 May 2008).
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2.7.2 Distribution Reform in 1990: a much needed cleanup
In the Japanese pharmaceutical industry, the supply chain linking manufacturers to 
patients involved two intermediaries: wholesalers and dispensing physicians. Since 
1951, the retail price of prescription drugs had been set by the government. As a result, 
dispensing physicians increased their margins by bargaining down the price paid to 
wholesalers. Until 1992, pharmaceutical manufacturers usually entered into resale 
price maintenance agreements with their wholesalers. Most forms of resale price 
maintenance were illegal in Japan since 1947. But Japan’s antimonopoly statute 
exempted pharmaceuticals from this prohibition. The resale price maintenance 
agreements limited the competitive pressure on Japan’s many small and inefficient 
wholesalers. For the manufacturers, this arrangement made it difficult for new entrants 
to sell drugs to Japanese wholesalers or dispensing physicians.210
In 1991, the government introduced several measures to reform the distribution 
system. These measures were, to a large extent, a response to foreign pressures to 
reduce barriers to entry into the Japanese market. The sheer complexity and cost 
involved in pharmaceutical distribution in Japan had deterred many potential firms 
from making a full entry into the market. The consternation of foreign firms in facing 
these market barriers, for example, was addressed in state-level talks, such as the 
Structural Impediments Initiative with the United States between 1989 and 1990.211
210 Problems with this system have been discussed widely. See for example, Shumei Tanaka, “Iyakuhin no Ryutsu o Meguru 
Mondaiten [Problems in Pharmaceutical Distribution],” in Shakai Yakugaku Nyumon (Tokyo: NankOdO, 1987), 156-168.
211 U.S. Department o f Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office o f Japan Market Access and Compliance, 
“U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII),” United States Department o f Commerce, 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/iapan/market-opening/market-opening.htm (accessed 2 May 2008).
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As part of the distribution reforms, resale price maintenance in pharmaceuticals was 
prohibited.212 This measure basically destroyed the vertical groupings that had long 
persisted between select wholesalers and manufacturers, and lowered barriers to 
entry.213 Liberated from the control of manufacturers, these reforms sparked a wave of 
consolidation, and wholesalers swiftly expanded from regional to national 
coverage.214 While there were 403 wholesalers in Japan in 1990, there were only 232 
by 2000.215 As larger firms, wholesalers were able to increase their bargaining power
916in dealing with manufacturers.
Another part of distribution reform involved a correction to the government’s method
of calculating the biennial price reductions, which no longer made it possible for
physicians to profit substantially from pharmaceutical price differentials. This resulted
in a shift in promotional strategies among pharmaceutical firms. No longer able to
provide generous discounts for physicians, pharmaceutical firms invested in the
education of marketing representatives to compete on the basis of quality rather than
price.
2,2 The new price settlement system was called “Shin-shikirika-sei.” See Ministry of Health and Welfare, “Iyakuhin, IryOryOgu no 
Ryfltsu Kindaika [Modernisation of Distribution in Pharmaceuticals and Medical Equipment],” in Kosei Hakusho [White Paper 
on Health and Welfare] (Tokyo, Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1974); Japan, House of Representatives, Health and Welfare Committee, 
Official Report o f  Debates, 126th Diet, 6th Session, 2 April 1993; Japan, House o f Councillors, Health and Welfare Committee, 
Official Report o f  Debates, 126th Diet, 7th Session, 20 April 1993; Japan, House o f Councillors, Health and Welfare Committee, 
Official Report o f  Debates, 126th Diet, 11th Session, 30 June 1993.
213 See Tadashi Inoue, “IryoyO Iyakuhin Shijo no Tokushusei to RyutsO Kaikaku [Special Feaures o f the Prescription 
Pharmaceutical Market and Distribution Reform],” Waseda Shakaigaku Kenkyu 49 (October 1994): 55-65. See also Japan 
Business History Association, Banyu Pharmaceutical: 85 Year History (Tokyo: Banyu Pharmaceutical, 2002): 304-308. Banyu 
Pharmaceutical’s then president Kenjiro Nagasaka responded spearheaded the industry’s reforms in distribution in response to the 
government’s policy reforms.
214 P. Reed Maurer, “Why Japanese Pharmaceutical Wholesalers Merge,” Pharma Marketletter, 4 June 1999; Ministry o f Health 
and Welfare, Iyakuhin Sangyd Jittai Chosa Hokoku [Report on the Status o f the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 1988-2000).
2,5 These figures are in terms of the number of companies who were members o f the Federation of Japan Pharmaceutical 
Wholesalers Association. True figures are expected to be higher, and the fall in the number of wholesalers much more dramatic. 
Federation o f Japan Pharmaceutical Wholesalers Association, “Changes in the Number of Member Firms” 
http://www.ipwa.or.iD/ipwa/index.html (accessed 4 May 2007). JihO, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] 
(Tokyo: Jih5, 2002), 215.
216 P. Reed Maurer, “Positive News on ‘Dramatic’ Wholesaler Restructuring in Japan Overlooked,” Pharma Marketletter, 20 
November 2003.
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2.7.3 Sweeping changes in the regulatory environment
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry made a major step towards globalisation when the 
government decided to harmonise its pharmaceutical regulations with the United 
States and Europe. In 1990, the three regions formed The International Conference on 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for 
Human Use (ICH) to reduce or eliminate the cost and time involved in duplicating 
drug development across countries. The harmonisation of regulations meant that 
Japanese drugs could easily be approved in the United States and Europe, just as 
European and American drugs could easily be approved in Japan. By using resources 
efficiently, the ICH also aimed to bring quality drugs more quickly to the market.217
For Japanese firms, incentives to innovate improved markedly. The adoption of 
American and European regulations strengthened the criteria for innovation. As well, 
Japanese firms were forced to compete with a greater number of foreign firms as 
harmonisation improved access to the Japanese market.218 In 1990, no foreign firms 
were among the top ten Japanese pharmaceutical firms.219 By 2005, there were two: 
Pfizer and Novartis. At the same time, harmonisation made it much easier for 
Japanese firms to access the large markets of Europe and the United States. In 1990,91
2,7 The International Conference on Harmonisation o f Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use, http://www. ich.org. (accessed 15 May 2007).
218 “Better and Stronger Brands: Brand Managers are Focusing on Launching Products Globally, Aiming to Make Patients and 
Physicians All Over the World Aware of their Products and in the Process Build Powerful Brands,” Med A d News 1 October 
2002, S16 (4); “Entering Japan: Deregulation Transforms the Third-largest Pharmaceutical Market into a Friendlier Place for 
Business,” Med A d News 1 March 2003,1 (3).
219 PJB Publications, Scrip: Pharmaceutical Company League Tables 1991 (Richmond: PJB Publications, 1991), 42.
220 JihO, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Jih5, 2007), 473. This excludes firms solely dedicated 
to the bulk production o f drugs.
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firms had expanded into overseas markets; by 2005, there were 284.221 ICH also 
helped raise the profile of Japanese firms, as they developed more innovative and
OOOeffective drugs that were recognised and successful in world markets.
This momentum for reform continued into the late 1990s. For example, Japanese 
authorities lowered barriers to foreign entry by dismissing the Japanese language 
requirement in filing patent applications, disposing of the requirement to conduct 
clinical trials on Japanese subjects, eliminating the local manufacturing requirement 
for foreign firms, and creating tax incentives for R&D.223 In 1997, the government 
added more flexibility to the market by recognising the use of contract research 
organisations to improve efficiency in drug development.224
In Japan, academics at national and public universities in Japan were considered to be
00^civil servants. Until 1998, Japanese academics were not allowed to take outside 
employment. This rule discouraged academics working on pharmaceuticals from
221 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyd Nenkan (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute), reprinted in Japan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, Data Book (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 2007), 21. In 1990, for 
example, there were 37 manufacturing facilities and 44 sales offices abroad. In 200S, there were 102 manufacturing facilities and 
206 sales offices abroad.
222 Established in 1990, the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) is a project which aims to harmonize the pharmaceutical regulations o f Europe, Japan 
and the United States. See http://www. ich.ore. The impact of foreign firms on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry has been 
reported in Mizuho Corporate Bank, Ltd., “Obei Seiyaku Kigyo no Saihen Doko to Wagakuni Seiyakigyokai no Inpurikeshon,” 
Mizuho Sangyd Chosa 17 (March 2005): 1-42.
223 Yakugyo Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo JihOsha, 1968-1999); JihO, Yakuji 
Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: JihO, 2000-2007).
224Ministry o f Health and Welfare, “Standards for the Implementation o f Clinical Trials on Pharmaceutical Products,”
MHW Ordinance No. 28,27 March 1997; and Ministry o f Health and Welfare, “Application of Standards for the 
Implementation o f Clinical Trials on Pharmaceutical Products,” Notification No. 445 o f Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics 
Division/Notification No. 68 of the Safety Division, Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau, 29 May 1997. Information on contract 
research organizations in Japan may be found at, Japan CRO Association, http://www.icroa.gr.ip/ (accessed 4 May 2008).
225 This status changed with the incorporation o f national universities in Japan in April 2004. See Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology, “Incorporation o f National Universities,” in FY2003 White Paper on Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2004), 
http://211.120.54.153/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpac200301 /hpac200301_2_021 .html
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commercializing their research. In 2000, the government also made it possible for
academics to establish companies and made it easier for academics to move between 
academia and industry. In so doing, the Japanese government hoped that, as in other
countries, university start-ups might help translate the fruits of academic research into 
commercial products.228
2.7.4 The impact of a greying population and cost containment policies
Over the 1990s, Japan’s ageing population intensified the financial pressures on the
national health insurance system. The proportion of the population aged 65 and over 
increased from 12.0% to 17.8% between 1990 and 2000.229 In response to the rising
financial pressures, the government continued to legislate reductions in the price of 
prescription drugs. As the government subsidised the purchase of prescription drugs in 
Japan, it was strongly incentivised to contain the prices of these drugs.230
The government’s policy of containing drug prices undermined the ability and
willingness of firms to make substantial reinvestments in R&D. The potential profits
of developing a new drug in Japan were much smaller than the United States, for
226 See Steven Collins and Hikoji Wakoh, “Universities and Technology Transfer in Japan: Recent Reforms in Historical 
Perspective,” The Journal o f  Technology Transfer 25 (June 2000): 213-222; Kenji Kushida, “Japanese Entrepreneurship: 
Changing Incentives in the Context of Developing a New Economic Model,” Stanford Journal o f  East Asian Affairs 1 (Spring 
2001): 86-95.
227 Barriers to entrepreneurship has been discussed in Yoshiaki Nakamura and Hiroyuki Odagiri, “Nihon no Baiobencha Kigyo: 
Sono Igi to Jittai [Japanese Bioventures: Meaning and Current Status],” RETTI Discussion Paper Series 02-J-007 (June 2002). An 
assessment o f recent changes in legislation has been written by Michael Lynskey “The Commercialisation of Biotechnology in 
Japan: Bioventures as a Mechanism of Knowledge Transfer from Universities,” International Journal o f  Biotechnology 6 (2004): 
155-185. Limitations on relying predominantly on in-house R&D has also been discussed in Robert Kneller, “Autarkic Drug 
Discovery in Japanese Pharmaceutical Companies: Insights into National Differences in Industrial Innovation,” Research Policy 
32 (2003): 1805-1827.
228 Steven W. Collins, The Race to Commercialize Biotechnology: Molecules, Markets, and the State in the United States and 
Japan (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 151.
229 Ministery of International Affairs and Communications,“Nenrei Kakusai Danjobetsu Jinko [Population by Single Years o f 
Age and Sex] (1884— 2000),” http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/02.htm (accessed 20 March 2007).
230The impact of the regular price reductions has been widely discussed. See for example, Tsuruhiko Nanbu, “Iyakuhin no SangyS 
Soshiki: Yakka Kisei no Keizaiteki Koka [Industrial Organisation of Pharmaceuticals: The Consequences o f Price Regulation in 
Japan],” Iryd to Shakai 7 (January 1997): 1-15.
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example, where there were no price restrictions on drugs. This had a heavy impact on 
Japanese pharmaceutical firms who, unlike their American counterparts, could not 
rely on government funding for industrial R&D.231 It was particularly crucial at a time 
when R&D processes were becoming increasingly costly and sophisticated. The 
limited ability to invest in research technologies such as genomics, combinatorial 
chemistry and high throughput screening, placed firms in Japan at further 
disadvantage 232 As well, the inability to grow meant that many Japanese firms lacked 
the capital to acquire foreign firms and expand.
Another effect of the government’s policy of reducing official drug prices was that 
physicians could no longer benefit from the pharmaceutical price differentials. After 
1990, many physicians began to abandon the business of dispensing drugs to patients. 
In 1990, 87.2% of physicians dispensed drugs; by 2005, 45.9% of physicians still 
continued to do so. With the separation of prescribing and dispensing functions, 
firms could no longer profit from high priced drugs with minimal innovative value. 
Instead, firms were incentivised to develop high priced drugs with greater innovative 
value.
2.7.5 The impact of globalisation
The Japanese pharmaceutical industry continued to develop over the 1990s. In the
231 Government funds for pharmaceutical R&D are provided to universities. Firms are therefore indirectly subsidised through 
joint projects conducted with universities.
232 Developments in drug discovery technologies has been written by Leland J. Gershell and Joshua H. Atkins, “A Brief History 
of Novel Drug Discovery Technologies,” Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 2 (April 2003): 321 -327. See also, James R. Broach 
and Jeremy Thomer, “High-throughput Screening for Drug Discovery,” Nature 384 (November 1996): 14-16.
233 Japan Pharmaceutical Association, “Iyakuhin Bungyo Shinchoku Jokyo [Progress on the Separation on the Prescribing and 
Dispensing of Medicines],” Japan Pharmaceutical Association, http://www.nichivaku.or.ip/contents/bungvo/default.html 
(accessed 20 April 2008).
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1990s, production values grew 1.1 fold from 4.9 trillion yen to 5.2 trillion yen.234 
While the momentum for growth slowed to an average of 0.4% a year compared to 
3.7% a year during the previous decade, the country maintained its position as the 
second largest market in the world. 235 Facing more rigorous standards and 
sophisticated technologies in R&D as well as greater competition from foreign firms, 
Japanese firms intensified their R&D orientation after 1990. Between 1990 and 2005, 
R&D expenditures almost doubled while R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales 
rose from 8.02% to 10.01%.236 Japanese firms also became a net exporter of 
pharmaceutical technology after 1997, recording a surplus of $1.4 million dollars by 
2005.237 The number of researchers also increased from 14,900 to 20,800 during this 
period.238 But in a global context, these figures remained much smaller than the 
leading pharmaceutical markets. For example, the average R&D budgets of the top 10 
Japanese firms were still about one-fifth of the average of the top Western companies 
in 2000.239
234 In nominal terms, production values grew from 4.7 trillion yen to 5.4 trillion yen between 1990 and 1999.
235 Yakuji Kdgyd Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo 
Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000); YakugyO JihOsha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo 
Jihosha, 1968-1999).
236 Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau & Statistics Centre, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyii Chosa Hdkoku [Report 
on the Survey o f Research and Development] (Tokyo: Management and Coordination Agency, 1985-2000); Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Survey o f Research and 
Development] (Tokyo: Ministry o f Internal Affairs and Communications, 2001-2006).
237 Ibid. It is recognised that these figures do not accurately represent the strength of Japanese firms. The figures, for example, 
obscure the number of foreign pharmaceutical firms who, rather than licensing out to Japanese firms, marketed their drugs 
through their own distribution networks in Japan.
238 Ibid.
239 Jiho, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2002), 159.
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Figure 8. Value of Pharmaceutical Trade, 1985-2005240
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry remained a net importer of pharmaceuticals. In 2005, 
Japan still imported 2.5 times more drugs than it exported, with imports of 538 billion 
yen (or approximately $4.9 billion).241 While these figures were smaller than the US 
trade deficit in pharmaceuticals of around $11 billion, far fewer Japanese drugs were 
recognised globally compared to those produced by American or European firms. In 
1999, only one eighth of NCEs launched by Japanese firms became international, 
compared to more than one third among US and European firms. In addition, although 
foreign sales among Japanese firms increased, they still accounted for only around a 
fifth of those among US and European firms.242 While the nominal gap in R&D
240 Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho  [W hite Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: G yosei, 1974-2000); Ministry 
o f  Econom y Trade and Industry. Boeki Doko D etabesu  [Database on Trends in Trade], 
http://www.meti.go.ip/Dolicv/trade policv/trade db/htmL/01 .html
241 Ministry o f  Economy Trade and Industry. Boeki D oko D etabesu  [Database on Trends in Trade], 
http://www.meti.go.ip/policv/trade policv/trade db/htm l/01 .html
242 Centre for M edicines Research International, “Japan in Focus: Strategies for Innovation and Global Drug Developm ent, What 
Differentiates Japanese Pharma Companies from their Western Counterparts.” R& D B riefing  28 (1999): 4.
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expenditures widened between Japanese firms and leading Western firms in the 1990s,
figures for the proportion of foreign sales to total sales did narrow. In 2005, Japan’s top
three pharmaceutical firms Takeda, Astellas and Eisai derived 44.3%. 45.3%, and
57.2% of their sales from overseas markets, respectively. In the meanwhile the top 
three global firms, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, and Sanofi-Aventis derived 48.0%, 
68.2%, and 55.6% of sales from overseas markets, respectively.243
2.7.6 Dramatic reorganisation since the millennium
Prompted by the dramatic changes to the regulatory environment, and in response to
the rising sophistication and costs of R&D, Japanese firms reorganised and globalised.
The performance gap also widened between Japanese firms that were globally 
competitive and those that were domestically oriented.244 Leading Japanese firms
gained more as they increasingly transferred their core operations abroad where there
were both larger markets and greater reward for innovation -  such as the United States.
These trends are reflected in the decline of clinical trials conducted in Japan versus the 
rise of clinical trials conducted abroad.245 This was because of the higher cost and
longer duration of clinical trials conducted in Japan in comparison to the United States 
or Europe.246 Drug approval times also took longer, not only because of the reluctance
243 Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, JPMA Databook (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 
2007); It is also important to note that Japanese firms that derive a substantial portion o f sales from abroad is still very limited.
244 See Yakugyo JihOsha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyO Jihosha, 1968-1999); Jiho, 
Yakuji Handobukku, [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Jih5, 2000-2007). The experience o f globally successful 
Japanese firms are documented in “Kokusaiteki Hitto Shohin no Joken [The Criteria for a Internationally Successful Drug],” 
Detailman (September 1991): 29-45; and “Kaigai de Katsuyaku suru Kokusan Shinyaku no Genjo [The Current Status of 
Japan-origin Drugs Abroad],” Gekkan Mix (June 1996): 44-62.
245 See Eiji Ueda, “Wagakuni no Chiken no Genjo to Mondaiten [The Current Environment and Issues around Clinical Trials in 
Japan,” Modan Media 50, no. 2 (2004): 12; Office o f Pharmaceutical Industry Research, “S5yaku no Ba to shite no KyosOryoku 
Kyoka ni Mukete [Creating a Stronger, More Competitive Environment for Drug Discovery],” Office o f  Pharmaceutical Industry 
Research, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (November 2005), 75.
246 Office o f Pharmaceutical Industry Research, “S5yaku no Ba to shite no Kyosoryoku Kyoka ni Mukete [Creating a Stronger, 
More Competitive Environment for Drug Discovery],” Office o f  Pharmaceutical Industry Research, Japan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (November 2005), 75-78.
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to approve new drugs after the HIV blood tragedy, but also because of the dispersion of
clinical trials across many hospitals, the adoption of more rigorous clinical trial
standards, and severe lack of qualified personnel to evaluate new drugs relative to the 
United States or Europe.247 The nationality of these globally-oriented Japanese firms
become increasingly questionable, as while management was located in Japan, both
the sources of innovation and potential for growth were located overseas.
From the late 1990s, a massive wave of M&A swept the Japanese pharmaceutical
industry as firms began to grasp the urgent need to achieve scale economies and
strengthen R&D operations to survive global competition. This began with the merger 
of Mitsubishi Chemicals with Tokyo Tanabe into Tokyo Mitsubishi Pharmaceutical in 
1999, and its merger with Welfide in 2001.248 Several other mergers followed,
including those of Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firm such as Yamanouchi and
Fujisawa into Astellas, Dainippon and Sumitomo into Dainippon Sumitomo, and 
Daiichi and Sankyo into Daiichi Sankyo -  all in 2005.249
At the same time, foreign firms raised their profile, as the harmonisation of
pharmaceutical regulations facilitated their entry into the Japanese market. Foreign
firms launched many new products, developed their own distribution networks, and
247 Even in 2006, Japan had 197 personnel to evaluate drug approvals, compared to 2,200 in the United States (FDA), 693 in the 
United Kingdom (MHRA), and 1,100 in Germany. See Office of Pharmaceutical Industry Research, “Seiyaku Sangyo no 
Shorai-zo [The Future Image of the Pharmaceutical Industry],” Office o f Pharmaceutical Industry Research, Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (May 2007), 113-114. See also, Robert Kneller, “University-Industry Collaboration 
in Biomedical Research in Japan and the United States: Implications for Biomedical Industries,” in Industrializing Knowledge: 
University-Industry Linkages in Japan and the United States, eds. Lewis M. Branscomb, Fumio Kodama, and Richard L. Florida 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 410-43 8.
248 Mitsubishi Pharma Corp., Yuka Shdken Hdkokusho (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2006), 4.
249 Astellas Pharma Inc., Yuka Shdken Hdkokusho (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2006), 4; Dainippon Sumitomo Pharma C o ., 
“Kaisha Enkaku [Company History],” http://www.ds-pharma.co.ip/profile/historv.html (accessed 28 July 2008); Daiichi Sankyo 
Co., Yuka Shdken Hdkokusho (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2006): 3.
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increased their sales in Japan. Indeed, between 1996 and 2005, foreign firms
accounted for more than 70% of Japan’s new drug approvals and were a major source 
of growth in Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. Several foreign firms even made high 
profile acquisitions, such as Roche’s purchase of Chugai in 2002, Abbott’s purchase of 
Hokuriku Seiyaku and Merck’s purchase of Banyu in 2003.
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry at the turn of the twenty-first century presented a
mixed picture. Japanese firms after the 1990s were stronger and dynamic, more R&D
intensive and global. The industry continued to grow in terms of production, R&D
investments, sales, and overseas operations. But economic recession, combined with
rigid and outdated institutional structures also dampened growth prospects. The 
number of NCEs discovered in Japan declined relative to other countries in the 1990s, 
and Japan no longer led NCE launches after 1995.252 Biennial price reductions also 
discouraged new entries into the Japanese market.253 Even with the M&A boom, the
size of Japanese firms remained far too small to rival the sales, profits, R&D, human
resources, or marketing capacity of leading Western pharmaceutical firms. For
decades, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry had been a highly successful domestic
industry. But it had yet to prove success in the global market.
250 Office o f Pharmaceutical Industry Research, “Seiyaku Sangyo no ShoraizO [The Future Image o f the Pharmaceutical 
Industry]” Office o f  Pharmaceutical Industry Research, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (May 2007), 52. See 
also, Michiyo Nakamoto and David Pilling, “Drugs Market Set for Change: Japan’s Pharma Industry is Slowly Opening Up,” 
Financial Times 3 April 2002.
251 Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., “History,” Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., http://www.chugai-pharm.co.ip/profile/about/historv.html 
(accessed 4 May 2008); Abbott Japan Co., “History,” Abbott Japan Co. http://www.abbott.co.ip/companv/history.asp (accessed 4 
May 2008); Banyu Pharmaceutical Co., “The History o f Banyu,” Banyu Pharmaceutical Co.
http://www.banvu.co.ip/content/corporate/about/historv/index.html (accessed 4 May 2008). These events were widely publicised. 
See for example, Christopher Bowe and Michiyo Nakamoto” Merck Bids for the Rest of Banyu” Financial Times, 10 January 
2003.
252 Centre for Medicines Research International, “Japan in Focus: Strategies for Innovation and Global Drug Development. What 
Differentiates Japanese Pharma Companies from their Western Counterparts,” R&D Briefing 28 (1999): 2.
253 ACCJ, FDI Task Force, “Pharmaceuticals,” Specific Policy Recommendation, February 2004.
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2.8 Analysis of the overview chapter
In the early 21st century, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry remained weak 
compared to pharmaceutical industries in the United States, Britain or Switzerland. 
For example, Japan’s largest and most profitable pharmaceutical firm, Takeda, ranked 
only 14th in global pharmaceutical sales in 2004. The next largest Japanese drug 
companies, Eisai and Sankyo, ranked 19th and 21st, respectively.254 In the fiscal year 
ending March 2006, Takeda recorded revenues of $10.3 billion, followed by Daiichi 
Sankyo’s $7.9 billion and Eisai’s $5.1 billion. 255 By comparison, Pfizer (US), 
GlaxoSmithKline (UK) and Merck (US) recorded revenues of $51.3 billion, $39.4 
billion, and $22.0 billion, respectively.256 In terms of firm size, Japan’s leading 
pharmaceutical firms, Takeda, Daiichi Sankyo and Eisai employed about 15,000, 
18,000 and 9,000 workers in 2005, respectively.257 This was only a fraction of the 
leading global firms such as Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline and Merck, for example, who 
employed about 106,000,100,000, and 61,500 workers, respectively 258 In an industry 
where scale economies mattered, the prospects for Japanese firms of becoming global 
leaders appeared dim.
254 PJB Publications, Scrip: Pharmaceutical Company League Tables 2005 (Richmond: PJB Publications, 2005), 33-34.
253 Japanese yen have been converted into US dollar amounts at the rate of 117 yen =US$ 1.00, the approximate exchange rate
prevailing on March 31,2006. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Annual Report 2006, 3; Daiichi Sankyo Co., Annual Report 2006,2; 
Eisai, Co., “Business Performance Highlights,” Eisai, Co., http://www.eisai.co.ip/eir/eachievementsl.html (accessed 10 June 
2007).
236 GlaxoSmithKline’s sales of £21.7 billion were converted into US dollars at the exchange rate of $1.82 = £1. Pfizer, Inc. 2005 
Annual Review (New York: Pfizer Inc., 2006), 12; GlaxoSmithKline pic. Annual Report 2005 (Brentford: GlaxoSmithKline,
2006), 4; Merck & Co., 2005 Annual Report (Whitehouse Station: Merck & Co., 2006), 68.
237 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Annual Report 2006,3; Daiichi Sankyo Co., Annual Report 2006,65; Eisai, Co., “Corporate 
Profile,” Eisai, Co., http://www.eisai.co.ip/ecompanv/eprofile/eprofile.html (accessed 10 June 2007).
238 Pfizer, Inc. 2005 Annual Review (New York: Pfizer Inc., 2006), 26; GlaxoSmithKline pic. Annual Report 2005 (Brentford: 
GlaxoSmithKline, 2006), 16; Merck & Co., 2005 Annual Report (Whitehouse Station: Merck & Co., 2006), 68.
I l l
Japanese firms were still less responsive to changing market conditions compared to 
their American or European counterparts. With the escalating costs of R&D and 
increasing competition from globalisation, the first wave of mergers among Western 
pharmaceutical firms occurred in the late 1980s. These mergers began with 
SmithKline Beecham (from SmithKline and Beecham) and Bristol Myers Squibb 
(from Bristol Myers and Squibb) in 1989. Consolidation continued into the 
millennium, with mergers such as Pfizer (from Warner-Lambert in 2000 and 
Pharmacia in 2003) and Sanofi-Aventis (from Sanofi-Synthelabo and Aventis) in 
2004. But the first mergers in Japan occurred only a decade later, with Mitsubishi 
Chemicals and Tokyo Tanabe in 1999.261 The belated responses of Japanese firms to 
exploit commercial opportunities undermined the potentials for growth.
USA Japan Germany Switzerland UK
1980-84 29% 16% 15% 13% 4%
1985-89 35% 9% 15% 3% 6%
1990-94 40% 9% 7% 11% 11%
Table 1: Main Countries where International Drugs have Originated262
Moreover, while Japan had managed to discover almost a tenth of the world’s drugs, it
failed to develop a pharmaceutical industry with global presence. Given Japan’s
industrial leadership in other research-intensive sectors, the inability to become a
239 “Drugs Mergers; Everybody Get Together,” The Economist, 8 April 1989, 78; “Drug Company Mergers; Love Potion No. 
9,” The Economist, 5 August 1989, 58.
260 Adrian Michaels, “Warner Bows to Pfizer Demand for Merger Talks,” Financial Times, 14 January 2000; Christopher Bowe, 
“Pfizer set to Complete Pharmacia Purchase,” Financial Times, 14 April 2003; “Abandoned at the Altar; Drug Mergers,” The 
Economist, 1 May 2004, 75.
261 “Barbarians at the Gate,” The Economist, 3 April 1999, 73-74.
262 P. E. Barral, 20 Years o f  Pharmaceutical Research Results Throughout the World (1975-94) (Antony: Rohne-Poulenc Rorer 
Foundation), 24.
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leader in pharmaceuticals was striking. An international drug has been defined as a 
drug that has been launched in at least four of the G7 countries. According to this 
definition, between 1975 and 2000, 86% of international drugs were discovered by the 
G7 countries: 33% were discovered in the United States, 14% in Germany, and 10 % 
each in Japan and Switzerland.263 Despite its capacity to discover drugs, Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry remained much smaller compared to the United States, 
Germany or Switzerland. Despite its acquisition of scientific and technological 
capacities, Japan did not make the transition into a globally competitive 
pharmaceutical industry.
Explanations for the relative weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry 
This overview chapter suggests that Japan’s pharmaceutical industry remained 
relatively weak for several reasons. In the following section, five possible 
explanations will be considered. Together, these factors help to account for the relative 
weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry.
The first cause of the relative weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry stems from 
the industry’s historical origins. German pharmaceutical firms were export oriented 
from a very early stage. The origins of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry, in contrast, lay 
in the import business. Japan’s oldest drug companies began as import houses in 
Osaka and only later branched out into manufacturing Westem-style pharmaceuticals 
for the domestic market. Adopting an international orientation did not occur naturally
263 Ibid.
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to Japanese firms. Moreover, many of the licensing agreements that allowed Japanese 
firms to produce foreign-discovered drugs in the post-war period prohibited exports of 
these products.
The second cause behind the weak performance of Japanese pharmaceutical firms lay 
in industrial structure. In the pharmaceutical industry, larger firms have a crucial 
advantage in achieving economies of scale in R&D, manufacturing and marketing. 
Japanese pharmaceutical firms have historically been much smaller than their 
American and European counterparts. In addition, while there are several major 
R&D-oriented pharmaceutical firms that dominate the US and UK markets, a greater 
number of these firms dominate the Japanese market. For example, while the UK 
pharmaceutical industry is comprised of seven major companies, there are roughly 20 
significant firms in Japan.264
The smaller size of Japanese firms compromised their ability to compete with larger 
Western firms. 265 Lacking capital, expertise and technology. Japanese firms 
concentrated on acquiring extensive manufacturing capacities through incremental 
innovation until the 1970s. In the meanwhile, American, British and German 
pharmaceutical firms developed robust R&D capacities through more radical 
innovations that required larger investments and developing global distribution
264 Jeremy Howells and Ian Neary, Intervention and Technological Innovation: Government and the Pharmaceutical Industry in 
the UK and Japan (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 17,233-234. See also, Robert Neimeth, “Japan’s Pharmaceutical Industry 
Postwar Evolution,” 117; “Japanese Drug Market; Weak Enough to Work Together,” The Economist, 13 August 1983,66; 
“Japan's Sickly Drug Firms,” The Economist, 19 October 1996,65; Yakugyo Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical 
Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyO Jihosha, 1968-1999); Jiho, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook]
(Tokyo: JihO, 2000-2007).
265 Robert Tulloch, Pharmaceutical Markets in the Pacific Rim, Scrip Reports (Richmond: PJB Publications, 1995), 46.
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networks.266 It is true that larger firms outsourced many of their business operations to 
smaller' firms ' and' that smaller' firms have teen * an important source of 
pharmaceutical innovation. But growth in the pharmaceutical industry was channelled 
by larger firms who managed to coordinate and gain from the operations outsourced to 
smaller firms.
As well, with limited resources, R&D in Japan took place in academia, where 
knowledge was transferred through informal networks. By comparison, industrial 
research had become the norm in German and American pharmaceutical firms by the 
early 20 century. Because R&D in Japan was conducted in academic laboratories, the 
research was not as responsive to industry conditions. By contrast, industrial 
laboratories in the United States and Germany could align their R&D goals more 
closely with marketing, distribution and sales agendas that would support industrial 
growth.
The third reason why Japan was not able to develop a globally competitive industry 
was due to factors that incentivised Japanese firms to launch numerous new drugs of 
minimal innovative value that would neither be approved nor commercially viable 
overseas. To begin with, Japanese drug authorities approved new drugs with relatively 
low criteria for innovation. In addition, as Japanese pharmaceutical firms were not 
able to profit from free market prices for pharmaceutical innovations, many firms 
preferred to minimise their investments in R&D. Moreover, most Japanese physicians
266 Jon Sigurdson, Future Advantage Japan?: Technology Strategies for Pharmaceutical and Chemical Corporations (London: 
Cartermill, 1996).
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continued to adhere to traditional practices of both prescribing and dispensing drugs. 
To profit from the difference between wholesale and retail drug prices, physicians 
were incentivised to prescribe newer and higher priced drugs that tended to have the 
steepest price differential.
Indeed, the profit incentives created by Japanese physicians’ dual prescribing and 
dispensing practices heavily shaped the industry. In 1989, for example, the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare revealed that pharmaceutical price differentials averaged around 
25% of official drug prices and amounted to 1.3 trillion yen a year.267 Physician 
demand for a particular drug translated easily into patient demand in a hierarchical 
society where patients did not question the authority of physicians, where few 
explanations were made of the medicines prescribed, and in a market where
ftconsumers were price insensitive. The generous criteria for drug approval, low 
reward for innovation, and endurance of this dual prescribing and dispensing practice 
led Japanese firms to launch drugs that were only profitable in the Japanese market. 
Furthermore, as Robert Neimeth has noted, the stark dissimilarities between the 
Japanese and overseas markets, generated reluctance among Japanese firms to make 
the immense investments necessary to expand into America or Europe.269
Perhaps the most powerful explanation for the relative weakness of Japan’s
267 See “Yakka Saeki Nen ni 1-cho 3-zen-oku en: Kusuridai SSgaku no 4-bun no 1 [Pharmaceutical Price Differentials amount to
1.3 Trillion Yen a Year, or a Quarter of Drug Prices],” Asahi Shimbun, 9 November 1989.
268 Eric Feldman, “Medical Ethics the Japanese Way,” The Hastings Center Report 15, no. 5 (1985): 21-24. It is, however, 
difficult to assess the degree to which a more hierarchical relationship might have mattered. See William E. Steslicke, “Doctors, 
Patients, and Government in Modem Japan.” Asian Survey 12, no. 11 (1972): 913-931.
269 Robert Niemeth, letter to author, 31 March 2006.
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pharmaceutical industry was the endurance of the government’s developmental health 
policies, which was suitable for a low-income country, but became outdated over the 
decades. With its governance by the MHW rather than the MITI, government policies 
tended to prioritise domestic health agendas over industrial development. The 
government’s developmental health policies were essentially guided by an 
overarching goal to provide universal access to drugs for Japanese citizens. To do so, 
the government set drug prices at fixed rate, subsidised patients who purchased 
prescription drugs, and reduced drug prices regularly to contain costs. These policies 
were appropriate in the early post-war period when Japanese consumers were still 
poor and infectious diseases were rampant. The government was able to afford 
essential medicines to treat acute, life threatening diseases that required medication for 
only a short period of time. But these policies persisted into the late 20th century when 
chronic diseases of affluence became the norm.
The MHW's tendency to prioritise the needs of consumers over industry reduced 
incentives among firms to innovate and develop drugs that would succeed in global 
markets. The capping of drug prices not only resulted in smaller profits, but also 
limited the ability of firms to pursue riskier, costly, or sophisticated investments in 
R&D. Japanese pharmaceutical firms attempted to maximise their gains by 
continuously launching new drugs with minimal innovative value. By comparison, 
policies in the countries that had developed pharmaceutical industries earlier, such as 
the United States, Germany and Britain, were designed to penalise imitations and 
encourage pioneering innovations that would be accepted worldwide.
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The fifth reason for the weak performance of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry lay in 
the government’s developmental industrial policies, which protected Japanese firms 
from foreign competition long after it was necessary or desirable. For decades, the 
government adopted an import-substitution policy, and Japanese firms relied on 
technology imports to develop or modify foreign-discovered products rather than 
pursue research for therapeutic breakthroughs. In a protected market, the 
government’s policies essentially enabled firms to remain highly profitable without 
launching highly original drugs that could be translated into foreign markets.
Even while Japanese firms acquired manufacturing capacities over the 1960s and 
developed substantial discovery capacities by the 1970s, various layers of protection 
remained. Until 1975, for example, foreign pharmaceutical firms were explicitly 
prohibited from establishing wholly-owned subsidiaries in Japan. In addition, 
distribution networks for pharmaceuticals remained highly complex and opaque until 
the 1990s, making it very costly and difficult for foreign companies to penetrate the 
Japanese market. Japan’s drug standards and classifications created another entry 
barrier, as they made drugs in the Japanese market a very different product from drugs 
abroad. It was only in the 1990s, when Japanese pharmaceutical regulations were 
harmonised with those in the United States and Europe, that foreign drugs were more 
easily recognised in Japan. Other regulations that protected Japanese firms included 
requirements to conduct clinical trials on Japanese subjects and to file drug approval 
documents in Japanese.
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As well, the lack of explicit industrial policy for the pharmaceutical sector meant that 
government policies tended to be reactive, ad-hoc, and short sighted. This was 
particularly visible in official responses to drug tragedies or escalating health care 
costs. The government was generally slow to enforce reforms, and usually guided 
industry through a prolonged period of administrative guidance before establishing 
legislation. An earlier implementation of comprehensive, long-term strategies and 
strong legislation to strengthen the industry would likely have facilitated the 
development of a more research intensive and global pharmaceutical industry well 
before the 1990s.
It is true that other regulations and the absence of certain institutional factors also 
weakened the ability of Japanese firms to produce globally competitive drugs. For 
example, regulation that forbade the entrepreneurship of university academics long 
stifled the translation of university research into viable commercial therapies. The 
absence of a structured clinical trial system and lack of qualified reviewers also made 
both drug development and approval in Japan a much more costly, inefficient, and 
time-consuming affair. Rather than the lack of reward, it was more the penalties to 
investments in innovation that deterred Japanese firms from developing therapies 
and from pursuing drugs that might be globally competitive.
The final factor behind the relative weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was 
the lack of entrepreneurial initiative among Japanese firms. Many firms were also
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short-termist, and were content to profit from a domestic market so long as it was 
protected from foreign competition. Few firms planned or actively sought to take 
advantage of international markets by for example, investing in R&D or developing 
overseas marketing networks from an earlier period. Most firms only began to do so as 
a response to government deregulation in the 1970s. While the pharmaceutical 
industries of Germany or Switzerland have historically prioritised foreign markets for 
growth, it was not until the 1990s that some Japanese firms began to circumvent 
inferior incentives within Japan by seeking more favourable opportunities abroad.
At the turn of the 21st century, the performance of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry 
remained mixed. Japan’s pharmaceutical industry experienced phenomenal growth 
from a small, insular domestic industry into a larger, more open, and global industry. It 
achieved spectacular growth in production, sales, trade and R&D. With the 
harmonisation of pharmaceutical regulation and research-intensive orientation, many 
features in Japan converged with the leading global pharmaceutical industries. But 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was not a global leader. Too little had been done too 
late.
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3 Antibiotics chapter
This thesis argues that Japanese pharmaceutical firms were historically much smaller, 
less R&D intensive, and more domestically-oriented in comparison with other 
developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry also remained relatively weak in comparison with the 
country’s leading industries such as automobiles and electronics. Japan was a net 
importer of pharmaceuticals, and Japanese firms generally remained uncompetitive in 
the global pharmaceutical industry.
But some sectors of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry were much stronger than 
others. This was particularly true of Japan’s antibiotics sector. Antibiotics have been 
Japan’s leading pharmaceutical export. At times, Japan was also able to record a 
trade surplus in antibiotics.
This chapter examines the history of the Japanese antibiotics sector and provides 
several explanations for its strong performance. The antibiotics sector emerged in the 
late 1940s under the guidance of the American Occupation forces. By the early 1980s, 
foreign observers remarked that Japanese firms had become global leaders in 
antibiotics. In the mid 1980s, antibiotics developed in Japan and produced under 
licence by American firms accounted for 20% of the US antibiotics market.273
270 Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo 
Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000); Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey 
on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2001-2006).
271 Japan recorded a trade surplus in antibiotics in 1993,1994 and 1998. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsushd 
Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1974-2000).
272 N.R. Kleinfeld, “Intense Battle for Antibiotics,” The New York Times, 13 June 1983.
273 Eric Schmitt, “What’s Hot in Imported Products; Antibiotics Made Jointly,” The New York Times, 30 November 1986.
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Japanese pharmaceutical firms demonstrated their capacity to discover innovative 
antibiotics from the early post-war period. In fact, some of the antibiotics discovered 
and developed by Japanese firms in the 1950s remain in worldwide use to date. In the 
1990s, the majority of firms involved in antibiotic research were still Japanese or 
American.274 Japanese firms have also dominated the domestic market with their own 
products -  even after the government’s protectionist policies were lifted in the mid 
1970s.275
This chapter examines the development of the antibiotics sector over five phases. In 
the first phase between 1945 and 1949, the antibiotics sector emerged under the 
American Occupation. This was followed by the rise of Japanese antibiotic 
discoveries and the acquisition of production capacities in a protected market via 
technology imports between 1950 and 1961. During the third phase between 1961 and 
1975, the antibiotics sector experienced volume-based expansion under universal 
health care while developing R&D capacities through process innovation. This was 
followed by a phase of government deregulation, which encouraged R&D capacities 
in product innovation via capital liberalisation and a new product patent regime 
between 1975 and 1990. Since the burst of the bubble in 1990 to 2005, the industry 
matured alongside efforts to harmonise regulatory guidelines with international 
standards under ICH. The chapter concludes by providing an explanation for why
274 Jenny Wilson, Antibacterial Products and Markets, Scrip Reports (Richmond: PJB Publications, 1997), 137.
273 Datamonitor, “Japan -  Antibacterial Drugs,” Industry Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2002), 9.
276 ICH refers to the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals 
for Human Use. See, The International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
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the performance of the Japanese antibiotics sector has been relatively strong.
3.1 Japan’s antibiotics sector during the Allied Occupation period
The creation of the antibiotics sector after 1945 was important for several reasons. 
First, antibiotics dramatically improved public health conditions in Japan, where many 
were suffering from infectious diseases. Second, antibiotics were the foundation of the 
modem Japanese pharmaceutical industry. Penicillin was a groundbreaking therapy 
that played a central role in building Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical industry. 
Japanese firms also produced other drugs in the Occupation period such as DDT, sulfa 
drugs and vitamins.277 This section follows the experience of Japanese firms in 
establishing the antibiotics sector through the first antibiotic, penicillin -  and later, 
streptomycin. It considers the reasons behind the remarkable rise of Japan’s antibiotics 
sector over the late 1940s.
3.1.1 Early Efforts to Produce Antibiotics, 1944-1945
Antibiotics are a substance that kills or inhibits the growth of other microbes. The age 
of antibiotics began with the discovery of penicillin by Alexander Fleming in 1929. 
Fleming, a bacteriologist at the University of London, accidentally discovered 
penicillin when he noticed that a mould that had contaminated one of his bacterial 
cultures had caused the bacteria to deteriorate.278 With its remarkable efficacy in
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, http://www. ich.org. (accessed 15 May 2007). See also overview chapter.
277 See “GyOkai TenbO: Seiyaku Kogyokai [Industry Prospects: The Pharmaceutical Industry],” Kigyo Chosa 63 (September 
1948): 3.
278 Alexander Fleming, “On the Antibacterial Action o f Cultures o f a Penicillium, with Special Reference to Their Use in the 
Isolation of H. Influenzae,” British Journal o f  Experimental Pathology 10 (June 1929): 226-236.
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7 7 Q  •treating infectious disease, penicillin revolutionised the practice of medicine. While
scientists had developed other antibacterials such as alkaloids and sulfa drugs in the 
first half of the 20th century, it was penicillin that gave birth to the modem antibiotics
era.
Although British scientists had discovered penicillin, it was the US firms such as
Merck, Squibb, Lederle and Pfizer who were able to commercialise penicillin during 
World War II.280 Fleming had abandoned research on penicillin in 1929 after he found
it difficult to isolate the substance and grew increasingly sceptical of its viability as an 
actual drug.281 While Oxford scientists led by Howard Florey, Ernest Chain and
Normal Heatley took up penicillin research in the late 1930s, they could not interest
British firms such as ICI or Boots in commercialising the dmg. Indeed, it was only 
after Florey and Heatley brought penicillin to the attention to the United States in 1941
that the US government and the leading American firms, working together, were able 
to mass-produce penicillin in 1943.
The Japanese Army learned of penicillin in late 1943. Since 1942, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education had operated an information service that
279 For a general history on the development o f penicillin, see for example, Gladys L. Hobby and Milton Wainwright, Penicillin: 
Meeting the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); John Parascandola, ed., History o f  Antibiotics (Madison: 
American Institute of the History of Pharmacy, 1980); David Wilson, Penicillin in Perspective (London: Faber, 1976). Textbooks 
generally define antibacterials as synthetic chemicals more toxic to bacteria than to mammals while antibiotics are defined as 
substances produced by microorganisms that are toxic to bacteria. The distinction between these two categories have, however, 
blurred over the years as scientists developed synthetic means to produce antibiotics.
280 See W. H. Helfand, H.B. Woodruff, K.M.H. Coleman and D.L. Owen, “Wartime Industrial Development of Penicillin in the 
United States, in John Parascandola, ed., The History o f  Antibiotics: A Symposium (Madison: American Institute o f the History 
o f Pharmacy, 1980): 31-55.
281 Gwyn Macfarlane, Alexander Fleming: The Man and the Myth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 139.
282 See for example, Jonathan Liebenau, “The British Success with Penicillin,” Social Studies o f  Science 17, no. 1 (1987): 
69-86; M. Lawrence Podolsky and Daniel E. Koshland, “The Oxford Incidents,” in Cures out o f  Chaos: How Unexpected 
Discoveries Led to Breakthroughs in Medicine and Health (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1997), 177-224.
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dispatched recent Western medical journals from Germany via submarine. These 
publications heightened the Army’s interest in penicillin production. One article in
the Klinische Wochenschrift was of particular interest, as it contained abstracts of
284penicillin related papers published by the Oxford Group between 1940 and 1943.
Upon reading these articles, surgeon major Katsuhiko Inagaki of the Army Medical 
School established a small research group in January 1944 to explore penicillin
production in Japan. Inagaki called upon leading scientists such as Yusuke Sumiki and
Hamao Umezawa at his alma mater, the University of Tokyo, to collaborate on this 
project.285 But what truly jumpstarted penicillin production in Japan was a newspaper 
article published in 28 January 1944. The Asahi Shimbun erroneously reported that 
Winston Churchill had been cured of pneumonia with a new drug called penicillin. 
While later reports clarified that the British premier had actually been cured by sulfa 
drugs, the Japanese Army immediately requested its medical school to organise a 
production committee within two to three days, and to supply the Army with penicillin 
by August 1944. The first Penicillin Committee convened on 1 February 1944
under military command. There, members of the Army Military School and scientists
283 Details of this discovery have been written in Fuksako Tsunoda, Hekiso: Nihon Penishirin Monogatari [Hekiso: The Story of 
Penicillin in Japan] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1978): 3-22. A brief overview of Japan’s wartime penicillin project was also written by 
a scientist involved in the project: Hamao Umezawa, “KQsei Busshitsu no Kenkyushi (1) [A History o f Research in Antibiotics 
{\)],” Shizen 17, no.2 (1962): 83-89.
284 Manfred Kiese, “Chemotherapie mit Antibakteriellen Stoffen aus Niederen Pilzen und Bakterien,” Journal o f  Molecular 
Medicine 22 (1943): 505-511.
285 Katsuhiko Inagaki, interview by Nihon Penishirin KyOkai, “Penishirin no Nihon Inyu [The Transfer of Penicillin into Japan], 
in Nihon Penishirin KySkai [Japan Penicillin Association],” Penishirin noAyumi: 1946-1961 [The History of Penicillin: 
1946-1961]; Katsuhiko Inagaki, interview by KihachirS Shimizu, “Nihon ni Okeru Penishirin Kaihatsu no Keii [The 
Development of Penicillin in Japan],” Today’s Therapy 19, no.2 (1995): 26-34. Inagaki’s involvement in the development of 
penicillin in Japan was later published by Haruhiko Inagaki, Hekiso: Kokusan Penishirin Kaihatsu no Hatafuri, Inagaki Gun 7 
Shosa to Ichikdsei Gakuto Doin [Hekiso: Pioneering the Development of Penicillin in Japan, Lieutenant Medic Inagaki and the 
Mobilised Students o f the Imperial University] (Tokyo: Nikkei Jigyo Shuppan Senta, 2005).
286 Chachiru Inochi Biroi, Zuruhon zai o Oginau Penishirin [Churchill’s Life is Saved: Penicillin, instead o f Sulfa Drugs, are the 
Drug of Choice],” Asahi Shimbun, 27 January 1944.
287 Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Early History of Antibiotics in Japan,” in The History o f  Antibiotics: A Symposium, ed. John 
Parascandola (Madison: American Institute of the History of Pharmacy, 1980), 69-90.
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at Japanese universities decided upon how to pursue penicillin production.
Headed by Inagaki, Japan’s wartime penicillin project was run by the Army Medical 
School. The Army organised several research groups comprised of Japanese academic 
scientists and requested them to inform the Army of their research results through 
detailed reports.289 By international standards, it was a small-scale project: a mere 1.9
billion yen project compared to the 63.5 billion yen spent to develop penicillin by the 
United States 290 But it was also a successful project. Despite the desperate scarcity of
supplies in a war-stricken economy, Japanese scientists were able to produce penicillin 
by December 1944.291
The two facilities to produce penicillin were selected by members of the Penicillin
Committee. Inagaki, who found striking similarities between milk production plants 
and images of penicillin production plants abroad, contacted Morinaga president
Hanzsaburo Matsuzaki, and requested that the confectioner and milk producer
cooperate in penicillin production. Morinaga produced its first batch of penicillin
under the guidance of Penicillin Committee scientists in December 1944. The sulfa
drug maker Banyu Pharmaceuticals followed shortly thereafter, with its first batch of 
penicillin in February 1945.292 The Army Medical School then distributed the
288 Katsuhiko Inagaki, Penishirin Iinkai no Kotodomo [Notes on the Penicillin Committee], 16 November 1944, Naito Museum 
of Pharmaceutical Science and Industry, Kagamihara, Japan. See also, Penishirin Iinkai, Penishirin Iinkai Gijiroku [Minutes o f the 
Penicillin Committee], February to December 1944, Naito Museum of Pharmaceutical Science and Industry, Kagamihara, Japan.
289 Ibid.
290 See Hamao Umezawa “Kosei Busshitsu o Motomete (1) [Searching for Antibiotics (1)]” Shokrn 1, no. 1 (1980): 294. 
Umezawa estimated that the development of penicillin in the 1940s cost the Japanese l.S billion yen while it cost the United 
States 50 billion yen in 1980 values. This article discusses the development of penicillin in Japan during the Second World War.
291 Katsuhiko Inagaki, Penishirin Iinkai no Kotodomo [Notes on the Penicillin Committee], 11.
292 Katsuhiko Inagaki, Penishirin Iinkai no Kotodomo [Notes on the Penicillin Committee] and Penishirin Iinkai, Penishirin 
Iinkai Gijiroku [Minutes of the Penicillin Committee],
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penicillin vials produced. The penicillin produced during this time was still low in
volume, of limited efficacy, and reached few patients. But Japanese firms were able to
produce some penicillin under the guidance of the Army and university scientists for 
military purposes during the Second World War.293
3.1.2 The First year of the Occupation
The rise of Japan’s post-war antibiotics sector began with the rebuilding of penicillin
production capacities that began during the Second World War. As mentioned earlier, 
penicillin production in Japan began in late 1944.294 To a certain extent, the rapid rise
of Japan’s penicillin industry was possible because Japan’s antibiotics makers had 
sustained relatively little damage during the war.
In the immediate post-war period, Japanese firms faced high demand for therapies that
might cure infectious disease. The lack of foodstuffs and unsanitary conditions
heightened morbidity and mortality levels for a range of infectious diseases, including 
tuberculosis, dysentery and diphtheria.296 While death rates from infectious disease
did fall along with improvements in food supply and public health standards in the
immediate post-war period, repatriated soldiers brought a fresh surge in morbidity 
levels as they carried infectious diseases from foreign lands.297
293 Ibid. Both firms had been linked to key members of the Penicillin Committee. President HanzaburO Matsuzaki o f Morinaga 
and Katsuhiko Inagaki were fellow alumni of the University o f Tokyo. President KOichi Iwadare of Banyu and Hamao 
Umezawa’s (one of the lead scientists of the project) were also alumni of the University o f Tokyo.
294 “Trade and Industry: Penicillin,” The Oriental Economist, 13 September 1947, 749.
295 This is well documented in the company security filings in the late 1940s. See also, Chobei Takeda, “Wagakuni no Iyakuhin 
KogyO to Boeki [Pharamceutical Industry and Trade in Our Country],” Kankeiren 16 (January 1949): 19-21.
296 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Densenbyo Oyobi Shokuchudoku no Kanjasu to Shibdshasu [Patients and Deaths of Infectious 
Diseases and Food Poisoning] (Tokyo, 1876 -1999),” httD://www.stat.go.ip/data/chouki/24.htm (accessed 20 March 2007).
297 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation o f  Japan and Its Legacy (London: Continuum, 2002), 409. See also 
Crawford F. Sams and Zabelle Zakarian, "Medic The Mission o f  an American Military Doctor in Occupied Japan and Wartom 
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As the pre-war producers and new entrants began to produce penicillin, the 
Occupation authorities were confronted with the need to control the quality and prices 
of penicillin in Japan. Unapproved, counterfeit, or mislabelled products were rife, and
*}Q O
a large volume of penicillin of dubious quality was traded on the black market. In 
an attempt to regulate penicillin available in Japan, the Ministry of Health introduced 
official drug prices for several standards of penicillin in 18 January 1946.2"  Much to 
the surprise of Japanese officials and firms, however, the GHQ banned sales of 
penicillin shortly after this announcement because of the limited efficacy and heavy 
side effects of penicillin produced in Japan.300 The Occupation authorities decided to 
improve penicillin production in Japan -  both for the Japanese and the American 
Army stationed in Japan.
The Allies’ decision to improve penicillin production in Japan was not entirely based 
on altruistic motives. For the GHQ, enabling Japanese firms to mass-produce 
antibiotics offered a more cost-effective means of public health administration and of 
providing antibiotics to American troops in Japan.301 Indeed, approximately 60% of 
the first penicillin ration was distributed to treat syphilis in the American Army at the 
Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) and Yoshiwara hospitals, while
298 “Furyo Iyakuhin Torishimari Kyoka: Yamitorihiki wa Genbatsu [Strengthening Regulations over Unauthentic Medicines: 
Strict Penalties for Black Market Transactions],” Iji Tsushin 1 (November 1946): 3; “Yami no Penishirin wa Inchiki [Black 
Market Penicillin is Fraudulent],” Directives and Important Releases o f  G.H.Q. 26 (December 1946): 10.
299 Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Early History of Antibiotics in Japan,” 77.
300 “Penishirin Saihanbai Kyoka [Penicillin Resale Approval],” Nihon Iji Shinpo 10 (May 1946): 11.
301 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 190. See also 
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Mission and  
Accomplishments o f  the Occupation in the Public Health and Welfare Fields (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 
Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 32.
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another 30% were used to treat bronchitis in Japanese civilians.302
Given the costs involved in communication, transport and time, it was much cheaper 
and convenient to produce antibiotics in Japan using improved domestic facilities, 
than import antibiotics from the United States. Inadequate supplies were 
supplemented with imports from the American Red Cross, UNICEF, Licensed 
Agencies for Relief in Asia (LARA) and CARE, but these could not sufficiently 
satisfy domestic demand.303 Production in Japan could also be more easily monitored 
and adjusted to fluctuations in demand. As well, improving public health conditions 
was expected to win the loyalty of the Japanese, and help the Occupation authorities 
achieve their broader agendas to democratise and demilitarise Japan -  and prevent the 
country from becoming Communist.304
As an occupying power, the GHQ had absolute authority. The Occupation forces were 
able to build an antibiotics sector in Japan without heavy opposition from vested 
interests in Japan. The early Japanese antibiotics sector therefore caught up quickly, 
equipped with modem technology, regulatory standards, and the expertise necessary 
for subsequent development.
302 “Penishirin no Daiikkai Haikyfl [The First Ration o f Penicillin]” Iyaku Tsushin 1 (July 1946): 3. The Recreation and 
Amusement Association (RAA) was an organisation established by the Japanese government to form brothels and provide 
prostitution services to the Occupation forces. Yoshiwara was a red-light district in Tokyo.
303General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 121. LARA was 
an American volunteer organisation established in April 1946 under the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign 
Service to provide aid to the impoverished regions o f Asia (particularly Japan, Korea, and Okinawa) after the Second World 
War. CARE was also an American humanitarian aid organisation founded in 1945 to provide relief to survivors o f World War II.
304 See Sey Nishimura, “Censorship of Medical Journals in Occupied Japan” Journal o f  the American Medical Association 274 
(August 1995): 456. See also overview chapter.
129
The GHQ introduced several measures to improve the conditions of Japan’s penicillin 
market during the first year of the Occupation. In January 1946, the Occupation 
authorities requested scientists at the University of Tokyo to evaluate the quality of 
penicillin submitted by potential manufacturers to the government for manufacturing 
approval. A Penicillin Ration Committee comprised of university professors was 
formed in June 1946 to help coordinate the distribution of scarce penicillin supplies.306 
The distribution routes were based on Japan’s wartime rationing organisations, such as 
the Medicines Control Company {Iyakuhin Tdsei Kabushiki Kaisha).307 It was true 
that distribution failures did occur, and that penicillin of dubious quality was traded on 
the black market. But the creation of formal transfer mechanisms helped restore some 
order to the chaos of the distribution routes in the immediate post-war period.
The GHQ also requested the formation of the Japan Penicillin Association {Nihon 
Penishirin Kyokai) as a forum to exchange information on penicillin production 
between government, industry, and academia.308 The association was established on 
15 August 1946, only a year after the bombing of Hiroshima, and was led by the early 
penicillin makers Banyu, Morinaga, Wakamoto, and Yaesu. An academic organisation, 
the Japan Penicillin Research Association {Nihon Penishirin Gakujutsu Kydgikai) was 
established a few weeks later -  a successor to the wartime Japan Antibiotic Penicillin
305 Japan Business History Association, ed., Banyu Pharmaceutical: 85 Year History (Tokyo: Banyu Pharmaceutical, 2002): 
95-96.
306 See for example. “Penishirin no Seisankeikaku [Production Plan for Penicillin] Akarui Bdeki 2, no.2 (1947): 11. Penicillin, 
along with other medicines -  such as antibiotics and vaccines -  were mostly rationed via “purchasing passbooks” to dealers 
authorized by the prefectural government, such as clinics, veterinary hospitals, pharmacies, and other retailers.
307 YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon YakugyO Shimbunsha, 1951), 247.
308 Nihon Penishirin Kyokai [Japan Penicillin Association], Penishirin noAyumi: 1946-1961 [The History of Penicillin: 
1946-1961], 58-67.
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Research Committee that was dissolved in 1945.309 But what truly transformed 
penicillin production in Japan were a series of technology transfers provided through 
Jackson Foster, a scientific consultant appointed by the GHQ.
3.1.3 Crawford Sams and Jackson Foster
I have sent back for a technician who will show your manufacturers 
how to make high potency penicillin and we and we are working with 
both your manufacturers and the Ministry to produce good penicillin, 
which will be sold in adequate doses.
Crawford F. Sams, “Address to Tokyo Pharmacists,” 7 March 1946310
During the Occupation, Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was regulated by the Public 
Health and Welfare Section led by Colonel Crawford F. Sams.311 Under Sams’
administration, the Occupation played a crucial role in the building of Japan’s
antibiotics industry by orchestrating the direct transfer of penicillin technology. The
most important technology transfers were made between October 1946 and February 
1947, when Jackson Foster visited Japan.312 Foster was an industrial scientist who had
been involved in the commercialisation of penicillin at Merck in the United States 
during the Second World War.313 The American scientist’s direct transfer of penicillin
technology to the Japanese was crucial to the eventual mass production of penicillin in
309 Nihon Penishirin Kyokai [Japan Penicillin Association], Penishirin noAyumi: 1946-1961 [The History o f Penicillin: 
1946-1961], 68-69. See also, Japan Antibiotics Research Association, “Honkai no Gaiyo [About Us],” 
http://www.antibiotics.or.ip/iara/news/iara.htni (accessed 28 April 2008). The Japan Penicillin Research Association was 
renamed as the Japan Antibiotics Research Association (JARA) in 1951. JARA currently operates under the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare, Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, Evaluation and Licensing Division. It continues to support 
antibiotic research to date.
310 Crawford F. Sams, “Address to Tokyo Pharmacists,” 7 March 1946 Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024, 
3 (NDL).
311 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation o f  Japan and Its Legacy (London: Continuum, 2002), 49. See also, 
Crawford F. Sams, interview by Darryl Podoll, 3 May 1979.
312 Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Early History o f Antibiotics in Japan,” 79-80.
313 Barry Woodruff, “A Soil Microbiologist's Odyssey,” Annual Review o f  Microbiology 35 (1981): 8.
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Japan.
Foster not only imparted his knowledge of penicillin to the Japanese, but also offered 
the strains of bacteria found to be effective in producing penicillin in the United States. 
Perhaps the most significant event was a three-day symposium on penicillin 
production held from 13 to 15 November 1946.314 The event was attended by 380 
leading figures in Japan, including 120 academics, 6 government officials, and 120 
workers from 47 firms.315 Foster’s lectures were reproduced as the first article in the 
first issue of the Japanese Journal of Antibiotics, the scholarly journal published by the 
Japan Antibiotics Research Association (JARA).316 After the lectures, Foster 
provided Professor Kin’ichiro Sakaguchi of the University of Tokyo with B21 strains 
for surface culture production, Q176 strains for deep-tank production, and a petroleum 
can full of com steep liquor -  which were then distributed to researchers throughout 
Japan. During his five-month stay, Foster also provided direct guidance at various
1^7production plants across Japan.
The Occupation authorities further nurtured the development of penicillin production 
in Japan by establishing central research laboratories, which promoted the diffusion of 
developments in penicillin technology -  not only across government, industry, and
314 Jackson W. Foster, “Three Days’ Symposium on Penicillin Production, Held at Welfare Ministry, Tokyo, Japan, November 
13-15,1946, “Journal o f  Antibiotics 1 (March 1947): 1-28.
315 Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Early History of Antibiotics in Japan,” 79.
316 Jackson W. Foster, “Three Days’ Symposium on Penicillin Production, Held at Welfare Ministry, Tokyo, Japan, November 
13-15,1946,” Journal o f  Antibiotics 1 (March 1947): 1-28.’ Prior to 1951, the Japan Antibiotics Research Association was 
known as the Japan Penicillin Research Association.
317 Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Early History of Antibiotics in Japan,” 80.
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academia, but also across the various regions of Japan.318 The GHQ’s decision to 
enable Japanese firms to produce penicillin was a windfall for the Japanese. After all, 
the United States had invested six years and 20 million of dollars in research to 
develop penicillin technology.319 The direct transfer of this technology enabled Japan 
to leapfrog over investments and accomplishments that would have been impossible 
for a war-torn economy.
3.1.4 Putting Foster’s Gift to Work
Helped by the interventions of the Occupation forces, Japan’s antibiotics sector grew 
quickly during the Occupation period. While Japanese firms had not been able to 
produce commercially viable doses at the end of the War, it produced 147 million units 
by 1951. Penicillin production rose, both as existing firms acquired 
mass-production capacities, and as new firms began to produce penicillin. While 
“shortages of critical raw materials, fuel, and power” remained a problem, distribution 
controls were removed in 1948, and the country was the third country after the United
t
States and the United Kingdom to become self-sufficient in penicillin.
318 Nihon Yakushi Gakkai, Nihon Iyakuhin Sangyoshi [A History o f the Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry], 113.
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Special Attention to the Past 10 Years] (Tokyo: Nippon Kayaku Co., 1976), 186; Junichi Aoyagi, Inochi o Kangaete 85-nen: 
Banyu Seiyaku no Ayumi [85 Years for Life: The History of Banyu] (Tokyo: Banyu Pharmaceutical, Co. 2000), 153.
320 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1950), 83.
321 Joichi Kumazawa and Morimasa Yagisawa, “The History o f Antibiotics: The Japanese Story,” Journal o f  Infection and 
Chemotherapy 8, no.2 (2002): 125. See also, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health 
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Figure 9. Penicillin Production and Prices, 1946-1951 (nom inal)32-
A major turning point occurred in 1948, when Japanese firms acquired mass 
production capacities. 323 Until that time, Japanese firms produced penicillin via 
surface culture, rather than deep-tank fermentation. In the early post-war period, 
Japanese firms produced penicillin from surface grown cultures in thousands of glass 
bottles. While Japanese scientists did manage to increase yields between 1944 and 
1948 by improving culture media and penicillin strains, this did not lead to a 
substantial rise in production levels.324 It was only after milk bottles were replaced 
with 1,000-4,000 litre fermentation tanks that Japanese firms were to mass-produce 
penicillin and production levels actually began to satisfy domestic demand.32^  Indeed,
’"General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public H ealth and  
Welfare in Japan  (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 123. These are 
nominal prices.
323 “Trade and Industry: Penicillin,” The O riental Economist, 1 May 1948, 352-353.
324 Kuniaki Tatsuta and Morimasa Yagisawa, Kdseibusshitsu: Seisan no Kagaku  [Antibiotics: The Science o f  Production] 
(Tokyo, Nihon Kagakukai, 1994), 9.
325 “‘Trade and Industry: Penicillin,” The O riental Economist, 13 September 1947, 749; "Trade and Industry: Penicillin,” The
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between 1947 and 1948, penicillin production increased 21 fold. In 1949, Japanese 
firms were finally able to produce penicillin with the 40,000 litre tanks used in the 
United States.326
The mass production of penicillin prompted a dramatic fall in prices -  and expanded 
access to penicillin for Japanese citizens. Despite general inflation, penicillin prices 
plummeted 62% from 1,333 yen to 500 yen in 1948. In fact, as production levels rose 
and penicillin was removed from ration distribution controls in 1949, penicillin prices 
fell by approximately 70% in both 1949 and 1950, and by 56% in 1951. As prices fell, 
penicillin became more affordable to a greater number of patients. By 1949, Japan had 
gained both capacity and self-sufficiency in penicillin production.
The growth of Japan’s penicillin industry continued to be supported by several 
measures implemented by the Occupation authorities. In January 1947, for example, 
the government introduced a rule to secure production materials for specific products, 
such as medicines.329 The Occupation forces also imported equipment and machinery 
necessary “to aid in indigenous pharmaceutical production and to provide high
OOA
standard testing equipment” for the National Institute of Health.
Oriental Economist, 1 May 1948, 352-353.
326 “Trade and Industry: Penicillin,” The Oriental Economist, 3 September 1949, 863; Hamao Umezawa, “KSsei Busshitsu no 
Kenkyushi (2) [A History o f Research in Antibiotics (2)],” Shizen i 7, no.3 (1962): 86, 87.
327 Penicillin was out o f reach of ordinary citizens in the early post-war period. In 1946, for example, the smallest dose of 10,000 
unit penicillin priced at 450 yen at a time when ordinary citizens could only withdraw 500 yen for living expenses from blocked 
deposits. See Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Early History of Antibiotics in Japan,” 77.
328 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 123.
329 This rule refers to the Shitei Seisan Shizai Wariate Kisoku. See Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 200-nen [200 Years of 
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3.1.5 Thinning Out
Attracted to the low risk, yet high profit potentials of penicillin manufacture, many
Japanese firms began to produce antibiotics in the late 1940s. In fact, the entry of so
many firms made Japan’s antibiotics sector intensely competitive in the late 1940s.
This reduced profits and the number of firms peaked around 1947, when membership
in the Japan Penicillin Research Association reached 72 members. Thereafter, the
number of penicillin producers declined, and only the strongest remained. Top
penicillin makers changed hands rapidly, and once leading firms such as Morinaga,
1Wakamoto and Toyo Jozo began to close their penicillin operations.
Table 2. Members of the Japan Penicillin Research Association, 1946-1956332
Year Number of Firms
Start 39
1946 55
1947 72
1948 54
1949 34
1950 21
1951 19
1952 19
1953 19
1954 18
1955 16
1956 15
While the intense competition and massive increase in production levels led to a swift
331 Nihon Penishirin KyOkai [Japan Penicillin Association], Penishirin no Ayumi: 1946-1961 [The History o f Penicillin: 
1946-1961], 170.
332 Ibid.
decline in penicillin prices and a peaking in the number of penicillin producers, these 
developments also led to considerable progress in the quality of penicillin available. In 
addition, there was a marked change in the leading producers of penicillin. In 1946, the 
top five penicillin makers were Banyu, Meiji Seika, Yashima Kagaku, Daito Shokusan, 
and Showa Yakuhin. In 1951, the top five were Nippon Kayaku, Takeda, Meiji Dairies, 
Meiji Seika, and Banyu.333 By the end of the Occupation, leading penicillin makers 
such as Banyu, Meiji Seika, and Takeda had survived industry clear out and had 
established their position in the Japanese market.334 A similar clear-out of industry 
was observed in the United States, where in 1950, 12 firms remained of the 20 firms 
engaged in penicillin production during World War II.335
In addition to the technology transfers and the creation of new institutions and 
organisations, the Occupation authorities added several layers of protection from 
foreign firms to nurture the Japanese antibiotics sector. This measure was significant, 
as strong competition from advanced foreign firms might have decimated the 
emerging industry. In the early post-war period, for example, imports were subject to 
approval by the SCAP, who would purchase “all pharmaceutical products considered 
necessary for import to Japan on a disease and unrest basis ... through normal 
procurement channels in the United States.”336 Deregulation of bulk imports to the 
private sector occurred in 1947, but finished products were imported by the
333 Ibid., 166.
334 Ibid., 170.
335 Federal Trade Commission, United States, Economic Report on Antibiotics Manufacture (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1958), 82.
336 Public Health and Welfare Section, ESS/FT, Chemicals Branch, “Visit of Mr. C. A. Scherer, Foreign Trade Representative of 
Kremers-Urban Company,” 4 December 1947. Declassified EO 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG no. 775024,4 (NDL).
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government until January 1950.
Almost all FDI was banned from Japan until 1949. The Occupation authorities
restricted FDI because foreign capital was viewed as an unnecessary complication that
might retard the administration of the Occupation as well as undermine the economic 
recovery of Japan. Japan experienced dramatic inflation after the war. It was
believed that, if FDI were permitted, foreign firms could take over undervalued
Japanese firms and dominate the domestic market and deplete Japan’s foreign reserves.
Under the GHQ’s strict capital controls, Japan’s antibiotic sector remained protected
from foreign competition. Had the GHQ allowed foreign antibiotics firms into Japan
during the Occupation period, Japan’s budding industry might have been destroyed.
What was remarkable about Japan’s antibiotics sector was not only the scale of
progress made, but also the speed of progress made so soon after the war. Japanese
firms were able produce enough penicillin to meet domestic demand before the end of 
the decade, in which scarcity “was of historical significance only.”340 As Japanese
manufacturers became confident of their capacity to produce penicillin, they began to
improve upon the quality of penicillin produced. They also made new attempts at 
streptomycin manufacture -  and even drug discovery.341
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339 See Mark Mason, American Multinationals in Japan: The Political Economy o f  Japanese Capital Controls (Cambridge: 
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340 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
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3.1.6 Diversification and Streptomycin: Branching Out
In the late 1940s, a second antibiotic, streptomycin, began to interest authorities in 
Japan. Mass production of streptomycin in the United States had begun in 1946, three 
years after its discovery by Selman Waksman at Rutgers University.342 As a therapy 
that could cure tuberculosis, the leading cause of death in Japan, several firms began to 
develop an interest in producing streptomycin. With streptomycin, Japan’s antibiotics 
sector entered a new phase of development.
As a stopgap measure to reduce demand pressures, the Occupation authorities 
imported streptomycin via the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) 
programme and commercial funds from 1949.343 But the extremely high incidence of 
tuberculosis in Japan meant that sufficient dollar funds were not available for the level 
of imports necessary to meet demand.344 Because of this, the Occupation authorities 
were keen to enable Japanese firms to achieve self-sufficiency.
To assist in making streptomycin, the Occupation authorities helped provide supplies 
of raw materials for streptomycin production. The Public Health and Welfare Section 
requested and received the bacterial strain that would enable commercial streptomycin
342 “Drug Production Begun: Two Plants Now Devoted to Making of Streptomycin,” The New York Times, 21 August 1946; 
Albert Schatz, Elizabeth Bugie, and Selman Waksman, “Streptomycin, A Substance Exhibiting Antibiotic Activity against 
Gram-positive and Gram-negative Bacteria,” Proceedings o f  the Society fo r  Experimental Biology and Medicine 55 (1944): 
66-69.
343 GARIOA was a U.S. government aid programme for American occupied territories after World War II. U.S. government aid 
through this programme provided mainly foodstuffs, fertilisers and pharmaceuticals to Japan between 1947 and 1951.
344 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 128-129.
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production from Selman Waksman via the Department of the Army.345 These cultures
were transferred to the Japanese government and distributed by the National Institute 
of health to researchers interested in commercial production.346 The Occupation
forces also encouraged Japanese firms to produce streptomycin by: emphasising its
therapeutic value, outlining the preparations required for domestic production, and
guaranteeing the procurement of any streptomycin produced. But unlike the case of
penicillin, Japanese requests for a technical consultant to facilitate the transition from 
laboratory to industrial production were frustrated.347 As the end of the Occupation
neared, the Allied forces transferred more responsibilities to the Japanese. Technology
transfers were increasingly arranged between Japanese and foreign firms without
mediation by the authorities. But not only was the Occupation regime less interested in
enabling Japanese firms to produce streptomycin compared to penicillin, the Japanese 
had much less clout in negotiating with foreign firms or universities.348
While the Occupation authorities were much less interventionist than in the transfer of
penicillin technology, they were still instrumental in the transfer of streptomycin
technology to Japan. The Central Streptomycin Research Council, comprised of
members of the Occupation forces, Japanese government officials and university 
professors, was established in late 1949.349 This council helped coordinate technology
345 Stuart G Smith to Selman A Waksman, 19 July 1948, Personal Correspondence; Selman A. Waksman to W Fujita, 15 March 
1949, Personal Correspondence, Selman A. Waksman Papers, Box 20, Folder 1, Rutgers University.
346 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 122-123.
347 Ibid.
348 See for example, Yusuke Sumiki to Selman A. Waksman, 28 November 1950 and 14 February 1950, Personal 
Correspondence, Selman A. Waksman Papers, Box 20, Folder 1, Rutgers University; Selman A. Waksman to Yusuke Sumiki, 4 
December 1950, 6 February 1951 and 18 June 1951, Personal Correspondence, Selman A. Waksman Papers, Box 20, Folder 1, 
Rutgers University.
349 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health and 
Welfare in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1949), 122. This
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transfers between firms in Japan and the United States. Indeed, the council
orchestrated two contractual agreements made between Merck and Meiji Seika and
Kyowa Hakko. In exchange for royalty payments, Merck supplied its patent rights,
<1CA
technical data, strains, and plant design. During May and June 1949, the American
firm also sent two scientists, Addinall and Colin, to provide technological guidance to 
the Japanese firms.351 Whereas penicillin technology had been transferred to many
firms, universities, and research organisations throughout Japan, streptomycin was
am
initially transferred to only a handful of firms.
The first commercial batch of streptomycin was made available in July 1951.353
Production levels grew quickly as Meiji Seika, Kyowa Hakko, the Institute of Science,
Shimane Chemical, and Japan Seibutsu Kagaku became its first licensed producers in 
October 1951.354 As with penicillin, the first manufacturers of streptomycin were new
entrants such as confectioners, brewers, and chemical firms rather than the traditional
pharmaceutical firms. By placing streptomycin on the ration control list until 1952, the
Occupation ensured streptomycin producers of profits. With the aid of supplies,
technology transfers, protectionist policies, and distribution routes secured by the
government, production levels rose from 1.7 kg in July 1950 to 416.8 kg in
council was comprised of officials from the GHQ’s Public Health and Welfare Section, Japan’s Ministry o f Health, university 
professors, and hospital directors.
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December 1951.355
Figure 10. Volume of Streptomycin Production, July 1950-Decem ber 1951356
Meiji and Kyowa’s streptomycin alliance with Merck marked the first of numerous 
technology imports of antibiotics during the 1950s. As one of the most novel 
therapeutic discoveries of the times, antibiotics comprised the majority of the 
technology imports in the 1950s -  although imports ranged from sulfa drugs, 
antihistamines, to hormonal preparations. Major transfers of antibiotic technologies 
over the following decade would include Sankyo’s alliance with Parke Davis for 
chloramphenicol in 1951, Banyu’s alliance with Bristol Laboratories in 1953 for 
procaine penicillin and 1955 for tetracycline, and Yamanouchi’s alliance with
355 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health and Welfare Section, Public Health an d  
Welfare in Japan  (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Public Health and Welfare Section, 1952), 124.
356 Ibid.
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Boehringer in 1954 for chloramphenicol.
3.1.7 Summary of the Occupation period
In less than half a decade after 1945, Japan became self-sufficient in antibiotics. 
Japanese firms managed to develop, produce, and distribute quality antibiotics within 
an extraordinarily short period of time. This was largely due to the guidance provided 
by the Occupation authorities. The Occupation forces supplied the necessary raw 
materials, provided technical assistance in antibiotic production, and stimulated 
demand by purchasing antibiotics for the use of American forces stationed in Japan. 
The Occupation authorities also introduced protectionist policies that eliminated 
foreign competition in Japan. The very existence of Japan’s antibiotics sector owes 
itself to the policies of the Allied forces.
The technology transfers arranged by the American authorities were able to create a 
modem pharmaceutical industry because Japanese firms were capable of adopting the 
knowledge provided. Two types of firms produced antibiotics in Occupied Japan: the 
traditional pharmaceutical firms and new entrants such as confectioners and
O CO
brewers. Neither had been heavily damaged from the bombings during the Second 
World War. Brewers and confectioners were particularly well positioned to use their 
idle facilities to produce antibiotics, as there was little demand for non-essential 
foodstuffs after the War. As such, the rebuilding of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry in
357 YakugyO Keizai KenkyOjo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon YakugyO Shimbunsha, 1957), 59-60.
338 Japan’s older, more traditional firms such as Takeda, Daiichi, and Sankyo often produced drugs such as hexyresourcinol, DDT, 
and sulfa drugs.
143
the Occupation period was not as difficult as in other sectors that had been devastated 
by the war. Moreover, the human capital and connections with universities that had 
survived the war proved crucial in rebuilding the pharmaceutical industry. Towards the 
end of the Allied Occupation of Japan, technology transfers took place between 
individual firms, with less intervention by government.
It is also worth noting that the development of the antibiotics sector was also 
encouraged by the high therapeutic demand in Japan. Infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis were rife and the leading causes of death. For many, penicillin and 
streptomycin offered a life-saving cure.
3.2 Building production capacities and discovering new antibiotics, 1951 -1961 
Prompted by the discoveries of penicillin and streptomycin, the 1950s evolved into an 
era of antibiotic discovery. While the government became less interventionist than it 
had been during the Occupation, it extended a strong degree of protection to enable 
Japanese firms to catch up with those in the West. As with other sectors of the Japanese 
economy, strong demand from the American Army during the Korean War 
(1951-1953) fuelled the growth of the antibiotics sector. Other reasons for growth 
included enduring therapeutic demand and strong informal networks between 
government, industry and academia.
But as in the Occupation era, the major reason for the growth of the antibiotics sector 
in the 1950s lay in the policies made by government. The government’s protectionist
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policies, for example, to control foreign exchange and restrict foreign capital while 
promoting process patents allowed for the rapid dissemination of technology -  and 
catch up -  among Japanese firms. The government also fostered the development of 
the antibiotic sector through research funding. This section shows how the 
government’s industrial policies continued to shape the development of Japan’s 
antibiotics sector after the Occupation era.
3.2.1 Japan’s first antibiotic discovery
Japanese scientists began to search for new types of antibiotics in the late 1940s. 
Discovering new antibiotics involved sifting through numerous soil samples to locate 
bacteria that might produce antibacterial substances. The process was also 
labour-intensive and required little expensive equipment. As such, antibiotics R&D 
was suited to a developing economy.
The first Japan-origin antibiotic was discovered by a team of researchers led by Yasuo 
Koyama and Akio Kurosawa of the Kobayashi Bacteriological Laboratory, which was
' I C Q
affiliated with the Lion Pharmaceutical Company. Since 1946, researchers at the 
Kobayashi Bacteriological Laboratory had screened approximately 140 strains of 
bacteria from soil samples collected across Japan. An effective strain, No 70B, was 
discovered out of a soil sample from Fukushima Prefecture in 1950. Found effective 
toward gram-negative bacteria, colistin was valued for its potential application against
359 Katsuichi Matsuo, “Korisuchin oyobi Korisuchin Metan Suruhonsan Natoriumu no Kaihatsu [The Development of Colistin 
and Colistin Methanesulfonate],” in Sangyo Gijutsu no Rekishi no Shutaisei-Taikeika o Okonaukoto ni Yoru Inobeshon Soshutsu 
no Kankyd Seibi ni Kansuru Chdsa Kenkyu Hokokusho [Investigation and Research Report on the Compilation and 
Organisation on the History o f Industrial Technology to Develop an Environment more Suitable for Innovation], ed. Japan 
Machinery Federation (Tokyo: Japan Machinery Federation, 2006), 74-80,242-275.
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dysentery and whooping cough, for which no effective therapies existed.
The commercialisation of colistin was a joint project between academia and industry. 
Research on manufacturing processes were conducted at the Lion Pharmaceutical, 
while basic animal tests on toxicity, absorption and excretion were outsourced to 
several research teams at Tohoku University and Tohoku Pharmaceutical 
University. After favourable results were obtained from the laboratory and 
preliminary tests at local hospitals, clinical trials were carried out in collaboration with 
Keio University, Tokyo University and Teishin Hospital. In 1951, initial attempts at 
mass production were conducted at Snow Brand Milk Products.
Colistin was approved for use in 1951. Lion Kinyaku Kogyo (Lion Antibiotic 
Industry) -  a firm established and operated by Kobayashi laboratory scientists -  
produced colistin, while Tokyo Iyakuhin -  a pharmaceutical distributor -  marketed the
'ic.'y
drug. Colistin’s therapeutic effects were recognised internationally, and it became 
the first Japan-origin antibiotic to be licensed overseas. While colistin was not 
approved in the United States until 1962, the drug was approved in Europe via 
Laboratories Roger Bellon (France) in 1959. 363 For Lion, colistin proved 
commercially successful, and in 1969, the firm was recognised by the Ministry of
360 Yasuo Koyama, Akio Kurosasa, Atsushi Tsuchiya, and Kinsuke Takakuta,”ANew Antibiotic “Colistin” Produced by 
Spore-forming Soil Bacteria,” Journal o f  Antibiotics 3, no. 7 (1950): 457-459.
361 One o f the scientists, Masahito Fujimasa established Lion Kinyaku specifically for this purpose in 1949.
362 Yakuji NippOsha, “Colistin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji Nipposha, 1952), 21-23.
363 FDA/Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “Label and Approval History: Coly-mycin S,” Drugs@FDA, FDA Approved 
Drug Products,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Label ApprovalHistory#apphist (accessed 
8 May 2008). Seiyaku Kigyo Kondankai [Council of Pharmaceutical Firms], Seiyaku Kigyd no Genjd to Kdsatsu [An Evaluation 
o f the Current Status o f Pharmaceutical Firms] (Tokyo: Seiyaku Kigy<5 Kondankai, 1965).
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International Trade and Industry (MITI) for its contribution toward Japanese 
exports.364
3.2.2 Import substitution and growth
While Japanese scientists began to discover and develop antibiotics, the Japanese 
antibiotics market in the 1950s was mostly comprised of antibiotics imported in 
finished form. In the second half of the decade, these were replaced by 
domestically-produced antibiotics based on imported technology. As in the 
Occupation era, the major players in the early 1950s remained the non-traditional 
pharmaceutical firms equipped with fermentation facilities. Many of these were 
confectioners and brewers who had been unable to maintain their existing business in 
non-essential goods under destitute post-war conditions.
But the traditional pharmaceutical firms -  wholesalers of Western medicines -  began 
to regain their footing in the market in the mid 1950s, as they began to produce 
antibiotics under foreign licenses. Sankyo, for example, shifted its focus from the 
production and sale of anthelmintics, DDT and BHC to the import, production and sale 
of antibiotics. By I960, antibiotics comprised almost a quarter of Sankyo’s total 
pharmaceutical sales of 18.1 billion yen, mainly via licenses from Parke Davis, 
Lovens Kemiske, Sando, and Squibb.365 Shionogi also formed alliances with Eli Lilly 
to launch antibiotics such as erythromycin. By 1960, antibiotics comprised 12.7% of
364 Katsuichi Matsuo, “Korisuchin oyobi Korisuchin Metan Suruhon san Natoriumu no Kaihatsu [The Development o f Colistin 
and Colistin Methanesulfonate],” 74.
365 Sankyo Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1960).
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production at Shionogi. Even Takeda, primarily a vitamins producer, launched
'if.n
antibiotics such as tetracycline and kanamycin in 1956 and 1959, respectively. 
Many of the antibiotics marketed in Japan originated from large American firms such 
as Parke Davis, Bristol, Squibb, Beecham, Pfizer, Upjohn and Eli Lilly.
In the 1950s, Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firms from the pre-war era regained their 
dominance in the antibiotics market through these imports of technology.368 Larger 
firms had greater capital to borrow technology from foreign firms. In addition, Japan’s 
larger, traditional pharmaceutical manufacturers began to form vertical keiretsu 
groupings with wholesalers in the 1950s. These alliances helped the traditional 
pharmaceutical firms to strengthen their marketing capacities and deter the entry of 
new firms.
366 Shionogi & Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1960).
367 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1960).
368 Minoru Aizawa and United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Review o f  the Development o f  Antibiotic Industry 
in Selected Countries: Technical Report: Antibiotic Industry in Japan, History and Development (Vienna: United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, 1985), 74.
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Product Length of Contract Companies
Procaine penicillin 1953 (15 years) Banyu-Bristol Laboratories
Streptomycin 1951 (15 years) Merck-Kyowa Hakko, Meiji
Chloramphenicol 1951 (15 years) Sankyo-Parke Davis
1954 (10 years) Yamanouchi-Boehringer
Chlortetracycline 1953 (15 years) Japan Lederle- 
American Cyanamid
Oxytetracycline 1953 (15 years) Taito Pfizer-Pfizer
Tetracycline 1953 (15 years)
1954 (15 years)
1955 (14 years
4 months)
Japan Lederle- 
American Cyanamid 
Taito Pfizer-Pfizer 
Banyu-Bristol Laboratories
Penicillin
Aminoesthyl
1954 (5 years) Sankyo-Lovens Kemiske
Dypenicillin 1953 (15 years) Banyu-Wyeth International
Table 3 Significant Imports of Antibiotic Technology after the Occupation369 .
Indeed, the government’s import substitution strategies were central to the 
development of Japan’s antibiotics sector in the 1950s. Japanese firms imported 
technologies as a rapid, efficient, and cost-effective means to catch up with more 
advanced countries. In fact, technology imports of antibiotics far outweighed any 
other therapeutic sector, accounting for 21 of the 70 technology imports for 
pharmaceuticals between 1951 and 1960. By restricting imports to products that 
remained unavailable in Japan or production processes that remained undeveloped in 
Japan, Japanese firms were protected from foreign competition. As a process patent 
regime, the government lowered barriers to entry and promoted the diffusion of new
369 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugy5 Shimbunsha, 1957), 59-60.
370 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon YakugyO Shimbunsha, 1961), 123.
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technologies across many firms.
Many Japanese firms took advantage of this environment to develop antibiotics 
through the reverse engineering of foreign products. While firms such as Roche and 
Taito-Pfizer had established operations in Japan, the few foreign firms in Japan did not 
pose a threat to domestic firms.371 This was because foreign firms were few in number, 
affiliated with Japanese firms, and had yet to establish their own distribution routes. It 
was true that the government’s protectionist measures encouraged the growth of an 
imitation -  rather than innovation -  industry during the 1950s, and the market began to 
bear signs of over-competition. Yet the government’s import-substitution policies in 
the 1950s were crucial to offering Japanese firms a chance to catch up with the West.
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371 Ibid, 124-145.
372 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1957), 289; 
Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K ogyd  Seisan D otai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical
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As Japanese firms imported new technologies and established new production plants, 
the antibiotics sector grew steadily over the 1950s. Japan’s rapid economic growth 
since the 1950s also had a strong impact on the growth of industry, as production 
levels correlated closely with macroeconomic performance. For example, while 
production grew rapidly during the Jinmu and Iwato economic booms from 1955 to 
1957, and from 1959 to 1961, respectively, production fell during the recession 
between 1957 and 1959. In the mean time, the importance of the antibiotics to Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry lessened, as more firms diversified out of antibiotics. 
Antibiotics were the leading therapy in 1952, comprising almost 16% of total 
production. A decade later, however, antibiotics comprised less than 10% of total 
production, and vitamins overtook antibiotics as the leading therapeutic sector 
between 1958 and 1969. While its market share relative to Japan’s overall 
pharmaceutical industry may have declined, the antibiotics sector experienced stable 
growth over the 1950s.373
Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyS Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kdgyo Seisan Dotai Chosa 
Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
373 Ibid.
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Japan’s imports of antibiotics declined during the 1950s both as special procurements 
by the US Army came to an end, and as imports were replaced by antibiotics produced 
in Japan. Antibiotic trade also declined in significance relative to total pharmaceutical 
trade.‘,76 While antibiotics had comprised almost half of total pharmaceutical trade at
the beginning of the decade, figures dropped to only 6% by the end of the decade. 
Antibiotics had comprised a significant proportion of both imports and exports of total
pharmaceuticals in the early 1950s. In 1951, imports and exports of antibiotics 
comprised 72.7% and 25.8% of imports and exports of total pharmaceuticals, 
respectively.376 But by the end of the decade, imports and exports of antibiotics had
374 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1957), 292-293, 
300-301; Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1961), 42.
375 Trade in this context refers to the sum o f  imports and exports.
376 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1957), 292-293, 
300-301.
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dropped to 8.0% and 4.8% of total pharmaceuticals, respectively. 377 Antibiotic 
exports did increase as Japanese firms became capable of producing antibiotics, 
particularly as leading firms began to recapture some of the South East and East Asian 
markets that it had lost during the War.378 But as the rise of exports was much smaller 
than the fall of imports, total trade in antibiotics declined over the 1950s.379
In terms of trading partners, Japan exported older antibiotics to the developing world 
while the country imported newer antibiotics from the developed world. In the late 
1950s, antibiotics comprised approximately 17% of pharmaceutical exports and 15% 
of pharmaceutical imports in Japan.380 Japan exported older antibiotics such as 
streptomycin and penicillin to India, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Italy, while Japan 
imported newer antibiotics such as chloramphenicol and viomycin, from the United
o o t
States, the United Kingdom and Germany.
3.2.3 Kanamycin and internationalisation
As Japanese firms acquired the capacity to produce leading antibiotics, and competed 
to develop better drugs, more firms attempted to discover their own original drugs. 
Between 1950 and 1960, Japanese firms discovered five of the 22 antibiotics (23%) 
marketed in Japan. These included colistin by Lion Kinyaku in 1951, sarkomycin by 
Meiji Seika in 1954, kitasamycin by Toyo Jozo in 1956, kanamycin by Meiji Seika in
377 YakugyQ Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon YakugyO Shimbunsha, 1961), 37-38.
378 Ibid., 44-45.
379 Ibid., 42.
380 Ibid., 37-38.
381 Ibid., 44-45.
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1958, and mitomycin by Kyowa Hakko in 1959.382 Four of the five antibiotics
originated out of small-scale confectionery or brewery firms, reflecting the importance
of fermentation capacities and non-traditional pharmaceutical firms in the
development of Japan’s antibiotics sector in the 1950s.
Government funding of antibiotic R&D played an important role in the discovery and
development of Japanese antibiotics. Since 1946, the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Education had supported research on antibiotics. The Ministry of Health,
for example, provided funding through the Japan Antibiotic Research Association,
which not only supported academic research but also promoted its dissemination 
through the publication of the Journal of Antibiotics -  which remains the leading 
journal on antibiotic research in Japan to date. Partly because government funding
was given to academic institutions, antibiotic discoveries in Japan evolved out of the
academic laboratory. While a few industrial laboratories were established by firms
such as Takeda, Fujisawa, and Daiichi in the 1950s, industrial laboratories did not take 
root in most of Japanese pharmaceutical firms until the 1960s. Where they did exist,
industrial research concentrated primarily on process innovation rather than product
382 Minoru Aizawa and United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Review o f  the Development o f Antibiotic Industry 
in Selected Countries: Technical Report: Antibiotic Industry in Japan, History and Development, 74. Two of the five are 
actually anticancer antibiotics sarkomycin and mitomycin), which reflect the expansion o f antibiotic science toward cancer 
therapy. It is worth noting discrepancies between discovery figures reported by the United Nations, the Science and Technology 
Agency (STA), and the JARA. For example, the UN reports 5 Japan-origin discoveries over the 50s while the STA and the JARA 
report 9 and 12, respectively. This is likely due to differences in methods of calculation, and the criteria for evaluating the 
significance for a given discovery. STA and JARA figures also suggest the growing importance of Japan-origin discoveries. For 
example, the STA reports that 25 antibiotic discoveries were made between 1950 and 1960, out of which 9 (36%) were Japanese, 
12 (48%) American, 1 (4%) British, French, Belgian, and Swiss. Yagisawa’s JARA figures suggest that half of the 12 Japan origin 
Antibiotics between 1950 and 1960 (inclusive) were available overseas. While Japan-origin discoveries gained greater importance 
in the domestic market, antibiotics with smaller margins of innovation may have been recognised as new therapeutic substances in 
Japan compared to other industrialised countries.
383 See Japan Antibiotics Research Association, “Honkai no Gaiy5 [About Us],” http://www.antibiotics.or.ip/iara/news/iara.htm 
(accessed 28 April 2008). See also, Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Early History of Antibiotics in Japan,” 88.
384 This is documented in various company histories. See for example, Takeda. Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 200-nen [200 Years 
of Takeda] (Osaka: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 1984); Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Fujisawa 100-nenshi [Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical, a 100 Year History] (Osaka: Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co.,1995); and Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi 
Seiyaku 80-nenshi [Daiichi Pharmaceutical, a 80 Year History] (Tokyo: Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., 1998).
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innovation. Government funding for antibiotic R&D provided the impetus for the 
discovery of antibiotics through academic laboratories in Japan.
The rise of antibiotic resistance also began to encourage firms to invest in R&D. 
Before the 1950s, the purpose of antibiotic R&D was to locate any naturally occurring 
substance effective toward bacterial infections. But the rise of antibiotic resistance and 
realisation of significant side effects over the decade renewed demand for antibiotics 
where similar therapies were already available.
One of the major antibiotic discoveries in the mid 1950s was kanamycin. Kanamycin 
had been discovered by a scientific team led by one of Japan’s leading scientists, 
Hamao Umezawa, who had led antibiotics research in Japan since World War II.385 
Since 1952, Umezawa had developed a systematic approach to antibiotic R&D, and 
studied antibiotic agents that: derived from actinomycetes; halted bacterial growth; 
were water-soluble; basic; and of low toxicity.386
Umezawa developed kanamycin working in collaboration with Meiji Seika, a firm 
with which he had been connected since the Occupation era. Meiji Seika had been 
established in 1916 as one of the first Wpstem-style confectionery firms in Japan. In 
the pre-war era, the firm developed its confectionery business in caramels and biscuits 
as it branched out into the production of canned foods. Faced with scarce food supplies
385 Hamao Umezawa was one of the central scientific researchers in Japan’s wartime penicillin project. See for example, 
Katsuhiko Inagaki, Penishirin linkai no Kotodomo [Notes on the Penicillin Committee], 16 November 1944, Naito Museum of 
Pharmaceutical Science and Industry, Kagamihara, Japan.
386 Hamao Umezawa, “KQseibusshitsu o Motomete (2): Kanamaishin no Hakken [Searching for Antibiotics (2): The Discovery 
o f Kanamycin],” Shokurt 12, no.2 (1980): 294-305.
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and a limited market for sweets after the War, however, Meiji Seika saw an urgent need 
to diversify its operations. The firm entered the antibiotics sector in 1946 as a venture 
that would build upon its fermentation capacities and where profits were ensured 
through the govemmenfs procurements of penicillin.387 By 1958, Meiji Seika had 
become one of the leading antibiotics makers in Japan, and one of 13 firms to survive 
the intense competition in the penicillin market. Meiji Seika’s involvement in
* ^  ft Qdeveloping kanamycin was a natural extension of its business in antibiotics.
Much like colistin, kanamycin’s development was a joint project between academia 
and industry, both within and beyond Japan. Basic research, for example, was carried 
out at Tokyo University, Meiji Seika, and Bristol Laboratories, while Merck joined 
during the clinical testing phase. While the scale of laboratory tests was small by 
today’s standards, they had become more sophisticated since colistin. After 
test-production at Meiji Seika’s Kawasaki plant -  a facility affiliated with Umezawa’s 
research efforts since the penicillin era -  clinical tests on patients were led by Tokyo 
University professor Tokuji Ichikawa, who reported favourable results in tuberculosis, 
dysentery, and other infectious diseases.390 As in other substances, however, the 
crystal structure was identified much later, in 1967.391
387 Takeshi Nakagawa, interview by ShOzQ Tsunabuchi in “Meiji Seika: IshokudOgen Baio o Mezasu [Meiji Seika Aims to 
Develop Biotechnology Businesss],” Will (December 1982): 48-51.
388 Nihon Penishirin Kyokai [Japan Penicillin Association], Penishirin noAyumi: 1946-1961 [The History o f Penicillin: 
1946-1961], 170.
389 For a history of Meiji Seika, see Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd., Meiji Seika no Ayumi: Kaukide Tsukutte 60-nen [A History of Meiji 
Seika: Selling What We Want to Buy for 60 Years] (Tokyo: Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd., 1977); Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd., Meiji Seika 
noAyumi: Sogyo kara 70-nen [A History of Meiji Seika: 70 Years since Establishment] (Tokyo: Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd., 1987).
390 Hamao Umezawa, “Kanamycin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji Nipp5sha, 1959), 13-17.
391 The synthetic production of antibiotics usually occurred much later after discovery, after the chemical structure was 
identified. See K. Maeda and H. Umezawa, “The Crystal Structure of Kanamycin,” Tetrahedron Letters 15 (1968): 1875-1879.
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Kanamycin’s discovery, while inexpensive, had been extremely labour intensive -  and 
required the cooperation of scientists from all over Japan. The substance was 
discovered in early 1955 out of a strain of actinomycetes (K-2J) found in a soil sample 
from Nagano prefecture. Regional collaborations in antibiotic research was essential 
to this process, as Umezawa’s scientific team laboriously examined between 50 and 
100 strains each week. These strains were provided by schools, community health 
centres, and regional offices throughout Japan, who collected and sent soil samples to 
the National Institute of Health -  where Umezawa was based. After delivery to the 
institute, these strains were cultivated and examined for any antibacterial substances 
produced. In 1955, scientists were able to identify kanamycin and its effective range of 
bacteria, as well as isolate the substance.
Kanamycin was valued for its low toxicity and its effectiveness against strains of 
bacteria that had become resistant to earlier antibiotics. In Japan, for example, 
kanamycin helped to contain dysentery and tuberculosis, which had increasingly 
become resistant to existing antibiotics.393 Kanamycin also proved effective in 
relatively low doses, and was found suitable to mass production in tank cultures.394
Kanamycin was launched by Meiji Seika in May 195 8.395 While discovered a few 
years later than colistin, kanamycin became a more successful drug because of its
392 Hamao Umezawa, Masahiro Ueda, Kenji Maeda, Koki Yagishita, Shinichi Kondo, Yoshiro Okami, Ryozo Itahara, Yasuke 
Osato, Kazuo Nitta, and Tomio Takeuchi, “Production and Isolation of a New Antibiotic, Kanamycin,” Journal o f  Antibiotics 
Series A 10 (September 1957): 181-188.
393 Hamao Umezawa, “KOsei Busshitsu o Motomete (2) [Searching for Antibiotics (2)],” 301.
394 Ibid., and Hamao Umezawa, “Kanamycin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji Nipposha, 1959), 
13-17. Hamao Umezawa, “Kanamycin: Its Discovery,” Annals o f  the New York Academy o f  Sciences 76, no. 2 (1958): 20-26.
395 Yakuji NippOsha, Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji NippQsha, 1959), 22.
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ability to treat tuberculosis and ease of use.396 For Meiji Seika, kanamycin proved to
be a tremendously successful drug that became one of Japan’s top antibiotics exports 
and remains in use to date.397 The experience of Meiji Seika demonstrates that the
capacity among Japanese firms to develop new antibiotics came to be recognised
abroad in the 1950s. The presentation of kanamycin at the New York Academy of 
Science on 10-11 July 1958 was widely documented in Western publications.398
Kanamycin also showed how Japan’s process patent regime penalised innovative drug
discoveries. Process patents allowed firms to reverse engineer drugs and did not
protect the discoveries of innovative firms. Meiji Seika had risked 200 million yen to 
pursue R&D of kanamycin at a time when the firm had a capital of 840 million yen.399
Despite its successful discovery, Meiji Seika faced an environment that did not
generously reward or protect innovation. After kanamycin’s approval in April 1958,
Meiji Seika had a monopoly in the Japanese market for less than five months. Banyu
and Yamanouchi launched their own versions of kanamycin on 15 September 1958, 
followed by Tanabe three days later.400 For many firms, the lack of government 
protection or support for product innovation undermined incentives to discover new
drugs.
396 See for example. Koichi Nakazawa, “Kekkaku no Kagaku Ryoho to Kanamaishin [Chemotherapeutic Approaches to 
Tuberculosis and Kanamycin],” Kenko Hoken 14 (November 1960): 46-48. Yasuhisa Chiba, “Kanamaishin to wa [What is 
Kanamycin?]” Kyosai Shinpd 2 (March 1961): 54-57.
397 Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd., Meiji Seika noAyumi: Sogyo kora 80-nen [The History of Meiji Seika: 80 Years from Establishment] 
(Tokyo: Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd., 1997), 20. See for example, Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd., Yiika Shoken Hdkokusho [Annual 
Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1960). By fiscal 1960, Meiji Seika derived 20% of sales, or 16.2 yen (in 
2005yen) from pharmaceuticals, with most o f its sales from penicillin, streptomycin, and kanamycin.
398 See for example, “From a Japanese Garden,” Time Magazine, 21 July 1958. See also, Hamao Umezawa, “Kanamycin: Its 
Discovery,” Annals o f  the New York Academy o f  Sciences 76, no.2 (1958): 20-26. This article documents Umezawa’s speech on 
“The Basic and Clinical Research of the New Antibiotic Kanamycin” at a conference, held jointly by the New York Academy of 
Sciences and Bristol Laboratories.
399 Takeshi Nakagawa, interview by ShOzO Tsunabuchi in “Meiji Seika: Ishokudogen Baio o Mezasu [Meiji Seika Aims to 
Develop Biotechnology Businesss],” 48. These are nominal values. In 2005 values, Meiji Seika had risked 1.09 billion yen to 
pursue R&D of kanamycin at a time when the firm had a capital of 4.57 billion yen..
Yakuji NippOsha, Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji Nipposha, 1959), 22.
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3.2.4 Summary of the period between 1950 to 1961
As in the Occupation period, the major reason for the development of the antibiotics 
sector between 1950 and 1961 was government policies. As foreign firms were 
prevented from entering the Japanese market, Japanese antibiotics makers were 
protected from foreign competition. In addition, Japan’s process patent regime 
encouraged firms to reverse engineer drugs discovered abroad, find another method to 
manufacture the drug, and launch this drug as a “new” product in Japan. This 
discouraged investments in R&D.401 Still, some Japanese drug companies did begin to 
invest in antibiotic R&D and discover new therapies that were licensed overseas. The 
search for new antibiotics involved little equipment and was a labour-intensive and 
serendipitous process -  and was a form of pharmaceutical R&D conducive to firms in 
a developing economy. The discovery of antibiotics was also facilitated by the 
collaborative links between academia, government and industry.
But unlike the United States, for example, where most research had been transferred to 
pharmaceutical firms by 195Q, antibiotic research in Japan remained in universities 
and public research institutes 402 Antibiotic research in the industrial laboratory would 
gradually take root over the following decades, as Japanese firms strengthened their 
capacity to produce and discover global antibiotics.403
401 Nihon Yakushi Gakkai, Nihon lyakuhin Sangyoshi [The History of the Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry], 110.
402 Hamao Umezawa, “KSsei Busshitsu o Motomete (2) [Searching for Antibiotics (2)],” 297.
403 This is evident in the various drug development processes. See Yakuji Nipposha, Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] 
(Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1950-2006).
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3.3 Nurturing industry through process innovations and domestic demand, 1961- 
1975
Between 1961 and 1975, Japan’s antibiotics sector saw a phenomenal expansion in 
terms of production, trade, and R&D. In 1961, antibiotics accounted for 10% of total 
drug production and this increased to more than 20% by 1975.404 Antibiotics were, in 
fact, the largest therapeutic sector in Japan between 1970 and 198 8.405 While the 
dominance of antibiotics in the pharmaceutical market was echoed in most other 
developed countries around the globe, the rate and extent of expansion in Japan was 
distinct406 Confectioners and brewers such as Meiji Seika and Toyo Jozo continued to 
compete alongside the more traditional pharmaceutical firms such as Takeda, 
Yamanouchi and Fujisawa into the mid 1970s.407
3.3.1 Building a domestically oriented antibiotics sector
Japan’s antibiotics sector began to evolve as a domestic oriented industry from the 
1960s. This was mainly because the government introduced universal health care, 
created distinct product standards, allowed physicians to dispense medicines, and set 
modest criteria for drug approval. In 1961, the government effectively underwrote 
demand for prescription pharmaceuticals when it launched universal health care. 
When the government established new product standards for Japanese drugs in 1967, 
it essentially excluded foreign drugs from the domestic market. Japan’s antibiotics
404 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chdsa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chdsa 
Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in die Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
405 Ibid.
406 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Pharmaceuticals: Gaps in Technology, 32, 69; and Yakugyo 
Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakugyo Keizai Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Economics Annual] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1967), 132-299.
407 Minoru Aizawa and United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Review o f  the Development o f  Antibiotic Industry 
in Selected Countries: Technical Report: Antibiotic Industry in Japan, History and Development, 74-75.
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sector began to expand rapidly within this highly protected environment -  where the 
government also sponsored demand.
In addition, Japanese physicians both prescribed and dispensed antibiotics.408 They 
bargained down the price at which they purchased their drugs from wholesalers, and 
profited from the difference between the official drug prices at which they resold their 
drugs to patients. Japanese physicians were particularly incentivised to over-prescribe 
antibiotics because official drug prices were high, and they could negotiate a steeper 
discount for wholesale prices. In addition, antibiotics could be prescribed to a large 
patient population. Infections were common complaints, antibiotics had relatively few 
side effects, and as a short-term therapy, the total cost of medicines was much lower 
than in chronic diseases. Furthermore, in 1967, the government established modest 
criteria for a substance to qualify as a new drug in Japan. The Japanese antibiotics 
sector expanded rapidly in an environment with strong demand for high priced 
antibiotics, and where incremental innovations easily qualified as new drugs. At the 
same time, however, the antibiotics sector became heavily domestically oriented, as 
both the demand structure and drug approval criteria were specific only to Japan.
3.3.2 A shift in antibiotic R&D
There was a major transition in antibiotic R&D over the 1960s, in terms of both the 
approaches used and the ability demonstrated by Japanese firms to discover new 
antibiotics. Antibiotics were no longer discovered out of serendipity from naturally
408 Michael Reich, “Why the Japanese Don't Export More Pharmaceuticals: Health Policy as Industrial Policy,” 135.
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occurring substances, but from semisynthetic compounds where new drugs were 
developed from compounds of known chemical structure and potential therapeutic 
value. The quality of antibiotics also improved during this time, as the newer drugs 
offered greater potency, wider antibacterial spectra, and lower toxicity. R&D methods 
also became more sophisticated, and entailed greater risk, cost, scale, and 
complexity.409
It is true that many Japanese firms continued to produce new antibiotics based on 
foreign technologies in a highly protected environment. After all, new discoveries 
were also relatively easy to commercialise using existing networks of collaboration 
maintained by pharmaceutical firms.410 Faced with numerous incentives to launch 
new antibiotics and supported by collaborations with university scientists, many 
Japanese drug makers were also content to build upon past successes to bolster the 
growth of the Japanese antibiotics market411
But Japanese firms proved increasingly successful in the discovery and launch of 
globally competitive antibiotics as they acquired the capacity to pursue advanced 
methods of R&D. As in other Japanese industries, many firms established central 
research laboratories in the 1960s. The government’s new quality standards -  such as 
GCP (Good Clinical Practice) and GPMSP (Good Post-Marketing Surveillance
409 See for example, Yukimasa Yagisawa, “Shinbunya o Kirihiraita Koseibusshitsu [ANew Field Created by Antibiotics],” Iyaku 
Janaru 9 (February 1970): 20-23.
410 The importance of collaborative networks in enabling pharmaceutical innovation has been discussed, for example, in Louis 
Galambos and Jane Eliot Sewell, Networks o f  Innovation: Vaccine Development at Merck, Sharp & Dohme, and Mulford, 
1895-7995.
411 Yukimasa Yagisawa, “AtarashT Koseibusshitsu no Doko [Trends in New Antibiotics],” Iyaku Janaru 8 (February 1969): 
31-34.
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Practice) -  introduced during this time, also helped Japanese firms strengthen their 
development capacities.412 Indeed, a total of 22 Japan-origin antibiotics, or 22% of 
post-war discoveries, were discovered between 1961 and 1975.413 Of these, 
approximately a third were eventually distributed worldwide. These transitions in 
antibiotic R&D in Japan are well illustrated in the experiences at Yamanouchi and 
Fujisawa.
Yamanouchi
In 1970, Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical launched a new antibiotic that was recognised 
around the world. The new antibiotic, josamycin, was a drug that not only cemented 
the firm’s strong position in the domestic market, but also prompted its 
internationalisation.
Founded by Kenji Yamanouchi in 1923, Yamanouchi prospered in the pre-war era as 
Japan’s first manufacturer of sulfa drugs. By the 1940s, the firm had captured 30% of 
Japan’s sulfa drug market414 In the years after the war, Yamanouchi diversified into a 
variety of medicines, including anthelmintics, penicillin and diuretics. Similar to many 
Japanese firms, Yamanouchi licensed-in antibiotic technologies, such as 
chloramphenicol and trichomycin, to develop its antibiotics business in the 1950s 415
412 GCP refers to quality standards for pharmaceutical R&D in the laboratory. GPMSP refers to quality standards to monitor drugs 
in a clinical setting after marketing.
413 Joichi Kumazawa and Morimasa Yagisawa, “The History o f Antibiotics: The Japanese Story,” 125-133; Morimasa Yagisawa, 
unpublished document, “Antibiotics, Chemotherapeutics and Other Microbial Products Originated from Japan,” sent to author. 
This includes 2 antifgungal antibiotics, 2 bioactive microbial substances and 4 anticancer antibiotics.
414 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
1950), 8.
415 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
1961), 7.
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But unlike many Japanese firms, antibiotics did not constitute the pillar of 
Yamanouchi’s operations. In 1960, Yamanouchi still derived over a quarter of its sales 
from sulfa drugs, followed by antibiotics and diuretics, which comprised 18% and 
11% of sales, respectively. The proportion of antibiotic sales did not change markedly 
over the 1960s, although antibiotics did begin contribute substantially to the firm’s 
business. In fact, antibiotic sales grew from 3.78 billion yen in 1960 to 15.2 billion yen 
in 1970.416
The search for Yamanouchi’s new antibiotic evolved amidst market conditions highly 
favourable to antibiotics. Josamycin was discovered in 1967 from a soil sample in 
Kochi Prefecture, out of numerous samples collected from Yamanouchi offices across 
Japan.417 The drug was developed by Takashi Osono at Yamanouchi’s central research 
laboratory in collaboration with Yoshiro Okami and Hamao Umezawa at the Institute 
of Microbial Chemistry. Clinical trials were outsourced to the School of Medicine at 
Juntendo University.418 While the drug’s development was much less rigorous 
compared to contemporary standards, the government’s new guidelines had prompted 
firms to modernise facilities, revise procedures, and write much more detailed reports 
compared to previous decades. Indeed, josamycin developed a better profile than its 
predecessors and was valued for lower toxicity levels, better absorption levels, and 
improved efficacy for a wider range of infections -  including several strains of
416 In nominal terms, Yamanouchi’s antibiotic sales grew from 722 million yen to 5.1 billion yen between 1960 and 1970. Ibid, 17. 
Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
1971), 18. The firm’s history has been documented in Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Yamanouchi Seiyaku 50-nenshi [A 50 
Year History of Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.] (Tokyo, Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.,1975).
417 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Yamanouchi Seiyaku 50-nenshi [A 50 Year History of Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.] 
(Tokyo, Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.,1975), 221.
418 Yakuji NippOsha “Josamycin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1970), 86-87.
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bacteria found to be resistant toward existing antibiotics.419
Josamycin recorded strong domestic sales following its launch in February 1970 420
For Yamanouchi, josamycin also prompted the firm’s expansion into overseas markets,
as the drug gained patent approval for countries ranging from the United States, 
Britain, West Germany to Switzerland 421 The drug’s first global launch was through 
El du Pont Nemours in 1974.422 For Yamanouchi, the drug was a success, and
contributed to its increase in antibiotic sales from 15.2 billion yen in 1970 to 19.8 
billion yen in 1980.423 Josamycin’s discovery was a product of Japan’s strengths in
antibiotic science and strong collaboration between industry and academia -  and led to 
its success in overseas markets. The drug’s strong performance in the Japanese market
was very much helped by government policy, which created a highly profitable
environment for antibiotics makers.
Fujisawa
Around the same time, Fujisawa also launched a new antibiotic that proved
tremendously successful in both domestic and international markets. The drug,
4>9Takashi Qsono, Yoshihiko Oka, Shunichi Watanabe, YOzO Numazaki, Kiruko Moriyama, Hitoshi Ishida, Kiyoshi Suzaki, 
YoshirO Okami and Hamao Umezawa, “A New Antibiotic Josamycin I: Isolation and Physicochemical Characteristics,” Journal 
o f  Antibiotics Series A 20, no.3 (1967): 174-180; and Kazuo Nitta, Kuniichiro Yano, Fumio Miyamoto, Yoshiharu Hasegawa, 
Toshihisa Sato, Noriko Kamoto and Shintaro Matsumoto, “A New Antibiotic, Josamycin. II: Biological Studies,” Journal o f  
Antibiotics Series A 20 no.3 (1967): 181-187.
420 Yakuji NippOsha “Josamycin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1970), 86-87.
421 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Yamanouchi Seiyaku 50-nenshi [A 50 Year History o f Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.] 
(Tokyo, Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co.,1975), 311-312.
422 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1976), 
7.
423 In nominal terms, Yamanouchi’s antibiotic sales grew from 5.1 billion yen to 15.9 billion yen between 1970 and 1980. 
Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1971), 
18; Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
1981), 12.
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cefazolin, belonged to a new category of antibiotics called cephalosporins, which were 
stronger and more widely effective compared to earlier antibiotics. Whereas scientists 
had previously discovered antibiotics by screening countless soil samples, cefazolin 
was a semisynthetic compound that was developed out of a known chemical structure 
that held the promise of a potential antibiotic. This was a marked transition from 
previous methods of antibiotic R&D.
While Fujisawa had launched antibiotics in the past, its decision to invest heavily in 
antibiotic R&D was a new phenomenon. Fujisawa was founded in 1894 by Tomokichi 
Fujisawa, and grew quickly in the pre-war period through the production of widely 
used therapies such as tonics and anthelmintics like camphor and santonin. In the 
post-war period, Fujisawa developed by importing foreign technologies from firms 
such as Geigy of Switzerland and Astra of Sweden. In the field of antibiotics, for 
example, a 1953 alliance with the Italian firm Carlo Erba enabled the firm to launch 
chloramphenicol as Kemicetine in Japan.424 By the early 1960s, Fujisawa derived 
around 15% of sales from antibiotics and had become known as one of Japan’s leading 
antibiotics makers.425 The success of these ventures prompted Fujisawa to invest in its 
own antibiotic R&D.
Fujisawa’s cefazolin venture reflected the firm’s strategic shift toward developing its 
own antibiotics. In 1961, Fujisawa signed a licensing agreement with the National
424 Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: OkurashQ Insatsukyoku, 1963), 7.
423 Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
1960-1965). For a history o f Fujisawa, see Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Fujisawa Yakuhin 80-nenshi [Fujisawa Pharmaceutical,
a 80 Year History] (Osaka: Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., 1976); Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Fujisawa Yakuhin 100-nenshi
[Fujisawa Pharmaceutical, a 100 Year History] (Osaka: Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., 1995).
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Research and Development Corporation (NRDC) of the United Kingdom to develop a 
substance called cephalosporin C into a potential therapy.426 Cephalosporin C had 
been identified out of a culture from the coast of Sardinia by the bacteriologist 
Giuseppe Brotsu of the University of Cagliari in 1945. Subsequent research at the 
NRDC led to the discovery that part of cephalosporin C, a chemical structure 7-ACA, 
could be isolated and chemically manipulated to locate new antibiotic substances. 
Compared to existing antibiotics, the cephalosporins held the promise of greater 
potency, a wider effective spectrum, less toxicity, greater stability, and less probability 
of causing allergic reactions.427
Fujisawa spent approximately 7.7% of its annual research costs to import 
cephalosporin C technology. Industrial scientists at Takeda and academic scientists 
at Toho University then worked together to build upon this imported knowledge. 
Using existing procedures to modify bacterial strains for production, Fujisawa 
scientists searched for productive strains through exposure to ultraviolet radiation, 
x-rays and chemical manipulation. To substitute for Fujisawa’s lack of laboratory 
capacities, researchers at Toho University offered their own facilities. After isolating 
7-ACA in 1963, the scientists developed cefazolin in 1967 and reported their results at 
meetings such as the Japan Society of Chemotherapy and the International Society for
426 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 1961), 187.
427 Minoru Nishida, Tadao Matsubara, Takeo Murakawa, Yasuhiro Mine, Yoshiko Yokota, Sachiko Goto, and Shogo Kuwahara, 
“Cefazolin, a New Semisynthetic Cephalopsorin Antibiotic II. In vitro and In vivo Antimicrobial Activity,” Journal o f  Antibiotics 
23, no .3 (1970): 137-148. See also Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Fujisawa Yakuhin 80-nenshi [Fujisawa Pharmaceutical, a 80 
Year History] (Osaka: Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., 1976), 342.
428 Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Fujisawa Yakuhin 100-nenshi [Fujisawa Pharmaceutical, a 100 Year History] (Osaka: Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., 1995), 165.
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Chemotherapy.429 Fujisawa’s development of cefazolin was testament to the rising 
calibre of antibiotic research by Japanese firms. While it was true that Fujisawa’s 
cephalosporin drug had taken much longer to develop than those of Eli Lilly or Glaxo, 
not all eight firms who obtained licenses from NRDC had been successful. Fujisawa -  
along with Glaxo and Lilly -  was one of three firms who were ultimately able to 
develop a viable therapeutic.
Fujisawa’s decade-long investment of over 150 million yen was, at the time, 
unprecedented for a Japanese firm. But the firm’s entrepreneurial venture began to pay 
off. Following its launch in 1971, cefazolin was eventually marketed in more than 100 
countries in Europe, North America and Asia. Thanks to cefazolin, antibiotic sales at 
Fujisawa grew from 29% to more than 40% of total sales in five years after launch -  or 
from 32.5 billion yen in 1971 to 64.6 billion yen in 1976.430
Cefazolin was a product of Fujisawa’s entrepreneurial foresight, whose managers 
undertook high-risk investments in hopes of capturing market opportunities from 
substantial product innovations. This was a time when Japanese firms invested little in 
R&D. The firm’s fortunes were also the product of Fujisawa’s strengths in antibiotic 
science and durable research alliances with both foreign and Japanese institutes.
429 Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co. Fujisawa Yakuhin 80-nenshi [Fujisawa Pharmaceutical, a 80 Year History] (Osaka: Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., 1976), 342. Cefazolin was valued for its wide bacterial spectrum toward gram positive and negative bacteria. 
It was also stable and well absorbed in the body, without causing bodily dysfunction or allergic reactions. It was also found to be 
effective to various bacterial strains that had become resistant to penicillin. See Minoru Nishida, Tadao Matsubara, Takeo 
Murakawa, Yasuhiro Mine, Yoshiko Yokota, Sachiko Goto, and Shogo Kuwahara, “Cefazolin, a New Semisynthetic 
Cephalopsorin Antibiotic II. In vitro and In vivo Antimicrobial Activity,” Journal o f  Antibiotics 23, no. 3 (1970): 137-148.
430 In nominal terms, Fujisawa’s antibiotic sales grew from 11.6 billion yen to 41.4 billion yen between 1960 and 1970. Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurashd Insatsukyoku, 1972): 10; Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurashd Insatsukyoku, 1977): 9.
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Cefazolin’s sales also benefited much from domestic conditions highly favourable to 
antibiotic sales. In any event, Fujisawa’s success in cefazolin spearheaded an era in 
which Japanese pharmaceutical firms would invest heavily in antibiotic R&D.431
Still, for many firms, Japanese government policies did not offer an attractive 
environment for innovation. Products of domestic origin often competed against 
products that were discovered overseas, licensed-in, or reverse engineered. By the 
time Fujisawa had launched cefazolin, for example, Eli Lilly and Glaxo’s 
cephalosporin drugs, cefalothin and cefaloridine, respectively, were already marketed 
in Japan. Eli Lilly, the first to develop cefalothin from cephalosporin C in 1962, 
provided an import/sale license to Shionogi in 1966, while Glaxo, who had developed 
cefaloridine in 1964 exported its drug to Shin Nihon Jitsugyo and distributed by Torii 
Yakuhin as in 1965.432 As the first cephalosporin drugs, Shionogi’s Keflin and Torii’s 
Ceporan showed strong sales in the domestic market. Many Japanese firms were long 
content to pursue import substitution policies as it proved profitable, and the domestic 
market remained dominated by antibiotics discovered outside of Japan. Between 1961 
and 1975, only 14 of the 43 antibiotics (33%) introduced into the Japanese market 
were of Japanese origin.433 Only a third of the antibiotic market was comprised of 
domestic agents.
431 See Robert Neimeth, “Japan’s Pharmaceutical Industry Postwar Evolution,” 160.
432Yakuji Nipposha “Cefamedine,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1971), 66; Yakuji 
Nipposha, “Cefaloridin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippOsha, 1966), 51-53; and Yakuji 
NippOsha, “Cefalotin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1967), 45-46.
433 Aizawa, Minoru, and United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Review o f  the Development o f  Antibiotic 
Industry in Selected Countries: Technical Report: Antibiotic Industry in Japan, History and Development, 74. While these 
figures are slightly lower than those compiled by Yagisawa in 2002, they are useful in providing insight on the composition of 
Japan-origin drugs in the Japanese market.
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Table 4. Antibiotics of Japanese Origin Marketed in Japan, 1961-1975434
Antibiotic Company Year
Chromomycin A3 Takeda 1961
Bleomycin Nihon Kayaku 1968
Aminodexy-KM Meiji Seika 1969
Josamycin Yamanouchi 1969
Enramycin Takeda 1969
Cefazolin Fujisawa 1971
Ribostamycin Meiji Seika 1972
Sulbenicillin Takeda 1973
Midekamycin Meiji Seika 1973
Dibekacin Meiji Seika 1973
Maridomycin Takeda 1975
Enviomycin Toyo Jozo 1975
Still, Japanese firms improved their capacity to discover, develop and launch 
innovative antibiotics over the 1960s and 1970s. While government policies did help 
non-innovating firms survive, it did seem to offer sufficient incentive for some firms to 
pursue innovative discoveries in antibiotics.
434 Ibid.
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3.3.3 1973: a year o f welfare for the people -  and for antibiotics makers
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Figure 13. Value o f Antibiotic Production, 1960-1975435
Between 1961 and 1975, the antibiotics sector expanded rapidly in terms of production, 
trade, and new drug discoveries.436 The high rate of growth in the antibiotics market 
coincided with the launch of a universal health insurance system in 1961 and an era of 
high-speed economic growth. As the above graph indicates, production levels rose 5.8 
fold between 1961 and 1975 from approximately 109.5 billion yen to 633.1 billion 
yen.437 Growth in the antibiotics sector was particularly pronounced, as the size of the 
overall pharmaceutical market grew only 2.9 fold during the same period.
The 1973 reforms appeared particularly instrumental in raising production levels. As
435 Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K ogyo Seisan D otai Chdsa Tdkei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K ogyo  Seisan D ota i Chdsa  
Tdkei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
436 Ibid. As historical data for sales are not available, production values have been used as a measure o f  market size.
437 In nominal terms, production levels rose from 22.0 billion yen to 363.4 billion yen. Ibid.
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mentioned in the overview chapter, the government introduced several welfare 
measures in 1973 that increased its level of sponsorship of prescription 
pharmaceuticals. The government expanded coverage for family dependants, capped 
the cost of high cost treatments, and introduced free health care for the elderly. In 
response, growth rates jumped with 19% year-on-year growth in 1973 and 10% 
year-on-year growth in 1974. In fact, production growth in the five years after 1973 
averaged 65 billion yen per year compared to 51 billion yen per year in the previous 5 
years. Japan’s rapid economic growth, too, had propelled the rise of the antibiotics 
sector, as more patients could afford antibiotic treatments. Supported by policy 
measures and economic conditions, the Japanese antibiotics sector experienced 
phenomenal growth in the 1960s and 1970s.439
3.3.4 Opening up
While strong restrictions to FDI had remained in place since 1950, Japan agreed to 
phase in capital liberalisation following its accession to the OECD and IMF in 1964. 
As well, by the mid 1970s, Japan’s antibiotics sector had largely caught up'with the 
West, and leading antibiotics makers were seeking to capture gains from abroad. 
While the pharmaceutical industry was not fully deregulated until 1975, the 
government gave approval for up to 50% investments from 1967 440 For foreign firms, 
the product standards introduced in 1967 still posed a significant barrier to entry.
438 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Kosei Hakusho [White Paper on Health and Welfare] (Tokyo, Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
Ministry o f Finance, 1974).
439 Ibid.
440 Yakugyo Jihosha, Nihon no Iyakuhin Sangyd [The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Jihosha, 1973), 
160-161; KSseisho 50-nenshi Henshulinkai (Editorial Committee for the 50 Year History of the Ministry o f Health and Welfare], 
“Jiyuka to Kokusaika no Shinten [Progress in Capital Liberalisation and Internationalisation],” in Koseisho 50-nenshi [A 50 Year 
History of the Ministry of Health and Welfare] (Tokyo: Kosei Mondai KenkyOkai, 1988), 1624-1626.
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Moreover, foreign firms had yet to establish a marketing presence in Japan. But the 
reforms brought a fresh wave of foreign investment in Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry.
As the Japanese market opened up, antibiotic trade also grew, and trade values soared
8.3 fold from 10.7 billion yen to 88.0 billion yen between 1960 and 1975.441 The 
growth of antibiotic imports was particularly remarkable, as it responded to strong 
demand conditions in the domestic market, and grew 14.7 fold from a mere 5.28 
billion yen to 77.7 billion yen between 1960 and 1975. The average growth of imports 
in other therapeutic sectors, by comparison, was 6.9 fold -  large, but less than half the 
figure for antibiotics. But the growth of antibiotic exports was much slower, as it grew 
only 1.9 fold from 5.38 billion yen to 10.3 billion yen. This was because many 
Japanese products were not approved in other markets, and because Japanese firms 
had yet to establish distribution networks overseas 442 In fact, the ratio of imports to 
exports increased 4.4 fold in the antibiotics sector, compared to 3.6 fold among all 
therapeutic sectors.
As with most OECD countries, Japan relied on the United States for most of its 
pharmaceutical imports. In 1975, for example, 46.3 billion yen of antibiotic imports 
came from the United States, followed by 16.5 billion yen from Singapore and 10.8
441 In nominal terms, trade values increased from 2.0 billion yen in 1960 to S0.S billion yen in 197S. Ministry o f International 
Trade and Industry, Tsiisho Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1958-1973); Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: GyOsei, 1974-2000.
442 In nominal terms, between i960 and 1975, antibiotic imports grew from 1.0 billion yen to 44.6 billion yen while antibiotic 
exports grew from 1.0 billion yen to 5.9 billion yen. Ibid.
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billion yen from the United Kingdom.443 While trade figures did grow, the massive 
trade deficit -  both in antibiotics and in other therapeutic sectors -  questioned whether 
Japanese drugs were of comparable quality to those in other developed countries.
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Figure 14. Value o f Antibiotic Trade, 1960-1975444
Transitions in the export destinations of antibiotics did suggest that the quality of 
Japan origin antibiotics was improving. In 1961, for example, the leading export 
destinations for Japanese antibiotics were East Asian neighbours such as Okinawa and 
Taiwan, followed by exports destined for Germany and other European countries 445 
But by the mid 1970s, the majority of antibiotic exports were destined for more
443 In nominal terms, antibiotic imports in 1975 from the United States, Singapore, and the United Kingdom were 26 .6  billion yen, 
9.5 billion yen, and 6.2 billion yen, respectively. Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo. Yakugyo K eiza i Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Economics 
Annual] Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1979), 167.
444 Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsiishd Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 
1958-1973); Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsiishd Hakusho  [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: G yosei, 1974-2000).
445 Between 1945 and 1972, Okinawa was ruled by the United States.
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developed countries; in 1975, for example, antibiotic exports were destined for South 
Korea, West Germany, Belgium, and the United States, in descending order.446 Japan’s 
antibiotic trade grew rapidly over the 1960s, and as the quality of Japan origin 
antibiotics improved, the country’s export destinations shifted from the developing to 
the developed world.
3.3.5 Summary of the period between 1961 to 1975
The experience of the antibiotics sector illustrates the factors that influenced the 
industry as a whole. There were several reasons for the strong performance of Japan’s 
antibiotics sector in this period. All of these reasons lay in government policies that 
were highly favourable to the industry. The strongest stimulus was the introduction of 
universal health care in 1961. Universal health care spurred demand for antibiotics as 
the government covered most of the costs of patients’ prescription drugs. This made it 
much easier for firms to sell drugs.
Japanese antibiotics makers also benefited from the practice permitted among 
Japanese physicians to both prescribe and dispense medicines. This practice created 
strong incentives among physicians to prescribe the newest and most expensive 
antibiotics, which tended to have the greatest price differentials. Given the 
government’s modest criteria for drug approval, the antibiotics sector flourished. Both 
firms and physicians were incentivised to expand the domestic market for financial
446 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyfljo, Yakugyo Keizai Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Economics Annual] Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1979), 
168.
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gain.447 While many antibiotics would not have been approved elsewhere, Japanese 
firms could prosper in an environment that remained heavily protected. Foreign direct 
investment was restricted until 1975. In addition, Japan’s distinct drug standards 
provided additional protection from foreign competition.
Perhaps because the government subsidised the cost of prescription drugs, Japanese 
patients were price insensitive, and purchased unnecessary antibiotics. Indeed, the 
over consumption of antibiotics became an oft-debated topic during the 1970s and 
1980s. But other factors also accounted for.this over consumption. Some scholars have 
attributed patient deference to physicians to Japan’s Confucian heritage of respect for 
authority, while others have noted the lack of professional information available to 
patients.448 Prescribing antibiotics also allowed physicians to preserve their reputation 
with patients who often expected a prescription drug upon a visit to the doctor.449
While many Japanese pharmaceutical firms established corporate research 
laboratories over the 1960s, most research laboratories specialised in reverse 
engineering Western products rather than in pursuing product innovations. The 
government’s drug pricing policy, whereby the government set the prices for 
prescription drugs, effectively capped the potential profits that could be made from 
drug discoveries. But the prices of antibiotics were relatively higher than in other 
therapeutic sectors. This encouraged some drug companies to invest in antibiotic R&D
447 Michael Reich, “Why the Japanese Don't Export More Pharmaceuticals: Health Policy as Industrial Policy,” 135.
448 Eric Feldman, “Medical Ethics the Japanese Way,” The Hastings Center Report 15, no.5 (1985): 21-24. It is, however, 
difficult to assess the degree to which a more hierarchical relationship might have mattered. See William E. Steslicke, “Doctors, 
Patients, and Government in Modem Japan.” Asian Survey 12, no.l 1 (1972): 913-931.
449 P. Reed Maurer, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, 11 July 2007.
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-  some of whom were able to develop internationally competitive antibiotics.
3.4 The maturation of the market and transition to product innovation, 1975-1990
The Japanese have proved themselves master soil searchers. In the last decade, 
many of the cephalosporins have come from Japan. Antibiotics are important 
there because it is the biggest user, per capita, of the wonder drugs, ahead even 
of the United States.
N.R. Kleinfield, “Intense Battle for Antibiotics,” 
The New York Times, 13 June 1983.
In keeping with the momentum from the previous decade, the antibiotics sector 
continued to expand in the 1970s. After 1975, government measures to liberalise 
foreign capital and strengthen intellectual property rights protection supported the 
growth of a number of Japanese pharmaceutical firms who had acquired the financial, 
scientific and technological capacity to assume higher risks and pursue more 
substantial innovations. Firms from other industries seeking new business 
opportunities entered the pharmaceutical sector during this period, as did foreign firms 
that had previously been alienated from the Japanese market.
While the government’s decision to contain health care costs through biennial price 
reduction dealt a swift and intense blow to production levels after 1981, it also helped 
the transition from volume to value-based production. Facing rising competition and 
falling profits in the home market, Japanese firms also expanded their operations 
abroad. While Japan’s expertise in antibiotic science and research networks was 
certainly important in sustaining the growth of Japan’s antibiotic sector, the timely
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implementation of government policies ultimately dictated its fortunes between 1975 
and 1990.
3.4.1 Modernising the market: capital liberalisation and product patents 
The legislation to liberalise foreign direct investment and to introduce product patents 
in 1975 and 1976, respectively, was a major milestone in Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry. The new legislation signalled a turning point: Japanese firms could no longer 
reverse engineer existing drugs and launch a new drug under a different process. They 
would also have to compete with an increasing number of foreign firms that were now 
in Japan to stay.
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3.4.2 Cutting excess demand
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Figure 15. Value of Antibiotic Production, 1975-19954 0
Following from the previous decade, antibiotic production continued to grow rapidly 
after 1975. Between 1975 and 1980, production levels grew from 633.1 billion yen 
to 1.03 trillion yen.451 But from 1981, the government began to reduce the prices of 
prescription drugs on a biennial basis over the course of the patent protection period. 
This radical measure, which aimed to contain the country’s escalating health care costs, 
began with a dramatic 18.6% reduction in 1981. While drug prices fell 5.8% between 
1976 and 1981, they dropped 46.1% between 1981 and 1986.452 The antibiotics sector 
was particularly hard hit, as the government began to impose steeper reductions on 
older drugs with less innovative value.453 Combined with the reforms to end free
450 Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K dgyd Seisan D otai Chdsa Tdkei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
451 In nominal terms, the production level o f  antibiotics increased from 363.4 billion to 814.3 billion yen. Ibid.
452 Jiho, Iryd lyakuhin Gvokai no Ippan Chishiki [General Information on the Health care and Pharmaceutical Industries] (Tokyo: 
Jiho, 2005): 60.
453 Yakugyo Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Jihosha, 1968-1999).
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healthcare for the elderly in 1983, antibiotics production peaked in 1982 and began to 
contract over the decade. In 1990, antibiotics production stood at 652.8 billion yen, a 
47% fall from its peak, and only a 3% increase compared to 1975.454
Despite this decline, however, the size of Japan’s antibiotics market was unparalleled
in the global market. Japanese antibiotics makers produced drugs worth well over 600 
billion yen throughout the decade -  at times reaching 1 trillion yen 455 In 1988, for
example, the Japanese market antibiotics market was valued at $4.8 billion, compared
to $3.4 billion in the United States and $360 million in the United Kingdom. This 
translated into a per capita consumption of $39.1 in Japan, compared to $13.8 in the 
United States and $6.4 in the United Kingdom 456 Japanese firms also became more
self-sufficient, as production from bulk imports declined from 336.3 billion yen in 
1975 to 240.8 billion yen in 1990.457
While antibiotic R&D involved less cost or risk compared to other therapeutic sectors,
the biennial price reductions still deterred Japanese firms from pursuing breakthrough
discoveries. Not only did Japanese firms see a substantial decrease in profits from
existing drugs, they had less to reinvest in R&D compared to their American or British
454 In nominal terms, antibiotic production stood at 624.1 billion yen in 1990. Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo 
Seisan Dotai Chosa Tdkei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 
1968-2000).
455 Ibid.
456 M. Ito, “Nichi-bei-5 ni okeru Kokinyaku no Rinshohyokaho [A Clinical Evaluation of Antibacterial Agents in the United 
States, Europe and Japan],” Saishin Igaku 44, no. 12 (1989): 2461. Per capita consumption calculated based on demographic data 
available at Organisation for Economic, Co-operation, and Development, OECD Health Data 2008: Statistics and Indicators fo r  
30 Countries (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008) in SourceOECD, 
http:www.sourceoecd.org.
437 In nominal terms, antibiotic production from bulk imports changed from 210.2 billion yen to 230.2 billion yen. Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chosa Tdkei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] 
(Tokyo: YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
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rivals. This had a particularly negative impact in undermining the capacity of Japanese 
firms to compete in the global market at a time when other drug regimes penalised 
imitation and provided substantial rewards for innovation. But there were also more 
positive outcomes. The price reductions were actually useful in nudging firms away 
from the over-production of antibiotics toward newer categories of drugs that were 
less subject to heavy reductions. It also helped end an era of volume-based expansion, 
as the minimal pharmaceutical price differentials lowered physician demand for 
antibiotics. In fact, it also encouraged the more innovative firms to pursue more 
favourable market opportunities abroad.
3.4.3 An increasing emphasis on R&D 
Quinolones
The intensification and internationalisation of R&D was well observed in the firms 
that developed quinolone antibiotics. With the many antibiotic programmes launched 
after the discovery of cefazolin in the 1970s, Japanese firms spearheaded the discovery 
of new antibiotics. One of these belonged a group of drugs called fluoroquinolones, a 
subset of the quinolone family of antibiotic drugs discovered in the 1960s. The 
discoveries were a product of previous successes in antibiotic discovery, close 
research collaborations with universities, and intense inter-firm competition. The 
decision among Japanese firms to make new investments in R&D were not only 
motivated by government policies, but also by limitations to therapeutic demand and 
the profit potential of existing therapies. With the wide spread use of antibiotics, new 
products were required to combat antibiotic-resistant strains. As a purely synthetic
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antibacterial drug, the discovery of quinolones were particularly timely, as by. the 
1970s, many strains of bacteria had grown resistant to sulfa drugs -  the first synthetic 
antibacterials discovered in the 1940s.458
The first quinolone antibiotic was introduced by the American firm Sterling Winthrop, 
which launched nalidixic acid in 1962. In subsequent years, as firms worldwide 
competed to improve on this drug, scientists discovered that the addition of a fluorine 
atom to the quinolone structure significantly improved the drug’s properties. The new 
quinolone antibiotics were valued for their superior potency, absorption, distribution, 
and effectiveness against a wide range of bacteria -  particularly with antibiotic 
resistant strains. While these drugs still had side effects that, for example, affected the 
central nervous system, fluoroquinolones made outpatient therapy possible where 
hospitalisation had previously been required. While some of the drug’s properties 
remained to be improved, its strengths far outweighed its weaknesses 459
Kyorin
In Japan, Kyorin’s discovery of the first fluoroquinolone antibiotic, norfloxacin, 
propelled the small, little-known firm into prominence as an innovative, global 
antibiotics firm. Kyorin’s newfound profits also helped enlarge the scale of its 
operations, as the firm’s sales of the drug recorded 27.7 billion yen two years after
458 For general information on quinolone drugs, see Peter Ball ,”The Quinolones: History and Overview,” in The Quinolones, by 
Vincent T. Andriole (San Diego: Academic Press, Inc., 1988), 1-33; David C. Hooper and Ethan Rubinstein, “Introduction,” in 
Quinolone Antimicrobial Agents (Washington D.C., American Society for Microbiology Press, 2003) viii-ix.
459 Hisashi Takahashi, Isao Hayakawa and Takeshi Akimoto, “The History of the Development and Changes o f Quinolone 
Antibacterial Agents,” Yakushigaku Zasshi 38 no. 2 (2003): 161-179.
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launch.460 Kyorin’s discovery of norfloxacin was motivated by the profit potentials 
from an innovative new drug, and was enabled by the firm’s R&D capacity and 
collaborations with university researchers.
It was somewhat surprising that Kyorin became the first to launch a new, innovative 
antibiotic. Founded as a manufacturer and distributor of new medicines in 1923, 
Kyorin was known more for its cardiovascular agents such as Behyd, Cholexamin, and 
Hespander that it had launched since the 1960s. As a smaller firm with limited R&D 
capacities, Kyorin’s R&D collaborations with university researchers were particularly 
crucial to the drug’s discovery. In step with government policies to encourage 
innovation, the firm established its central research laboratory in 1977.461 Forming 
close alliances with researchers at the nearby Department of Microbiology in Gunma 
University’s School of Medicine, Kyorin’s researchers conducted experiments to 
develop the drug by manipulating the quinolone structure.462
Kyorin’s development of norfloxacin reflected considerable advances in antibiotic 
R&D among Japanese firms. Not only had drug development evolved from the sifting 
of numerous soil samples, but the quality, safety and effectiveness guidelines had also 
become more rigorous. Laboratory tests spanned longer durations with complex tests 
conducted on a more types and numbers of species. Clinical tests also became more 
sophisticated, as double-blind tests were conducted, and greater attention was paid to
460 Calculated on the basis of official drug prices and converted into 2005yen. See “KyOrin Seiyaku[Kyorin Pharmaceutical],” 
Fain Kemikaru 31, no. 13 (August 2002): 20.
461 Kyorin Pharmaceutical Co., “Enkaku [History],” in Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho 
Insatsukyoku, 1995), 3.
462 This is documented in the scholarly articles published.
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side effects and adverse reactions as well as therapeutic effects. Such efforts bore fruit 
with the discovery of norfloxacin, which had a wider antibacterial spectrum and 
greater potency compared to existing antibiotics.463
Norfloxacin was an innovative therapy that not only proved highly profitable for 
Kyorin, but also brought the firm global recognition that helped expand its business 
beyond Japan. Approved in February 1984, norfloxacin was distributed domestically 
by Kyorin and Torii Pharmaceutical as Baccidal.464 Shortly thereafter, norfloxacin 
was approved in the United States in October 1986, and marketed by Merck Sharpe 
and Dohme in over 20 countries as Noroxin.465 The drug brought substantial sales to 
Kyorin, as Noroxin sales amounted to $41 million in 1988.466 Kyorin’s transformation 
with the new drug was a product of government policy, entrepreneurial initiative, and 
close research alliances with university researchers.
Daiichi
Around the same time, a 20-member research team at Daiichi Pharmaceutical was also 
searching for new quinolones in collaboration with Gunma University’s School of
463 Akira Ito, Keiji Hirai, Matsuhisa Inoue, Hiroshi Koga, Seigo Suzue, Tsutomu Irikura, and Susumu Mitsuhashi, “In Vitro 
Antibacterial Activity of AM-715, a New Nalidixic Acid Analog,” Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy 17, no. 2 (1980): 
103-108. Earlier quinolones were largely ineffective toward gram-negative bacteria. Keiji Hirai, Akira Ito, Yasuo Abe, Seigo 
Shizue, Tsutomu Irikura, Matsuhisa Inoue and Susumu Mitsuhashi, “Comparative Activities o f AM-715 and Pipemedic and 
Nalidixic Acids Against Experimentally Induced Systemic and Urinary Tract Infections,” Antimicrobial Agents and 
Chemotherapy 19, no. 1 (1981): 188-189.
464 Yakuji Nipposha, “Norfloxacin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji Nipposha, 1985), 128-129.
465 PJB Publications, Scrip's Antibacterial Report (London: PJB Publications, 1990), 26. See also, “Merck Introduces Two Drugs 
in the U.S.,” Chemical Week, 26 November 1986,16.
466 Martha Glaser, “Market-share Battle Marks Cardiovasculars, Antiarthritics; 48th Annual Prescription Review,” Drug Topics 
131 (March 1987): 43; Martha Glaser, “Quinolones, Antidepressants Gained in 1988: PDS; Pharmaceutical Data Services,” Drug 
Topics 133 (April 1989): 73
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Medicine.467 It was not surprising that Daiichi entered the antibiotic sector with the 
discovery of quinolone drugs. Daiichi was Japan’s leading sulfa drug maker. Both 
sulfa drugs and quinolones are synthetic antibacterial compounds, and Daiichi could 
build upon its existing expertise to develop quinolones. Moreover, in the 1970s, sulfa 
drug makers were pushed to seek new opportunities as demand for sulfa drugs 
declined. Not only were existing sulfa drugs becoming less effective toward multiple 
bacterial strains, demand for sulfa drugs was being replaced by better antibiotics that 
were more potent but had fewer side effects.
Daiichi’s investment into quinolone R&D in the 1960s was motivated more by the 
limitations of its core product than the government’s policies to encourage 
innovation.468 Daiichi’s discovery of its quinolone drug, ofloxacin, was a product of 
existing expertise, research networks, and entrepreneurship. The success of Daiichi’s 
drug was buoyed by government policy as well as the firm’s size and marketing 
expertise.
Daiichi was a large firm with a history as one of Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firms. 
Founded as Arsemin Shokai by six entrepreneurs in 1915, Daiichi was formed in 
response to the acute shortages of antisyphilitic drugs during the First World War as 
German imports came to a halt. Daiichi was one of several new firms that launched 
salvarsan during this period as Japanese scientists such as Shozaburo Keimatsu of
467 K. Sato, Y. Matsuura, M. Inoue, T. Une, Y. Osada, H. Ogawa, S. Mitsuhashi, “In Vitro and In Vivo Activity o f DL-8280, a New 
Oxazine Derivative,” Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy 22, no. 4 (1982): 548-553.
468 Government pressures to innovate occurred after the mid 1970s in the form of capital liberalisation and product patents.
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Tokyo University succeeded in producing the drug in Japan.
Exploiting opportunities in both domestic and East Asian markets, Daiichi flourished 
as the leading provider of antisyphilitic remedies. By the end of World War II, Daiichi 
had established itself as one of the leading pharmaceutical firms and the primary 
producer of sulfa drugs in Japan. In the post-war period, Daiichi remained a leading 
provider of sulfa drugs, as well as being a producer of vitamins and cardiovascular 
drugs. With long history, prominent standing, and large size, Daiichi had also 
developed considerable marketing strengths in pharmaceuticals.469
From the 1960s, Daiichi had invested much of its R&D efforts in seeking to develop a 
new drug that would replace the dwindling sales of sulfa drugs. Daiichi not only spent 
substantial time and funds in drug development, but also sought alliances -  both with 
university researchers and foreign pharmaceutical firms. Indeed, such collaborations 
were essential to the discovery of the new drug. Daiichi’s ofloxacin was developed out 
of nalidixic acid, which was licensed-in from Winthrop in 1964, and was until the 
early 1980s its popular quinolone drug branded as “Wintomylon.”470 The new drug 
was a product of 20 years of research, after thousands of derivatives were created out 
of Wintomylon in collaboration with researchers at Gunma University. Like 
norfloxacin, ofloxacin was valued for its potency, wide antibacterial spectrum, and
469 For Daiichi’s history, see Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 70-nen noAyumi [Daiichi Pharmaceutical, a 70 Year 
History] (Tokyo: Daiichi Pharmaceuticals Co., 1986); Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 80-nenshi [Daiichi 
Pharmaceutical, a 80 Year History] (Tokyo: Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., 1998); or Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 
90-nenshi [Daiichi Pharmaceutical, a 90 Year History] (Tokyo: Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., 2007).
470 Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 70-nen no Ayumi [Daiichi Pharmaceutical, a 70 Year History], 35, 77; Daiichi 
Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 80-nenshi [Daiichi Pharmaceutical, a 80 Year History], 242.
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effectiveness toward bacteria that had developed antibacterial resistance. As at Kyorin, 
Daiichi’s development of ofloxacin reflected the advances in drug R&D of the times in 
step with greater demands placed on standards during this time. Records of clinical 
tests, for example, reported much larger sample sizes and higher degrees of 
effectiveness.471
Much like Kyorin’s norfloxacin, Daiichi’s launch of ofloxacin as Taravid in 1985 
fuelled the growth of the firm and spurred its internationalisation 472 Indeed, a decade 
after its launch, antibiotics sales at Daiichi grew almost three fold from 23.3 billion 
yen to 69.2 billion yen, and the firm’s reliance on antibiotics more than doubled from 
15% to 30%. Largely a domestic firm until the mid 1980s, exports grew from 8.12 
billion yen in 1985 to 15.4 billion yen in 1990.473
While Daiichi discovered norfloxacin a year after Kyorin, Daiichi’s superior 
marketing strategies, larger size and previous alliances with foreign firms helped 
Daiichi’s drug achieve much greater success in the domestic and global market. 
Daiichi licensed ofloxacin to numerous foreign firms, such as to Hoechst (Germany), 
Johnson & Johnson (United States), Sigma Dow, Glaxo Italy (Italy) in 1983 and to 
Roussel-Uclaf (France) in 1984. While, ofloxacin was marketed by Hoechst as 
Taravid in all Europe excluding France and Germany, the Middle East, Africa and
471 Trials for ofloxacin were carried out on 4,785 subjects, including 8 double-blind tests, and revealed that the substance was 
effective in 3,701 subjects, or 77.3%, o f the cases. Side effects were found in 4.1% of the cases.
472 Yakuji NippSsha, “Ofloxacin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji NippOsha, 1986), 125-126.
473 In nominal terms, Daiichi’s antibiotic sales grew from 21.1 billion yen to 70.4 billion yen. Exports grew from 7.3 billion yen to 
11.2 billion yen. Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 80-nenshi [Daiichi Pharmaceutical, a 80 Year History], 399;
Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Yiika Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurashd Insatsukyoku, 1986), 10,13; 
Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: OkurashS Insatsukyoku, 1991), 19; 
Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1996), 24.
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some parts of Asia, the drug was marketed by Johnson & Johnson as Floxacin in North 
and South America, as well as the Pacific region.474 Eventually reaching more than 
120 countries, ofloxacin’s worldwide sales neared $500 million in 1990.475 Daiichi’s 
greater success relative to Kyorin embodied some of the changes in the 
pharmaceutical industry more generally, where marketing was becoming as important 
as R&D in securing sales 476
It was true that Daiichi was not able to capture the gains of firms with a direct 
marketing presence abroad. But the firm gained substantially from its overseas sales. 
Ofloxacin’s discovery was a product of Daiichi’s prior strengths in synthetic 
antibacterials and initiative to seek new market opportunities. Its strong sales 
performance was a product of the high domestic demand secured by government 
policy and Daiichi’s distribution strengths in both domestic and global markets. The 
experiences of the Japanese firms that pioneered the development of new quinolone 
drugs shows the importance of entrepreneurship, research collaborations, and 
government policy to their success.
There were other antibiotics firms -  aside from quinolone drug makers -  that invested 
in R&D and expanded overseas. This included Sumitomo Pharmaceutical, which 
launched the antibiotic, meropenem.477 Sumitomo’s meropenem belonged to the
474 “Ofloxacin/Levofloxacin,” Gekkan Mix[Monthly Medical Information Express] (December 1996): 55-56
475 In 2005 values, this was nearly $750 million. Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Daiichi Seiyaku 70-nen no Ayumi [Daiichi 
Pharmaceutical, a 70 Year History], 277; John Elmsey, “Flourine Helps the Medicine Go Down” The Independent, 18 March 
1991, 17.
476 See Matthew Lynn, The Billion-Dollar Battle: Merck v Glaxo (London: Mandarin, 1992).
477 Yakuji NippQsha, “Meropenem,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo, Yakuji Nipposha, 1996), 103-109.
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carbapenem family of antibiotics, and was developed by altering the chemical 
structure of Merck’s imipenem, which had been launched in 1985. Compared to 
imipenem, Sumitomo’s new antibiotic had a wider effective range, fewer side effects, 
and was easier to use. Research collaborations were essential to the drug’s
478development, especially with the increasing rigour involved in antibiotic R&D. 
Test results reflected higher criteria in the drug approval process and the 
internationalisation of the research process.
As an innovative therapy, Sumitomo’s drug quickly gained global recognition. In fact, 
meropenem was first launched in Italy in 1994 before it was launched in Japan as 
Meropen in 1995. Sumitomo licensed meropenem to ICI to develop the drug for most 
major markets outside of Japan. After FDA approval in June 1996, meropenem was 
launched in September by Zeneca Pharmaceuticals as Merrem in the United States.479 
With sales of 13.3 billion yen in 2000, or 10.8% of total sales, meropenem proved a 
blockbuster discovery. For Sumitomo, meropenem not only allowed it to gain footage 
in the domestic market, but also helped its internationalization.480
Led by successes like these, Japan’s antibiotics sector experienced its height of 
antibiotics discovery during this period. Indeed, Japan discovered more than 40% of
478 SaburO Fukai, ed., Konnichi no Shinyaku: Kindai lyakuhin no Hensen [New Drugs Today: Changes in Modern 
Pharmaceutials] (Tokyo: Yakuji Jihosha, 1995), 878. See also, Yutaka Takeuchi, Yoshiaki Takebayashi, Makoto Sunagawa, 
Yutaka Isobe, Yukari Hamazume, Akura Uemura, and Tetsuo Noguchi, “The Stability o f a Novel Carbapenem Antibiotic, 
Meropenem (SM-7338), in a Solid State Formulation for Injection,” Chemical & Pharmaceutical Bulletin 41, no. 11 (1993): 
1998-2002.
479 FDA/Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “Label and Approval History,” Drugs@FDA, FDA Approved Drug Products, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/Scripts/cder/DrugsatFDA/index.cfin?fuseaction=Search.Label_ApprovalHistory#apphist 
(accessed 8 May 2008).
480 In nominal terms, meropenem reached 13.6 billion yen in sales. Jenny Wilson, Antibacterial Products and Markets, Scrip 
Reports (Richmond: PJB Publications, 1997), 78.
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its antibiotics in the decade after 1975.481 But innovation was often incremental, and 
dependent on pre-existing discoveries of certain bacterial strains, and global 
recognition of these drugs was varied.482 Yet international recognition of Japan-origin 
drugs did increase. As the figures in parentheses in table 4 show, the increase in the 
proportion of Japan-origin antibiotics recognised globally after 1975 reflects the shift 
from volume to value-based growth.
Table 5. Antibiotic Discoveries Originating from Japan, 1946 - 1995483
Number of Products Discovered Total
1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995
11 12 23 40 13 99
(4=36.4%) (4=33.3%) (5=21.7%) (18=45%) (7=53.8%) (38=38.4%)
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of Japanese discoveries that were 
licensed abroad.
From a global perspective, too, the number of antibiotics discovered by Japanese firms 
at this time was not insignificant. A study of new drugs discovered worldwide between 
1969 and 1980 revealed that a total of 113 antibiotics were discovered during this 
period. Of these, 22.5 substances, or almost 20 percent, originated from Japan, while 
37 (or 33%) were discovered in the United States, 11.5 (or 10%) in Italy and 9.5 (or 
8%) in the United Kingdom.484 It was true that the innovative value among these
481 The degree o f international competitiveness (according to rates of overseas licensing) has varied according to types of 
antibiotics. The number of Japan-origin antibiotics has been highest in b lactam antibiotics at 39 substances, or 39% o f all 
discoveries. The volume o f discovery has not necessarily correspond to the degree of competitiveness, either. While macrolides 
comprise 11.6% of antibiotic discoveries, they comprise 8.6% of overseas licensings.. While quinolones comprise 15% of 
discoveries, they comprise 20% of licensings.
482 Joichi Kumazawa and Morimasa Yagisawa, “The History o f Antibiotics: The Japanese Story,” 127; Morimasa Yagisawa, 
unpublished document, “Antibiotics, Chemotherapeutics and Other Microbial Products Originated from Japan,” sent to author.
483 Ibid.
484 Ibid.
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substances likely varied, and that Japanese antibiotics may have been more 
incremental than breakthrough discoveries. But the figures provide insight into the 
fruition of Japanese efforts in antibiotic research during this time.
3.4.4 Expanding abroad
The liberalisation of foreign capital in 1975 prompted many Japanese firms to seek 
opportunities abroad, as they faced limited growth potential at home. In addition to 
foreign rivals, Japanese firms were also facing competition from a growing number of 
new firms specializing in chemicals, textiles to food companies that had entered the 
pharmaceutical sectors. These firms, facing saturated markets in their respective 
sectors, were eager to pursue new opportunities in a high technology sector that held 
greater potential for high returns and long-term growth. The introduction of product 
patents in 1976 encouraged Japanese firms to intensify their R&D efforts to develop 
innovative drugs. Japanese firms expanded their overseas ventures as government 
policies shifted from protection to liberalisation, imitation to innovation, domestic to 
export-oriented growth.
There were several other measures that facilitated export growth during this period. 
Japan was pressured by the United States to open its market to foreign drugs.485 
Japanese firms responded to increased competition in their home market by expanding 
abroad. Shorter drug examination times and quarterly drug approvals also made it 
easier for Japanese firms to bring new drugs to the market. Moreover, the government
4gs United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Market Access and Compliance, “MOSS 
Agreement on Medical Equipment and Pharmaceuticals.”
improved Japanese drug standards such as GLP (Good Laboratory Practice), GCP 
(Good Clinical Practice), and GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) over the decade.486 
While most of these quality guidelines were legally enacted after 1990, Japanese firms 
upgraded their drug development processes in anticipation of their legislation, and 
made their products more competitive in the global market. These policies helped 
Japanese firms raise R&D capacities, and achieve export growth abroad.
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Figure 16. Value o f Antibiotic Trade, 1970-199548
Antibiotic exports continued to grow after 1975. Between 1975 and 1990, antibiotic 
trade grew 50% from 88.0 billion yen to 128.0 billion yen.488 Antibiotic imports, as 
with production, appeared to be heavily influenced by government reforms. The
486 GLP GCP and GMP are quality standards for the laboratory, for clinical trials, and for manufacturing, respectively. Yakugyo 
Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku, [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Jihosha, 1968-1999).
487 Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsiishd Hakusho  [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku,
19 5 8 -1973); Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsiishd Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: G yosei, 1974-2000).
488 In nominal terms, antibiotic trade grew from 50.5 billion yen in 1975 to 122.4 billion yen in 1990. Ibid.
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decline of imports after 1981, for example, corresponds to the government’s 
introduction of biennial price reductions that reduced both physician demand for 
antibiotics as well as firm incentives to produce antibiotics. The growth of exports, in 
the mean time, appeared to reflect the rising competitiveness of Japanese antibiotics, 
as government policies to introduce product patents or liberalise foreign capital 
incentivised Japanese firms to adopt a more R&D intensive orientation. Antibiotic 
imports rose only slightly from 77.7 billion yen in 1975 to 79.3 billion yen in 1990 
while exports more than quadrupled from 10.3 billion yen to 48.7 billion yen.489 
While import growth was somewhat stunted by the regular price cuts, export growth 
reflected the rising capacity of Japanese firms to launch globally competitive 
antibiotics.
While production levels began to contract in the early 1980s, the Japanese antibiotics 
sector experienced solid growth in international trade and R&D between 1975 and 
1990. The growth in trade was largely due to the government’s steps to lift the 
protective barriers that secured profits for Japanese firms and opened up the market. 
This was done first through the liberalisation of capital controls, and later through the 
harmonisation of Japan’s pharmaceutical regulations with those in foreign countries. 
While these measures made it easier for foreign drugs to penetrate the Japanese market, 
it also made it easier for Japanese drugs to be access overseas markets.
The strong performance of the antibiotic sector was also fuelled by advances in
489 In nominal terms, beween 1975 and 1990, antibiotic imports increased from 44.6 billion yen to 75.8 billion yen while 
antibiotic exports increased from 5.9 billion yen to 46.5 billion yen. Ibid.
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antibiotic R&D. With advances in science and technology, and health and industrial
policies to promote-volume based production, discoveries of semisynthetic and 
synthetic antibiotics were made during this period.490 As more became known of the
therapeutic benefits and disadvantages of antibiotics -  as well as outcomes of their use 
over the long-term and in specific populations -  better antibiotics were developed.491
To counter resistant bacterial strains there was also a continuous need to modify and 
develop new products.492
The introduction of product patents and capital liberalisation had suggested a shift, 
both that Japanese industry would be incentivised to develop novel drugs that could
compete against non-Japanese products, and that Japanese industry was prepared to do 
so. Antibiotic R&D under the process patent regime centred on the development of 
new methods of production or new types of formulations to the extent it did not
infringe upon patent law. But given the lower threshold for innovation that merited
government recognition of NCEs, many Japanese firms pursued incremental product
innovations after the introduction of the product patent law. The Japanese antibiotics
market grew mostly through the proliferation of similar products, rather than the 
discovery of original drugs.493 Still, Japanese strengths in drug development evolved
490 Most o f these were semisynthetic b lactam, aminoglycoside, and macrolide antibiotics or synthetic quinolone antibiotics. In 
addition, research evolved in new therapeutic applications of microbial metabolites. These included the immunomodulators 
ubeminex discovered in 1975 by Nippon Kayaku, gusperimus discovered in 1985 by Nippon Kayaku, and tacrolimus discovered 
in 1986 by Astellas -  as well as the anticholesterol agent pravastatin discovered in 1983 by Sankyo. Tacrolimus and pravastatin, 
two o f the four substances discovered during this period, were distributed overseas.
4,1 Specific patient populations refer to patient groups whose response to a given drug may differ from an average healthy adult. 
Such groups include children, pregnant women, the elderly, and patients undergoing other types o f treatment. Between 1949 and 
1982, the concentration of streptomycin required in a given dose increased from 37.5% to 89.8%.
492 See for example, Harold C Neu, “The Crisis in Antibiotic Resistance,” Science 257, no. 5073 (1992): 1064-1073; and John 
Travis, “Reviving the Antibiotic Miracle?” Science 264, no. 5157 (1994): 360-362.
493 See for example, Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyd Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual], (Tokyo: Yano Research 
Institute, 1985), 2-12.
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in step with advances in safety, quality and efficacy standards and were recognised 
internationally. By the mid 1980s, antibiotics developed in Japan and licensed to 
American companies accounted for about 20 percent of the $5 billion US antibiotics 
market.494
3.4.5 Summary of the period between 1975 to 1990
In this period, Japanese antibiotics makers faced increasing challenges and pressures 
to innovate. These pressures included foreign penetration of the Japanese market, the 
introduction of a new patent regime, the government’s policy to contain drug prices.
3.5 1990 onwards
By the 1990s, the Japanese antibiotics sector had matured as a strong, domestically 
oriented industry. But the antibiotics market continued to evolve over the 1990s. 
Facing increasing competition in a saturated home market, many firms diversified 
out of antibiotics while other firms stepped up efforts to strengthen their overseas 
presence. These antibiotics makers intensified their R&D efforts to develop globally 
competitive products. The antibiotics market contracted during this period, as firms 
suspended sales of imitative antibiotics and innovative antibiotics makers began to 
concentrate on developing their overseas operations.
3.5.1 A shrinking domestic market
With regular price reductions, rising co-payment levels, and the re-evaluation of
494 The US antibiotics market at the time would have been approximately $9 billion in 2005 values. Eric Schmitt, “What’s Hot in 
Imported Products; Antibiotics Made Jointly,” The New York Times, 30 November 1986.
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existing prescription drugs since the 1980s, the Japanese antibiotics market contracted 
rapidly in the 1990s.495 These measures had been implemented in an attempt to
resolve severe fiscal problems arising from the country’s anachronistic health care
system, which was struggling to cope with an ageing population, rising costs, and 
growing patient consciousness over health care.496 As the government’s policies
provided symptomatic relief to its finances, it also reduced the size of the antibiotics
market.
The biennial price reductions, combined with the lower launch prices of antibiotics,
placed an enormous dent in physician prescribing incentives. Artificial demand fell as
pharmaceutical price differentials became minimal. In fact, the percentage of
prescription drugs dispensed by physicians fell from 87.2% in 1990 to 49.5% in 
2005.497 The government’s decision to raise co-payment levels from the late 1990s
also lowered patient demand for antibiotics. Many firms no longer viewed antibiotics
as a profitable business, physician demand for antibiotics fell, and an increasing
number of better-informed patients were more wary of purchasing unnecessary 
antibiotics 498
In addition, fewer antibiotics came onto the market.499 Part of this was due to low
495 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chosa Tdkei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
496 See Naoki Ikegami and John Creighton Campbell, “Health Care Reform in Japan: The Virtues o f Muddling Through,” Health 
Affairs 18 (May/June 1999): 56-75.
497 Japan Pharmaceutical Association, Iyakuhin Bungyo Shinchoku Jokyo [Progress on the Separation on the Prescribing and 
Dispensing o f Medicines], Japan Pharmaceutical Association, http://www.nichivaku.or.ip/contents/bungvo/default.html 
(accessed 20 April 2008).
498 The biennial price reductions on reducing demand has been widely discussed. See for example, Hidenao Takahashi, “Iyakuhin 
no Juy5 no Kakaku Danryokusei no Suikei [The Price Elasticity o f Demand in Pharmaceuticals: An Examination of the Biennial 
Price Reductions],” Hitotsubashi University COE Working Paper 12 (August 2005): 16
499 Yakugyo Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyS Jihosha, 1968-1999); Jih5,
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levels of discovery during this period. Indeed, manufacturing and import approvals for 
new antibiotics tapered off after the 1990s.500 The number of antibiotics approved for 
manufacture or import averaged 1.9 per year in the 1990s compared to 4.9 per year in 
the 1980s. With the continual need to develop new drugs for antibiotic resistant 
infections, firms invested in new, advanced methods of drug discovery such as 
genomic science, high throughput screening, rapid DNA sequencing, combinatorial 
chemistry, and cell based assays to launch innovative antibiotics.501 Daiichi 
Pharmaceutical, for example, had a collaborative agreement with the US firm 
Pharmacopoeia to use combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening for new 
drug discovery. Yet in Japan, as elsewhere, fewer new antibiotics were discovered
CM
in the 1990s compared to previous decades.
Moreover, the antibiotics market became smaller as the few antibiotics that were 
discovered encountered longer drug approval times. Politically, exposure of the HIV 
blood scandal in the 1980s slowed the drug approval process and discouraged many 
firms from investing in antibiotics. For many firms, investment in antibiotics became 
less attractive, as longer assessment times raised the cost of drug development for a 
relatively low priced drug. As well, the drug scandal had produced better-informed 
patients reluctant to spend on unnecessary antibiotics. The drug scandals also
Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2000-2007).
500 Ibid.
501 J. R. Broach and J. Thomer, “High-throughput Screening for Drug Discovery,” 14-16; JQrgen Drews, “Drug Discovery: A 
Historical Perspective,” Science 287, no. 5460 (17 March 2000): 1962.
502 Pharmacopoeia Drug Discovery, Inc. Annual Report 2006 (Cranbury, NJ: Pharmacopoeia Drug Discovery, Inc., 2007), 2.
503 Joichi Kumazawa and Morimasa Yagisawa, “The History o f Antibiotics: The Japanese Story,” 126; Morimasa Yagisawa 
“Biseibutsu Taisha Sanbutsu Tansaku Kenkyfl no Doko [Trends in Exploratory Research o f Microbial Metabolite Part 2; 20 Years 
after Antibiotics],” Baiosaiensu to Indasutori 58, no. 2 (2000): 92. The difficulty of drug discovery despite advances in 
phenomenal advances in drug discovery technologies has been widely discussed. See for example, Gerry Higgs, “Molecular 
Genetics: the Emperor's Clothes of Drug Discovery?” Drug Discovery Today, 9 (September 2004): 727-729.
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contributed to the contraction of the antibiotics sector in the 1990s.
The decline in actual therapeutic demand, too, reduced size of the antibiotics market. 
By the 1990s, with improvements in health care and public health, demand for 
antibiotics had become minimal. Mortality and morbidity rates for infectious diseases 
stood at remarkably low levels compared to half a century earlier. While it was true 
that the incidence of infectious disease in Japan tended to be higher than countries 
such as the United States, United Kingdom, or Germany, the incidences and deaths of 
infectious diseases such as diphtheria, typhoid fever or dysentery were negligible and 
declining.504
504 In 1999, tuberculosis still affected 43.8 thousand and killed 3,000 in Japan, but these figures were about 10% and 2% o f 1945 
figures, respectively. See Ministry of Health and Welfare, “Patients and Deaths of Infectious Diseases and Food Poisoning (1876 
-1999),” http://www.stat.go. jp/data/chouki/02.htm (accessed 6 May 2008); and World Health Organisation. Global TB database, 
accessed 1 November 2007. http://www.who.int/tb/country/global_tb_database/en/index.html.
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Figure 17. Value o f Antibiotic Production, 1985-2005 05
With the government’s cost containment measures, few new discoveries, and limited 
therapeutic demand, antibiotic production levels contracted then stabilised in the 
1990s. Indeed, for the first time since the 1940s, antibiotics production fell to almost 
half the level a decade earlier. While antibiotic production levels averaged 858 billion 
yen during the 1980s, for example, these figures almost halved to an average of 456 
billion yen during the 1990s, thereafter steadying near 400 billion yen.506 In the end, 
few firms found it attractive to invest in what were now relatively low priced drugs 
that were reduced every two years -  particularly given the rising cost of drug 
development and declining physician dispensing rates. Facing saturated markets at 
home, many firms began to suspend their sales of antibiotics or seek new opportunities
505 Yakuji K dgyd  Seisan D otai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo 
Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000); Ministry o f  Health, Labour and Welfare, Yakuji Kog)’d  Seisan D ota i Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey 
on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2001-2006).
306 Ibid. Yakuji Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Jihosha, 1968-1999).
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abroad.507
3.5.2 Stepping up efforts at globalisation
As in most sectors of the Japanese economy, the bursting of the bubble in 1990 
prompted a reorientation and modernisation of industry. As mentioned in the overview 
chapter, the major change in Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was the harmonisation of 
regulatory standards with Europe and the United States. It was a significant milestone 
that not only opened doors to foreign competition, but also made it easier for Japanese 
drug makers to access overseas markets. Reforms to the distribution system in the 
early 1990s also improved transparency in the market and prompted greater 
competition in the domestic market. The enforcement of quality standards such as 
GCP and GPMP in 1990 and 1993, respectively, also improved the quality of Japanese 
drugs. In the late 1990s, the government discarded another longstanding protectionist 
policy that obliged foreign firms to establish production facilities in Japan to operate 
the country. As well, the drug approval process was simplified and made more 
transparent.508 These reforms made the Japanese market became much more 
comparable to the advanced markets of the United States and Europe.
While the biennial price reductions dented innovative incentives, the government’s 
new policies to harmonise regulations and encourage rigorous innovation encouraged 
Japanese firms to develop globally competitive products. While antibiotic discoveries
307 See for example, “Japan’s Medicine Men Take Aim,” The Economist, 2 March 1991, 69.
308 YakugyO JihOsha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyQ Jihosha, 1968-1999); Yakuji 
Nipposha, The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry in the New Millenium (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 2001). See also, Ralph 
Paprzycki, “The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in Japan: Case Studies of the Automobile, Finance, and Health Care 
Industries,” Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series 141 (February 2006): 26-31.
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were not numerous, new antibiotics such as quinolones were launched by Daiichi, 
Dainippon, and Toyoma Kagaku, while several cephalosporin drugs were launched by 
Shionogi, Takeda, and Fujisawa.509 The major dilemma for Japanese antibiotics 
makers was not so much to strengthen their R&D capacities but to develop the 
capacity to commercialise their discoveries abroad. Japanese antibiotics firms were 
latecomers to the global market. While they had previously gained profits from 
licensing agreements, they failed to reap the gains from a direct marketing presence 
abroad.
Trade figures demonstrate that Japan’s antibiotic sector was gaining the capacity to 
compete in the global market in the 1990s. Over the decade, antibiotic exports rose 
from 48.7 billion yen to 57.3 billion yen while imports declined slightly from 79.3 
billion yen to 57.3 billion yen. In 2000, import and export figures were roughly 
comparable, as Japanese firms imported 58.3 billion yen as it exported 57.3 billion 
yen.510 Following the burst of Japan’s economic bubble in the 1980s, antibiotic trade 
did decline in the early 1990s. Japan’s imports of antibiotics originated from Britain, 
Germany, and Switzerland while its exports were destined for China, Thailand and 
Italy.511
509 Saburo Fukai, ed., Konnichi no Shinyaku: Kindai lyakuhin no Hensen [New Drugs Today: Changes in Modem 
Pharmaceutials] (Tokyo: Yakuji Jihbsha, 1995) 928-941, 854-894.
510 In nominal terms, between 1990 and 2000, antibiotic exports rose from 46.6 billion yen to 59.0 billion yen while antibiotic 
imports declined from 75.8 billion yen to 59.9 billion yen. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho [White 
Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1974-2000); Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, Bdeki Ddko Detabesu [Database on 
Trends in Trade], http://www.meti.go.iD/policv/trade policv/trade db/html/01.html (accessed 12 May 2008).
511 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyS Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
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Figure 18. Value o f Antibiotic Trade, 1990-2000512
But this data needs to be interpreted with caution, as they do not fully capture Japan’s 
performance in antibiotics. For example, the export destinations of Japanese 
antibiotics have mostly been to the developing world rather than to the developed 
world.313 Import figures also do not include the rise in the number of overseas 
products directly distributed by foreign firms. Import figures may also be lower due to 
downward price pressures in the domestic market. Japanese drug prices have been
roughly comparable with other countries, but the biennial price reductions have led to 
a more rapid decline in prices over the patent protection period.514 At the same time,
export figures also do not capture the availability of Japanese antibiotics abroad, as
most firms licensed out their technologies rather than directly distributing their
512 Ministry o f  International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: G yosei, 1974-2000).
513 Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kog\>5 Seisan D otai Chdsa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
514 See N igel Thompson, International Price Comparison: Japan  (Tokyo: Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association  
Long Term Vision Research Council, 1999).
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products abroad.515 Antibiotics makers struggled to expand in the midst of increasing 
competition with lower cost, quality antibiotics from the developing world -  and from 
high barriers to entry in most markets. Historical data on antibiotic trade, technology 
trade, and NCE discoveries well demonstrate the strengths of Japan’s antibiotics sector, 
as do qualitative data from academic and popular press.516
To a certain extent, the strengths of Japan’s antibiotics sector were observed in the 
absence of foreign firms in the Japanese market. By the new millennia, large 
multinational firms such as GlaxoSmithKline, Abbott, Bayer and Roche topped global 
antibiotics rankings and dominated most antibiotics markets in world, ranging from
r i « 7
United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. But these firms were largely 
absent in Japan. Instead, domestic firms such as Shionogi, Fujisawa, and Daiichi 
dominated the Japanese market.518
This was partly because the Japanese market still posed barriers to entry. Antibiotics 
were a mature sector comprised of many substitutable, high quality drugs that were 
marketed by numerous firms with extensive distributional networks. Japan was not an 
attractive market for most foreign firms, as local partnerships were essential for
315 See for example, “Global Drug Market: 30 Years o f Growth,” Pharma Marketletter, January 4,1993; Peter Martin, “Weak 
Link in the Chain: Distribution Difficulties have meant that Japan's Successes in the West's Car and Consumer Electronics 
Markets have not been Equalled in Other Industries,” Financial Times, 6 March 1997.
316 For trade statistics, see Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: Gy5sei, 
1974-2000) and Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000). Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics 
Bureau & Statistics Centre, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku [Report on the Survey o f Research and Development] (Tokyo: 
Management and Coordination Agency, 1985-2000). Various writers have documented Japan’s strong performance in antibiotics. 
See for example, Michael Reich, “Why the Japanese Don't Export More Pharmaceuticals: Health Policy as Industrial Policy,” 
136; Eric Schmitt, “What’s Hot in Imported Products; Antibiotics Made Jointly,” The New York Times, 30 November 1986.
317 Datamonitor, “Global -  Antibacterial Drugs,” Industry Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2002), 8.
318 Datamonitor, “Japan -  Antibacterial Drugs,” Industry Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2002), 9.
Most Japanese firms relied upon domestic sales for a significant portion o f total revenue.
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distribution, just as the reverse was true for Japanese firms. But the absence of foreign 
firms was also reflective of the fact that Japanese firms were competitive. Indeed, 
during the mid 1990s, four of the top 15 global antibiotics firms were Japanese, while 
six were American.519 While the strengths of these firms were better known to the 
domestic -  rather than global -  market, the government’s earlier policies had 
succeeded in establishing a strong Japanese antibiotics industry.
3.5.3 Summary of the period between 1990 to 2005
The value of antibiotics produced declined substantially over the 1990s. It did so for 
several reasons. Antibiotics were a now a mature drug with relatively low prices. 
Rather than invest in developing antibiotics, many firms opted to invest in launching 
more profitable types of drugs. In addition, the 1992 reforms to Japan’s distribution 
system eliminated the artificially high demand for antibiotics, and lowered production 
levels. Moreover, in the 1990s, the government began to harmonise Japan’s 
pharmaceutical regulations with American and European regulations. As drugs 
approved in foreign countries were recognised in Japan, domestic firms faced greater 
competition from foreign firms in their home market. Antibiotics of minimal 
innovative value were no longer able to compete in the Japanese market. In addition, 
as drugs approved in Japan were recognised in the United States and Europe, more 
Japanese firms began to channel their efforts on expanding abroad.
519 Jenny Wilson, Antibacterial Products and Markets, Scrip Reports (Richmond: PJB Publications, 1997), 137.
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3.6 Analysis of the antibiotics chapter
This section considers several possible explanations as to why the Japanese antibiotics 
sector flourished in comparison with the rest of the industry. One hypothesis is that 
Japan’s strong foundations in science supported the development of a strong 
antibiotics sector. The historical strengths of Japan’s medical research, in particular, 
have been cited by scholars such as James Bartholomew. Contributions to the 
international scientific community made by Meiji era scientists such as Sahachiro 
Hata, Shibasaburo Kitasato, and Hideyo Noguchi, who led scientific research both 
inside and outside of Japan attest not only to the calibre of scientists in Japanese 
universities, but also to the academic infrastructure that supported scientific research 
since the Meiji period.
Some scholars have argued that while the Japanese have been very competitive in the 
applied sciences, the country’s comparative weakness in the basic sciences may have 
undermined the development of a stronger pharmaceutical industry.521 The Meiji era 
achievements of Japanese academic science, particularly in bacteriology, would 
suggest that this is untrue. But even if the claims made by these scholars held some 
validity, Japan’s relative strengths in applied science in fact, would not have hampered 
the discovery or development of antibiotics, which are based more on the linear,
520 See James R. Bartholomew, The Formation o f Science in Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
521 See for example, Eleanor Westney, “Country Patterns in R&D Organization: The United States and Japan,” in Country 
Competitiveness: Technology and the Organizing o f  Work, by Bruce Kogut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 36-53; 
David T. Methd and Joan D. Pinner-Hahn, “Globalization of Pharmaceutical Research and Development in Japanese Companies: 
Organizational Learning and the Parent-Subsidiary Relationship,” in Japanese Multinationals Abroad: Individual and 
Organizational Learning, by Schon Beechler and Allan Bird (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 191-210.
522 See for example, Christian Oberlaender, “The Rise of Western ‘Scientific Medicine’ in Japan: Bacteriology and Beriberi,” in 
Building a Modem Japan: Science, Technology and Medicine in the Meiji Era and Beyond, ed. Morris Low (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 11-36.
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incremental, and evolutionary learning rather than breakthrough discoveries. While 
Japan’s historical foundations in science demonstrate how the country provided a 
favourable environment for antibiotic development, it does not fully explain why 
Japanese firms were actually able to develop a strong antibiotic sector.
A more plausible explanation for the strength of Japan’s antibiotics sector stems from 
industrial structure. Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was dominated by many small 
firms compared to the pharmaceutical industries of other countries. While Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms were smaller than their foreign counterparts, antibiotic R&D 
required fewer resources compared to other types of drugs, such as anticancer drugs. 
As Japanese firms opted to invest in antibiotic R&D, they were able to develop a 
strong antibiotics sector.
With a large number of firms engaged in antibiotic production, Japan’s antibiotics 
sector was also intensely competitive. Moreover, the barriers to entry were relatively 
low, and food, beverages, and textiles firms were able to enter the industry. In order to 
survive intense competition, Japanese firms developed antibiotics with better quality, 
safety and efficacy profiles. While the competitive domestic environment may have 
contributed to the strong performance of Japan’s antibiotics sector, it does not 
ultimately account for its strengths. The United States, for example, developed a 
world-class antibiotics sector in a market dominated by a few large firms. Industrial 
structure alone does not provide a sufficient reason for the strengths of Japan’s 
antibiotics sector.
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The close research links formed between Japanese academia and the pharmaceutical 
industry also help explain why the antibiotics sector became internationally 
competitive. During the Second World War, for example, government, academic, and 
industry scientists collaborated in their attempts to commercialise penicillin. These 
collaborative links were often based on long standing personal connections developed 
during university, and persisted well into the post-war era. The government supported 
antibiotic research since the immediate post-war period, and these connections were 
invaluable in helping translating the fruits of academic research into leading 
commercial discoveries such as kanamycin, josamycin, or oxalyplatin in later years. 
Japanese academics were not restricted from collaborating with firms in the formative 
years of Japan’s antibiotics sector.
While restrictions on formal collaborations with industry were put in place after the 
student protests of the late 1960s, this rule had a limited impact on the formation of the 
antibiotics sector. In addition, the restrictions were lifted in 1998.523 Louis Galambos 
and Jane Eliot Sewell have argued that networks of collaboration were essential to the 
building of a competitive pharmaceutical industry in the United States.524 The same 
was true in Japan. But smaller firms without links to academia such as Kyorin and 
Toyama Chemical were also able to build a strong foothold in the Japanese antibiotics
523 See Takehiko Hashimoto, “The Hesitant Relationship Reconsidered: University-Industry Cooperation in Post-war Japan,” in 
Industrializing Knowledge: University-Industry Linkages in Japan and the United States, eds. Lewis M. Branscomb, Fumio 
Kodama, and Richard L. Florida (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 234-251; and Robert Kneller, “The Beginning of University 
Entrepreneurship in Japan: TLOs and Bioventures Lead the Way,” Journal o f  Technology Transfer 32 (2007): 435-456.
524 Louis Galambos and Jane Eliot Sewell, Networks o f  Innovation: Vaccine Development at Merck, Sharp & Dohme, and 
Mulford, 1895-1995.
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market. The strength of Japan’s antibiotics sector cannot sufficiently explained by the 
existence of collaborative networks.
Another explanation for the development of a strong antibiotics sector in Japan relates 
to the strong demand for antibiotics created under the country’s medical system. 
Japanese physicians both prescribed and dispensed drugs. Under Japan’s fee for 
service system, Japanese physicians were compensated more generously for 
prescribing rather than consultation services. Physicians were particularly incentivised 
to prescribe drugs that could be easily administered to a wide patient population, and 
had a greater difference between wholesale and retail prices. Japan’s antibiotics sector 
grew, as both physicians and patients were insensitive to actual drug prices under the 
universal health care system. After all, the government reimbursed physicians for drug 
sales and subsidised patients for drug expenses.
Finally, it was the effectiveness of government policy that helped develop a strong, 
globally competitive antibiotics sector. Until the 1970s, Japan’s government 
concentrated on enabling Japanese firms to acquire foreign technologies. As Japanese 
firms caught up with Western firms, the government gradually opened the market.
The most important turning point occurred when the government liberalised capital 
controls in 1975 and introduced product patents in 1976. The shift from a process 
patent regime to a product patent regime encouraged Japanese pharmaceutical firms to 
pursue product innovations. To compete against foreign firms, Japanese firms began to
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strengthen their R&D capacities and launch more competitive products.
The government’s introduction of product and quality standards since the 1970s also 
helped improve the quality, safety and efficacy of Japanese pharmaceutical products, 
But it is worthwhile noting that country-specific standards also protected firms from 
foreign competition, and eased Japan’s transition to a more R&D intensive and global 
industry. This was because foreign firms found it overly costly and risky to adapt their 
products for the Japanese market. Government policies helped nurture Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry within a heavily protected environment.
The harmonisation of Japanese pharmaceutical regulations with Europe and the 
United States in the 1990s further pressed Japanese firms to invest in substantial 
innovations to survive the rising competition from foreign firms. The Japanese 
government changed its policies toward the antibiotics sector in a timely fashion, 
encouraging Japanese firms to pursue breakthrough innovations after Japan had 
caught up with the West. The timely implementation of these policies was key to the 
strong performance of Japan’s antibiotics sector.
Government intervention was more effective in developing the antibiotics sector than 
in other pharmaceutical sectors because of certain features specific to antibiotics. 
Antibiotics are a hospital and clinic based therapy that can be prescribed for a wide 
variety of infections. As a remedy for an acute ailment, its cost burden was relatively 
low, yet its effects were quickly observable, and patient demand was high.
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Other features of antibiotics facilitated Japan’s entry into global markets. Antibiotics 
are medicines that are used for a short period of time for a wide range of infectious 
ailments, and have few side effects. Patients and physicians can evaluate the safety and 
efficacy of antibiotics within a short period of time. These features are particularly 
important when translating drugs into overseas markets. Obtaining approval in foreign 
drug regimes is difficult for drugs that require long-term administration or have heavy 
side effects -  such as cancer drugs. Japanese firms have been much more successful in 
exporting or licensing antibiotics because their safety and efficacy are relatively easy 
to establish for drug authorities.
In addition to its industrial policies, the government’s health policies also helped 
strengthen Japan’s antibiotics sector. In introducing universal health care in 1961, the 
government guaranteed demand for prescription pharmaceuticals and supported the 
growth of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. The government further expanded this 
market by reducing co-payment levels and introducing free health care for the elderly. 
By setting high prices on antibiotics, the government also provided strong incentives 
for firms to launch antibiotics, while the greater price differentials in high-priced drugs 
incentivised physicians to prescribe more antibiotics. As a drug prescribed to a wide 
population, these government policies were particularly helpful in expanding the size 
of Japan’s antibiotics market.
The Japanese antibiotics sector was built upon a long history of expertise in
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fermentation technology, strong academic science, and informal networks between 
government, industry and academia. By a stroke of luck, antibiotics proved relatively 
easy to discover, produce, and export in a developing economy. Helped by the 
Occupation regime and the government’s developmental health and industrial policies, 
Japanese antibiotics makers were able to capitalise on their potential.
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4 Anticancer drug chapter
In the early 1980s, many Western observers speculated that the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry might become a global leader. In fact, The Economist 
reported in 1983 that Japan rivalled America as a place of discovery for new drugs, 
and that Western pharmaceutical companies were increasingly turning to Japan. In 
particular, it emphasised the strengths of the Japanese antibiotics sector, and the 
potentials of the anticancer drug sector. 525 The Economist was suggesting that 
Japanese pharmaceutical firms were about to penetrate overseas markets and achieve 
successes similar to those of Toyota and Sony in the automobile and electronics 
sectors. Other Western publications in the 1980s discussed the potential threat posed 
by Japanese firms who might -  with their traditional strengths in fermentation 
technology -  be better positioned to take advantage of new advances in biotechnology 
to develop innovative therapies, including anticancer drugs.
To date, Japanese pharmaceutical firms have largely failed to live up to these 
predictions. The weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry is especially visible in 
the realm of anticancer drugs. Japan has had a massive trade deficit in anticancer 
drugs; most anticancer drugs in the country are either imports or foreign-discovered 
drugs produced under license.527 It is true that Japanese pharmaceutical firms have 
launched several anticancer drugs that have been used in other countries. But the
525 “Japanese Drug Companies Pull Ahead in the Race to Innovate,” The Economist, 24 September 1983, 93.
526 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Commercial Biotechnology: An International Assessment (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Geoffrey M. Holdridge, ed., “JTEC/WTEC Annual Report and Program Summary, 
1993/1994” (Baltimore: Japan Technology Evaluation Center, 1994).
527 Yakugy5 JihSsha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyS Jihosha, 1968-1999); Jiho, Yakuji 
Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: JihQ, 2000-2007).
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successes have been few and far between, and contradict the general trend depicted in 
the trade data. In addition, the more successful Japanese drug companies that have 
developed global drugs, such as Takeda, have expanded abroad by transferring their 
R&D, production, and marketing operations overseas. These firms have sought to 
benefit from overseas environments more favourable to pharmaceutical innovation. 
The experience of firms such as Takeda suggests at why Japan’s anticancer drug sector 
as a whole has underperformed.
The previous chapter demonstrated why Japan’s antibiotics sector flourished. In 
contrast, this chapter surveys the development of the anticancer drug sector in Japan 
and considers why it failed to live up to the optimistic predictions made by foreign 
observers in the 1980s. It concludes by providing several possible explanations for the 
failure of Japan to develop a globally competitive anticancer drug sector.
The chapter follows the development of the anticancer drug sector across four phases 
of development. The first phase refers to the historical foundations of anticancer drug 
development before the Second World War. In the next phase during the 1950s and 
1960s -  which coincided with the golden age of antibiotic discovery -  Japanese firms 
launched anticancer antibiotics and pursued the small-scale production of foreign 
anticancer drugs under license. Between 1975 and 1990, there was a volume-based 
expansion of drugs for the domestic market. During this phase, anticancer drugs of 
limited efficacy flourished in a market protected by universal health insurance, unique 
product standards, a distinct medical system -  and links between government, industry
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and academia. The Japanese pharmaceutical industry, in fact, lost more than a decade 
in developing a globally competitive anticancer drug sector, as it misdirected 
investments into developing largely ineffective drugs rather than breakthrough drugs.
After the early 1990s, regulatory reforms opened the market to foreign firms and drugs, 
and the government improved incentives for firms to adopt a more research-intensive 
orientation. But with more favourable regimes for innovation abroad, leading Japanese 
firms began to move some of their core R&D operations abroad. While the more 
outward oriented Japanese firms became stronger, launched blockbuster drugs, and 
expanded their global reach, the more domestic oriented firms began to suffer as they 
faced stiff competition from foreign firms in the domestic market.
4.1 On anticancer drugs
Anticancer drugs refer to a substance, other than food, that is used to prevent, diagnose, 
treat, or relieve symptoms of cancer, a disease in which abnormal cells divide without 
control and migrate from the original site to other parts of the body. Cancer 
treatments, which aim to remove or control the cancer, range from surgery, radiation, 
chemotherapy, immunotherapy, hormone therapy, and bone marrow transplantation. 
The range, effectiveness, and purpose of anticancer drugs have evolved in step with 
medical advances in cancer therapy. In practice, the specific drugs used differ 
according to a range of factors -  such as the afflicted body region, type, and stage of
528 National Cancer Institute, “Dictionary o f  Cancer Terms,” National Cancer Institute, http://www. cancer, gov/di ctionarv/ (20 
March 2007).
529 Jacqueline L. Longe, Deirdre S. Blanchfield, eds., Gale Encyclopedia o f  Medicine.(fmamgLon Hills,: Gale Group, 2001), 
635-636.
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cancer. Anticancer drugs are classified into several categories according to their 
chemical origins and functional attributes. These include alkylating agents, 
antimetabolites, plant alkaloids, antitumour antibiotics, hormonal therapies, and 
others.
As in other therapeutic sectors, the product attributes of anticancer drugs shape its 
market dynamics. Compared to older drugs such as antibiotics, anticancer drugs -  as a 
newer drug -  share the attributes of more recent therapies for neurological disorders or 
autoimmune diseases. For example, the safety and effectiveness profile of newer drugs 
are often unknown and continue to be improved. Such features reflect the status of 
medical research, as scientists are only beginning to understand the complex 
interactions between the genetic and environmental factors that govern the progression 
of diseases grouped as cancer. While drug profiles are continuously modified, newer 
drugs such as anticancer drugs tend to exhibit serious side effects such as hair loss, 
nausea, or death.530 To balance the effectiveness of anticancer drugs against the high 
levels of toxicity, the amount and type of drug prescribed is adjusted according to the 
patient. While some drugs can be taken orally, most anticancer drugs require more 
invasive, hospital based methods of administration.
A single anticancer drug is generally used as part of a therapy with other anticancer 
drugs for a particular type and stage of cancer over a prolonged period of time, and 
generally produces severe side effects. This is unlike antibiotics, where a given drug is
530 This is because most anticancer drugs available today cannot distinguish between benign and malign cells. See Jacqueline L. 
Longe, Deirdre S. Blanchfield, eds., Gale Encyclopedia o f  Medicine, 634-635.
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effective toward a wide range of infectious diseases for a short period without risk of 
significant side effects. Given the small number of applicable conditions, anticancer 
drugs are produced on a more limited scale compared to other therapeutic sectors, such 
as antibiotics. As treatment for a life threatening disease, however, therapeutic demand 
for anticancer drugs tends to be strong and price insensitive. Anticancer drugs also 
tend to be highly profitable, with significant first mover advantages. This is because in 
Japan, initial drug prices for anticancer drugs are high do not fall as quickly as in other 
therapeutic sectors. In addition, few substitutes are available. Moreover, switching 
costs are high due to the long-term and individualised nature of cancer therapy, where 
changing to another therapy carries additional therapeutic risk.
Therefore, whereas the antibiotics market is characterised by intense price competition, 
the anticancer drug market is characterised largely by non-price competition. In the 
anticancer drug market, sales are determined by a drug’s therapeutic quality and the 
marketing efforts of medical representatives. Despite the incomplete nature of 
anticancer drugs as a product, the life-saving prospects of a scarce yet risky remedy 
with few substitutes have created a price inelastic market where information is highly 
valued.531
4.2 Predawn, before 1945
Before 1945, there was no anticancer drug sector in Japan. This was because, in Japan
531 See Hisao Ends, MatsurS Oka, Masaki Ozawa, Yoshiaki Kamoya, and Nobuo Tanaka, “IrySyS Iyakuhin ShijS ni Okeru KyosS 
Keitai [Forms of Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Market],” in Iyakuhin Sangyd Soshikiron [On the Organisation o f the 
Pharmaceutical Industry], ed. Tsurihiko Nanbu (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2002), 49-74.
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or elsewhere, there were no anticancer drugs available before World War II. But 
Japanese scientists were actively engaged in cancer research well before the Second 
World War. Japanese government officials, entrepreneurs, and academic scientists 
worked together to pursue cancer research -  including research on cancer therapies.
As James Bartholomew has noted, the First World War prompted Japan to strengthen 
its capacities in scientific research. Japanese efforts in cancer research, in fact had 
merited the formation of national research institutes such as the Japan Foundation for 
Cancer Research (Gankenkyukai) in 1908 and the Japanese Cancer Association 
(Gangakkai) in 1935. Japan was among the first countries to establish national 
cancer research institutes. While Britain’s Imperial Cancer Research Fund was 
established in 1902, the American National Cancer Institute in 1937, and the German 
Cancer Research Center {Deutsches Krebs Forschungs Zentrum) was established in 
1964.534
Despite these early developments, however, Japanese cancer research remained 
relatively small, unorganised, and lacked coordination between fundamental and 
applied research. It seemed to lack the government guidance that supported industrial 
research in countries such as the United States, Britain, and Germany. This poorly 
integrated approach to research often lacked the momentum to translate academic
532 James R. Bartholomew, The Formation o f  Science o f  Japan, 199-237.
333 Japan Cancer Association, “Gangakkai no Rekishi [The History o f the Japan Cancer Association],” Japan Cancer Association. 
http://www.ica.gr.ip/b01.html (accessed 1 December 2007).
334 National Cancer Institute, “The National Cancer Institute Act, 1937-2007: Celebrating 70 Years of Excellence in Cancer 
Research,” The National Cancer Institute Act, http://www.cancer.gov/aboutnci/ncia (accessed 1 December 2007); Cancer 
Research UK, “Our History,” http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerandresearch/historvandachievements/ourhistorv/
(accessed 1 December 2007); German Cancer Research Center, “History,” http://www.dkfe.de/en/dkfe/geschichte.html. 
(accessed 1 December 2007).
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research into a final product. After 1945, cancer research in the United States was 
backed by the American government, who helped coordinate, and organise large scale, 
interdisciplinary, and results-oriented industrial research at the National Cancer 
Institute.535 By World War II, Germany and the United States had managed to 
integrate academic science in pharmaceuticals with industrial research, whereas 
academic pharmaceutical research in Japan remained detached from the industrial 
laboratory well after World War II.536
Japan was unable to develop a strong anticancer drug sector despite its strong 
foundation in academic science. Japan was neither able to capitalise on the fruits of its 
early research nor the networks of collaboration formed between government, industry, 
and academia. It is true that, at a time when the disease was less common, there was 
less demand for anticancer drugs. In addition, most of Japan’s small pharmaceutical 
firms were wholesalers or licensed producers of foreign-discovered drugs who lacked 
the capital or equipment necessary to develop anticancer drugs. Research institutes, 
such as Riken, were established to promote university-industry collaboration in 
scientific research in the early 20th century. But there remained a relative disconnect 
between university scientists who pursued research for purely academic purposes and 
industrial scientists who pursued research for commercial ends.537 What appears 
lacking was a government commitment to industrial R&D that would coordinate these
535 Robert F. Bud, “Strategy in American Cancer Research After World War II: A Case Study” Social Studies o f  Science 8 
(November 1978): 425-459.
536Jonathan Liebenau, “Industrial R&D in Pharmaceutical Firms in the Early Twentieth Century,” Business History 26, no.3 
(1984): 229-346.
537 See for example, Bowen C. Dees, “Japanese Science and Technology Before 1945,” in The Allied Occupation and Japan's 
Economic Miracle: Building the Foundations o f  Japanese Science and Technology, 1945-52 (Richmond: Japan Library, 1997): 
1- 11.
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differences and help translate the fruits of academic research into commercial 
products.
4.3 Beginnings, from 1945 to 1975
Japan’s anticancer drug sector emerged during the 1950s when the first chemotherapy 
drugs began to be sold in Japan. As elsewhere, the only cancer treatments available 
prior to this time were surgery and radiation. Despite its later weakness, Japan’s 
anticancer drug sector was relatively successful in its early years. Japanese firms 
launched improved versions of foreign discovered drugs and developed original 
anticancer drugs that were distributed worldwide and continue to be used today. In a 
heavily protected environment, Japanese firms were able to launch domestic versions 
of foreign-discovered drugs with relative ease. Japanese firms were also able to 
discover several anticancer drugs that were basically a type of antibiotic effective 
toward cancer. For Japanese firms operating in a still developing economy, the low 
cost, labour intensive, and serendipitous method of developing these drugs suited their 
comparative advantage.
Yet in terms of size, Japan’s anticancer drug sector remained small and undeveloped 
until the early 1970s. As figure 19 shows, anticancer drug production rose 
dramatically after the mid 1970s. This was because the therapeutic demand for 
anticancer drugs was less than for other types of therapies, such as antibiotics. As well, 
the anticancer drugs developed during this time had limited efficacy despite their 
heavy side effects. While the introduction of national health insurance in 1961 and
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launches of several new anticancer drugs such as mitomycin, bleomycin, and ftorafur 
did increase production levels over the 1960s, they did not prompt a significant 
expansion of the anticancer drug market.
Figure 19. Value o f  Anticancer Drug Production, 1955-1975538
Yoshitomi
The launch of one of Japan’s first anticancer drugs, Nitromin, originated out of 
academia. During World War II, US scientists had found the chemical weapon, 
nitrogen mustard, to be effective in fighting cancer.539 Soon after the war, Morizo
Ishidate and Tomizo Yoshida, two leading cancer scientists based at the University of
5j8 Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K ogyo Seisan D otai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K dgyd  Seisan D o ta i Chosa  
Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000). When the 
Japanese government began to collect statistics on anticancer drugs in the mid 1950s, these figures were aggregated into the 
category o f  antitumour drugs. As the vast majority o f  antitumour drugs are comprised o f  anticancer drugs, this thesis has used 
antitumour drugs as a proxy for anticancer drugs over the post war period.
5j9 L.S. Goodman, M.M. Wintrobe, W. Dameshek, M.J. Goodman, A. Gilman and M.T. McLennan, “Nitrogen Mustard Therapy. 
U se o f  methyl-bis(beta-chloroethyl)am ine hydrochloride and tris(beta-chloroethyl)amine hydrochloride for Hodgkin's disease. 
Lymphosarcoma, Leukemia, and Certain Allied and M iscellaneous Disorders," Journal o f  the Am erican M edical A ssociation  105 
(1946): 475^176; C.P. Rhoads, “Nitrogen Mustards in the Treatment o f  Neoplastic Disease: Official Statement" Journal o f  the 
Am erican M edical Association  131 (1946): 656-658.
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Tokyo and Tohoku University, respectively, succeeded in reducing its toxicity to a 
tenth.540 The scientists then collaborated with Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical Industries to
commercialise the drug, whereby the scientists guided the firm through the screening 
and manufacturing process.541
Yoshitomi was then a small pharmaceutical firm that had been established in 1940 as a
joint venture between Takeda Pharmaceuticals -  Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firm
-  and Mitsubishi Chemicals. Yoshitomi developed quickly after the war, and by 1950,
employed over 1,000 workers and produced 2.3% of the nation’s pharmaceuticals.
From its inception, Yoshitomi had particularly strong ties with Takeda, which
distributed most of its products. In 1949, for example, sales to Takeda comprised 76%
of the firm’s total sales, followed by the Ministry of Health and public hospitals, at 
13% and 4%, respectively.542
Despite its success in developing a new anticancer drug, launching Nitromin in 1952 
did not lead to substantial sales for Yoshitomi.543 While Nitromin marked a milestone
as one of the first anticancer drugs developed in Japan, demand for the drug remained
limited -  due mostly to limited therapeutic demand and the drug’s heavy side effects.
540 T. Yoshida, H. Sato, and M. Ishidate, “Yoshida Nikushu ni yoru Akusei Shuyo KagakuryohO no Jikkenteki KenkyO 1 
[Experimental Studies on Chemotherapy of Malignant Growth Employing Yoshida Sarcoma 1,” Gann 41 (1950): 93-96; M. 
Ishidate, K. Kobayashi, Y. Sakurai, H. Sato, and T. Yoshida, “Experimental Studies on Chemotherapy of Malignant Growth 
Employing Yoshida Sarcoma Animals (II). The Effect of N-oxide derivatives of Nitrogen Mustard,” Proceedings o f  the Japan 
Academy 27 (1951): 493-498.
541 Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical Co., Yoshitomi Seiyaku 50-nen noAyumi [A 50 Year History of Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical Co.] 
Tokyo: Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical Co., 1990): 55-57; Shinpei Miyata, “Tomizo Yoshida: Yoshida Carcinoma and the Beginning 
of a New Era (Yoshida TomizO: Shinjidai o Hiraita Yoshida Nikushu),” Gekkan Gan 33 (September 2002): 42-45.
542 Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., Yiika Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: OkurashO 
Insatsukyoku, 1949).
543 Yakuji NippSsha, “Nitromin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1952), 118.
Approved at 1,000 yen per 5 ampoules, Nitromin was manufactured by Yoshitomi and distributed through Takeda
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In fact, Nitromin accounted for only 0.5% of Yoshitomi’s total sales in I960.544 
Despite the ability of academic scientists to develop and launch drugs in collaboration 
with private firms, the cancer market grew slowly.
Kyowa Hakko
The first anticancer drug of Japanese origin to be distributed worldwide was 
mitomycin by Kyowa Hakko Co. Like many of the firms that developed anticancer 
drugs in Japan, Kyowa Hakko’s area of expertise was not in pharmaceuticals. In fact, 
Kyowa Hakko’s predecessor was a government-funded manufacturer of methanol and 
acetone established in 193 3.545 Drawing on its expertise in fermentation and chemical 
synthesis, Kyowa Hakko was established in 1949 as a producer of raw material 
alcohol, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and fertilisers. As with many non- traditional 
pharmaceutical firms during this period, Kyowa Hakko gained its strengths through 
the production and sale of the leading antibiotics: penicillin and streptomycin. By 
1960, Kyowa Hakko had developed into a fairly large firm, which was capitalised at 
12.9 billion yen and employed over 2,700 workers.546
In 1955, the firm gained approval to sell five anticancer substances (eight drugs). 
Kyowa Hakko had formed alliances with universities such as the Kitasato Research 
Institute or foreign firms such as Roche to market new anticancer drugs.547 In terms of
544 Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho 
Insatsukyoku, 1961).
343 Methanol is an alcohol used as a raw material in many industrial and chemical processes. Acetone is a widely used solvent.
346 In 2005 values, this would be approximately 66.8 billion yen. Kyowa Hakko Kyogyo Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual 
Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1960).
347 Yakuji NippOsha, “Mitomycin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippOsha, 1960), 15-18; 
Shigetoshi Wakaki, ‘Tosha ni okeru Seiganzai no KenkyO to Kaihatsu no GenjG [The Status o f Anticancer Drug R&D at Our
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its own R&D, Kyowa Hakko concentrated on the development and improvement of 
anticancer antibiotics such as mitomycin.548
Kyowa Hakko’s development of mitomycin was, in fact, motivated by university
researchers who had contacted the firm to jointly develop its discovery. In 1955, Toju
Hata’s laboratory at the Kitasato Institute for Infectious Diseases asked Kyowa Hakko 
to produce a large volume of samples for laboratory use.549 Japan’s first antitumour
antibiotic, carzinophilin, had actually been discovered by Hata in 1954 and developed
by Kyowa Hakko, but its success was short lived because of its instability and 
toxicity.550 Similar to many antibiotics of its time, mitomycin had been isolated from a
soil sample. Preclinical tests had shown mitomycin to be effective in the destruction of 
both microbes and malignant tumour cells.551 By forming an alliance with Kyowa
Hakko, the Kitasato Institute hoped to capitalise on the firm’s expertise in
fermentation. This collaboration resulted in the isolation of several types of mitomycin.
Among these, mitomycin C, identified by Shigetoshi Wakaki of Kyowa Hakko, was 
found to be most effective and was developed into a potential therapy.
Company],” Kagakukdgyd (April 1976): 96-98.
348 Anticancer antibiotics are, like antibiotics, a substance produced by bacteria that is used to treat cancer. See for example, 
national Cancer Institute, “Dictionary of Cancer Terms: Antitumor Antibiotic” National Cancer Institute,” 
http://www.cancer.gov/templates/db alpha.aspx?CdrID=44488 (accessed 26 May 2008). Biological modifiers are substances 
that alter the interaction between the body’s immune system and cancer cells, in order to boost, direct or restore the body’s ability 
to fight the disease. See, National Cancer Institute, “Biological Therapies for Cancer: Questions and Answers,” National Cancer 
Institute, http://www.cancer.gOv/cancertopics/factsheetyTherapv/biological#a3 (accessed 26 May 2008).
549 Kyowa Hakko Kyogyo Co., Bara wa Bara: Kyowa Hakko 35-nenshi [A Rose is a Rose: A 35 year History o f Kyowa Hakko] 
(Tokyo: Kyowa Hakko Kyogyo Co., 1984), 70.
530 Toju Hata, Fumiwaka Koga, Yoshitomo Sano, Kokichi Kanamori, Akihiro Matsumae, Ryozo Sugawara, Tadashi Hoshi, 
Tatsuo Shima, Shinya Ito, and Setsuo Tomizawa, “Carzinophilin, New Tumor Inhibitory Substance Produced by Streptomyces,” 
Journal o f  Antibiotics 7 (August 1954): 107-112.
551 Toju Hata, Yoshimoto Sano, Ryozo Sugawara, Akihiro Matsumae, Kokichi Kanamori, Tatsuo Shima, Tadashi Hoshi, 
“Mitomycin, a New Antibiotic from Streptomyces. I f  Journal o f  Antibiotics, Series A 9 (July 1956): 141-146; Ryozo Sugawara 
and Toju Hata, “Mitomycin C, aNew Antibiotic from Streptomyces II,” Journal o f  Antibiotics, Series A 9 (July 1956): 147.
332 S. Wakaki, H. Marumo, K. Tomioka, “Isolation o f New Fractions o f Antitumour Mitomicins,” Antibiotics and Chemotherapy 
8, no. 8 (1958): 228-240.
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The drug’s success was not only a product of government funding for academic 
research in antibiotics, but also of collaborations between academic and company 
scientists both within and beyond Japan. 553 Research on mitomycin was also 
conducted abroad, and favourable research results by prominent scientists such as
Kanematsu Sugiura of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research in
the United States proved particularly effective in gaining international recognition for 
the drug.554
But while the Japanese government approved mitomycin C in 1959, differences in
drug approval standards according to country and time meant that the drug was not 
available in some major markets for a considerable time. The United States, for
example, initially rejected mitomycin as a potential cure for cancer due to “major toxic 
reactions but seldom objective improvement.” 555 The FDA did, however, grant 
approval in 1974, and mitomycin was distributed by Bristol-Myers Squibb.556 By the 
mid 1980s, mitomycin was available in more than 60 countries.557
While mitomycin became one of Kyowa Hakko’s core products, its sales records
demonstrated why Japanese firms had weak incentives to invest heavily in drug R&D.
533 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the government had supported academic research in antibiotics from the late 1940s. 
This funding was useful in the search for other therapeutic uses o f substances produced by bacteria, including the treatment of 
cancer.
554 Thomas W. Ennis, “Dr. Kanematsu Sugiura, 89, Dies; A Pioneer in Cancer Chemotherapy; Research Dates to 1912,” The New 
York Times, 23 October 1979. Since the end of World War II, the Japanese American scientist Kanematsu Sugiura had liaised with 
Japanese scientists for collaborations in cancer research. See also, John Hillaby, “Cancer Increase is not Clear-Cut; World 
Congress in London Attributes Some of It to Regular Check-Ups,” The New York Times, 9 July 1958; William L. Laurence, 
“Science in Review: Reports o f Progress in Fight on Cancer Hold Out Hope o f Cutting Death Toll,” The New York Times, 13 July 
1958.
333“Cancer Drug Rejected; U.S. Says Japanese Antibiotic has Significant Side-effects,” The New York Times, 22 January 1959.
336 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “FDA Oncology Tools Approval Summary for 
Mitomycin C,” U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http:/Ayww.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/onctools/summarv.cfm?ID=273 
(accessed 10 November 2007).
337 Kyowa Hakko Kyogyo Co., Bara wa Bara: Kyowa Hakko 35-nenshi [A Rose is a Rose: A 35 Year History of Kyowa Hakko], 
70.
224
Japan’s process patent regime meant that the fruits of R&D could easily be shared by a 
rival firm. While Kyowa Hakko’s application for mitomycin C, for example, was 
approved in September and launched in October 1959, Sankyo was able to launch 
mitomycin in the same month. As well, although mitomycin was one of Kyowa 
Hakko’s key products, with an yearly production level of 839,000 yen by 1965, this 
was still less than a fifth of the firm’s production values for streptomycin -  a drug it 
produced under license.558 With little reward, many firms could not justify the heavy 
investments necessary for innovation.
With its success in mitomycin, Kyowa Hakko was able to carve out a prominent 
position in the anticancer drug sector -  initially through anticancer antibiotics. After 
all, the government offered funding for antibiotic research, set relatively high prices 
for both antibiotics and anticancer drugs, and provided rewards for incremental 
innovations. Kyowa Hakko invested heavily in its human resources, and concentrated 
its investments on drugs that utilised the firm’s expertise in fermentation technology to 
strengthen R&D capacity.559 Kyowa Hakko also formed alliances with academic and 
industry research laboratories both inside and outside of Japan to compensate for, as 
well as build upon, limited technological expertise. 560 In addition to importing 
technologies, the company had also sent its key researchers to study at leading cancer 
research centres in the United States from the mid 1960s onwards. These efforts
558 In nominal terms, Kyowa Hakko’s yearly production level was approximately 214,000 yen. Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co., Yuka 
Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1965), 8, 16; Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co., Yuka 
Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1966), 20.
559 BenzaburO Kat5, “Innen no Dori ni Rikkyaku Shita Jigyo Keiei [Business Management Based on the Philosophy o f Fate],” in 
Gendai Toppu Keiei no Jigyo Tetsugaku [Business Philosophies among Today’s Leading Managers], ed. Nihon JitsugyS 
Shuppansha (Tokyo: Nihon JitsugyS Shuppansha, 1969). BenzaburS Kat5 became the president of Kyowa Hakko in 1949 and its 
chairman in 1969.
*° Ibid.
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helped Kyowa Hakko to learn of cutting-edge research and strengthen its research 
capacities.561
Nippon Kayaku
As its name “Kayaku (explosives),” might suggest, Nippon Kayaku was a firm with 
core interests outside of pharmaceuticals. The firm was established in 1916 to produce 
explosives for the construction sector as German imports became unavailable during 
World War I. Building upon its core competencies, the firm diversified into chemical 
dyes and pharmaceuticals in the interwar period. By 1950, Nippon Kayaku had 
established itself as the ninth leading pharmaceutical firm in Japan in terms of 
production, with particular strengths in aspirin and penicillin (in which it was second 
and fifth in the Japanese market, respectively).562 In the late 1960s, the launch of a 
new anticancer drug, bleomycin, helped strengthen the firm’s pharmaceutical business. 
Nippon Kayaku’s pharmaceutical sales stood at 19.4 billion yen, or 19.5% of the 
firm’s total sales five years after bleomycin’s launch. A decade later, the firm’s 
pharmaceuticals sales reached 24.0 billion yen, or 22.3% of total sales.564
Nippon Kayaku’s entry into the anticancer drug sector was motivated by the firm’s 
contacts with university researchers. One of the firm’s scientists, Tomohisa Takita,
561 Shigetoshi Wakaki, ‘Tosha ni Okeru Seiganzai no Kenkyu to Kaihatsu no GenjO [The Status o f Anticancer Drug R&D at our 
Company],” 96-98.
562 Nippon Kayaku Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1950), 1; Nippon 
Kayaku Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1951), 19. The market 
positions o f Japanese firms are based on production, as sales values are not readily available.
563 In nominal terms, Nippon Kayaku’s pharmaceutical sales five years after launch stood at 9.3 billion yen. Nippon Kayaku Co., 
Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1974), 20.
364 In nominal terms, Nippon Kayaku’s pharmaceutical sales a decade after launch reached 17.8 billion yen. Nippon Kayaku Co., 
Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1979), 22.
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worked at Hamao Umezawa’s laboratory at the Institute of Microbial Chemistry.565
As observed in the antibiotics chapter, Umezawa was a leading authority in 
microbiology who had been involved in the development of antibiotics such as
penicillin, streptomycin, and kanamycin in Japan. In 1962, Umezawa discovered the
anticancer antibiotic, bleomycin, out of a soil sample from Fukuoka prefecture, and 
asked Nippon Kayaku for assistance in its development. 566 Solid collaboration
between academic and industrial scientists was essential to the development of
bleomycin. Clinical trials of bleomycin were conducted with the assistance of Tokuji 
Ichikawa, then the Director of First Tokyo National Hospital.567
As a globally competitive anticancer drug, bleomycin’s launch in 1969 not only
bolstered sales of Nippon Kayaku’s pharmaceutical division, but also solidified the
firm’s position in the anticancer drug market. Bleomycin was recognised globally,
with overseas approval in Denmark, Norway, France and Taiwan before its approval in 
the United States in July 1973.568 Nippon Kayaku’s ambitions to enter overseas
markets also led to the upgrading of production standards. In the early 1970s, the
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) imposed the adoption of modem manufacturing
standards for exports to the United States. In hopes of gaining FDA approval, Nippon
565 Nippon Kayaku Co., Nippon Kayaku no Ayumi: Kono 10-nen o Chushin ni Shite [The History o f Nihon Kayaku: With Special 
Attention to the Past 10 years] (Tokyo: Nippon Kayaku Co., 1976), 93; Tokuji Ichikawa, “Bureomaishin no Shokai [An 
Introduction to Bleomycin],” Gan no Rinsho 14 (1967): 149.
566 Hamao Umezawa, Kenji Maeda, Tomio Takeuchi, and Yoshiro Okami, “New Antibiotics, Bleomycin A and B,” Journal o f  
Antibiotics, Series A 19 (Septemberl966): 200-209; Hamao Umezawa, “Koseibusshitsu o Motomete (3): Michi no RyOiki Gan e 
no Chosen [Searching for Antibiotics (3): Challenging Cancer],” Shokun 12, no. 3 (1980): 230-244.The discovery o f bleomycin 
followed upon the failure of phleomycin, a substance that proved too unstable and toxic for commercialisation.
567 Yakuji NippSsha, “Bleomycin,” inSaikin noShinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1969), 51-55. See also, 
Institute o f Microbial Chemistry, Institute o f  Microbial Chemistry: 1962-1977 (Tokyo: Center for Academic Publications, 1977), 
18-21.
568 Nippon Kayaku Co., Nippon Kayaku no Ayumi: Kono 10-nen o Chushin ni Shite [The History of Nihon Kayaku: With Special 
Attention to the Past 10 years], 94. Partly because of its lower toxicity levels, bleomycin proved more successful compared to 
mitomycin C. See also, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,”FDA Oncology Tools 
Approval Summary for Bleomycin,” U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/onctools/summary.cfm?ID=208 nnk (accessed 10 November 2007).
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Kayaku modernised its standards. 569 The launch of an innovative drug strengthened 
the firm’s operations.
f H A
Table 6. Anticancer Antibiotics Discovered in Japan
Anthracyclines Aclarubicin (1975) Pirarubicin (1979)
(2)
Bleomycin Group *Bleomycin (1965) Peplomycin (1974)
(2)
Miscellaneous *Sarkomycin (1953) Crazinophilin (1954)
(5) * Mitomycin C (1955) Chromomycin A3 (1956) 
*Zinostatin (1965, previously Neocarzinostatin)
Note: Nine substances. * indicates those that have also been used outside of Japan.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese discoveries in anticancer drugs were primarily in 
anticancer antibiotics, which were effectively bacterial substances that could be used 
to treat tumours instead of bacteria. Japanese firms took advantage of the lower R&D 
costs for developing anticancer antibiotics during this time. In addition, the 
government supported antibiotic research through research funding and by promoting 
technology imports in a protective environment that recognised process patents. 
Support for antibiotic research indirectly supported the discovery, development, and 
launch of anticancer antibiotics. Long standing connections formed between academia 
and industry also helped scientists build upon the synergies of academia and industry 
to develop commercially viable therapies.
569 Nippon Kayaku Co., Nippon Kayaku no Ayumi: Kono 10 nen o Chushin ni Shite [The History of Nihon Kayaku: With Special 
Attention to the Past 10 years], 95.
570 Compiled from Joichi Kumazawa and Morimasa Yagisawa, “The History of Antibiotics: The Japanese Story,” 125-133; 
Morimasa Yagisawa, unpublished document, “Antibiotics, Chemotherapeutics and Other Microbial Products Originated from 
Japan,” sent to author.
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But while Japan’s expertise in antibiotic development could help create anticancer 
antibiotics, it seemed less able to develop some other types of anticancer drugs that 
were being developed in the West. Overseas, the anticancer drug sector saw the 
development of drugs such as methotrexate and 5 fluorouracil (5-FU) and actinomycin 
in the 1950s, and the vinca alkaloids vincristine and vinblastine in the 1960s.571 In 
Japan, firms such as Meiji Seika and Takeda launched the anticancer antibiotics 
sarkomycin and chromomycin, respectively, while Japan Lederle introduced 
methotrexate.572 The development of more advanced chemotherapy drugs developed 
in the West required much higher levels of R&D and human capital than Japan could 
invest. The fact that the Japan origin drugs during this time were in anticancer 
antibiotics, and that Japan’s greatest contributions in the anticancer drug sector have 
been in this field, also suggests at some of the causes for Japan’s subsequent weakness 
in this sector.
571 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual], (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985), 
17-19.
572 Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakugyd Keizai Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Economics Annual] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1967), 
182-173.
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4.3.1 Transitions in therapeutic demand
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Figure 20. Deaths from Tuberculosis and Malignant Tumours57’
Part of the reason that the anticancer drug market remained undeveloped over the 
1950s and 1960s, stemmed from the smaller therapeutic demand for anticancer drugs 
in Japan compared to drugs such as antibiotics. As indicated in figure 22, cancer 
deaths rose gradually after the Second World War. But it was not until the mid 1950s 
that figures for cancer overtook those for tuberculosis, which was only one type of 
infectious disease. On the other hand, cancer deaths in the United States and Britain, 
for example, had overtaken deaths from infectious disease much earlier.574 Moreover, 
while deaths from cancer became more common than deaths from infectious diseases
573 Ministry o f  Health. Labour and Welfare. “Deaths by Leading Cause o f  Death, Population and Households,” 
http://www.stat.go.ip/english/data/chouki/02.htm (accessed 1 December 2007).
'74 See for example, “Death rate, by cause: 1900-1998.” Table Ab929-951 in Historical Statistics o f  the United States, Earliest 
Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, eds. Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines. Alan L. Olmstead, 
Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright (N ew  York: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSW eb/index.do; John Charlton and Mike Murphy, “"Trends in Causes o f  Mortality: 1841-1994 -  
An Overview,” in The Health o f  Adult Britain , eds. John Charlton and Mike Murphy (London : Stationery O ffice, 1997), 30-57.
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in Japan, the number of cancer patients remained significantly lower than the numbers 
with infectious diseases such as tuberculosis well into the 1970s.575
To a certain extent, the undeveloped status of Japan’s anticancer drug sector during the 
1950s and 1960s might be explained by the lack of government guidance during this 
period. At a time when the therapeutic demand for anticancer drugs remained low but 
antibiotics remained high, it was much more active in supporting antibiotic research. 
While the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Education did launch 
cancer research subsidies from 1963, these did not immediately translate into 
substantial drug launches.576 But by 1970, much more attention was paid to the 
development of anticancer drugs as the death toll from cancer had more than doubled 
since the immediate post-war years.
While therapeutic demand for anticancer drugs remained relatively low compared to 
the more developed countries, university scientists were actively engaged in cancer 
research, and were able to translate these discoveries into commercial products by 
collaborating with Japanese firms, often based on long standing personal connections. 
The government’s funding for antibiotic research indirectly supported the 
development of anticancer antibiotics, as Japanese firms commercialised research that 
originated in universities. Japan could also build upon its prior experience in 
antibiotics. Japanese industrial policy may have helped firms import technologies in a
575 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Kanja Chosa [Patient Survey] (Tokyo: Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1953-1985). 
376 National Cancer Center, “Cancer Statistics in Japan, 2007,”
http://panioho.ncc.go.iD/public/statistics/backnumber/2007 en.html (accessed 1 December 2007).
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protected environment, and Japanese health policy may have supported physician 
demand for anticancer drugs, but these factors did not have a direct impact on the 
anticancer drug sector in the 1950s and 1960s.
4.3.2 Beyond anticancer antibiotics
The lack of government policies such as product patents to incentivise the 
development of anticancer drugs, however, came to adversely impact the development 
of Japan’s anticancer drug sector in later years. By the late 1970s, Japan had 
discovered the last of its anticancer antibiotics. Development of the next generation of 
anticancer drugs required scientists with more highly specialised knowledge of 
cancers and anticancer drugs, and firms able to undertake much larger R&D 
investments.
The limited reward for undertaking significant risk in the Japanese pharmaceutical 
market disincentivised many firms from developing other types of anticancer drugs. In 
addition, the smaller, non-traditional pharmaceutical firms that had pioneered the 
emergence of Japan’s anticancer drug sector lacked the expertise and funds to discover, 
develop, and distribute highly sophisticated anticancer drugs. During the discovery of 
anticancer antibiotics, the absence of a coherent government policy to develop 
anticancer drugs did not hurt short-term performance. But after the discoveries of the 
last anticancer antibiotics, the lack of a more research-intensive research orientation 
undermined long-term prospects for a competitive anticancer drug sector.
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4.3.3 Summary of period between 1950 and 1975
Despite the small size of Japan’s anticancer drug market, however, Japanese firms 
were able to launch globally competitive anticancer drugs. Japan’s emergence in this 
field might be explained by the same reasons for the strengths of its antibiotics sector. 
After all, the development of these drugs involved the same scientists, universities, 
and firms involved in the development of antibiotics.577 The anticancer antibiotics 
launched by the Japanese were essentially antibiotics effective against tumours rather 
than bacteria. As a drug whose discovery was based on labour intensive, empirical 
methods to cultivate effective bacterial strains, anticancer antibiotics was suited to an 
developing economy as it did not require high levels of R&D investment or human 
capital. Similar to antibiotics, anticancer antibiotics were discovered out of serendipity, 
screening thousands of soil samples to locate bacteria that produced substances that 
would harm the growth of tumours -  and could be done by scientists from a range of 
disciplines. It was relatively easy for Japanese scientists to learn, adapt, and build upon 
these techniques and develop strengths in anticancer antibiotics.
Although government policies did encourage the development of anticancer 
antibiotics via incremental innovation, state interventions did not have a vital impact 
on the development of the early anticancer drug sector. The anticancer drugs of the 
1950s and 1960s originated in the academic laboratory and were transformed into 
commercial products through collaborations between academia and industry. Thus,
577 Institute o f Microbial Chemistry, Institute o f  Microbial Chemistry: 1962-1977 (Tokyo: Center for Academic Publications, 
1977); See also, Hamao Umezawa, “Seiganzai wa Dokomade Kitaka [The Status o f Anticancer Drugs],” KagakuAsahi 
(September 1982): 50-54.
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while government policy did not explicitly guide the anticancer drug sector, it did 
support its growth.
Firms such as Kyowa Hakko and Nippon Kayaku often entered the anticancer drug 
sector by chance, prompted not out of research at their own laboratories, but through 
alliances formed with academic laboratories engaged in anticancer drug research. For 
firms with access to academic knowledge for potential therapies during the 1950s and 
1960s, entry barriers in the anticancer drug sector were fairly low. Few firms had 
entered the market, truly effective medicines had yet to be developed, and demand 
remained lower than other therapeutic sectors. With the launch of globally competitive 
drugs, Kyowa Hakko and Nippon Kayaku were able to carve out a strategic position in 
a niche market, as non-traditional pharmaceutical firms that had diversified into 
pharmaceutical sector. While anticancer drugs were not highly profitable at this time, 
new entrants did gain first mover advantages by establishing alliances with foreign 
pharmaceutical firms and forming distribution networks that proved beneficial in the 
long term.
While some firms developed new anticancer drugs and others obtained approval to sell 
imports of new anticancer drugs, Japan’s anticancer drug market remained small 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Not only were the therapeutic effectiveness of the few 
drugs available counterbalanced by their toxic effects, the more recent drugs 
developed abroad had yet to be approved in Japan.578 The belated approval of
57S YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakugyo Keizai Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Economics Annual] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippSsha, 1967),
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anticancer drugs in Japan stemmed from the lack of demand for more invasive 
therapies, and the lack of cancer specialists to examine or use such drugs in Japan. Still, 
Japan’s anticancer drug sector during the 1950s and 1960s emerged with strong 
beginnings. It was able to launch globally competitive anticancer drugs that remain in 
use to date.
4.4 A period of volume-based growth, 1975-1990
Between 1975 and 1989, the Japanese anticancer drug sector saw an unprecedented 
expansion of the domestic market unparalleled elsewhere in the world. By the 1980s, 
more anticancer drugs were being sold in Japan than in any other country, including 
the United States.579 In 1985, the US anticancer drug market was only 40% of the size 
of Japan’s anticancer drug market. 580 But Japan’s anticancer drug market was 
dominated by drugs that could not gain approval in other pharmaceutical markets. 
Japan’s leading anticancer drugs did not meet the more rigorous efficacy criteria 
established by foreign drug regulators in the United States, the United Kingdom, or 
Germany. In retrospect, the drug approval process in Japan appeared political and 
unscientific. Japan’s anticancer drug sector experienced extraordinary expansion 
during this period with drugs of limited therapeutic value.
From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, two drugs, Krestin and Picibanil, dominated 
Japan’s anticancer market. A third drug, SSM (Specific Substance Maruyama), was
172-173; National Cancer Institute, “Developmental Therapeutics Program, FDA Approved Drugs,” National Cancer Institute. 
http://dtp.nci.nih.gov/timeline/flash/FDA.htm (accessed 10 November 2007).
579 Masanori Fukushima, “The Overdose o f Drugs in Japan,” Nature 342 (December 1989): 850-851; Yano Research Institute, 
Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmacutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985).
580 “The Pharmaceutical Market,” Nikkei Business, 9 December 1985,10.
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not officially approved, but was also used widely. It is now recognised, however, that 
the two drugs had limited therapeutic value, and they are in very limited circulation
C O  1
today. This section examines the experience of the firms that launched these 
popular anticancer drugs to identify why the Japanese anticancer drug remained weak 
in global perspective despite domestic success. None of these drugs were approved in 
other advanced markets because the evidence regarding efficacy did not meet drug 
standards in these countries. Even while Japan was producing more anticancer drugs 
than the United States, cancer survival rates in Japan tended to be lower.582 The 
experience of these firms suggests that the weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug sector 
-  as well as its volume based expansion -  was largely a product of limited R&D 
incentives, lack of transparency in the drug approval process, and the distinct medical 
practices of the times.
4.4.1 The formation of a distinctly domestic anticancer drug market 
The phenomenal expansion of Japan’s anticancer drug production began soon after the 
launch of Krestin and Picibanil in 1975 and 1976, respectively. The two drugs 
belonged to a new category of anticancer drugs that had very few side effects and were 
therefore relatively easy to prescribe. Production levels of anticancer drugs, which 
were 17.2 billion yen in 1975, had jumped more than 50% to 51.6 billion yen in 1976. 
By 1980, production values had reached 136.4 billion yen, nearly 88 times the values a
581 JihQ, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2000-2007).
582 See Masanori Fukushima, “The Overdose of Drugs in Japan,” 850-851; and Suketami Tominaga, Kunio Aoki, Isaburo 
Fujimoto, Minoru Kurihara, eds., Cancer Mortality and Morbidity Statistics: Japan and the World-1994 (Tokyo: Japan 
Scientific Societies Press, 1994).
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decade earlier. ' In fact, between 1975 and 1989, Chugai’s Picibanil and Kureha and
CO A
Sankyo’s Krestin accumulated over 1 trillion yen in sales.
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Figure 21. Value of Anticancer Drug Production, 1970-1995585
The Japanese anticancer drug market was intensely domestic, in terms of both the 
nationality of the firms and the origin of drugs that dominated the sector. Drug sales
came almost solely from the domestic market, as the Japan-origin drugs were not 
approved in Europe or North America. In fact, as figure 23 indicates, even the
amount of drugs produced from bulk imports declined during this period. But this
volume based expansion ended as abruptly as it had begun. After the government
583 In nominal terms, anticancer drug production jumped from 9.9 billion yen in 1975 to 32.4 billion yen in 1976. By 1980, 
production levels reached 107.4 billion yen. Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K dgyd  Seisan D otai Chosa Tokei [Annual 
Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
584 This has been documented widely. See for example, “K5ganzai de 1-chd en no Iryohi ga Muda, Nihon Byoinkai ga Kenkai 
[Japan Hospital Association Estimates Waste o f  1 Trillion Yen from Two Cancer Drugs," Asahi Shimbun, 29 December 1989.
585 Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K ogyo Seisan D otai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
237
reduced the effective range of Picibanil and Krestin in 1989, production levels 
peaked conspicuously at 205.7 billion in 1989 before slipping suddenly and steeply 
into decline.586
Interestingly, the extraordinary expansion in Japan’s anticancer drug market during 
this period appeared to be little related to actual therapeutic needs. It was true that 
cancer mortality rose steadily. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of deaths from 
cancer increased from 119,977 to 161,764, and cancer became the leading cause of 
death in 1981.587 But in contrast to the 1.3 fold increase in the number of cancer deaths, 
however, there was an 88-fold jump in drug production during the same period -  from
coo
1.55 billion yen to 136.4 billion yen. Moreover, morbidity rates suggest that the 
number of cancer patients remained relatively low compared to other types of diseases 
-  which did not see a similar increase in production.589 While it is true that neither 
mortality nor morbidity rates are directly indicative of demand -  as only a portion of 
the deceased or ill would have been treated by chemotherapy -  they do provide an 
approximation of therapeutic demand. To this extent, therapeutic demand had little to 
do with the massive expansion of Japan’s anticancer drug market.
4.4.2 Anticancer drugs in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s
While cancer therapy had made significant advances since the development of
586 In nominal terms, anticancer drug production reached 190.9 billion yen in 1989. Ibid.
587 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Deaths by Leading Cause o f Death, Population and Households.” 
http://www.stat.go.ip/english/data/chouki/02.htm (accessed 1 December 2007).
388 In nominal terms, anticancer drug production increased from 517 million yen in 1970 to 107.4 billion yen in 1980. Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] 
(Tokyo: YakugyS Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
589 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985), 13.
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nitrogen mustard in the 1940s, increases in government spending and higher demand 
for anticancer drugs in the 1970s had yet to result in a viable cure for cancers. 
Anticancer drugs at this time -  in Japan and worldwide -  did not cure the disease. At 
best, they contained metastases. Despite heavy side effects, most anticancer drugs 
tended only to extend life by a few months.590
In the 1970s, Japanese firms began to develop and launch a new type of anticancer 
drug. Cancer immunotherapy drugs were developed in response to advances in 
immunology and the limitations of existing cancer therapies such as surgery, 
chemotherapy, and radiation therapy. Rather than attacking the tumour directly, 
immunotherapy aimed to boost the immune system to destroy or control cancer -  
providing an alternative or a complement to existing cancer therapies. Cancer 
immunotherapy aimed to extend the life expectancy of cancer patients through the 
control of and coexistence with cancer. These drugs were approved for a wide range of 
cancers, in various stages and locations of the body. While scientific advances 
produced new medicines with improved efficacy, cancer immunotherapy continued to 
offer remedies with significantly less side effects compared to radiation or 
chemotherapy, and gave hope to patients for whom surgery was not an option.591
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese anticancer drug market was dominated by cancer 
immunotherapy drugs -  a phenomenon not observed among Western counterparts.
590 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1980), 8, 
58.
591 Jacqueline L. Longe, Deirdre S. Blanchfield, eds., Gale Encyclopedia o f  Medicine, 636. See also, “Japanese Drug Companies 
Pull Ahead in the Race to Innovate,” The Economist, 24 September 1983, 93.
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Chugai’s Picibanil, Kureha and Sankyo’s Krestin, and Zeria’s SSM were the first 
cancer immunotherapy drugs to become widely available. The discovery and 
development of these drugs bore a striking resemblance to the labour intensive and 
serendipitous research on naturally occurring substances -  which was similar to 
antibiotic R&D and conducive to a developing economy. While the discovery of 
Picibanil was based on earlier scientific efforts involving a bacteriological approach to 
cancer therapy, Krestin was based on traditional medicine, and SSM was based on 
clinical observations in medical practice. The discovery of cancer immunotherapy 
drugs may not have been influenced by government incentives, but their success was 
very much a product of a regime that rewarded incremental innovations; where 
informal links between government, industry and academia facilitated drug approval; 
and where the practice of oncology had yet to develop. These were also plausible 
explanations for the weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug sector.
Chugai
Chugai Pharmaceutical’s new anticancer drug, Picbanil, changed the fortunes of the 
mid-ranking pharmaceutical firm in the early 1970s, transforming it into one of 
Japan’s largest and well-known pharmaceutical firms by the early 1980s.592 In fact, 
soon after launch, Picibanil sales saved the finances of the heavily indebted firm.593 
Chugai’s success with the drug was a product of a regime that rewarded incremental 
innovations and featured a non-transparent drug approval system.
592 Carla Rapoport, “Chugai -  a Portfolio of Pills,” Financial Times, 22 September 1983.
593 Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1977), 10.
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It was somewhat surprising that Chugai not only launched a new anticancer drug, but 
also that it would become a blockbuster drug that both changed the firm’s fortunes and 
altered the dynamics of the anticancer drug sector. After all, Chugai sold no anticancer 
drugs before 1975. The firm was founded by Juzo Ueno in 1925 as an import 
distributor of drugs from the Germany pharmaceutical firm, Gehe & Co.594 Unlike 
many of its rivals which had grown through the sales of antibiotics in the post war 
period, Chugai developed expertise in substances such as disinfectants and 
anthelmintics. In 1960, for example, over half of Chugai’s sales came from 
disinfectants, followed by tonics and chemotherapeutics.595 A decade later, the firm 
derived a third of its sales from disinfectants, followed by a much smaller segment of 
central nervous system drugs and anthelmintics.596 Chugai was a newcomer to the 
anticancer drug sector.
Chugai’s first anticancer drug emerged out of its contacts with academia. Since 1954, 
Hajime Okamoto at Kanazawa University had sought to identify the scientific 
mechanism behind the old knowledge that erysipelas, a type of bacterial skin infection, 
could at times control or destroy cancer. This bacteriological approach to cancer 
therapy had been studied by scientists and physicians, and involved administering a 
combination of dead bacteria to patients. In the 19th century, for example, William 
Coley of the New York Cancer Hospital argued that the bacteria produced a substance
594 See Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Chugai Seiyaku 75-nen no Ayumi [A 75 year History of Chugai Pharmaceutical] (Tokyo: 
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 2000).
595 Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1961), 12.
596 Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1971), 12.
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that could prevent tumour growth.597 Qkamoto attempted to identify and dilute the 
relevant strain of bacteria to develop the effective substance into a drug.598 Chugai
co-developed Picibanil in collaboration with university scientists. Picibanil’s
commercialisation was evidence of active cancer research in universities and strong
links between government and with private enterprise to develop potential therapies.
Despite its phenomenal popularity in Japan, Picibanil was a distinctly domestic drug
that was not distributed outside Japan. Launched in October 1975 as the first officially
recognised cancer immunotherapy drug in the world, the drug was popular for its 
applicability to a wide range of cancers and remarkably minor side effects compared to 
existing cancer therapies.599 During the 1980s, in fact, Picibanil sales ranged from 
10% to 15% of the anticancer drug market, and generated approximately 25 billion 
yen in annual revenues.600 Such strong sales enabled Chugai to recover from the
struggling sales of its leading product, the health tonic Guronsan. But the drug did not
meet approval criteria in Europe or the United States, and remained a domestic drug.
Indeed, Japanese critics also began to question whether approval standards had been
particularly ambiguous or lenient, as strong sales were not matched by clinical 
results.601 After the MHW’s reappraisal in December 1989 banned Picibanil from
3,7 William Bradley Coley, The Treatment o f  Malignant Tumors by Repeated Inoculations o f  Erysipelas: With a Report o f  Ten 
Original Cases (Philadelphia: Lea Brothers & Co., 1893).
398 Jane E. Brody, “Japanese Study Use o f Toxins in Cancer Treatment,” The New York Times, 24 January 1968; Hajime Okamoto, 
Susumu Shoin, Mikio Minami, Saburo Koshimura and Ryusaku Shimizu, “Experimental Anticancer Studies part XXX. Factors 
Influencing the Streptolysin S-forming Ability of Streptococci Having Anticancer Activity,” Japanese Journal o f  Experimental 
Medicine 36 (1966): 161-174; Hajime Okamoto, Mikio Minami, Susumu Shoin, Saburo Koshimura and Ryusaku Shimizu, 
“Experimental Anticancer studies part XXXI. On the Streptococcal Preparation Having Potent Anticancer Activity,” Japanese 
Journal o f  Experimental Medicine 36 (1966): 175-186; Hajime Okamoto, Susumu Shoin, Saburo Koshimura, and Ryusaku 
Shimizu, “Studies on the Anticancer and Streptolysin S-Forming Abilities of Hemolytic Streptococci,” Japanese Journal o f  
Microbiology, 11, no. 4 (1967): 323-326.
399 Examples o f such side effects were fever, aches, and lack of appetite, rather than death. See Yakuji Nipposha, “Picibanil,” in 
Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1976), 67-73.
600 Yakugyo Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugy5 Jihosha, 1968-1999).
601 See for example, “Nihon no Kusuri, Kuresuchin [Krestin, a Japanese Drug],” Nikkei Business, 9 December 1985, 9-11.
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being prescribed as the main drug in an anticancer regimen, Chugai’s anticancer drug 
sales plunged from 25.3 billion yen in 1989 to 8.5 billion yen in 199Q.602 As will be 
discussed later, Picibanil’s fortunes were a product of Japan’s drug approval system.
Kureha Kagaku and Sankyo
Much like Picibanil, the launch of Krestin, changed the fortunes of both the firm that 
discovered and developed the drug, Kureha Chemical Industry Co., and the firm that 
distributed the drug, Sankyo Co. During its peak in 1984, Krestin captured 31.1% of 
the anticancer drug market.603 In fact, combined with Taiho’s Ftorafur and Chugai’s 
Picibanil the top three anticancer drugs comprised approximately half of the 
.anticancer drug market during the mid 1980s.604 Yet none of these drugs were 
approved in the advanced Western markets. It was somewhat peculiar that so few 
drugs were used to treat cancer in Japan, given that cancer is comprised of over 100 
types of complex diseases.605
Like Picibanil, it was somewhat surprising not only that Kureha would discover a new 
anticancer drug, but also that it would become a blockbuster drug that changed both 
the firm’s fortunes and the dynamics of the anticancer drug sector. Before launching 
Krestin, Kureha was a medium size chemical company with no dealings in 
pharmaceuticals, let alone anticancer drugs. The firm was established in 1944, when it
602 In nominal terms, Chugai’s sales fell from 23.5 billion yen in 1989 to 8.2 billion yen in 1990. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka 
Shdken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku 1991), 19.
603 Yano Research Institute, lyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985), 
537.
604 Yakugyd Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyO Jihosha, 1968-1999).
605 National Cancer Institute, “What is Cancer?” National Cancer Institute, http://www.cancer.eov/cancertopics/what-is-cancer 
(accessed 10 July 2008).
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became independent from the textile maker Kureha Boseki. Kureha was a mid ranking 
chemical firm capitalised at 8 billion yen, specialising in plastics, agrochemicals and 
other industrial chemicals. The company was known for its popular cling film 
“Kurerappu,” which was launched in 1960. Kureha was not only a newcomer to 
anticancer drugs, but also to pharmaceuticals.606
Kureha’s entry into the anticancer drugs was accidental. In 1965, Chikao Yoshikumi, a 
Kureha researcher began to investigate the possible antitumour properties of 
Kawaratake mushrooms, based on rumours in his hometown that an elderly patient 
had been cured of stomach cancer by taking the traditional remedy.607 The head of 
research at Kureha indulged Yoshikumi’s request to investigate the substance, and
r n o
allowed him to pursue research outside of normal working hours. Kureha’s 
engagement in anticancer drugs was not prompted by any government policy or 
academic connections.
The drug’s development, however, was a product of collaboration with academic 
scientists, government officials, and other firms. In 1968, Kureha formed an academic 
alliance with the Kyoto Institute of Technology to identify the effective agent.609 After 
polysaccharide K was identified and isolated in 1971, Kureha established an internal 
research group and consulted researchers at the Japan Foundation for Cancer Research
606 In 2005 values, Kureha’s capitalisation in 1975 was 13.7 billion yen. Kureha Chemical Industry Co., Yuka Shdken Hokokusho 
[Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1976), 1,10.
607 Kawaratake musrooms are found in Japan’s mountainous regions and have been used in Chinese traditional medicine as a 
medicinal mushroom, which are harvested, dried, ground and reconstituted as tea to boost the immune system.
608 Kureha Chemical Industry Co., Kureha Kagaku 50-nenshi [A 50 Year History of Kureha Chemical Industry] (Tokyo, Kureha 
Chemical Industry Co., 1995), 419.
609 Ibid., 420.
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and the University of Tokyo for further advice. The clinical trials were performed by 
researchers from these two organisations, and Kureha received guidance from 
government officials in the drug application process.610 As a new entrant, the firm’s 
collaborations with government and academia were essential to drug development.
To substitute for lack of experience in pharmaceutical distribution, Kureha’s alliances 
with more established firms were important. For Kureha, Sankyo was an optimal 
choice as a marketing partner. Sankyo was one of the largest Japanese pharmaceutical 
firms with a reputation for its strengths in marketing. The firm had been founded in 
1899 by the Meiji entrepreneur Matasaku Shiobara who established Sankyo Shoten as 
an import distributor of Tadiastase, a stomach medicine discovered by the 
Japanese-American scientist Jokichi Takamine.611 The company grew quickly in the 
pre-war era and rivalled Takeda as one of Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firms by the 
Second World War. In the post war period, Sankyo built its operations through the 
import-distribution and licensed manufacture of new medicines from firms in the 
United States and Europe. 613 Sankyo’s historical marketing strengths were 
indispensable to Krestin’s success.
Krestin experienced unparalleled success, but remained a domestic drug. After its 
launch in October 1976, Krestin sales rose from approximately 15 billion yen in 1977
610 Yakuji Nipposha, “Krestin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1978), 96-101.
611 The firm became the Japanese agent for Parke Davis in 1902 and began to manufacture drugs in 1905. It launched vitamins in 
1911. See Sankyo Co., Sankyo 60-nenshi [Sankyo, a 60 year History] (Tokyo: Sankyo Co., 1960).
612 Sankyo Co., Sankyo 90-nenshi [Sankyo, a 90 year History] (Tokyo: Sankyo Co., 1990).
613 Particularly prominent was the manufacture of Chloromycetin licensed in from Parke Davis in 1951. A year prior to the launch 
o f PSK in 1975, Sankyo derived most o f its sales from nervous system drugs, followed by vitamins and antibiotics.
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to a peak in 1984 with 31.1% of the Japanese anticancer drug market at approximately 
52 billion yen.614 In fact, in 1987, it was the top selling drug in Japan and 12th 
worldwide.615 As Kureha’s corporate history notes, “There was no product in our 50 
year history that grew so rapidly and strongly as Krestin.”616
The drug’s success was a product of Japan’s drug approval and pricing system. Krestin
was popular for its wide range of approved indications, limited side effects, and ease
of administration. But its therapeutic effects were not matched by its extraordinary 
sales performance.617 Anticancer drugs, after all, commanded high prices. Critics
began to voice scepticism over drug approval standards, particularly as it was revealed,
for example, that much of the research had been published in non-refereed
company-sponsored journals, and that efficacy had been measured in terms of tumour 
size rather than survival.618 After the MHW’s reappraisal in December 1989 reduced
Krestin’s indications, Sankyo’s anticancer drug sales plunged from 34.7 billion yen in
the fiscal year ending March 1990 to 13.5 billion yen in the fiscal year ending March 
1991,619
614 In nominal terms, sales o f Krestin grew from approximately 10 billion to 32.5 billion yen. Market share is based on production 
values. Toshihiko Suguro, ’’Kureha Kagaku Kogyo: Daikokubashira ‘Kuresuchin’ Gekigen no Kiki [Kureha Chemical Industry: 
Sales o f Core Product ‘Krestin’ may Plummet],” Shukan Toyd Keizai, 12 May 1990,139-140. Yano Research Institute, Iyaku 
Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985), 537.
615 Peter Marsh, “Pharmaceutials 6; Optimistic But Still Some Way to Go,” Financial Times, 1 October 1987.
616 Kureha Chemical Industry Co., Kureha Kagaku 50-nenshi [A 50 Year History o f Kureha Chemical Industry], 424.
6l7Yano Research Institute, “KGryoku ga Yowai kara Tsukawareru, Kuresuchin, PishibanTru [Krestin and Picibanil Used because 
of Minimal Effects),” Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985): 15-18; “Muko no Rakuin, Koganzai 
Kuresuchin no Unmei [Fate of Krestin, a Drug Labelled Ineffective],” Shukan Shincho (15 August 1991), 164-165; Yakuji 
Nipposha, “Krestin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippOsha, 1978), 96-101.
618 “KOganzai l-ch5 en no Kiyasume-ry5 [1 Trillion Yen Anticancer Drug for Ease of Mind]” Aera, 1 June 1988, 6-11; “Soshite
Ima [And Today]” Aera, 20 December 1988,22. See, Isao Nakao, Tadashi Yokoyama, Ichiro Urushizaki, Akira Wakui, Hisashi 
Furue, Yoshiyuki Koyama, Kiyoji Kimura, Nobuya Ogawa, and Tatsuo Saito, “Shinko Igan ni Taisuru PSK no RinshO Koka 
[Clinical Effects o f PSK in Advanced Gastric Cancer],” Oncologia 14 (1985): 163-170; Minoru Niimoto, Takao Hattori, 
RyOichiro Tanida, Koyoshi Inokuchi, and Nobuya Ogawa, “Igan Chiyu Setsujo Shorei ni Taisuru Maitomaishin C, Futorafuru, 
Kuresuchin o Mochiita Jutsugo Men’eki Kagaku RyohO [Postoperative Immunotherapy for Curatively Resected Gastric Cancer 
Patients Using Mitomycin C, Ftorafur and Krestin],” Oncologia 14 (1985): 171-180. Oncologia is a journal sponsored by Kureha. 
6,9 In nominal terms, Sankyo’s sales o f anticancer drugs fell from 32.5 billion yen in the fiscal year ending March 1990 to 13.0 
billion yen in the fiscal year ending March 1991. Sankyo Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: 
Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1991), 23. See also Toshihiko Suguro, “Kureha Kagaku KogyO, Daikoku Bashira Kuresuchin Gekigen
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Zeria
In 1976, a small, Tokyo based pharmaceutical firm filed an application for SSM, 
another cancer immunotherapy drug. Unlike Picibanil and Krestin, however, SSM 
never gained official approval. This decision was extremely controversial and 
prompted intense public debate over Japan’s drug approval process. Critics charged 
that the drug was denied approval due to the influence of competing pharmaceutical 
firms.620 SSM’s rejection suggested that the success of a drug was heavily influenced 
by its connections in government, industry, and academia. More specifically, it. 
implied that scientists and firms needed to develop strong connections to key 
individuals in government, industry and academia to facilitate a drug’s success.
Like Chugai, Kureha and Sankyo, Zeria’s entry into the anticancer drug sector was 
accidental. SSM’s discovery was neither a direct product of government policy nor 
corporate strategy; it was a chance discovery by a physician. The drug was discovered 
and developed by Chisato Maruyama of the Nippon Medical School, a small private 
university in Tokyo. A dermatologist by training, Maruyama began to develop SSM 
from human tuberculosis bacilli at the end of World War II in 1944. His bacteriological 
approach to cancer therapy was similar to Picibanil and Coley’s toxins in the 19th 
century. In 1956, Maruyama began to investigate whether the presence of tuberculosis 
or leprosy bacilli hindered cancerous growth.621 SSM’s discovery was not influenced
no Kiki [Kureha Chemical Industries’ Core Product Krestin Under Threat],” Shukan Toyd Keizai, 12 May 1990,139-140.
620 For example, see “ Maruyama Wakuchin o D5 Kangaeruka [What to think of the Maruyama Vaccine],” Asahi Shimbun, 12 
July 1981.
621 The Research Institute of Vaccine Therapy for Tumors and Infectious Diseases, Nippon Medical School, “Maruyama 
Vaccine,” Nippon Medical School, http://vaccine.nms.ac.ip/ (accessed 1 December 2007). Given the possible harm or side effects 
stemming from tuberculosis vaccines made of live or killed organisms, Maruyama decided to use his vaccine which was a 
derivative o f the human tuberculosis bacteria.
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by government or company incentives, and its development was much more ad-hoc
than planned.
Despite lack of evidence from animal tests, Maruyama began to administer his patients 
with SSM from 1964 and opened a clinic in 1972.622 In the meanwhile, scientists
continued research on SSM. For example, Hiroshi Sato, a leading authority in
Japanese cancer research at the Sasaki Institute found that SSM reduced pain and
controlled cancerous growth for a wide range of cancers -  in different types and stages 
-  with limited side effects.623 The fact that a physician could widely administer a drug 
without official approval indicates that pharmaceuticals in Japan were more loosely 
regulated than in many developed markets.624
Zeria entered the anticancer drug sector upon tthe request of SSM’s discoverer to
co-develop the drug. Established in 1955, Zeria was known mostly for its dietary
supplement chondroitin, and was engaged in the import distribution or manufacture of
ff)  ^pharmaceuticals. As the building of its first central laboratory at the late date of
1983 suggests, the Tokyo-based firm was neither heavily engaged in R&D nor 
prescription drugs until the mid 1980s.626 Zeria resembled Chugai, Kureha, or Sankyo
as a new entrant to the anticancer drug sector, but was a much smaller firm, with
622 The Research Institute o f Vaccine Therapy for Tumors and Infectious Diseases, Nippon Medical School, “Maruyama 
Vaccine.” Maruyama established the Research Institute o f Vaccine Therapiy for Tumors and Infectious Diseases at die Nippon 
Medical School in 1972 to provide vaccine therapy for patients with tumoirs or infectious disease.
623 The Sasaki Institute is a non-profit cancer research institute established! by the scientist Takaoka Sasaki in 1939. See Sasaki 
Foundation, “Sasaki Instititute” http://www.sasaki-foundation.ip/labo/eg-ttop.html (accessed 1 December 2007).
624 “Maruyama Wakuchin Jissitsu 1-man en: KSseisho Zeria Seishiki ni Gtoi [Maruyama Vaccine Effectively Available for 10 
thousand yen],” Asahi Shimbun, 28 November 1981,1. Article states that tthe drug will be available via post to patients who pay 
out of pocket -  almost as an over the counter drug.
625 Zeria Pharmaceutical Co., “Enkaku (Company History),” Zeria Pharmaceutical Co., http://www.zeria.co.ip/comp/co01.html 
(accessed 1 December 2007); Datamonitor, “Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.,” Company Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2007).
626 Zeria Pharmaceutical Co., Yuka Shoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities; Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1990), 1.
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limited links to individuals or organisations in government, industry or academia.
Without the size and connections of larger firms, Zeria was placed in a much more
disadvantaged position compared to Chugai or Sankyo. For example, four of the 12
examiners on SSM’s approval committee had direct conflicts of interests with its
approval, as they were involved in the development of its rival drugs: one in Picibanil 
and three in Krestin.627 While the two leading drugs were highly profitable, SSM -
with similar therapeutic claims — threatened to take sales away from Picibanil and
Krestin. In 1979, Picibanil and Krestin comprised 15.8% and 33.4% of the anticancer 
drug market, respectively.628 At a time when Krestin and Picibanil charged 3,254 yen
and 5,313 yen for treatment per day, respectively, Maruyama had been prescribing 
SSM for 125 yen per day.629 As a small firm with limited connections, Zeria was not
in a position to attract political support for drug approval.
Zeria’s lack of interest in forming such connections also failed to gamer support for
drug approval. Maruyama’s refusal to form a partnership with Yuichi Yamamura -  an
Osaka University academic with strong connections in both industry and academia -  
for example, reportedly created a political conflict.630 Diet proceedings revealed, for
627 Yoshio Sakurai, Shigeru Tsugakoshi, and Kazuo Ota were involved in the development of Krestin, while Hisashi Furue was 
involved in the development of Picibanil. See for example, Japan, House o f Representatives, Labour and Welfare Committee, 
Official Report o f  Debates, 94th Diet, 20"1 Session, 30 July 1981.
628 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyd Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1980), 
446.
629 Japan, House of Representatives, Labour and Welfare Committee, Official Report o f  Debates, 94th Diet, 20111 Session, 30 July 
1981; Japan, House of Councillors, Labour and Welfare Committee, Official Report o f  Debates, 95th Diet, 3rd Session, 27 October 
1981. See also, YakugyS Kenkyu-kai, Hokenyaku Jiten [Insured Drugs Almanac] (Tokyo: Jih5, 1969-2006) or Nihon 
Yakuzaishi-kai, Shakaihoken Yakka Kijurt [Insured Drug List] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippOsha, 1977-2006).
630 Yasunari Iwai, “Maruyama Wakuchin wa Naze Ninka Sarenakatta noka [Why the Maruyama Vaccine was not Approved],” 
Shukan Shincho, 4 and 11 January 2001,66-69; Yasunari Iwai, “Maruyama Wakuchin wa Naze Ninka Sarenakatta noka, [Why the 
Maruyama Vaccine was not Approved],” Shukan Shincho, 18 January 2001, 58-61.
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example, that Yamamura and Yoshio Sakurai, who had been in charge of allocating 
government funds for cancer research, diverted research away from SSM. In addition, 
important clinical trial data supplied to the MHW allegedly “disappeared,” and the 
drug approval committee had revised drug approval regulations in the summer of 1980 
to more rigorous standards -  incorporating new criteria that had not been applied to the 
two earlier drugs. Much public criticism pointed to the double standards used to 
evaluate “efficacy,” as the committee discredited widely acclaimed clinical trial data, 
which used double blind tests for the first time in Japan.631
Maruyama’s secondary status and lack of deference to custom also failed to win 
friends that might have otherwise facilitated the drug’s success. Maruyama was 
associated with a small private university without the prestige of national universities. 
In addition, he was a practitioner who had inadvertently stumbled upon a potentially 
effective therapy. As a medical practitioner, his status was viewed as secondary to 
those engaged solely in academic research.632
Moreover, Maruyama failed to subscribe to the conventions of the discipline. As a 
dermatologist, he initially published his findings in journals of dermatology rather 
than journals that published more cancer research -  such as internal medicine, surgery 
or obstetrics. Maruyama also published and presented overseas prior to wider,
631 PS-K, for example, was reportedly approved after two meetings, without requests for comparative trials or explanation of 
survival rates. See for example, “Maruyama Wakuchin Yukosei 3% ika no Imi [The Meaning of Less than 3% Efficacy],” Asahi 
Shimbun, 27 December 1980,3.
632 Yasunari Iwai, “Maruyama Wakuchin wa Naze Ninka Sarenakatta noka [Why the Maruyama Vaccine was not Approved],” 
Shukan Shincho, 4 and 11 January 2001,66-69; Yasunari Iwai, “Maruyama Wakuchin wa Naze Ninka Sarenakatta noka, [Why the 
Maruyama Vaccine was not Approved],” Shukan Shincho, 18 January 2001,58-61.
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domestic recognition of his work.633 He also published books such as “Maruyama 
Vaccine: Conquering Cancer (Maruyama Wakuchin: Gan o Oitsumeru)” before an 
official decision on the drug had been made.634 Maruyama’s flamboyant decision to
name the drug after himself further alienated the more conservative parties engaged in 
anticancer drug development.635 Most poignantly, he administered the drug without
official approval, whereby SSM had become a drug even before it was approved.
Ready opponents and the lack of strong supporters undermined the drug’s potential
for success. This was particularly so in an environment where approval standards
remained undeveloped and informal connections could facilitate a drug’s approval.
Maruyama and Zeria’s failure to form these links helped to exclude SSM from direct
competition with Krestin and Picibanil.
SSM’s rejection also revealed that Japan’s drug approval process was not transparent -  
and that its decisions were not entirely binding, either.636 While the approval of
Krestin and Picibanil was swiftly decided in one year and two and a half years, 
respectively, the decision on SSM was not made for almost five years. This roused
public debate and support groups, such as Patients and Families of the Maruyama
633 One of Maruyama’s first presentations on the potential effects of cancer chemotherapy with his colleague Keishiro Fujita at the 
11th International Cancer Congress, Florence, Italy, October, 1974.
634 Maruyama Chisato, Maruyama Wakuchin: Gan o Oitsumeru [Maruyama Vaccine: Conquering Cancer] (Tokyo: KK 
Bestsellers, 1976).
635 A detailed history of SSM has been written in Kazuo Miwa, “Shiseiji Maruyama Wakuchin no 17-nen [A 17 Year History of 
Our Maruyama Vaccine],” Bungei Shinju, August 1981,208-236.
636 “O o Hiku Aimaisa: Fushin Maneku Yakuji Gy5sei [The Effects o f Ambiguity: Pharmaceutical Administration Invites 
Mistrust],” Asahi Shimbun, 16 August 1981.
637 An application for SSM was made on November 1976, and was rejected in July 1981. See “Gan no Maruyama Wakuchin, 
Shinyaku Ninka Shinsei o Teishutsu [A New Drug Application Filed for the Maruyama Vaccine that Treats Cancer],” Asahi 
Shimbun, 30 November 1976; “Maruyama Wakuchin Koka Nashi [Maruyama Vaccine Found Ineffective],” Asahi Shimbun, 11 
July 1981.
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Vaccine (Maruyama Wakuchin: Kanja Kazoku no Kai) headed by University of Tokyo 
law professor Shionohara Hajime, that championed the drug’s approval. The
government’s eventual response was ambiguous. In July 1981, the Central
Pharmaceutical Affairs Council refused to approve the drug, citing the lack of 
evidence regarding efficacy.639 But the panel attached a separate opinion to the main
report, stating that the vaccine could not be considered “invalid,” and that further 
research might be pursued.640
As a compromise measure, the MHW adjusted and adapted legal provisions over the
years to allow for the provision of SSM without official approval, responding to 
patient demand but restricting supply.641 Government provisions allowed Zeria to 
supply the drug to Nippon Medical University, albeit on a much more limited scale 
than an official approval would have allowed. Given the large number of patients
already using the drug, the MHW permitted use of the vaccine, as part of clinical tests 
in drug development.642 Since, 1981, the period of clinical testing has been extended 
indefinitely for over two and a half decades.643 As of 31 March 2002, SSM had been
638 “Maruyama Wakuchin Ninka Sokushin o: Shinohara Kyojura 40-man nin Seigan Shomei [Accelerate Approval of the 
Maruyama Vaccine: Professor Shinohara and Others Collect 40,000 Petitions],” Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 1980; “Maruyama 
Wakuchin ShiryO Johokokai no Men Kara Yokyu [Request for Disclosure o f Maruyama Vaccine Documents],” Asahi Shimbun, 
12 May 1982; “Maruyama Wakuchin Soki Ninka YQsei [Request for Swift Approval o f the Maruyama Vaccine],” Asahi Shimbun, 
1 October 1993.
639 The Central Pharmaceutical Affairs Council is an advisory panel to the MHW that evaluates drugs in Japan.
640 “Maruyama Wakuchin KokaNashi [Maruyama Vaccine Found Ineffective],” Asahi Shimbun, 11 July 1981.
641 “K5seish5 ga Kyokyfl Keizoku Yosei: Maruyama Wakuchin, Seiyaku Gaisha ni [MHW Requests Pharmaceutical Firms to 
Continue to Supply the Maruyama Vaccine],” Asahi Shimbun, 11 July 1981; “Maruyama Wakuchin no Kyokyu Encho Sara ni 
3-nen Mitomeru [3 year Extension Granted to Supply the Maruyama Vaccine],” Asahi Shimbun, 30 November 1984; “Maruyama 
Wakuchin YOsho Chiken Sara ni 3-nen Encho [3 year Extension Granted for For-fee Clinical Trials of the Maruyama Vaccine],” 
Asahi Shimbun, 21 November 1987; “Maruyama Wakuchin Sara ni 3-nen Encho [3 year Extension Granted for Use of the 
Maruyama Vaccine],” Asahi Shimbun, 15 November 1990; “Maruyama Wakuchin Shiyo 4-nenkan no EnchS [4 year Extension 
Granted for Use o f the Maruyama Vaccine],” Asahi Shimbun, 7 December 1993.
642 “’Chikenyaku’ Irei no Atsukai; Kyokyu Kakudai suru Maruyama Wakuchin [Unprecedented Handling as ‘Trial Drug’: 
Supplies o f the Maruyama Vaccine Grow],” Asahi Shimbun, 2 October 1981; “Maruyama Wakuchin Hikitsuzuki KyOkyu e 
[Supply of the Maruyama Vaccine to Continue],” Asahi Shimbun 24 November 1984. This article discusses MHW’s deference to 
large numbers o f patients already using the drug.
643 See The Research Institute of Vaccine Therapy for Tumors and Infectious Diseases, Nippon Medical School, “Maruyama 
Vaccine.” See also “Maruyama Wakuchin Seibun Noshukuyaku: FukusayO Yokuseizai de Shonin [Concentrated Maruyama
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provided to 355,805 patients.644
While the government remained undecided about whether to approve the drug, it was 
still willing to adjust its laws to allow for its distribution. Patients who have wished to 
receive the drug have been required to appear at Nippon Medical University to receive 
guidance regarding its use. Nippon Medical University has coordinated all supply of 
the vaccine, manufactured by Zeria at a price of 9,000 yen for 20 ampules or 40 days 
supply. In 1991, the MHW made another concession and approved a concentrated 
version of the vaccine, Ancer 20, developed by Zeria Pharmaceuticals Co. However, 
Ancer 20 was approved as a remedy to treat the side effects of radiotherapy rather than 
as an anticancer drug. While access to the original drug remained uncovered by 
national health insurance, the new drug was approved by the MHW. Firms such as 
Zeria suffered from opaque standards, as they could not assess the risks involved in 
planning drug development.
These three popular anticancer drugs, Picibanil, Krestin and SSM were remarkably 
similar in their manner of discovery, therapeutic attributes, and mechanisms of action. 
But the three drugs experienced remarkably different levels of success in the Japanese 
market. With swift government approval, Chugai’s Picibanil as well as Kureha and 
Sankyo’s Krestin experienced unprecedented sales growth, contributing not only to 
the firms’ financial health but also to spectacular growth in national production. The
Vaccine: Approved as Remedy for Side Effects],” Asahi Shimbun, 6 June 1991.
644 The Research Institute of Vaccine Therapy for Tumors and Infectious Diseases, Nippon Medical School, “Maruyama 
Vaccine.”
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non-approval of Zeria’s SSM, however, did not simply result in losses for the firm. 
The government’s refusal to approve SSM, in fact, evolved into a social issue debated 
widely by politicians, academics, journalists and patient groups in the media and Diet 
proceedings. Incidentally, these discussions revealed much about the dynamics of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. They raised critical questions over: the still 
rudimentary level of R&D in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry; the malleability of 
drug regulation in comparison with overseas counterparts; and the often 
non-transparent and politicised process of drug approval -  where outcomes could be 
strongly influenced by linkages between government, industry, and academia. 
Understanding the dynamics of Japan’s anticancer drug sector at this time help 
illuminate the reasons for its weakness.
4.4.3 On the phenomenal growth of Japan’s anticancer drug sector 
The extraordinary expansion of Japan’s anticancer drug market requires further 
explanation. It is particularly important to examine why the demand for anticancer 
drugs abruptly grew so rapidly, and why firms developed drugs that were not approved 
beyond Japan.
The impact of medical culture
Japanese medical culture had a significant impact on the expansion of Japan’s 
anticancer drug market during the 1970s and 1980s. Different approaches to cancer 
therapy in Japanese medical practice help explain why many anticancer drugs of 
questionable efficacy were prescribed and sold in Japan. It should be noted that 
anticancer drugs of the time could not cure cancer patients and could only extend life
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by a few months while creating severe side effects.645 Given the small benefits to be 
gained from an arduous therapy, many Japanese physicians preferred to prescribe 
anticancer drugs with minimal side effects, even if such drugs had limited efficacy. 
Japanese physicians’ aversion to side effects may also have stemmed from the widely 
publicised drug tragedies that surfaced over the 1960s and 1970s.646 Effective but 
highly toxic anticancer drugs such as adriamycin, bleomycin, and vincristine were 
available for use in Japan in this time, but had lower sales in comparison their 
performance in Western markets. 647 Japanese approaches to cancer therapy 
diminished the demand for the more effective but more toxic anticancer drugs that 
were in high demand in the American and European markets. The medical culture in 
Japan incenitivised drug companies to develop ineffective anticancer drugs with mild 
side effects.
Another important factor behind the growth of Japan’s anticancer drug sector during 
this time relates to the unwillingness of Japanese doctors to inform cancer patients of 
their illness. Until recently, Japanese physicians seldom informed cancer patients of 
their diagnosis, based on the belief that communicating such a death sentence was
f L A Q
unwelcome. Doctors typically prescribed anticancer drugs with the fewest side 
effects so as to prevent patients from discovering that they had an almost fatal disease. 
As the prescriptions given to patients were not labelled, many patients remained
645 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nertkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1980), 8, 
58.
646 Widely publicised scandals involved drugs such as thalidomide, SMON, and chloroquine.
647 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyd Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985), 
17-23.
648 David Swinbanks, “Japanese Doctors Keep Quiet,” Nature 339 (June 1989): 409.
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ignorant of the drugs prescribed -  and their diagnosis. In Japan’s hierarchical society, 
few patients questioned the physician’s authority.649 While the diffusion of cancer 
information on the Internet has empowered patients, who have become more informed 
and assertive in demanding particular treatments, this technology was not available in 
the 1970s or 1980s. Japanese medical practice therefore played an important role in 
generating the final demand for safe yet largely ineffective therapies.
Japanese medical practices towards cancer generated demand for a type of anticancer 
drug that was very different from those in demand in the West. Japanese firms were 
incentivised to develop anticancer drugs that were safer, if less effective, than those 
found in Western markets.
R&D incentives under universal health care
Another reason for the rapid expansion of Japan’s anticancer sector lay in R&D 
incentives, whereby firms were forgiven for a lack of innovation but stood to benefit 
from launching drugs with limited side effects that could be prescribed to a wide 
population.650 Before the product patent system was introduced in 1975, the criteria 
for innovation in Japan were lower than in other advanced markets. In addition, the 
national health insurance system not only guaranteed that the government would 
underwrite demand, but also incentivised physicians to prescribe newer, higher priced
649 Todd S. Elwy, Michael D. Fetters, Daniel W. Gorenflo, and Tsukasa Tsuda, “Cancer Disclosures in Japan: Historical 
Comparisons, Current Practices,” Social Science & Medicine, 46, (September 1998): 1151-1163.
650 This was the same reason for the rapid expansion o f the antibiotics sector during this period.
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drugs to gain from pharmaceutical price differentials that supported their income.651 
Anticancer drugs such as Picibanil and Krestin had high drug prices. The drugs also 
offered the promise of a remedy that existing anticancer drugs could not achieve. 
Anticancer drugs such as Picibanil and Krestin experienced tremendous success, not 
only because of their high prices and large pharmaceutical price differentials, but also 
because they could be prescribed to many patients.
The impact of rudimentary infrastructure
In addition, the infrastructure for developing anticancer drugs remained 
underdeveloped in Japan. In the early 1980s, for example, the number of cancer 
specialists in the United States was estimated at 5,000 compared to 100 in Japan.653 
The absence of cancer specialists and cancer hospitals meant not only that Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms found it extremely difficult to conduct clinical trials, it also 
meant that Japanese physicians were also unable to administer effective yet often 
highly toxic cancer therapies to Japanese cancer patients.654 The scarcity of oncologist 
training in Japan diminished demand for innovative drugs, as there were few 
physicians capable of using them. Physicians who administered too little of the drug 
found the expense to be wasteful, as the drug was ineffective. But those who 
administered too much of the drug found the serious harm done to patients too
651 Physician prescribing incentives from pharmaceutical price differentials are not an insignificant. For reference, see “Yakka 
Kijun Jissei Kakaku yori Ohabadaka: Saeki 4-wari Chikakumo [Official Drug Prices Much Higher than Actual Drug Prices: 
Pharmaceutical Price Differentials Account for 40 Percent of Drug Prices],” Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 1978; and “Yakka Saeki Nen 
ni 1-chd 300-oku en: Kusuridai Sogaku no 4-bun no 1 [Pharmaceutical Price Differentials amount to 1.3 Trillion Yen a Year, or a 
Quarter of Drug Prices],” Asahi Shimbun, 9 November 1989. See also Masanori Fukushima, “The Overdose o f Drugs in Japan,” 
850-851; and “The Strange Ways of Japanese Medicine Makers,” Fortune, 29 July 1991,118.
652 Yakka Kijun [Official Drug List] (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Hoki Shuppan, 1975-1990).
653 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985), 18.
654 See Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan, [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985), 
17-19.
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devastating to use again.655
Another reason for the volume-based expansion of the anticancer drug sector lay in 
Japan’s opaque drug approval system, where the criteria for drug approval was unclear. 
Scholars such as Lacey Glenn Thomas and Gerald Laubach have argued that clear, 
rigorous drug approval standards are very important in incentivising firms to develop 
globally competitive drugs.656 A drug approval system that is transparent, stable, and 
based on scientific criteria incentivises firms to invest in developing quality drugs that 
can also be approved in other markets. But a more opaque or politically charged drug 
approval system changes this incentive structure and incentivises firms to invest in 
political rent-seeking at the expense of R&D.
Indeed, Japan’s drug approval process during this period was subject to political 
influence. Drug regulations were malleable, and drug approval decisions were shaped 
by powerful individuals. Moreover, the blurring of the boundaries between 
government, industry, and academia also created conflicts of interest. The governance 
of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry by a set of administrative guidance, 
ministerial orders, and quality standards created room for ambiguous interpretation. 
Firms benefited from forming strategic alliances with key individuals in government 
and academia to facilitate drug approval. The approval process involved political
655 The certification o f oncologists began in 2007. See Japanese Board of Cancer Therapy, http://ibct.ip/index.htmi. (accessed 1 
December 2007).
656 See for example, Lacey Glenn Thomas, “Spare the Rod and Spoil the Industry: Vigorous Competition and Vigorous 
Regulation Promote Global Competitive Advantage: A Ten Nation Study o f Government Industrial Policies and Corporate 
Pharmaceutical Competitive Advantage,” First Boston Working Paper Series', 90-03 (1990); Gerald D. Laubach, “Federal 
Regulation and Pharmaceutical Innovation,” Proceedings o f  the Academy o f Political Science 33, no.4 (1980): 60-80.
657 Anne Kreuger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, 64 (June 1974): 291-303.
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interplay that at times prioritised benefits to select parties rather than the therapeutic 
effectiveness of the drug.
In the 1980s, the integrity of MHW’s drug approval process came to be intensely 
debated in media and parliament. This was not only because the two leading 
anticancer drugs of dubious efficacy had experienced a phenomenal rise in production. 
It was also because the criteria for Picibanil and Krestin’s approval and SSM’s 
rejection remained unclear.659 The media reports and parliamentary proceedings that 
followed SSM’s rejection in 1981 eventually led to the revisions of Krestin and 
Picibanil’s indications in 1989.660 The revisions, which stated that the two drugs could 
no longer be used as the main component of an anticancer regimen, led to a precipitous 
fall in production. These discussions remarked upon the political role of linkages 
formed between government, industry, and academia in facilitating drug approvals.
Links between government, industry, and academia
The volume based expansion of Picibanil and Krestin was supported by their links to
powerful individuals with overlapping roles in government, industry, and academia -
by excluding competition from drugs that did not have similar links. Scientists who
658 “Ososugita Yakujishin TSshin (Recommendation by the Drug Approval Committee Long Due)” Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 
December 1989. The article discusses the non-transparent, politicised nature o f approval among select parties that neglected 
patient interests.
659 “Maruyama Wakuchin: Sekinin Omoi Gyosei Tokyoku [Maruyama Vaccine: Heavy Responsibility of Administrative 
Authorities]” Asahi Shimbun, 6 December 1980. This article elaborates on need for disclosure o f documents in the approval 
process.
660 “Maruyama Wakuchin Koka Nashi [Maruyama Wakuchin Rejected],” Asahi Shimbun, 11 July 1981; “Hanagata Koganzai 
Kuresuchin, YakkO Shirabenaoshi [Top Cancer Drug Krestin to be Tested for Effectiveness],” Asahi Shimbun, 5 September 1997; 
“Koganzai Kuresuchin PishibanTru, Tandoku deno Yakko Hobo Hitei [Effectiveness of Cancer Drugs and Picibanil Almost 
Negligible When Used Alone],” Asahi Shimbun, 10 December 1989; “2 KOganzai Hyokagae [Revisions to Two Cancer Drugs],” 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 December 1989, 30; “Kuresuchin PishibanTru KQnO Gentei o TQshin [Reduction to Effective Range of 
Krestin and Picibanil Recommended],” Asahi Shimbun, 21 December 1990; “K5no Gentei o Toshin; Kuresuchin to PishibanTru 
[Reduction of Effective Range Recommended: Krestin and Picibanil],” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 21 December 1989.
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developed Picibanil and Krestin, for example, also served on committees that 
approved these drugs.661 Prominent individuals such as Yoshio Sakurai bridged
important roles across government, academia and industry: as Director of the
Chemotherapy Centre at the National Cancer Research Institute, as Chair of the
Subcommittee for Drugs against Malignant Tumours, and as Director of Yoshitomi
Pharmaceutical. Sakurai’s direct involvement in the development of Krestin at the
National Cancer Research Institute, and as chair of MHW’s drug approval committee,
for example, was argued to have created conflicts of interests that facilitated Krestin’s 
approval.662
Links between government and industry were also reinforced by amakudari, where 
MHW bureaucrats retired to directorships in private firms. Amakudari is a 
retirement path whereby government bureaucrats gain positions in private or public
institutions within the domain of the ministry from which they have originated. While
this practice arguably facilitated industrial development under government guidance, 
it has also led to corrupt ties between government and industry. Chugai, for example,
had strengthened its ties to the government when it welcomed MHW vice minister 
Teiichiro Sakamoto as its vice president.664 These practices placed larger firms with
661 Yoshio Sakurai and Shigeru Tsugakoshi were involved in both the development and approval o f Krestin. See “ KOganzai 
Kuresuchin, Yakujishin no 2 Iin Hantei Ronbun ni Kanyo [Two Members o f the Drug Approval Committee Involved in Drug 
Development]” Asahi Shimbun, 19 December 1989. See also, Japan, House of Representatives, Labour and Welfare Committee, 
Official Report o f  Debates, 94th Diet, 20th Session, 30 July 1981; and Japan, House o f Representatives, Labour and Welfare 
Committee, Official Report o f  Debates, 104h Diet, 4th Session, 6 March 1986.
662 Similarly, his direct involvement in the development of Yoshitomi Pharmaceutical’s anticancer drug, Protectron, was argued to 
have facilitated its approval in the late 1960s; such ties were strengthened when he later became a director of the company. See 
“Ninki KOganzai Kuresuchin no Kono [Effectiveness o f Anticancer Drug Krestin],” Shukan Shincho, 16 October 1986,44-45.
663 See for example, Richard A. Colignon and Chikako Usui, Amakudari: The Hidden Fabric o f  Japan's Economy (Ithaca: ILR 
Press, 2003).
664 Japan, House o f Representatives, Labour and Welfare Committee, Official Report o f  Debates, 87th Diet, 15th Session, 9 May 
1979; Japan, House o f Councillors, Labour and Welfare Committee, Official Report o f  Debates, 93rd Diet, 9th Session, 25 
November 1980. These proceedings also take note of the wide custom of amakudari across the pharmaceutical industry, with a list 
o f 60 former MHW officials retiring as executives in leading firms ranging from Takeda, Sankyo, Daiichi, Shionogi, Fujisawa and
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greater financial clout at a political advantage compared to smaller firms. Picibanil and 
Krestin’s performance reportedly benefited from Chugai and Sankyo’s links to 
influential individuals with overlapping roles in government, industry, and academia.
Of course, it is also important to recognise that MHW’s rejection of SSM may not have 
been entirely politically motivated. The MHW, in fact, was justified in its decision to 
reform anachronistic drug approval standards and begin to reject safe but largely 
ineffective drugs, given contemporary developments abroad.665 With much higher 
levels of government funding, more transparent and rigorous standards of evaluations, 
and the existence of medical specialists and facilities for cancer therapy, the American 
and British anticancer drug markets, for example, were dominated by more innovative 
yet invasive therapies.666 With advances in science, Japanese scientists who had 
previously held genuinely optimistic hopes for the effectiveness of cancer 
immunotherapy drugs were more pessimistic by the 1980s. Given the burden 
placed by Picibanil and Krestin on national health insurance funds, the MHW was also 
under pressure by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to contain costs and not approve 
similar drugs.668 The imposition of more stringent standards for SSM, while perhaps 
unfair compared to preceding drugs, also resulted in the much needed upgrading of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical R&D. While MHW’s rejection of SSM might have been based
Eisai.
663 “Maruyama Wakuchin, Yowai Rinsho Shiken Deta, [Maruyama Vaccine Supported by Weak Clinical Data],” Asahi Shimbun,
27 December 1980; “Hyoka Nibun, Maruyama Wakuchin [Divided Opinions on the Maruyama Vaccine],” Asahi Shimbun, 22
January 1981.
666 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985): 
17-19.
661 “Gan: Men’eki Ry5ho no Jitsuryoku to Genkai [Cancer: The Strengths and Limitations o f Cancer Immunotherapy],” Asahi 
Shimbun, 11 July 1981.
668 Kazuo Miwa, “Shiseiji Maruyama Wakuchin no 17-nen [A 17 Year History o f Our Maruyama Vaccine],” Bungei Shinju, 
August 1981,208-236.
261
on scientific evidence rather than political influence, the criteria for drug approval 
remained opaque.669
Other reasons
There were also other explanations for the proliferation of largely ineffective drugs in 
Japan during this period. Part of Krestin’s dramatic sales record, for example, was 
attributed to Sankyo’s marketing strategy and sales network.670 The significance of 
marketing to firm performance echoed a wider, global trend in the pharmaceutical 
industry during the early 1980s. Based on a rigorous marketing strategy, Glaxo 
managed to overtake the antiulcer market, with Zantac (ranitidine) approved in 1981, 
despite minimal improvements over Smith Kline & French’s antiulcer drug, Tagamet 
(cimetidine) approved in 1979.671 Glaxo had revolutionised the industry -  in which 
marketing capacity became as important to firm performance as the capacity for drug 
discovery and development.672 Chugai and Sankyo’s ability to skilfully market 
Picibanil and Krestin, respectively, contributed to the drugs’ success,
Other factors may have accounted for the growth of Japan’s anticancer drug sector 
through relatively ineffective drugs. Government support for cancer research, for 
example, was much less in Japan compared to many Western countries such as the
669 KOichi Yoshimoto, “Kagaku to Igaku no Aida: Maruyama Wakuchin o Megutte [Between Medicine and Science: On the 
Maruyama Vaccine],” Chud Koron, September 1981,286-295.
670 Sankyo Co., Sankyo 80-nenshi [Sankyo, a 80 Year History] (Tokyo, Sankyo Co., 1979), 162.
671 Ernst R. Bemdt, Linda Bui, David R. Reiley and Glen L. Urban, “Information, Marketing, and Pricing in the U.S. Antiulcer 
Drug Market,” The American Economic Review 85 (May 1995): 100-105. Davina C. Ling, Ernst R. Bemdt, Margaret K. Kyle, 
“Deregulating Direct-to-Consumer Marketing o f Prescription Drugs: Effects on Prescription and Over-the-Counter Product 
Sales,” The Journal o f  Law and Economics 45 (October 2002): 691 -723; Filippo Dell'Osso, “Defending a Dominant Position in a 
Technology Led Environment,” Business Strategy Review 1 (June 1990): 77-86.
672 Matthew Lynn, The Billion Dollar Battle: Merck vs. Glaxo (London: Mandarin, 1992).
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United States.673 Cancer immunotherapy drugs, like antibiotics, were less costly to 
develop compared to other types of anticancer drugs. In addition, the government 
placed little emphasis on coordinating academic and industrial research at a time when 
the US government, for example, played a major role in coordinating cancer research 
projects through the National Cancer Institute. But government support for cancer 
research does not sufficiently explain the causes of Japan’s weakness in anticancer 
drugs. After all, while the government did launch cancer research subsidies through 
the MHW and the Ministry of Education from 1963, these did not directly translate 
into the availability of new anticancer drugs.674 The nature of R&D incentives, the 
opacity of the drug approval system, and Japanese medical culture provide a far 
stronger explanation for the weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug sector at this time.
4.4.4 Summary of the period between 1975 and 1990
There are several reasons why the Japanese anticancer sector experienced a 
phenomenal expansion through anticancer drugs that did not exist in leading Western 
markets during this period. One of the major reasons lay in Japan’s opaque drug 
approval process and the lack of government funding for research in anticancer drugs. 
It is important to note, however, that even if innovative drugs had been developed and 
approved, the Japanese medical system was not prepared to take advantage of such 
drugs. The development of anticancer drugs is dependent on physicians and
673 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1985),
13.
674 Increases in cancer research funding has not necessarily translated into new drug discoveries. See for example, Gardiner 
Harris, ‘'New Drug Points Up Problems in Developing Cancer Cures,” The New York Times 20 December 2005. Michael Reich 
has also noted the R&D spending does not necessarily correlate with drug discoveries in Michael Reich, “Why the Japanese Don’t 
Export More Pharmaceuticals: Health Policy as Industrial Policy,” 124-150.
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technicians with expertise in cancer and cancer drugs to administer the drug, as well as 
hospitals equipped with the relevant equipment to deliver the drug. The lack of such 
infrastructure not only disincentivised innovation, but they also maintained invisible 
yet significant barriers to entry to foreign firms despite formal attempts at deregulation 
-  and provided life support for non-innovating firms. The absence of R&D incentives, 
lack of regulatory transparency, and distinct medical culture helped encourage the 
development of high priced, safe yet largely ineffective drugs that would not have 
survived in other advanced markets. These factors were the source of Japan’s 
weakness in anticancer drugs.
4.5 Hollowing out, 1990 onwards
Despite considerable advances in the anticancer drug market over the decades, Japan’s 
anticancer drug sector remained weak compared to countries such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Germany. This was demonstrated clearly in Japan’s large 
trade deficit and trading partners. In 2000, for example, Japanese firms ran a deficit of
27.3 billion yen, as it exported 4.9 billion yen and imported 32.2 billion yen. While 
imports of anticancer drugs originated from developed countries, led by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France, its exports were primarily destined to 
developing countries, led by China, Taiwan, and Middle Eastern countries such as 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Japan remained reliant on Western imports, and its 
anticancer drug sector was not able to compete in advanced Western markets.
675 In nominal terms, Japan exported 5.0 billion yen and imported 33.2 billion yen worth o f anticancer drugs in 2000. It should be 
noted that trade figures for anticancer drugs are not available in the Tsiisho Hakusho. Trade data for anticancer drugs were 
available in Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Dotai Chdsa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyd Keizai Kenkyujo, 2001).
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Part of this could be explained by the inability of Japanese university professors to 
commercialise their research, the lack of venture capital for biotechnology start-ups, 
and the comparably small size of Japanese firms without significant funds for R&D 
spending. But a much more compelling reason for the weakness of Japan’s anticancer 
drug sector was the comparative lack of research incentives, lack of specialised 
experts or facilities for drug development, and distinct medical practices that restricted 
demand for highly innovative anticancer drugs. In the 1990s, Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry began to observe the hollowing out of R&D in Japan. To circumvent inferior 
incentives in the home market, Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firms began to 
prioritise drug development in American or European regimes that were more 
favourable to pharmaceutical innovation.
4.5.1 Lagging drug approvals and problems in infrastructure 
In the 1990s, fewer anticancer drugs were approved in Japan compared to other 
advanced markets. Despite having the second largest cancer market in the world after 
the United States, 30 cancer therapies approved in the United States had not been 
approved in Japan. This was a new development that had not been observed in 
previous decades.677
Some argued that Japan’s delayed approval of innovative drugs was a result of
676 Matsuyama Kotone, Tetsuji Sadaike, Masanori Fukushima, “The Present Approval State o f Anti-tumour Drugs in Japan,” 
Rinsho Hydka [Clinical Evaluation] 31 (2004): 579-86.
677 Jeffrey S. Brown, Brigitta Bienz-Tadmor, and Louis Lasagna, “Availability of Anticancer Drugs in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan from 1960 through 1991,” Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics 58 (September 1995): 243-256.
265
administrative failure. The government had been reluctant to consult foreign test data 
or quicken its pace of examination following the criticism over the approval of Krestin 
and Picibanil in the 1980s and the HIV blood scandal in the early 1990s. While this 
was true to some extent, the issue was more complex: the Japanese government lacked 
the resources, funds and capacity -  in terms of human capital, facilities, and 
organisation -  to support drug R&D and review drugs efficiently compared to 
overseas competitors in the United States and Europe.678 For one, the Japanese 
clinical trial system was less equipped in relation to comparable systems abroad. 
Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency in 2005 maintained 
approximately 250 staff, including 10 clinical examiners, of whom three were 
biological statisticians. By comparison, the FDA employed approximately 2,300 staff, 
with 300 clinical examiners, including 100 biostaticians.679 Moreover, there has been 
no system or standards established to conduct clinical trials in Japanese hospitals; in 
the past, most were conducted through personal connections, on an ad-hoc basis.680
In addition, there were fewer cancer specialists and facilities compared to many other 
countries. Oncologists, for example, were only certified in 2007, more than 35 years 
after the United States, and Japan had much fewer cancer hospitals compared to its
1TQ 1
Western counterparts. The lack of infrastructure long limited the demand for 
anticancer drugs, as it meant that fewer Japanese physicians were capable of
678 Shunsuke Ono, “The Performance o f the Japanese New Drug Review System: From the Reviewer’s Perspective,” Rinshd 
Hyoka [Clinical Evaluation] 31 (2004): 557-66.
679 Jon Sigurdson, Future Advantage Japan?: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Report, (London: Cartermill Publishing, 1996).
680 P. Reed Maurer, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, 11 July 2007.
681 Japanese Board o f Cancer Therapy, “Ninteii Seido Kisoku [Certified Oncologist Regulations],” Japanese Board o f Cancer 
Therapy, 2 May 2007, http://www.jbct.jp/sys_regulation01.html (accessed 30 November 2007).
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prescribing the drug, and fewer facilities were equipped to administer the drug to 
cancer patients.
4.5.2 A shift in Japan’s anticancer drug market
While it remained weak in global perspective, the anticancer drug sector transformed 
markedly after 1989. Following public debates over the efficacy of Japan’s leading 
anticancer drugs, the government banned Chugai’s Picibanil and Kureha’s Krestin 
from being prescribed as the main drugs in cancer therapy. The composition of Japan’s 
anticancer drug market changed as sales of the two drugs plunged. The impact of the 
1989 revisions, as well as the government’s cost containment measures are reflected in 
the production trends after 1990. Anticancer drug production stabilised but decreased 
slightly due to the biennial price reductions. The slight decrease also reflected delays 
in the approval process, which limited the availability of drugs already marketed 
overseas. At the same time, more anticancer drugs of foreign origin were available in 
the market. As a disease that mostly affects the elderly, Japan’s ageing society also 
contributed to a rising cancer population.
682 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, “Patients and Deaths of Infectious Diseases and Food Poisoning (1876 -1999),” 
http ://www. stat. go. i p/data/chouki/02 .htm (accessed 6 May 2008).
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Figure. 22. Value of Anticancer Drug Production, 1985683
Whereas the top three anticancer drugs in 1985 were domestic drugs not approved in 
the United States or Europe, a decade later, the top three anticancer drugs— Taiho’s 
UFT, Roche’s Fruturon, and Takeda’s Leuplin—were all therapies recognised 
beyond Japan. Although Japan’s anticancer drug market remained undeveloped, it 
was becoming less backward relative to its Western counterparts.
Taiho
One of the leading anticancer drug makers since the 1980s began as a small import 
distributor of Western medicines in 1963, a time when the Japanese pharmaceutical
683 Ministry o f  Health and Welfare, Yakuji K ogyd  Seisan D ota i Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000). Ministry o f  Health, Labour and W elfare, Yakuji 
K ogyd  Seisan D ota i Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2001-2006).
684 Gekkan Mix [Monthly Medical Information Express] (Decem ber 1996): 61. The top three drugs in 1985 were Krestin, 
Picibanil and Ftorafur. See Yakugyo Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku, [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo 
Jihosha, 1987), 266.
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market was expanding rapidly. Established as a subsidiary of a leading 
over-the-counter (QTC) drug maker, Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Taiho 
Pharmaceutical Co. offered numerous therapies ranging from anti-allergy to digestive 
medicines.685
Taiho’s decision to invest in anticancer drugs was an organic outgrowth of its past in 
reverse engineering foreign-discovered drugs. Taiho pursued incremental innovations 
based upon an imported technology made possible through alliances with university 
researchers and marketing partnerships with foreign firms. In 1969, Taiho formed a 
partnership with the Latvian Institute of Organic Synthesis in the Soviet Union in 1969 
to launch Ftorafur, a drug for colorectal cancer that was patented in the United 
Kingdom and the United States in 1969 and 1976, respectively. After conducting 
Japanese clinical trials from 1970, Taiho launched its drug in 1973. Taiho’s 
collaboration was unique, in that it sought new market opportunities through licenses 
with a Soviet organisation at a time when the majority of firms imported technologies 
from the United States or Europe. For Taiho, this collaboration proved a strategic 
success. Ftorafur sales rode on the tails of Krestin and Picibanil sales in the 1980s and 
placed Taiho firmly as a key player in the Japanese anticancer drug market by the 
1980s.687
685 Tadamasa Matsumoto, “Wagasha ni Okeru Koganzai no Kaihatsu,” Kagaku to Kogyd (April 1976): 105-107; Letter from 
Valdis Jakobsons, Chairman of the Board, AS Grideks (successor to Latvian Institute or Organic Synthesis) to author, dated 10 
May 2006; Taiho Pharmaceutical Co., “Taiho Yakuhin no Ayumi,” httD://www.taiho.co.iD/corporation/historv/index.html 
(accessed 2 December 2007).
686 Yakuji NippOsha, “Nl(2Tetrahydrofiiryl-5-fluouracil),” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippSsha, 
1974), 53-61. Solomon Aronovich Giller, Regina Abramovna Zhuk, Marger Jurievich Lidak, Aina Avgustovna Zidermane, 
“Substituted Uracils,” British Patent 1,168,391 filed 8 January 1968 and issued 22 October 1969; Leroy B. Townsend, Robert A. 
Earl, Steven J. Manning, “Method o f Synthesizing l-(tetrahydro-2-furanyl)-5-fluorouracil,” U.S. Patent 3960864 filed 6 May 
1974 and issued 1 June 1976.
687 “UFT,” in Gekkan Mix [Monthly Medical Information Express] (December 1996): 60-61.
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Taiho developed UFT in collaboration with Setsuro Fujii and others at Osaka 
University, who strengthened the anticancer properties of Ftorafur by adding a 
substance called uracil in 1978.688 In 1984, UFT was approved for wide range cancers 
-  from the head, lung, and breast, to neck -  and featured few adverse effects compared 
to many existing therapies.689 Its wide range of approval, limited side effects, and ease 
of use helped Taiho record robust sales in Japan for well over a decade -  with annual 
sales exceeding 80 billion yen in the mid 1990s.690
In many ways, Taiho’s UFT reflected a transitional phase in the government’s 
commitment to pharmaceutical R&D. UFT was met with mixed reception abroad. The 
drug was approved in more than 15 countries, and was marketed by Merck in countries 
such as UK, France, and Germany by 2005.691 It was, however rejected in the United 
States in 2001, as the FDA cited insufficient evidence regarding efficacy or superiority 
over existing drugs.692 UFT was not an entirely new therapy, but a product of 
incremental improvements on an existing anticancer drug. While it was more effective 
compared to Japan’s previous anticancer drugs, it had yet to be fully recognised 
internationally. This was similar to the status of Japan’s drug approval standards, in 
which criteria had improved, but had yet to become comparable to those of the
688 S. Fujii, K. Ikenaka, M. Fukushima, and T. Shirasaka, “Effect of Uracil and its Derivatives on Antitumor Activity of 
5-fluorouracil and l-(2-tetrahydrofuryl)-5-fluorouracil,” Gann 69 (1978): 763-72; See also, Tetsuhiko Shirasaka, SI Tanjd 
[Creating S-l] (Tokyo: Evidensu, 2006), 74-88.
689 Yakuji Nipposha,.“Tegafur-Uracil,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippOsha, 1985), 110-113.
690 This value is in nominal terms. “UFT,” Gekkan Mix [Monthly Medical Information Express] (December 1996): 60-61.
691 Merck KGaA, “2006 Online Report: Commercial Unit Oncology,” Merck KGaA, 
httn://www.merck.de/servlet/PB/menu/1647870/index.html. (accessed 6 December 2007).
692 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “Colorectal Cancer Endpoints Workshop 
Summary, 12 November 2003,” U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/cancer_endpoints/colonEndpointsSummary.htm (16 May 2006).
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advanced Western markets.
As a means to counter the government’s periodic price reductions of existing therapies, 
Taiho continued to invest in R&D and launch new drugs. The firm’s continuous efforts 
at improving existing therapies resulted in the launch of another anticancer drug TS-1, 
in 1999. In step with improvements in Japanese approval standards, TS-1 was 
recognised with a license for worldwide distribution by Sanofi-Aventis in 20Q6.693
Yakult Honsha
It was during these times that Yakult Honsha Co. launched its successful anticancer 
drugs, irinotecan and oxaliplatin. Yakult Honsha is a food company known for its 
probiotic drink, “Yakult,” that entered pharmaceuticals and cosmetics in the 1970s. 
The drink, “Yakult,” was first launched in 1935 by the bacteriologist Minoru Shirota as 
a nutritional supplement that would promote a healthy intestinal tract in a still poor 
economy. The company had been established in 1955 in order to manufacture and sell 
“Yakult.” Yakult Honsha expanded over the decades through its operations in food and 
beverage, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, with international operations spanning the
694continents.
Facing saturation in the food and beverages market, Yakult Honsha planned to build 
upon its core competencies, take advantage of new developments in biotechnology,
693 Datamonitor, “Taiho Pharmaceuticals Co Ltd.,” Company Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2007).
6,4 Yakult Honsha Co., YukaShoken Hokokusho [Annual Securities Report] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1990), 1; Yakult 
Honsha Co., “Enkaku [History],” htto://www. vakult.co.iD/front/companv/profile/htm/index03.html. (accessed 15 November 
2007); Datamonitor, “Yakult Honsha Co., Ltd.,” Company Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2007).
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and gain an edge in a niche sector. As observed in the overview chapter, the entry of 
Yakult Honsha into pharmaceuticals represented a wider phenomenon in the 1970s 
and 1980s, when Japanese firms from a range of sectors began to diversify into this 
industry for the same reason.695 The firm invested heavily to develop its research 
capacity by hiring new scientists and forming alliances with universities and other 
firms to supplement its lack of expertise in drug development and distribution.696 
Yakult hoped that its new investments in cancer therapy would help the firm gain a 
foothold in the pharmaceutical industry.
The research that led to Yakult’s anticancer drug, irinotecan, in fact, had begun 
decades earlier, in America during the mid 1960s. In 1966, researchers led by M.E. 
Wall at the Research Triangle Institute in North Carolina isolated camptothecin, an 
extract from a Chinese tree which was found to be effective against certain mouse 
cancers.697 Clinical trails, initiated at the National Cancer Institute in the United States 
during the 1970s, were withdrawn due to the high toxicity of the substance. But 
worldwide, research continued on campotothecin compounds and derivatives in 
search for a potential anticancer drug.698
During the 1970s, Yakult Honsha invested heavily in the recruitment of capable 
scientists and forming academic and corporate alliances in order to make its new
695 Yano Research Institute, Iyaku Sangyo Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Industry Annual] (Tokyo: Yano Research Institute, 1980), 
12-15.
696 David Drutz, phone interview by author, 15 November 2005.
697 Monroe E. Wall, M. C. Wani, C. E. Cook, Keith H. Palmer, A. T. McPhail, and G A. Sim, “Plant Antitumour Agents 1: The 
Isolation and Structure of Campothecin, a Novel Alkaliodal Leukemia and Tumour Inhibitor from Camptotheca Acuminata,” 
Journal o f  American Chemical Society 88 (20 August 1966): 3888-3890; Monroe Wall and Mansukh Wani, “Camptothecin: 
Discovery to Clinic,” Annals o f  the New York Academy o f  Sciences, 803 (13 December 1996): 1.
698 Yakuji NippOsha, “Irinotecan,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1995), 72-76.
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venture in pharmaceuticals a success. 699 At the firm’s Central Institute for 
Microbiology Research in Tokyo, researchers worked with scientists at the School of 
Pharmaceutical Sciences at Showa University.700 By 1979, researchers at Yakult were 
able to reduce the toxicity of camptothecin, and an effective substance was synthesised 
in 1983. To compensate for its lack of experience in drug development, the company 
formed an alliance with Daiichi Pharmaceuticals from 1984.701
Yakult experienced phenomenal success when it launched its new anticancer drug, 
irinotecan in 1994. Yakult’s anticancer drug was a truly innovative therapy -  the first 
drug that was found to be effective for colorectal cancer in 40 years. In fact, Yakult’s 
anticancer drug became a global blockbuster drug. In the domestic market, irinotecan 
was launched as Campto by Yakult and Topotecin by Daiichi in April 1994.702 
Overseas, irinotecan was introduced in France as Campto by Rhone-Poulenc in 1995, 
and as Camptosar in the United States by Pharmacia & Upjohn in the following year. 
As of March 2006, irinotecan was approved in 100 countries, and sold in 88. Until the 
introduction of its successor drug, oxaliplatin, irinotecan formed the backbone of 
Yakult’s pharmaceutical operations; with annual sales over 15 billion yen, it 
comprised over 90% of Yakult’s pharmaceutical sales.703 With 80% of its sales from 
overseas markets, it was more of a global, rather than Japanese drug.704 Yakult’s 
success with irinotecan solidified the firm’s position in the anticancer drug market, and
699 Kiyoshi Terada, “Ensan Irinotecan,” Fine Chemical 29 (September 2000): 31-41.
700 Yakuji Nipposha, “Irinotecan,” 72-76.
701 T. Miyasaka and S. Sawada, “Anticancer Agent Irinotecan,” Gendai Kagaku [Current Chemistry] 343 (1999): 58-66.
702 Yakuji Nipposha, “Irinotecan,” 72-76.
703 Yakult Honsha, Co., “ Yakult Honsha Iyakuhin Jigyd Setsumeikai [Yakult Honsha Discussion of Pharmaceutical Operations],” 
14 June 2006.
704 Rosemary C. Bonney, SCRIP'S Guide to Cancer Therapies: A Biotech Revolution? (Richmond: Scrip Reports, 2001).
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helped the launch of a new anticancer drug.
This new drug, oxaliplatin, was a platinum-based anticancer drug that was actually 
discovered in 1976 by Kidani Yoshinori at Nagoya City University.705 But with
limited success in preclinical tests, Japanese researchers had abandoned clinical
testing in the 1970s. In 1989, however, Debiopharm, a Switzerland-based
pharmaceutical firm, licensed-in oxaliplatin. Debiopharm was a firm that specialised
in ethical drug development and registration; the firm licensed-in potential compounds
and licensed-out the developed drug. Debiopharm was able to develop oxaliplatin into
a successful drug, which was approved as a therapy for colorectal cancer in France, the 
UK, and the US in 1996,1999, and 2004, respectively.706 But in Japan, Yakult did not 
gain approval for oxaliplatin, branded as Elplat, until March 2005.707
Reforms in R&D incentives, the drug approval process, and the modernisation of
cancer therapy in Japan over the 1990s resulted in the approval of drugs such as
oxaliplatin. As with irinotecan, oxaliplatin’s strong performance in global sales
generated considerable revenues for Yakult. At a high launch price, oxaliplatin gained 
sales of 9 billion yen in 2005 in Japan, and surpassed irinotecan sales in Japan during 
2006.708
705 Yakult Honsha, Co., “Yakult Honsha lyakuhin Jigyo Setsumeikai [Yakult Honsha Discussion of Pharmaceutical Operations].”
706 Yakuji Nipposha, “Oxaliplatin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 2006), 68-77.
707 As mentioned earlier, the drug’s belated approval in Japan was not simply due to the absence of R&D incentives or fully 
modem, transparent criteria for drug approval. It was also due to delays to the drug approval process following the HIV blood 
scandal in the early 1990s. As well, Japanese medical system still had much smaller demand for rigorous chemotherapy. 
Moreover, the infrastructure to develop and approve anticancer drugs remained much less developed compared to the leading 
Western pharmaceutical markets. The Japanese anticancer drug sector had fewer physicians capable o f providing rigorous cancer 
treatment or coordinating clinical trials. It also had fewer experts capable o f evaluating innovative cancer drugs.
708 Yakult Honsha Co., “Yakult Honsha lyakuhin JigyO Setsumeikai SankO ShiryQ [Reference Materials for the Informational • 
Meeting on the Pharmaceutical Business at Yakult Honsha],” 14 June 2006.
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4.5.3 Technology, patient empowerment, and the modernisation of medical practice 
While Japanese physicians did not historically disclose to cancer patients their full and 
accurate diagnoses, Japan’s medical culture began to change over the 1990s. The 
growth of Internet use, in particular, empowered patients who accumulated 
information on cancer and cancer therapies. This meant that physicians were more 
likely to prescribe drugs with the conspicuous side effects of cancer chemotherapy, 
and that there was more demand for such drugs. Japanese cancer patients began to help 
expand demand for innovative anticancer drugs and pressure authorities to accelerate 
drug approval.
The Internet not only empowered cancer patients with knowledge of their condition 
and possible therapies, but also fostered patient networks that campaigned for 
anticancer drugs that had yet to be approved in Japan. Patient groups such as Japan’s 
Cancer Patients Support Organization (CANPS), for example, were instrumental in 
obtaining approval for oxaliplatin in Japan.709 The national organisation for cancer 
patients was only established in 2005, but quickly gained political influence through 
connections with government, firms and academia.710 Patient groups concentrated 
primarily on the rapid approval of drugs for cancer or orphan diseases that were not
709Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Mishoninyaku KentO Kaigi [Committee on Non Approved Drugs in Japan], “Kako 5-nenkan ni 
Gakkai/Kanjadantai kara no Soki ShQnin no Yob5 ga Ari, katsu Heisei 17-nen 3 gatsu Izen ni Obei 4 kakoku de Shonin Sareta 
Mishoninyaku [Drugs Requested by Academic / Patient Organiations for Accelerated Approval Within the Past 5 years, that were 
Approved in the 4 American and European Countries Prior During or Before March 2005],” 
http ://w w w .m hlw .go.iD /shingi/2005/03/s0331-13.h tm l (accessed 1 December 2007).
710 Gankanja Dantai Shien Kiko, “Shui [Statement],” http://www.canps.net/ (accessed 10 August 2007). Naoko Wakao, 
Representative o f Japan’s Cancer Patients Support Organization (CANPS), letter to author, 7 September 2007.
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711available in Japan but already approved in other countries. For pharmaceutical 
firms, patient groups could also act as a vehicle to promote potential approvals. Much 
of the funding for CANPS campaigns, for example, came from pharmaceutical firms, 
and foreign pharmaceutical firms have been particularly keen in funding and
7 1 7disseminating information on new drugs yet to be approved in Japan. The absence 
of empowered cancer patients in earlier times indirectly undermined the development 
of Japan’s anticancer drug sector.
4.5.4 Barriers to entrepreneurship
The legal barriers to entrepreneurship faced by Japanese university academics until the 
late 1990s also hindered the translation of innovative research in anticancer drugs into 
commercial therapies. As mentioned in the overview chapter, until 1998, academics at 
national or public universities were prohibited from receiving income in private
71 <j
industry or establishing firms to commercialise their research. In the meanwhile, 
American academic start-ups such as Genentech had played a key role in launching 
new anticancer drugs in the United States.714
The comparatively smaller size of Japanese firms also disadvantaged prospects for 
innovative discoveries due to the limited size of R&D that smaller firms could
711 P. Reed Maurer, interview by author, Tokyo,, Japan, 11 July 2007. While specific definitions vary according to country, orphan 
diseases refer to life-threatening or debilitating conditions that are rare. In general, few remedies are available for orphan diseases, 
as pharmaceutical firms do not expect to be adequately compensated for investments on drug R&D through sales.
712 Naoko Wakao, Representative Japan’s Cancer Patients Support Organization (CANPS), letter to author, 7 September 2007.
713 The Law for Promoting University Technology Transfer was introduced in 1998. An assessment o f recent changes in 
legislation has been written by Michael Lynskey, “The Commercialisation of Biotechnology in Japan: Bioventures as a 
Mechanism of Knowledge Transfer from Universities,” International Journal o f  Biotechnology 6 (2004): 155-185. As noted in 
the overview chapter, university professors lost their civil servant status in 2004.
714 Rosemary C. Bonney, SCRIP'S Guide to Cancer Therapies: A Biotech Revolution?
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possibly afford. Dominant players in the Japanese anticancer drug market such as 
Taiho, Nippon Kayaku, and Kyowa Hakko were not only much smaller than global 
leaders such as Novartis, Bristol-Myers Squibb, or Aventis, but were also more 
diversified firms with considerable business outside of pharmaceuticals.715 Still, less 
R&D investment does not directly lead to an inability to innovate. After all, from a 
historical perspective, drug discovery has not been as fruitful in recent years despite 
massive increases in R&D investment, advances in technology, and greater knowledge 
of both drugs and disease.716
4.5.5 Opening up
Japan’s protectionist policies had created a distinctly domestic anticancer drug market. 
At the turn of the century, it remained the only market where domestic firms, rather 
than global multinationals dominated the market. Global leaders such as 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson & Johnson, AstraZeneca, and Aventis had remarkably 
little presence in Japan.717 Aside from Takeda, most of the leading firms such as 
Kyowa Hakko, Taiho, and Nippon Kayaku were younger, mid sized, less renowned 
firms. In addition to differences in language and culture, with an intricate distribution 
network and distinct domestic laws, most foreign firms found entry barriers still high 
enough to opt for licensing contracts rather than direct entry, despite substantial 
reforms since the 1990s.
7,5 Datamonitor, “Japan -  Cancer drugs,” Industry Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2002), 8-9; Datamonitor, “Global -  Cancer 
drugs,” Industry Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2002), 9-10.
716 JOrgen Drews, “Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective,” 1960-1964.
717 Datamonitor, “Global -  Cancer drugs,” 9-10.
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But Japan’s anticancer drug sector had begun to open up and modernise in the 1990s. 
R&D incentives to innovate improved significantly following the modernisation of 
Japanese pharmaceutical regulations, the Market Oriented Sector Selective 
discussions of the 1980s, distribution reforms, and the harmonisation of regulation 
with the United States and Europe in the early 1990s.718 Criteria for drug approval 
were more transparent, quality, safety, and efficacy guidelines were modernised, and 
innovative drugs were priced with a much higher premium compared to less 
innovative drugs. But while incentives had improved, conditions remained more 
favourable in other advanced nations. In the United States, for example, drug 
evaluation times were shorter, and while approval standards were more rigorous, 
approval decisions were based more on science than politics.719 Moreover, compared 
to the medical practices in many Western countries, it was less common for Japanese 
physicians to provide cancer patients with complete and accurate disclosure of their 
illness. In medical systems where the practice of informed consent was more 
common, patient demand was higher for potentially effective therapies, which tended 
to be highly invasive and toxic.
In a more global economy, where better incentives existed abroad, leading Japanese 
firms such as Takeda moved some of their core operations -  such as R&D and
718 United States Department o f Commerce, International Trade Administration, Market Access and Compliance, “MOSS 
Agreement on Medical Equipment and Pharmaceuticals.” United States Department of Commerce. 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/iapan/source/menu/medDharm/ta860109.html (accessed 15 May 2007)
719 See for example, Office of Pharmaceutical Industry Research, “Soyaku no Ba to shite no Kyosoryoku Kyoka ni Mukete 
[Creating a Stronger, More Competitive Environment for Drug Discovery]” Office o f Pharmaceutical Industry Research, Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (November 2005); Office of Pharmaceutical Industry Research, “Seiyaku SangyO 
no Shorai-zo [The Future Image of the Pharmaceutical Industry]” Office o f  Pharmaceutical Industry Research, Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (May 2007).
720 Emiko Ohnuki-Tiemey, Illness and Culture in Contemporary Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 62.
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marketing -  overseas, hollowing out innovation in Japan. While these outward 
oriented firms grew stronger, the more domestically oriented firms began to suffer in 
the face of foreign competition at home. Whether to strengthen their global reach or 
merely to survive, Japanese firms actively formed alliances with other firms during 
this period. Despite considerable reforms, comparatively inferior incentives facing the 
Japanese firms hindered the development of a strong anticancer drug sector in Japan. 
Entrepreneurial initiatives taken by firms such as Takeda also reflected diverging 
fortunes among Japanese firms, whereby outward looking firms prospered from 
expanding opportunities and inward looking firms suffered from a shrinking home 
market.
Takeda
While one of the oldest of Japanese pharmaceutical firms, Takeda was also an 
entrepreneurial firm that invested in R&D and adopted an export orientation, even 
before the Second World War.721 Founded in 1781 as wholesaler of Chinese medicines, 
Takeda had established its position as one of Japan’s leading pharmaceutical firms by 
the Second World War -  primarily through the import and distribution of Western 
medicines. In the post war period, the firm grew primarily through its strengths in 
vitamins and antibiotics, the leading therapeutic sectors of the early post war period. 
As evident from the writings of its chairman in 1949, Takeda’s managers adopted an 
export orientation from relatively early period.722 By 1962, the firm re-expanded into
721 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 180-ttenshi [A 180 Year History of Takeda] (Osaka: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 1962).
722 Chobei Takeda, “Wagakuni no lyakuhin KogyO to Boeki [Pharamceutical Industry and Trade in Our Country],” Kankeiren 16 
(January 1949): 19-21.
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South East Asia, a region where it had developed extensive operations during the 
interwar era.723 In 1978, Takeda entered the European market and launched its first 
antibiotics in the United States in 1980.724
Takeda’s decision to invest in anticancer drugs was a product of Takeda’s strategies to 
invest in R&D to strengthen the firm, rather than an attempt to develop anticancer 
drugs in particular. Over the decades, Takeda had cultivated scientific and 
organisational capacities for R&D by forming ties with university scientists who could 
lead innovative research. In 1961, for example, Takeda launched its anticancer 
antibiotic, Toyomycin, under the advice of Morizo Ishidate at the University of Tokyo, 
who had developed Nitromin in the early 1950s.725
The development of its main anticancer drug, leuprorelin, also emerged out of 
Takeda’s investments in R&D, which involved sending its key scientists to learn from 
foreign research institutes. In a manner similar to many large Japanese firms, Takeda 
had adopted the practice of sending its best scientists to study abroad to learn, adopt, 
and build upon cutting edge technologies. In the mid 1960s, Takeda had sent Fujino 
Masahiko, who later became Takeda’s chairman, to study at the Baylor College of 
Medicine in Houston, Texas.726 At the time, Baylor was pursuing research on the 
potential therapeutic effects of two substances: TRH (thyrotropin releasing hormone)
723 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 200-nen [200 Years o f Takeda] (Osaka: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 1984).
724 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., “Takeda no Rekishi [A History of Takeda],” 
httD://www.takeda.co.jp/about-takeda/historv/article 79.html (accessed 30 November 2007).
725 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Takeda 180-nenshi [A 180 Year History of Takeda]; Takeda. Pharmaceutical Co., Takeda 200-nen 
[200 Years of Takeda].
726 Yakuji Nipposha, “Leuprorelin,” in Saikin no Shinyaku [New Drugs in Japan] (Tokyo: Yakuji Nipposha, 1993), 127-130.
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and LH-RH (luteinizing hormone releasing hormone). Back in Japan, Fujino 
continued this research to consider possible applications to infertility and other 
hormone-related afflictions, and eventually found a potential therapy for prostate
777cancer. Takeda’s leuprorelin, in fact, marked a major therapeutic innovation in the 
treatment of prostate cancer.
But facing few rewards for innovation in Japan, Takeda looked abroad to develop this 
drug. Leuprorelin marked one of the first of Japan-origin drugs to be developed and 
launched abroad, as firms such as Takeda sought to capture the gains of greater market 
size, swift drug approval processes, and the more favourable pricing regimes of 
countries such as the United States. To compensate for the lack of experience in the US 
market, Takeda formed a joint venture with Abbot in 1977 -  TAP Pharmaceutical
778Products Inc. -  in order to develop drugs in the United States. Taiho, too, 
established Taiho Pharma, its US subsidiary in 2002 to prioritise drug development in 
the United States.729
Leuprorelin was recognised for its effectiveness toward a wide range of cancers in 
international markets. Following FDA approval, leuprorelin was launched in the 
United States as Lupron Injection in May 1985 by TAP Pharmaceutical. Leuprorelin
727 Satoshi Sasaki, Toshihiro Imaeda, Yoji Hayase, Yoshiaki Shimizu, Shizuo Kasai, Nobuo Cho, Masataka Harada, Nobuhiro 
Suzuki, Shuichi Furuya and Masahiko Fujino, “A New Class o f Potent Nonpeptide Luteinizing Hormone-releasing Hormone 
(LHRH) Antagonists: Design and Synthesis of2-phenylimidazo[l,2-a]pyrimidin-5-ones,” Bioorganic & Medicinal Chemistry 
Letters 12, (August 2002): 2073-2077.
728 “Kaigai ShijO e Mukau Nihonsei Shinyaku [Japan-origin Drugs Expanding into Overseas Markets],” Gekkan Mix (September 
1991): 29; “Leuprorelin,” Gekkan Mix (June 1996): 44-45. This joint venture concluded on 30 June 2008. See Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Co., “Beikoku Jigyo Saihen ni Tsuite [On the Reorganisation of US Operations],” Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 
news release dated 2 July 2008, http://www.takeda.co.ip/press/article 28213.html (accessed 30 July 2008).
729 Datamonitor, “Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited,” Company Profile. (London: Datamonitor, 2007).
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was improved and approved for a wider range of indications in the following years, as 
Lupron Depot, Viadur, and Eligard, in 1989, 2000, and 2002, respectively. Takeda’s 
drug was only launched in Japan 9 years after the United States, as Leuplin in 
September 1994. Both in the international and domestic market, leuprorelin proved 
highly successful. Between 1988 and 1995, overseas sales soared from approximately 
3.3 billion yen to 78.6 billion yen.730 In 2004, Leuplin was still the top selling
t x  tanticancer drug in Japan at 44.3 billion yen.
The government’s introduction of improved safety, quality, and efficacy standards 
over the 1970s and 1980s had coincided with the development of leuprorelin. The 
introduction of GMP (1974), GLP (1982), and GCP (1989) helped raised the quality of 
Japan origin drugs. As leuprorelin’s development history suggests, however, 
anticancer drug development in Japan was often an ad-hoc product of corporate 
strategies to invest in R&D by individual firms who decided to invest in R&D -  rather 
than a product of clearly defined research strategies by government or firms. As the 
trend among Japanese firms to prioritise drug development and marketing abroad 
suggests, government policies were less than optimal in incentivising firms to develop 
a strong anticancer drug sector in Japan.
Japanese firms that developed drugs abroad also stood to benefit from superior pricing 
regimes. The development of Takeda’s cancer therapy leuprorelin demonstrated that,
730 In nominal terms, overseas sales increased from approximately 3 billion yen to 80 billion yen “Leuprorelin,” Gekkan Mix 
(June 1996): 44-45.
731 In nominal terms, Leuplin’s 2004 sales reached 44.5 billion yen. Fuji Keizai, Iryoyo lyakuhin Detabukku [Prescription 
Medicine Databook] 5 (Tokyo: Fuji Keizai, 2005), 12.
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while firms operated within a highly regulated environment under a common set of 
incentives and disincentives, firm responses varied significantly. For example, one 
response to a system that rewarded incremental innovation was to develop me-too 
drugs; another was to seek opportunities where product innovation was rewarded. 
Poor economic conditions, downward price revisions, and rising foreign competition 
in the home market, disincentivised firms such as Takeda from developing anticancer 
drugs in Japan. Instead, they increasingly sought opportunities abroad by investing 
heavily in R&D and strengthening overseas distribution networks. The Japanese 
government had been loath to place initial high prices on drugs due to financial 
constraints of the Japanese health insurance system. But if a drug was already 
approved abroad, the government set prices to minimise the difference between 
domestic and overseas prices.734 These policies incentivised stronger firms like 
Takeda to prioritise drug development outside of Japan. Without the profit potentials 
offered by larger cancer markets, and the absence of a generous pricing regime to 
reward innovation, the Japanese market could not support the development of a strong 
anticancer drug sector.
4.5.6 Summary of the period between 1990 and 2005
Over the 1990s, the Japanese cancer market had evolved markedly in both size and 
content. By 2001, the Japanese anticancer drug market stood at 14.4 % of the global 
market at $3.3 billion, compared to $10.9 billion in the United States and $1.6 billion
732 Me-too drugs refer to drugs with minor improvements over existing alternatives.
733 See for example, Michiyo Nakamoto, “Global Reach through Tie-ups: Japan,” Financial Times, 30 April 2002; “Looking 
West,” The Economist, 18 June 2005.
734 “Kaigai Shijo e Mukau Nihonsei Shinyaku [Japan-origin Drugs Expanding into Overseas Markets],” Gekkan Mix (September 
1991): 29.
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in the United Kingdom. The cancer market expanded amid an ageing population, 
wider options in pharmacological treatments, and increased survival rates -  as well as 
the comparatively high prices for new, innovative cancer therapies. By 2004, the 
Japanese anticancer drug market had expanded to 460.0 billion yen, led by Takeda’s 
Leuplin, Taiho’s UFT, and AstraZeneca’s Kasodex, which recorded sales of 44.3 
billion yen, 30.8 billion yen, and 20.9 billion yen, respectively.736 For firms, there 
were considerable pressures to invest in innovative therapies and survive intense 
competition.
Case studies from the three firms that launched leading anticancer drugs during this 
period indicated that initial decisions to invest in anticancer drug research were the 
product of entrepreneurial initiative rather than government policy. Drug development, 
however, was very much influenced by government incentives. Under a system that 
rewarded incremental innovations more than other Western countries, some firms such 
as Taiho, developed a series of improved, domestic versions of anticancer drugs that 
were discovered abroad. ,
Other anticancer drug makers, such as Yakult and Takeda, began to circumvent 
inferior rewards to R&D in the Japanese market and sought opportunities overseas. 
These firms began to transfer their core R&D operations to countries where R&D was
735 In nominal terms, the value of the anticancer drug markets in 2001 in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom were 
$3.4 billion, $11.1 billion, and $1.6 billion, respectively. Datamonitor, “Japan -  Cancer drugs,” 4; Datamonitor, “Global -  Cancer 
drugs,” 4; Datamonitor, “United States -  Cancer drugs,” Industry Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2002), 4; Datamonitor, “United 
Kingdom -Cancer Drugs,” Industry Profile (London: Datamonitor, 2002), 4.
736 In nominal terms, the size of Japan’s anticancer drug market in 2004 was 461.8 billion yen. Nominal sales values in 2004 for 
Leuplin, UFT, and Kasodex were 44.5 billion yen, 31.0 billion yen, and 21.0 billion yen, respectively. Fuji Keizai, Irydyo lyakuhin 
Detabukku [Prescription Pharmaceutical Databook], 12.
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more rigorous and costly but where rewards to innovation were higher -  and where 
their drugs could be translated more easily into multiple pharmaceutical markets. 
These firms were increasingly rootless: most of the managerial and sales operations 
were based in Japan, but the sources of innovation and potential for future growth was 
now based overseas.
While a handful of Japanese firms were able to launch innovative anticancer drugs, 
these were exceptions. There were several reasons for the relative weakness of Japan’s 
anticancer drug sector. It was true that more drugs were approved on the basis of 
efficacy, even if they had significant side effects. The government did improve 
incentives to innovate by placing higher prices, for example, on innovative drugs -  and 
many firms responded by investing more heavily in R&D. But innovation among 
many domestic firms suffered from lower prices than abroad, biannual price 
reductions, lack of venture capital, an undeveloped clinical testing environment, and 
considerable delays in the drug approval process. Remnants of protectionist policies 
and the persistence of some non-tariff barriers, too, allowed comparatively weaker 
firms and drugs to survive in the domestic market. Finally, it was only after the 
millennium that the Japanese medical system was more equipped with the expertise 
and the facilities, or catered to patients empowered with knowledge over their 
condition, which created the final demand for innovative therapies.
4.6 Analysis of the anticancer drug sector
The Japanese anticancer drug sector was far less successful in drug discovery,
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development or sales -  both in comparison with leading Western counterparts and the 
Japanese antibiotics sector. The experience of the anticancer drug sector sheds light 
upon the causes for the weakness in Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. This section 
considers why Japan’s anticancer sector remained underdeveloped.
Some scholars have suggested that the relative weakness of the Japanese anticancer 
drug sector stems from Japan’s weak foundation in science compared to countries with 
stronger performance in this sector. Samuel Collins and Steven Collins have argued 
that the Japan’s weakness in pharmaceutical innovations stems from lack of 
investment in basic science and research at universities.737 But Japanese universities 
engaged in rigorous cancer research in collaboration with government and industry
t l i  HWIsince the early 20 century. In addition, most Japan-origin anticancer drugs of 
global repute originated in academic laboratories. Japan’s weakness in the anticancer 
drug sector cannot be explained by a weakness in basic science.
Another possible explanation for the weakness of the anticancer drug sector in Japan 
relates to industrial structure. The Japanese pharmaceutical industry was dominated by 
smaller firms for a longer period than in the leading pharmaceutical markets. Of the 
nearly 500 Japanese prescription drug makers in 2005, the leading firm, Takeda, was 
only a quarter of the size of the leading global firms, such as Pfizer or
737 Samuel Collins, Japanese Science: From the Inside (London: Routledge, 1999), 56; Steven W. Collins, The Race to 
Commercialize Biotechnology: Molecules, Markets, and the State in the IJnited States and Japan (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2004), 151.
See also “Pioneers o f Cancer Research in Japan,” Japanese Journal o f  Cancer Research 82 (December 1991): 1448-1449.
738 Japan Cancer Association, “Nihon Gangakkai no Rekishi [History o f the Japan Cancer Association],” 
http://www.jca.gr.ip/b01.html. (accessed 1 December 2007).
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GlaxoSmithKline. The difference between the market concentration of Japanese 
and other advanced Western markets, however, has not been significantly different. 740
There is some value in explaining the weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug sector in 
light of its industrial structure. Large firms would have an advantage in developing 
anticancer drugs, which involve a much more costly and complex process compared to 
antibiotics. After all, producing cutting edge anticancer drugs requires a much higher 
R&D investment than in antibiotics.
But smaller firms are not necessarily disadvantageous to the development of an 
anticancer drug sector. After all, smaller pharmaceutical ventures in the United States 
have launched globally successful anticancer drugs and have contributed to the 
strength of the American industry. Firms may realise economies of scale in R&D. But 
the benefits of larger firm size are less clear in production or marketing. This is 
because anticancer drugs generally target a very particular type, stage and location of 
cancer, which limits the demand for each type of anticancer drug. Each anticancer drug 
also targets a niche market. Industrial structure only provides a partial explanation for 
the weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug sector.
739 In sales. See Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Annual Report 2006 (Tokyo: Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 2006), 2; Pfizer, Inc., 
Annual Review 2006 (New York: Pfizer, Inc., 2007), 9; GlaxoSmithKline pic., Annual Report 2006 (London, GlaxoSmithKline 
pic., 2007), 2. See also, Ministry o f Health, Labour and Welfare, lyakuhin Sangyd Jittai Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Status of 
the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Ministry o f Health, Labour and Welfare, 2006),
http ://wwwdbtk. mh lw.go.j p/toukei/kouhyo/i ndexk-kousei. html.
740 To 1994, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Shuyo Sangyd ni Okeru Ruiseki Seisan Shuchudo [Concentration Ratio of Main 
Industries] (Tokyo: Japan Fair Trade Commission, 1975-1994), http://www.iftc.go.ip/katudo/ruiseki/ruisekidate.html (accessed 1 
June 2008). From 1995, Ministry o f Health and Welfare, lyakuhin Sangyd Jittai Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Status of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1988-2000); Ministry o f Health, Labour and Welfare, lyakuhin 
Sangyd Jittai Chosa Hdkoku [Report on the Status of the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Ministry o f Health, Labour and 
Welfare, 2001-2006).Also, U.S. Census Bureau, “Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing,” Economic Census: Concentration 
Ratios http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/concentration.html. (accessed 1 December 2007).
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A more convincing explanation for the weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug sector lies 
in the incentives facing university professors, who faced considerable barriers in 
commercialising their research until 1998. The Law on National Public Employees, 
for example, effectively banned outside employment, while rigid labour markets and 
bankruptcy laws penalised failures in entrepreneurship.741 The pre-1998 rules 
governing academics had a particularly acute impact on the anticancer drug sector.
Because the development of antibiotics was depended upon linear, incremental and 
evolutionary learning, restrictions to the transfer of academic know-how had a limited 
impact on the development of the antibiotics sector.742 Antibiotic discovery had long 
been based on the random screening of a vast number of soil samples, and -  while 
labour intensive -  did not require the human capital and equipment needed to develop 
anticancer drugs. In Contrast, anticancer drug development was much more 
sophisticated, and required more specialised expertise, equipment and more 
revolutionary knowledge spillovers from universities. Indeed, university affiliated 
start-ups such as Genentech played a large role in stimulating innovation and 
discoveries of anticancer drugs in the United States. While the pre-1998 rules 
hampered the development of the anticancer drug sector, it is not yet clear whether the 
change in the rules will result in a strong anticancer drug sector in Japan.
741 See Steven Collins and Hikoji Wakoh, “Universities and Technology Transfer in Japan: Recent Reforms in Historical 
Perspective,” The Journal o f  Technology Transfer 25 (June 2000); Kenji Kushida, “Japanese Entrepreneurship: Changing 
Incentives in the Context o f Developing a New Economic Model,” Stanford Journal o f  East Asian Affairs 1 (Spring 2001).
742 Steven W. Collins, The Race to Commercialize Biotechnology: Molecules, Markets, and the State in the United States and 
Japan, 151.
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One of the most powerful reasons for the relative weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug 
sector was unhelpful government policy. More specifically, the weakness of Japan’s 
anticancer drug sector stemmed largely from inferior R&D incentives, an undeveloped 
drug approval system, and Japanese medical practice. It was true that other factors, 
such as industrial structure, or legal barriers to entrepreneurship facing university 
professors, hindered the development of a strong, innovative industry. But these 
factors mattered less in explaining the causes for Japan’s weakness in the anticancer 
drug sector.
To a certain extent, the ineffectiveness of government intervention in Japan’s 
anticancer drug sector might be explained by the country’s belated demand for drugs 
that treated diseases of affluence such as cancer compared to other advanced nations. 
On a practical level, it is also much more difficult for a government to intervene in the 
development of a complex product. Only a handful of firms equipped with high levels 
of human capital, capable and willing to undertake extraordinary risk and cost in the 
R&D process could acquire the capacity to discover and develop innovative anticancer 
drugs. Government policy is more effective and conducive in sectors such as 
antibiotics that can involve numerous firms in low-cost, labour-intensive, and 
serendipitous methods of drug discovery for mass production.
The weakness of Japan’s anticancer drug sector is most convincingly explained by its 
inferior R&D incentives. Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical industry was shaped by the 
endurance of MHW’s developmental health policies that prioritised improvements in
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public health over the development of industry. Public health objectives to deliver low 
cost drugs to Japanese citizens under universal health insurance encouraged the 
government to set -  and effectively cap -  prices and conduct periodic price reductions. 
While this helped contain health care costs for the government and facilitated public 
access to medicines, it also encouraged firms to long pursue incremental innovations 
rather than invest heavily in R&D. The introduction of product patents and capital 
liberalisation should have incentivised firms to invest more heavily in R&D and 
develop more competitive drugs. But Japan’s unique product standards, lower criteria 
for innovation, and medical culture protected drugs of lesser quality from foreign 
competition. Japanese government policies that sustained less competitive drugs in the 
market help explain why Japan’s anticancer drug remained weak.
At times, Japan’s politicised, unscientific, and non-transparent drug approval system 
also reduced R&D incentives and undermined the industry’s prospects for growth. For 
firms, alliances with other firms and universities could substitute for or complement 
their lack of capacities in drug discovery, development, or distribution, while 
affiliations with the government could facilitate drug approval. But in the 1970s and 
1980s, firms unable to assess the government’s approval criteria invested in 
developing political ties rather than R&D to facilitate drug approval. This helped 
prompt a massive expansion of the anticancer drug sector, which was supported by 
Japan’s distinct product standards and medical system. If the safety and efficacy 
criteria for drug approval had been more transparent, more firms might have invested 
in R&D despite lower drug prices. At a time when many Western markets were
290
launching new, innovative anticancer drugs, Japan’s undeveloped drug approval 
system misdirected investments and undermined the industry’s potential at a crucial 
time in its development.743
Just because a drug received approval in Japan, did not mean it was recognised in other 
countries. A major factor limiting the ability of Japanese drug companies to export 
anticancer drugs was the fact that Western governments long viewed the Japanese 
regulatory system with scepticism. Until its pharmaceutical regulations were 
harmonised with the United States and Europe in the early 1990s, Japan’s drug 
approval standards lacked the rigour and credibility of its Western counterparts. As a 
result, it was difficult for Japanese firms to use Japanese approval as a precedent to 
gain approval in other countries. Japan’s drug approval process lacked credibility 
because of its non-transparent approval process and lack of clear, rigorous standards 
for laboratory or clinical trials. N
Gaining recognition from regulatory authorities in advanced Western markets was 
particularly important in anticancer drugs. Cancer is a disease of affluence with most 
of its patients in the developed world. Japanese firms in the antibiotics sector could 
export their products to developing countries with less rigorous standards and higher 
demand for therapies to treat infectious diseases. But Japanese firms in the anticancer 
drug sector could not export their products to the developed world. Japanese
743 The importance o f drug approval standards in advancing pharmaceutical industries has been discussed by Lacy Glenn 
Thomas, who compared the British and French pharmaceutical industries. See, Lacy Glenn Thomas, III., “Implicit Industrial 
Policy: The Triumph of Britain and the Failure of France in Global Pharmaceuticals,” 451-489.
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antibiotics makers were therefore able to enjoy a degree of success in exports that their 
counterparts in the anticancer drug sector could not.
The weakness of the anticancer drug sector was also affected by Japan’s medical 
system. Many physicians in Japan also dispensed drugs, and derived a portion of their 
income from dispensing drugs. Physicians were therefore incentivised to prescribe 
drugs that could be prescribed widely and had a greater difference between wholesale 
and retail prices. The cancer immunotherapy drugs of the 1970s and 1980s -  unlike 
most anticancer drugs -  had few side effects and were approved for various types of 
cancer. These drugs were popular because they could be prescribed to a large 
population of cancer patients who remained ignorant of their diagnosis, and could 
neither ascertain nor question the efficacy of drugs until long after they were taken. 
Cancer immunotherapy drugs were also popular because anticancer drugs were highly 
priced drugs that tended to have greater pharmaceutical price differentials. As a result, 
Japanese firms developed anticancer drugs of limited efficacy that could neither be 
approved in other advanced nations nor be delivered beyond the Japanese medical 
system.
The lack of oncologists, cancer hospitals, and proper patient diagnoses, not only 
undermined the capacity to conduct accurate clinical trials in Japan, they also limited 
demand for innovative cancer therapies in Japan. Physicians and technicians, as well 
as hospitals and facilities, provided the infrastructure that determined not only the 
manner of drug development but also the size of demand. As a complex, hospital
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based therapy, the development of anticancer drugs was dependent on physicians and 
technicians with expertise in cancer and anticancer drugs to administer the drug *- as 
well as hospitals equipped with the relevant equipment to deliver the drug. A strong 
anticancer drug sector also required a medical culture where physicians would provide 
patients with an accurate diagnosis to generate demand for an arduous treatment. The 
lack of such infrastructure for much of the post war period also long hindered the 
development of Japan’s anticancer drug sector.
With a history of solid, active cancer research in universities, and strong networks of 
collaboration between academia and industry to translate academic research into 
commercial products, Japan had the potential to develop a strong, competitive 
anticancer drug sector. During the 1950s and 1960s, it appeared capable of doing so. 
But the Japanese industry failed to fulfil its promise. Without clear or rigorous R&D 
incentives or a medical culture to deliver innovative cancer therapies, Japan’s 
anticancer drug sector did not capitalise on its potential.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has traced the history of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry since 1945. 
It explained how Japanese pharmaceutical firms recovered from the Second World 
War and caught up with Western firms by importing technologies. The two case 
studies have also shown that Japanese pharmaceutical firms were able to develop a 
number of original, innovative therapies, some of which have proven successful in 
overseas markets.
The emphasis of this thesis, however, has not been on the achievements of the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry, but rather on its relative weakness. I argue that 
while Japanese firms were able to catch up with Western pharmaceutical firms by the 
1970s and acquired the capacity to discover innovative drugs, they did not exploit the 
potential to become global leaders. Rather than invest heavily in R&D to pursue 
breakthrough discoveries, most opted to launch many new drugs with limited 
innovative value that could not be sold in other advanced markets. It was true that a 
handful of leading firms began to develop global blockbuster drugs and increase their 
overseas presence. But Japanese firms remained much smaller in terms of sales, 
workforce, or R&D expenditures, and Japan remained a net importer of 
pharmaceuticals.
The aim of this thesis has been to explain why Japan’s pharmaceutical industry did not 
become a global leader, and continues to lag behind the pharmaceutical industries of 
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. I used two
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classes of medicines, antibiotics and anti-cancer drugs, as case studies for exploring 
the overall history of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. I showed that the 
experiences of these two sectors were very different, and that the antibiotics sector was 
the stronger of the two. Japanese pharmaceutical firms were able to develop many 
antibiotics that came to be produced under license in other industrialised countries. 
Japan’s anticancer drug sector was far less successful; it developed fewer globally 
competitive drugs and remained heavily reliant on imports.
There were several reasons why Japan’s antibiotics sector became stronger than the 
anticancer drug sector. Both sectors were heavily shaped by government policy. But 
the government did not necessarily plan to foster the antibiotics sector over the 
anticancer drug sector. Policies governing the pharmaceutical industry -  whether it be 
on intellectual property or capital liberalisation -  applied to all therapeutic sectors. The 
MHW’s tendency to prioritise universal access to prescription drugs, however, had a 
disproportionate impact on the anticancer drug sector. The government’s cost 
containment measures, to set drug prices and reduce them regularly, limited the profits 
that pharmaceutical firms in Japan could gain from launching new therapies. Japanese 
firms were reluctant to invest in anticancer drugs, which were much more expensive 
and difficult to develop compared to antibiotics.
As the previous chapters showed, the search for new antibiotics was a more low-cost, 
labour-intensive, and serendipitous process compared to the search for new 
anticancer drugs. In addition, whereas a given antibiotic could treat many infectious
295
ailments, a given anticancer drug could only treat a particular type and stage of 
cancer. Antibiotics were more suited to mass production and allowed R&D expenses 
to be recovered over a larger number of consumers.
Other characteristics that were specific to antibiotics or anticancer drugs also led to 
differences in performance between the two sectors. The efficacy of many antibiotics 
were long-established, and few had significant side effects. On the other hand, the 
efficacy of many anticancer drugs had yet to be established, and most had severe side 
effects. As a treatment for an acute ailment, the efficacy of antibiotics could also be 
more swifly and easily determined compared to that of anticancer drugs. The ease of 
evaluating the safety and efficacy of antibiotics made it easier for Japanese firms to 
obtain approval from drug regulators abroad, and export these drugs into overseas 
markets.
Pharmaceutical firms in Japan had much less incentive to develop anticancer drugs 
compared to antibiotics. The undeveloped medical infrastructure and opaque drug 
approval process increased the risk and cost of drug development. Moreover, well into 
the 1980s, there was little demand in Japan for efficacious anticancer drugs, as these 
tended to have strong side effects. Japanese physicians did not inform patients of their 
cancer diagnosis, and prescribed drugs with few side effects but of limited efficacy. 
Only in the 1990s did Japanese patients begin to make more informed decisions and 
generate final demand for more effective anticancer drugs. The antibiotics sector 
outperformed the anticancer drug sector in Japan because the returns to
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pharmaceutical R&D were limited; because antibiotics were easier to export compared 
to anticancer drugs; and because Japan’s medical system did not generate demand for 
more effective anticancer drugs.
The problems observed in the anticancer drug sector of the Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry illustrate some of the reasons why Japan did not become a leader in the global 
pharmaceutical industry. Japanese pharmaceutical firms were able to dominate the 
domestic market and remain highly profitable over the post-war period. But Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry did not become a world leader, as did its automobile and 
consumer electronics industries. Even after the millennium, Japan remained a net 
importer of pharmaceuticals.
I begin this conclusion with a summary of my explanations for why Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry did not realise its potential and become a global leader. I then 
move to expand upon the broader significance of this study to the existing scholarship. 
I conclude by outlining some directions for future research.
5.1 Reasons for the unrealised potential of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, there are several reasons why Japan did not 
develop a strong, globally-competitive pharmaceutical industry. The major reasons for 
the weakness of the industry are: the weak incentives for pharmaceutical firms to 
invest in R&D, the government’s protectionist policies, the industrial structure of the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry, and Japanese medical culture. There are several
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factors of secondary importance that also help to explain the underperformance of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. These include differences in therapeutic demand 
conditions between Japan and its potential export markets; different drug standards 
that essentially acted as trade barriers; the historical origins of Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms; barriers to entrepreneurship among university academics; and 
the lack of initiative taken by Japanese firms to expand into overseas markets.
The single most important reason for the underperformance of Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry lay in weak R&D incentives. The government did not offer strong incentives 
to invest in the discovery of innovative new drugs. The weakness of these R&D 
incentives stemmed from the fact that the industry was governed by the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (MHW), rather than the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). Whereas the MITI prioritised the growth of industry, the MHW 
prioritised improvements in public health. In order to increase access to drugs among 
Japanese citizens, the MHW set drug prices rather than allow pharmaceutical firms to 
determine prices in a free market. Under universal health care, the MHW continued to 
place downward pressures on drug prices. From the 1980s in particular, the 
government legislated regular reductions in drug prices so as to contain rising health 
care costs.
The previous chapters showed how the government’s tendency to prioritise the needs 
of consumers over industry reduced incentives among firms to develop innovative 
drugs that would succeed in world markets. As well, the lack of government funding
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for industrial R&D limited the scale of projects firms could undertake. The 
government also protected the domestic market long after Japanese firms were capable 
of competing with Western firms. In an environment where firms could remain highly 
profitable while launching imitative drugs, few invested in developing more 
innovative drugs that could have been marketed abroad. The endurance of 
developmental health policies and the lack of sector-specific industrial policies 
disadvantaged Japanese firms in developing a strong pharmaceutical sector.
For many years, Japan’s intellectual property regime disincentivised Japanese firms 
from investing in the discovery of truly innovative therapies. Until 1975, Japan had a 
process patent regime. This was very different from the product patent regime that had 
already been adopted in Western countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Japan’s patent regime encouraged firms to reverse engineer 
foreign-discovered drugs, because new patents could be filed for an alternative path to 
an existing product. While many Japanese firms began to invest in R&D to discover 
original therapies after product patents were introduced in 1976, most continued to 
pursue incremental improvements rather than breakthrough discoveries. Japanese 
firms therefore developed drugs similar to drugs available abroad -  and could not gain 
approval in these markets.
I showed that Japan’s drug approval process was, at times, politicised and 
non-transparent. For pharmaceuticals firms, this reduced the incentive to invest in 
R&D because it was difficult to determine the risk involved in gaining drug approval.
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The development of anticancer drugs during the 1970s, in particular, revealed how 
firms unable to assess the government’s drug approval criteria invested in forming 
political ties to facilitate drug approval. These misdirected investments undermined 
the industry’s potential at a crucial time in its development. The very distinct features 
of the Japanese market also made Japanese firms reluctant to make the costly 
investments necessary to expand into overseas markets. The Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry remained relatively weak because firms invested little in R&D, and were 
content to profit from incrementally innovative drugs that were mostly recognised 
only in Japan.
Had Japan’s intellectual property regime introduced product patents earlier and 
penalised imitation, Japanese firms would likely have developed more original drugs 
that might have been recognised abroad. Had Japanese firms faced clearer standards 
and a more transparent and unbiased drug approval process, they might have invested 
in more pharmaceutical R&D to develop more original therapies. Had policies been 
different, firm responses and industrial performance would not have been the same. 
Institutions played a critical role in the shaping of Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical 
industry.
The second major reason for the weakness of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry lay 
in the government’s protectionist policies. Well into the 1970s, the government 
protected Japanese firms from foreign competition through a combination of capital 
controls, intellectual property laws, and distinct product standards. Japanese firms
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could prosper without introducing original drugs. Had the government implemented 
less protectionist policies tailored to a more developed economy by the 1970s, 
Japanese firms might have pursued the discovery of highly innovative drugs that could 
have been marketed overseas. Had the government accounted for the idiosyncrasies of 
different therapeutic sectors to implement sector specific policies, Japan might have 
developed stronger sectors in anticancer drugs or other therapies. Japan’s 
pharmaceutical industry remained relatively weak, partly because the mix and degree 
of interventions by the state was less than optimal -  for its level of development and 
for specific therapeutic sectors.
The third major cause of the weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry lay in 
industrial structure. Compared to countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland, the Japanese industry was dominated by numerous smaller 
firms. But in the pharmaceutical industry, larger firms have a crucial advantage in 
achieving economies of scale in R&D, production, and marketing. As observed in the 
antibiotics and anticancer drug sectors, the size of pharmaceutical firms became 
increasingly important over the years. This was because R&D processes became more 
costly and complex, manufacturing processes incorporated rigorous quality controls, 
and sophisticated marketing strategies came to play a crucial role in drug sales. The 
smaller size of Japanese firms compromised their ability to compete with the larger 
firms in Western countries.
The fourth major cause for the weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry involves
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medical culture. The traditional practice among Japanese physicians to both prescribe 
and dispense pharmaceuticals created strong demand for newer drugs with higher 
prices, even if they had minimal innovative value. This was because Japanese 
physicians could profit from the difference between the wholesale and retail prices of 
drugs, and high priced drugs tended to have greater price differentials. In addition, 
culturally specific approaches to medical therapy, most notably in the area of cancer 
treatments, created demand for pharmaceuticals that were not recognised beyond 
Japan. The Japanese pharmaceutical industry remained a domestic, rather than global 
industry, because Japanese firms developed drugs that were not recognised by drug 
regulators abroad.
Several secondary factors also accounted for the weakness of Japan’s pharmaceutical 
industry. As shown in an earlier chapter, the historical origins of Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms are part of the explanation. Many Japanese pharmaceutical firms 
began as import houses specialising in the distribution of German drugs. When these 
firms later began to produce these drugs for the Japanese market, many remained 
reliant on foreign technology and launched domestic versions of foreign-discovered 
drugs. A distinct feature of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was its development, not 
through the discoveries of original therapies, but through the borrowing of foreign 
technologies. The importation of technology allowed Japanese firms to leapfrog over 
earlier phases of pharmaceutical innovation. But Japanese pharmaceutical firms were 
path-dependent, and many firms continued to focus on acquiring or improving the 
capacity to produce rather than discover or develop leading drugs.
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This focus on manufacturing, often found among late industrialisers, distinguished 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry in two ways. First, Japanese firms pursued process 
innovations and incremental product innovations in developing their industry. Second, 
Japanese firms were less vertically integrated than their American or European 
counterparts. As manufacturing concerns, fewer Japanese firms were historically 
engaged in R&D; it was only later that firms undertook backward integration into 
R&D.
In addition, the incidence of diseases in Japan was different from other industrialised 
countries. Infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, for example, remained common 
causes of death in Japan for much longer than other developed countries. Even after 
diseases of affluence became the leading causes of death, patterns of disease in Japan 
were not identical to other markets. As a result, Japanese pharmaceutical firms 
launched therapies in response to domestic needs, which were not necessarily the same 
as those abroad.
As I showed above, drug standards in Japan were not harmonised with those of the 
United States and the European Union until the 1990s. Before that time, drugs 
developed in Japan were not recognised as drugs that could be launched in these 
markets, and vice versa. The immense cost involved in re-developing drugs for 
overseas markets both deterred Japanese firms from expanding abroad, and protected 
Japanese firms from foreign competition.
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I also showed that barriers to entrepreneurship imposed on university academics in 
Japan prevented the translation of academic research into commercial products. For 
several decades, academics could not work in private enterprise. In addition, the lack 
of infrastructure -  the absence of qualified physicians, the low numbers of examiners, 
and a less rigorous clinical trial system -  undermined the ability of Japanese firms to 
develop highly innovative drugs.
Finally, the belated initiative taken by Japanese firms to seek opportunities abroad 
hindered the development of a more globally competitive pharmaceutical industry. 
Since 2000, Japanese firms such as Takeda and Astellas have transferred their core 
R&D operations to the United States to develop drugs for the American, European and 
Japanese markets.744 Had these firms taken the initiative at an earlier stage to develop 
drugs that could have been marketed in multiple markets, Japan might have developed 
a pharmaceutical industry with a stronger international profile.
5.2 Contributions to existing scholarship
This thesis contributes to five areas of scholarship. This refers to the global histories 
on the pharmaceutical industry; works on Japanese industrial policy; the literature on 
late economic development; and existing works that highlight the relevance of New 
Institutional Economics in economic growth. It also contributes to existing debates on
744 See Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., “Takeda Establishes new Global Pharmaceutical R&D Center in US,” Takeda Pharmaceutical 
Co. newsroom release dated 25 December 2003, http://www.takeda.com/press/article 801 .html (accessed 16 July 2008); 
“Asuterasu, Bei ni Shinyaku Kaihatsu Kyoten [Astellas Establishes New Drug Development Centre in the United States],” Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 4 March 2008.
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Japanese capitalism and discussions on the role of cultural variables in shaping 
economic development.
My first contribution is to broaden our understanding of the global history of the 
pharmaceutical industry by expanding the geographic coverage beyond the North 
Atlantic region. While much has been written on the histories of the pharmaceutical 
industries of the United States and Europe, little has been published on the history of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry.745 This thesis aims to help fill this gap in the existing 
literature. As one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical markets, incorporating the 
history of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry is essential to building a more complete 
understanding on the history of the global pharmaceutical industry.
The second contribution of this thesis is to illustrate the role of government policy on
the development of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. I argue that the weak R&D 
# )
incentives created by the government led to the industry’s weak performance. 
Japanese firms opted to develop drugs that would not necessarily gain approval in 
foreign drug regimes because they could profit from less innovative drugs in a 
protected home market. However, there were other reasons why Japanese firms 
developed less innovative drugs. These reasons included industrial structure, medical 
culture, as well as lack of entrepreneurship.
743 As mentioned in the overview chapter, most works on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry have been limited to corporate
histories. A few other works were recently published, such as Nihon Yakushi Gakkai, Nihon fyakuhin Sangydshi [The History of
the Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry]; and Takashi Nishikawa, Kusuri Kara Mita Nihon; Showa 20-nendai no Genfukei to 
Konnichi [Looking at Japan from “Medicine” : Scenes from the 1940s to the Present] (Tokyo: Yakuji NippOsha, 2004).
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The experience of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry demonstrates not only that 
industrial policy played a powerful role in shaping the industry, but also that unhelpful 
policies harmed its development. In the early post-war period, for example, the 
government’s import substitution policy was crucial to enabling Japanese firms to 
produce modem pharmaceuticals. Indeed, by the 1970s, Japanese firms were prepared 
to compete with Western rivals. But as the government continued to protect the 
domestic market and introduced few incentives to innovate, many Japanese firms 
remained content to profit from incrementally innovative drugs from the domestic 
market. This type of state intervention did not help Japan develop a globally 
competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The third contribution of this thesis is to show that the concept of late development 
advanced by Alexander Gerschenkron can be applied to the pharmaceutical sector. 
Gerschenkron argued that the state took a greater role in backward economies to 
substitute for lacking institutions and promote economic development.746 More recent 
works by Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino examined how late developers 
industrialised by borrowing and improving foreign technologies.747 They also 
highlighted the role of the interventionist state and the firms’ focus on 
production-related R&D in these economies. The Japanese pharmaceutical industry 
adheres to the patterns of late development discussed in these works. Unlike Germany,
746 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book o f  Essays (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962).
747 Alice H. Amsden, The Rise o f  “The Rest": Challenges to the West From Late-industrialization Economies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, “Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead: 
Late Industrialization in Historical Perspective,” in Convergence o f  Productivity: Cross-national Studies and Historical Evidence, 
eds. William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N. Wolff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 285-315.
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Britain, or the United States, the history of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry was 
shaped by a developmental state, the borrowing of foreign technology, and 
incremental innovations of production technology. Compared to the earlier 
industrialisers, Japan pursued a very different path in developing a modem 
pharmaceutical industry.
The highly interventionist and developmental state had a particularly prominent role in 
nurturing Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. As a heavily regulated industry, the state 
plays a central role in the development of any pharmaceutical industry. Nevertheless, 
the extent and manner of state intervention in Japan was different from the earlier 
developers. While the Japanese government did not target the pharmaceutical industry 
for growth, it nurtured the industry by facilitating technology transfers to firms and 
promoting the diffusion of technology through process patents. The government also 
protected the domestic industry by restricting capital controls and creating distinct 
product standards in Japan.
The Japanese experience sheds light upon how a late developing economy might 
experience a different path to developing a modem pharmaceutical industry. At a time 
when Japanese firms are moving abroad and pharmaceutical regulations are becoming 
harmonised, Japan appears to be converging with the global leaders. The challenge to 
Japanese pharmaceutical firms has remained the shift to a more research-oriented 
industry: from the borrowing of foreign technologies to generating their own 
discoveries.
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The fourth contribution of my thesis is to show the importance of strong, rigorous, and 
credible institutions in developing a world-leading pharmaceutical industry. I have 
drawn on the insights of New Institutional Economics and have illustrated its 
relevance to business history. Douglass North and other proponents of New 
Institutional Economics have argued that institutions such as property rights play a 
crucial role in explaining economic growth.748 The case studies demonstrate that 
Japan’s intellectual property regime had a fundamental impact on technological 
innovation, diffusion, and industrial performance. Japan’s process patent regime long 
incentivised firms to reverse engineer products and find an alternative path to 
producing the same product. Most Japanese firms only began to invest in R&D to 
discover new original therapies when product patents were introduced in 1976.
I also showed how the lack of transparent, credible institutions influenced firm 
behaviour. As observed in the experience of the anticancer drug sector, Japanese drug 
standards until the 1990s were opaque, and its drug approval processes were 
politicised and non-transparent. Without clear standards, Japanese firms were unable 
to ascertain the risk involved in undertaking R&D, and were therefore less willing to 
engage in large R&D projects. Governed by a non-transparent and politicised drug 
approval process, some Japanese firms also invested in forming political ties that 
would facilitate drug approval, rather than invest in developing drugs that could be 
marketed abroad.
748 Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).
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The fifth contribution of my thesis relates to debates on whether the distinct features of 
Japanese capitalism are suitable to economic development in a high technology age. I 
make several points on the debate on how Japanese capitalism has differed from other 
varieties of capitalism. Japanese capitalism has been most strongly characterised by 
the long-term relationships of firms with the government, other firms, and their 
employees, such as through industrial policy, keiretsu structures, and lifetime 
employment. While Japanese industries have ranged in their degree of success, 
existing scholarship in Japanese capitalism has been much less interested in studying 
the country’s weaker or declining industries, whether it be petrochemicals or 
pharmaceuticals. Given this, the study of weaker industries provides a more intricate 
understanding of the dynamics of Japanese capitalism.
Many scholars have concluded that the Japanese economic system was helpful in 
enabling the country to achieve phenomenal growth until the 1980s, but became a 
burden thereafter. Marie Anchordoguy, for example, argued that Japan’s style of 
capitalism undermined growth in the more recent period of globalisation and rapid 
technological change.749 My research on the pharmaceutical industry largely supports 
this argument. But it also argues for a more nuanced understanding on advantages and 
disadvantages of coordinated and liberal market economies.
In the early post-war period, the collaborative, long-term relationships between
749 Marie Anchordoguy, Reprogramming Japan: The High Tech Crisis Under Communitarian Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005).
government, firms, and employees were helpful in enabling Japanese firms to catch up 
with Western pharmaceutical firms. The government’s industrial policies, for example, 
nurtured Japanese firms. Practices such as amakudari, where government bureaucrats 
retire to firms or agencies under their ministries’ jurisdiction, helped cement ties and 
align the interests of government and business in pursuing growth. The keiretsu ties 
between pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesalers not only ensured the survival 
of many small wholesalers, they also long protected the Japanese market from foreign 
penetration.
But the Japanese economic system was not always beneficial to industrial 
development, even before the 1980s. The experience of the anticancer drug sector 
showed that the collaborative relationship between government and firms could also 
lead to investment in political rent-seeking over R&D. Compared to firms in more 
liberal economies, Japanese firms tended to be less inclined to undertake significant 
risk and develop a research-oriented pharmaceutical industry.
It is true that many features of Japanese capitalism were less helpful in supporting the 
industry in later years -  particularly as science and technology became more advanced, 
and the domestic market became more open to global competition. Low labour 
mobility and limited access to venture capital, for example, made it difficult for firms 
to respond swiftly and flexibly to market conditions or pursue radical innovations. 
Japanese firms were also less likely to implement dramatic job cuts or undertake 
significant risk in R&D compared to their overseas rivals. These features of Japanese
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capitalism weakened the capacity of Japanese firms to compete with foreign firms.
As the leading Japanese firms globalise and prioritise overseas markets for drug 
development, they appear to be converging with leading global pharmaceutical firms. 
After all, these firms are governed by the same laws to develop, manufacture, and 
distribute drugs, and compete in the same markets -  as with leading American and 
European firms. But this convergence remains partial. Since the 1990s, Japanese firms 
have loosened their keiretsu ties, streamlined their business operations, and have 
merged to invest in large-scale R&D projects. At the same time, however, Japanese 
firms retain amakudari practices, workers are employed for long periods, and 
downsizing often occurs in the milder form of voluntary retirement.
These findings have contemporary relevance, particularly at a time when Japan has 
been shifting to a more market-oriented model. But it remains questionable whether 
the Japanese model should be so hastily discarded. Japanese economic institutions 
tend to be embedded in Japan’s distinct political and cultural trajectory, and are 
integrated with the larger social environment. As Richard Freeman has noted, this 
makes the cost of switching systems expensive.750 In addition, as Kozo Yamamura has 
suggested, collective capitalist systems may be more conducive to development as 
new technologies mature, and innovations take on a more incremental or applied 
nature.751 Given the benefits of both liberal and less liberal capitalist systems, partial
750 Richard B. Freeman, “Single Peaked vs. Diversified capitalism: The Relation Between Economic Institutions and Outcomes,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 7556, February 2000.
751 Kozo Yamamura, “Germany and Japan in a New Phase of Capitalism: Confronting the Past and the Future, in The End o f  
Diversity?: Prospects fo r  German and Japanese Capitalism, ” eds. Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck (Ithaca: Cornell
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convergence is likely most suitable for further development.
The sixth contribution of my thesis is to demonstrate the role of culture in shaping the 
development of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry. Scholars such as Mark Granovetter 
and Lawrence Harrison have emphasised how cultural factors shape the economic 
development of countries.752 The business historian Kenneth Lipartito has argued that 
a cultural approach is fundamental to understanding the history o f business and the 
differences in industrial performance across nations.753 Of course, definitions of 
“culture” have varied. While culture might generally be defined as shared values, 
norms, ideas and behaviours, this thesis has referred to culture more narrowly in terms 
of Japanese medical culture. This thesis has shown that some aspects of Japan’s 
medical culture -  such as physician dispensing and prescribing practices, distinct 
approaches to medical therapy, and the doctor-patient relationship -  played a 
particularly strong role in shaping its pharmaceutical industry.
The two case studies, for example, showed that the traditional practice upheld by 
Japanese physicians to both prescribe and dispense medicines fundamentally altered 
the type of drugs demanded in Japan. Physicians in Japan often prescribed higher 
priced medicines to gain from greater pharmaceutical price differentials. Japanese 
firms responded to this environment by continuously launching higher priced drugs 
with minimal innovative value. While it is true that patients in most medical cultures
University Press, 2003), 115-146.
752 For example, Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem o f Embeddedness” The American 
Journal o f  Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481-510; Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E. Harrison, Culture Matters: How Values 
Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
753 Kenneth Lipartito, “Culture and the Practice of Business History,” Business and Economic History 24, no. 2 (1995): 1-41.
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likely defer to the expert advice of physicians, in a hierarchical society where few 
patients questioned physicians’ authority, physician demand also led more easily to 
patient consumption.
As I observed in the anticancer drug section of this thesis, distinct approaches to 
medical therapy also had a substantial impact on the type of drugs demanded, 
developed and launched in Japan. The preference for milder forms of cancer therapy in 
Japan diminished the development of more rigorous yet innovative forms of therapy, 
while the cultural reluctance of physicians to diagnose patients of terminal conditions 
dampened demand for more interventionist remedies. Again, given the information 
asymmetries in the doctor-patient relationship and the hierarchical culture in Japan, 
distinct approaches in medical therapy led readily to a pharmaceutical market where 
the leading medicines could only be found in Japan. To this extent, this thesis has 
illustrated how Japanese medical culture had a profound impact on the development of 
the pharmaceutical industry.
5.3 Future directions
As there are few works on the history of Japan’s post-war pharmaceutical industry, it is 
hoped that there will be further research on this topic. There are several possible 
directions for future research on the history of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry 
that lie outside the scope of thesis. I will consider each in turn.
My thesis has looked at antibiotics and anticancer drugs. One direction for future
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research would be to examine the history of other categories of drugs in Japan. 
Possible choices for research might be the markets for cardiovascular drugs, central 
nervous system-related drugs, or vitamins. These sectors have grown dramatically 
over the post-war period.
An examination of the cardiovascular sector, for example, could offer a better 
understanding of drug development trends in Japan. Many Japanese firms have 
launched cardiovascular drugs, some of which have become blockbuster drugs.754 
Given the large volume of cardiovascular drugs produced and developed in Japan, a 
study of this sector provide ample opportunities to investigate the experience of more 
pharmaceutical firms.755 These case studies would allow us to better appreciate the 
evolution of pharmaceutical innovation in Japan.
Research into central nervous system drugs that treat conditions such as Alzheimer’s 
or depression could shed greater light on the impact of Japan’s ageing population and 
Japanese medical culture on the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry. Japan’s 
ageing population has increased demand for drugs to treat conditions such as 
Alzheimer’s. The study of Alzheimer’s drugs would provide an opportunity to 
consider the impact of a rapidly ageing population, the impact of elderly health care 
policy, and the infrastructure of medical care for the elderly, on shaping therapeutic
754 YakugyQ JihOsha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Yakugyo JihQsha, 1968-1999); Jih5, Yakuji 
Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2000-2007).
755 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Ddtai Chosa Tdkei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyQ Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000); Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Ddtai 
Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Jih5 ,2001-2006).
156 YakugyS Jihosha, Yakuji Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: YakugyO Jihosha, 1968-1999); Jiho, Yakuji 
Handobukku [Pharmaceutical Affairs Handbook] (Tokyo: JihO, 2000-2007).
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sectors.
Antidepressants would be a particularly interesting category of drug to study because
it is a sector of drugs in which cultural variables are salient. Japanese citizens have 
used antidepressants at a lower rate than citizens of other industrialised countries even 
though Japan’s suicide rate has been one of the highest in the world.757 This has been
frequently attributed to Japanese cultural attitudes toward depression, the treatment of 
depression in Japan, and the lack of a satisfactory clinical trial system. Further
research on this topic would allow for a better assessment on the impact of medical
culture and regulatory infrastructure on the pharmaceutical industry in Japan.
A study of the vitamins sector could offer additional insights. Between 1958 and 1969, 
vitamins were the most produced drugs in Japan.759 This was a time when Japan was 
still concerned with nutritional deficiencies among a large proportion of its 
population.760 A study of this sector could illuminate how changing health needs
shape therapeutic sectors. In addition, vitamins in Japan qualify as both prescription
and over-the-counter drugs. While the vitamins sector has become less prominent over
the decades, further research would also provide an opportunity to investigate the
757 World Health Orgnization, ’’Suicide Rates (per 100,000), by Country, Year, and Gender.” World Health Orgnization, 
http://www.who.int/mental health/prevention/suicide/suiciderates/en/ (accessed 2 August 2008); Edward Norbeck and Margaret 
Lock, ed., Health, Illness, and Medical Care in Japan: Cultural and Social Dimensions (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1987), 13. See also, Qsamu Tajima, “Mental Health Care in Japan: Recognition and Treatment of Depression and Anxiety 
Disorders,” Journal o f  Clinical Psychiatry 62, Suppl. no. 13 (2001): S39-S44.
738 See for example, Douglas Berger, “Antidepressant Clinical Development in Japan: Current Perspectives and Future 
Horizons,” Clinical Research Focus 16, no. 7 (September 2005): 32-35.
759 Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Ddtai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Ddtai Chosa 
Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000).
760 See the relevant years o f Ministry of Health and Welfare, Kosei Hakusho [White Paper on Health and Welfare] (Tokyo: 
OkurashO Insatsukyoku, 1955-2000).
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boundaries of prescription and over-the-counter drugs over the years.
Another potential research project would be to examine the experience of other 
non-Western countries to add comparative perspective. The emerging economies of 
India and China are fast developing a modem pharmaceutical industry.761 A 
comparative study of Japan’s East Asian neighbours, such as South Korea and Taiwan, 
would provide an invaluable opportunity to investigate how East Asian countries have 
developed their pharmaceutical industries. A comparative study between these three 
countries may be particularly useful, as they are more developed and are likely to share 
more cultural attributes compared to other Asian countries. These comparative 
approaches would not only help to contextualise the Japanese experience, it would 
also help to gain a better understanding of how late developing economies acquire 
competitive strengths in knowledge-intensive industries.
A third possible direction for future research involves archival research at Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms. An examination of archival data would provide a more 
complete understanding over the motivations and behaviour of pharmaceutical firms. 
This thesis consulted an abundant array of sources -  from academic, trade, and popular 
journals, to company security filings -  to develop a more comprehensive analysis. Had 
it been possible, the examination of material from corporate archives would have 
provided a more intricate understanding of the motivations and behaviour of 
pharmaceutical firms. However, it remains unclear whether access to corporate
761 See for example, by PJB Publications, “Asia an Awakening Healthcare Giant,” in Scrip Yearbook 2008 ,14th ed., vol. 2, 
(Richmond: PJB Publications, 2008), 221-222.
archives will improve in the future.
My next research project will be on the history of Japan’s traditional medicines 
industry, and builds upon the work of this thesis. A study on the business of traditional 
medicines would be an important project that examines the evolution of modem 
Japanese business, not in a high-technology sector, but in a very traditional sector. As 
mentioned in the overview chapter, Western style medicines emerged after the Meiji 
Restoration, when Japan embraced Western technology, including medicines. This 
industry has been the subject of this thesis. But the type of traditional medicines used 
in Japan before the Meiji Restoration continued to be consumed in large quantities. 
Japanese patients continue to consume a substantial amount of traditional medicines,
m s *
and it is a significant industry.
But Japan’s traditional medicines industry is very different from its modem 
pharmaceutical industry. Research on this topic provides an opportunity to further 
investigate major themes discussed in this thesis, such as state industry relations, 
industrial structure, and the role of culture in industrial development. The study of a 
traditional sector in a contemporary setting is also hoped to provide a more intricate 
understanding the impact of late development and the paradox of Japan’s dual 
economy -  of an economy that is both old and modem.
762 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Ddtai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry] (Tokyo: YakugyO Keizai Kenkyujo, 1968-2000); Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Ddtai 
Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: JihO, 2001-2006).
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Research on the history of Japan’s traditional medicines industry would elaborate 
upon state-industry relations in Japan. After the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese 
government suppressed the growth of traditional medicines when it endorsed Western 
medicine over traditional medicine. But after the 1960s, the government reintegrated 
traditional medicines into the national health care system as prescription drugs, and
nc/\
fostered the growth of the traditional medicines. I am interested in understanding 
why the government reversed its policy.
This project would also illuminate the impact of industrial structure on the 
development of industry. For example, the market structure of this industry is highly 
oligopolistic. The two leading firms, Tsumura and Kracie -  previously Kanebo -  have 
over 90% of the market.764 In addition, there is almost no overlap between the firms 
engaged in traditional medicines and those engaged in Western style medicines. While 
the two types of firms coexist in the same pharmaceutical market, they are virtually 
two separate sectors.
This research would also address the role of culture in the history of Japanese business, 
particularly in terms of physician dispensing practices or approaches in medical 
therapy. In many cases, these traditional medicines are also prescribed by the same 
physicians that prescribe Western style medicines.
763 See “Kanp5yaku no Yukue [The Future o f Kampo Medicines],” Detailman (February 1995): 40-41. For an overview on the 
history o f traditional medicine in Japan, see for example, Margaret M. Lock, “History of East Asian Medicine in Japan,” in East 
Asian Medicine in Urban Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 50-66.
764 Tsumura & Co., “Iry5y5 KanpOseizai no Shijo DQko [Market Trends in Prescription Kampo Medicines],” Tsumura & Co., 
http://www.tsumura.co.ip/zaimuA)usiness/l 2.html (accessed 20 July 2008).
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This thesis has shown how the history of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry has been 
shaped by a complex interplay of factors. The Japanese pharmaceutical industry would 
have evolved very differently had the government provided greater rewards for R&D, 
had Japanese firms been larger, or had Japanese medical culture been more similar to 
those of the advanced Western markets. Further studies on the history of the Japanese 
pharmaceutical industry would provide additional insights into Japanese industrial 
policy, late development, and Japanese capitalism. To some extent, the history of 
Japan’s pharmaceutical industry is a study into the enigma of the Japanese economy. 
This research has attempted to unravel some of the complexities of an economy that 
remains caught between imitation and innovation, collectivism and individualism, 
tradition and modernity.
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Appendix 1. Value of Pharmaceutical Production765
Table A 1.1 Nominal Value for All Categories of Drugs (in millions of yen)
All Categories
All Drugs Prescription Drugs
Total Production
Total
Production
Domestic
production
Bulk
Imports
1945 335
1946 1,872
1947 5,176
1948 17,092
1949 31,031
1950 31,916
1951 42,376
1952 58,564
1953 75,647
1954 78,468
1955 89,539
1956 103,767
1957 125,147
1958 134,476
1959 149,258
1960 176,012
1961 218,075
1962 265,596
1963 341,141
1964 423,225
1965 457,639
765 Compiled from Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon Yakugyo Shimbunsha, 
1951,1957, 1961,1964); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyd Seisan Ddtai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyd Keizai Kenkyujo, 1953-1967); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo 
Seisan Ddtai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, 
1968-2000); Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Yakuji Kogyo Seisan Ddtai Chosa Tokei [Annual Survey on Production in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry] (Tokyo: Jiho, 2001 -2007). As noted in the anticancer drug chapter, figures for antitumour drugs have 
been used as proxy for anticancer drugs.
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1966 507,108
1967 563,257
1968 688,953 488,316 316,152 172,164
1969 842,514 615,800 398,789 217,012
1970 1,025,319 770,451 478,781 291,670
1971 1,060,424 826,173 506,850 319,323
1972 1,091,791 843,531 511,288 332,242
1973 1,367,138 1,081,285 656,800 424,486
1974 1,699,688 1,381,833 856,627 525,207
1975 1,792,406 1,464,030 905,892 558,139
1976 2,162,436 1,799,418 1,079,856 719,562
1977 2,458,294 2,056,991 1,280,655 776,326
1978 2,793,878 2,350,579 1,484,128 866,450
1979 3,042,302 2,562,029 1,665,834 896,194
1980 3,482,177 2,978,437 1,981,278 997,159
1981 3,679,139 3,135,703 2,161,243 974,460
1982 3,980,232 3,406,516 2,339,005 1,067,510
1983 4,032,057 3,438,567 2,382,616 1,055,950
1984 4,027,996 3,429,482 2,450,987 978,495
1985 4,001,807 3,383,710 2,386,022 997,688
1986 4,280,732 3,649,842 2,547,249 1,102,593
1987 4,825,398 4,141,820 2,897,396 1,244,424
1988 5,059,459 4,309,824 2,991,784 1,318,040
1989 5,502,271 4,676,456 3,230,933 1,445,523
1990 5,595,435 4,720,333 3,324,858 1,395,475
1991 5,697,244 4,812,216 3,357,206 1,455,010
1992 5,574,220 4,680,204 3,309,315 1,370,889
1993 5,695,068 4,819,341 3,457,673 1,361,668
1994 5,750,332 4,881,157 3,489,218 1,391,939
1995 6,168,062 5,243,575 3,747,649 1,495,927
1996 6,100,046 5,156,439 3,770,744 1,385,696
1997 6,147,833 5,187,140 3,766,935 1,420,206
1998 5,842,096 4,936,520 3,619,537 1,316,982
1999 6,290,023 5,438,173 4,012,085 1,426,088
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2000 6,182,631 5,376,330 3,878,730 1,497,600
2001 6,504,318 5,728,874 4,062,517 1,666,358
2002 6,489,278 5,729,882 4,034,118 1,695,764
2003 6,533,108 5,813,704 4,120,441 1,693,263
2004 6,525,293 5,837,295 4,132,221 1,705,075
2005 6,390,722 5,741,280 4,247,218 1,494,062
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Table A1.2 Nominal Value for Antibiotics (in millions of yen)
Antibiotics
All Drugs Prescription Drugs
Total
Production
Total
Production
Domestic
production
Bulk
Imports
1950
1951
1952 9,288
1953 12,750
1954 12,331
1955 12,511
1956 12,193
1957 16,950
1958 18,399
1959 14,180
1960 17,224
1961 22,010
1962 28,224
1963 36,018
1964 52,247
1965 58,554
1966 64,506
1967 72,992
1968 95,432
1969 114,447
1970 157,020
1971 176,647
1972 174,196
1973 238,916
1974 331,380
1975 363,392 363,308 153,062 210,246
1976 522,392 522,313 222,686 299,627
1977 583,908 583,906 275,360 308,546
1978 636,418 636,416 303,817 332,598
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1979 658,009 658,008 328,546 329,462
1980 814,320 814,320 425,852 388,467
1981 780,136 780,136 422,796 357,340
1982 865,148 865,148 474,935 390,213
1983 735,888 735,888 417,591 318,296
1984 742,496 742,496 490,469 252,027
1985 690,505 690,505 446,162 244,343
1986 683,361 683,361 431,409 251,953
1987 733,974 733,974 444,721 289,253
1988 702,485 702,485 421,660 280,825
1989 724,523 724,523 438,035 286,488
1990 624,117 624,117 393,867 230,250
1991 589,014 589,244 370,236 219,009
1992 441,097 441,097 287,206 153,891.
1993 444,048 444,048 298,683 145,365
1994 386,639 386,639 263,475 123,164
1995 451,477 451,477 314,763 136,714
1996 394,150 394,150 283,377 110,773
1997 433,475 433,475 321,076 112,399
1998 402,483 402,483 305,863 96,620
1999 437,812 437,812 345,470 92,343
2000 373,949 373,949 291,170 82,778
2001 410,413 410,413 304,430 105,983
2002 369,764 369,764 271,224 98,540
2003 386,923 386,923 293,816 93,107
2004 362,813 362,813 276,499 86,314
2005 346,951 346,097 255,367 90,730
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Table A1.3 Nominal Value for Anticancer Drugs (in millions of yen)
Anticancer Drugs
All Drugs Prescription Drugs
Total Total Domestic Bulk
Production Production production Imports
1955 47
1956 59
1957 63
1958 76
1959 94
1960 162
1961 236
1962 347
1963 410
1964 1,029
1965 508
1966 435
1967 589
1968 607
1969 481
1970 517
1971 885
1972 726
1973 1,602
1974 4,661
1975 9,898 9,894 4,929 4,965
1976 32,376 32,376 16,753 15,623
1977 60,236 60,236 37,726 22,510
1978 84,474 84,474 57,325 27,149
1979 93,782 93,782 61,344 32,438
1980 107,351 107,351 72,662 34,689
1981 122,620 122,620 86,937 35,683
1982 124,511 124,511 91,242 33,270
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1983 134,725 134,725 98,925 35,800
1984 143,627 143,618 121,344 22,275
1985 138,601 138,591 117,740 20,851
1986 160,822 160,799 137,751 23,047
1987 180,659 180,633 153,687 26,946
1988 193,045 193,031 164,273 28,759
1989 190,927 190,911 144,983 45,927
1990 164,151 164,134 116,044 48,090
1991 166,989 166,987 106,673 60,314
1992 166,810 166,810 98,702 68,108
1993 169,707 169,707 100,568 69,139
1994 169,476 169,476 98,267 71,209
1995 170,149 170,149 99,653 70,496
1996 156,920 156,920 97,364 59,555
1997 151,216 151,216 93,866 57,350
1998 135,378 135,378 83,881 51,497
1999 139,925 139,925 85,782 54,142
2000 146,995 146,995 88,041 58,954
2001 153,155 153,155 90,232 62,924
2002 167,748 167,748 88,581 79,166
2003 144,300 144,300 91,857 52,443
2004 147,811 147,811 101,282 46,528
2005 137,993 137,993 108,436 29,557
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Appendix 2 Pharmaceutical R&D766
Table A2.1 Nominal Value of R&D Expenditures (in millions of yen)
R&D Expenditures
1960 3,696
1961 6,794
1962 7,081
1963 9,983
1964 13,214
1965 14,602
1966 15,903
1967 18,068
1968 24,651
1969 20,656
1970 45,410
1971 55,740
1972 55,011
1973 64,406
1974 79,157
1975 95,191
1976 109,537
1977 120,537
1978 134,714
1979 176,905
1980 189,838
1981 218,435
1982 239,817
1983 289,896
1984 295,284
766 Compiled from Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku [Report on the 
Survey ofResearch and Development] (Tokyo: Office of the Prime Minister, 1961-1984); Statistics Bureau & Statistics Centre of 
the Management and Coordination Agency, Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku [Report on the Survey ofResearch and 
Development], (Tokyo: Management and Coordination Agency, 1985-2000); Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, ed., Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku [Report on the Survey ofResearch and Development] (Tokyo: 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2001-2006).
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1985 341,880
1986 341,978
1987 380,701
1988 416,220
1989 455,950
1990 516,062
1991 590,105
1992 643,415
1993 629,179
1994 632,802
1995 642,190
1996 667,145
1997 643,291
1998 681,118
1999 689,449
2000 746,214
2001 839,400
2002 965,723
2003 883,653
2004 906,749
2005 1,047,747
Table A2.2 R&D Expenditures as a Percentage of Sales
R&D Expenditures 
/ Sales
1960 2.2
1961 2.0
1962 2.5
1963 2.3
1964 2.9
1965 3.0
1966 3.1
1967 2.8
1968 3.0
1969 3.3
1970 3.4
1971 3.9
1972 4.3
1973 4.1
1974 4.4
1975 4.9
1976 5.1
1977 4.8
1978 5.0
1979 5.5
1980 5.5
1981 5.9
1982 5.6
1983 6.6
1984 6.5
1985 7.0
1986 6.9
1987 7.0
1988 6.9
1989 7.5
1990 8.0
1991 8.7
1992 8.7
1993 8.2
1994 7.8
1995 8.0
1996 8.1
1997 8.1
1998 8.1
1999 8.1
2000 8.6
2001 8.5
2002 8.9
2003 8.4
2004 8.6
2005 10.0
331
Appendix 3. Value of Pharmaceutical Trade767
Table A3.1 Nominal Value for All Categories of Drugs (in millions of yen)
Imports Exports
1947 521 7
1948 698 45
1949 934 146
1950 598 514
1951 2,141 1,082
1952 3,352 1,605
1953 4,145 2,165
1954 3,600 3,267
1955 3,522 3,001
1956 3,376 3,882
1957 4,001 5,258
1958 4,026 4,947
1959 5,131 5,539
1960 6,265 6,457
1961 9,690 7,388
1962 9,728 8,996
1963 13,945 9,125
1964 19,425 9,821
1965 21,517 11,911
1966 28,434 12,057
1967 35,292 13,411
1968 45,997 14,440
1969 56,822 18,229
1970 77,873 23,743
1971 81,337 29,989
767 Compiled from Yakugyo Keizai Kenkyujo, Yakuji Nenkan [Pharmaceutical Annual] (Osaka: Nihon YakugyS Shimbunsha, 
1951,1957, 1961, 1964); Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] (Tokyo: 
Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1958-1973); Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsiishd Hakusho [White Paper on Trade] 
(Tokyo: Gy5sei, 1974-2000). From 2001, this data has been available at Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, BoekiDoko 
Detabesu [Database on Trends in Trade], http://www.meti.go.ip/policv/trade nolicv/trade db/html/01 .html (accessed 12 May 
2008).
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1972 79,096 25,590
1973 97,938 27,185
1974 133,160 40,122
1975 130,688 36,806
1976 163,200 43,100
1977 164,422 48,401
1978 172,736 47,012
1979 202,471 57,902
1980 243,568 66,826
1981 253,619 72,736
1982 311,107 75,856
1983 288,447 82,709
1984 298,917 84,433
1985 308,166 93,281
1986 290,591 86,500
1987 305,188 85,152
1988 340,586 91,889
1989 366,659 98,923
1990 395,452 111,133
1991 419,134 146,763
1992 464,942 172,941
1993 436,288 163,993
1994 430,939 158,081
1995 461,687 173,359
1996 489,522 205,494
1997 512,668 235,849
1998 490,215 250,585
1999 524,149 274,683
2000 513,377 294,529
2001 611,895 331,628
2002 677,236 351,825
2003 716,502 368,708
2004 769,196 383,028
2005 905,966 367,664
Table A3.1 Nominal Value for Antibiotics (in millions of yen)
Imports Exports
1950 3
1951 1,558 280
1952 2,064 321
1953 2,266 499
1954 1,540 741
1955 840 303
1956 572 511
1957 638 908
1958 580 853
1959 648 1,040
1960 1,009 1,027
1961 632 320
1962 1,034 688
1963 1,911 688
1964 2,409 742
1965 2,922 845
1966 4,148 937
1967 5,230 981
1968 7,666 1,170
1969 9,107 1,511
1970 15,319 1,511
1971 17,538 2,437
1972 15,147 2,720
1973 19,813 3,579
1974 35,189 5,044
1975 44,595 5,891
1976 62,937 7,174
1977 54,671 8,680
1978 53,991 8,880
1979 57,725 12,007
1980 69,467 14,530
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
69,145 15,941
85,916 18,839
71,661 22,153
76,665 25,741
69,889 29,400
62,984 27,273
65,264 29,249
68,435 33,926
73,674 36,523
75,792 46,566
70,826 57,850
67,940 67,218
57,254 58,947
52,202 54,639
63,458 56,255
67,217 63,744
66,874 62,418
64,317 68,464
70,355 60,089
59,887 58,960
62,249 57,704
65,010 68,988
66,592 55,472
59,900 55,472
66,247 59,971
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